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In recent years, with the rapid development of deepfake technology, a large number of deepfake videos have emerged on the Internet, which poses a huge threat to national politics, social stability, and personal privacy. Although many existing deepfake detection methods exhibit excellent performance for known manipulations, their detection capabilities are not strong when faced with unknown manipulations. Therefore, in order to obtain better generalization ability, this paper analyzes global and local inter-frame dynamic inconsistencies from the perspective of spatial and frequency domains, and proposes a Local region Frequency Guided Dynamic Inconsistency Network (LFGDIN). The network includes two parts: Global SpatioTemporal Network (GSTN) and Local Region Frequency Guided Module (LRFGM). The GSTN is responsible for capturing the dynamic information of the entire face, while the LRFGM focuses on extracting the frequency dynamic information of the eyes and mouth. The LRFGM guides the GTSN to concentrate on dynamic inconsistency in some significant local regions through local region alignment, so as to improve the model’s detection performance. Experiments on the three public datasets (FF++, DFDC, and Celeb-DF) show that compared with many recent advanced methods, the proposed method achieves better detection results when detecting deepfake videos of unknown manipulation types.

Purpose: Expanding on the real-world financial market framework and considering the current market turmoil, with cryptocurrencies (where contracts for difference (CFDs) are extremely common) (Hasso et al., 2019) displaying unprecedented volatility, the authors aim to test in an online laboratory setting whether displaying a risk warning message is truly effective in reducing the level of risk taken and whether the placement of this method makes a difference. Design/methodology/approach: To explore the impact of risk disclosure framing on risk-taking behavior, the authors conducted an online pair-wise lottery choice experiment. In addition to manipulating risk awareness through the presence or absence of risk warning messages of varying intensity, the authors also considered dynamic inconsistency, cognitive ability and questionnaire-based financial risk tolerance (FRT) scores. The authors aimed to identify potential relationships between these variables and experimentally elicited risk aversion. The authors' study offers valuable insights into the complex nature of risky decision-making and sheds light on the importance of considering dynamic inconsistency in addition to risk awareness and aversion. Findings: The authors' results provide statistical evidence for the efficacy of informative and very salient messages in mitigating risky decision, hinting at several policy implications. The authors also provide some statistical evidence in support of the relationship between cognitive abilities and risk preferences. The authors detect that individual with low cognitive abilities scores display great risk aversion. Originality/value: This study investigates the impact of risk warning messages on investment decisions in an online laboratory setting – a unique approach. However, the authors go beyond this and also examine the potential influence of dynamic inconsistency on decision-making, adding further value to the literature on this topic. To ensure a comprehensive understanding of the participants, the authors collect data on cognitive ability and FRT using questionnaires. This study provides a simple and cost-effective framework that can be easily replicated in future research – a valuable contribution to the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract When presented with the option of either an immediate benefit or a larger, later reward, we may behave impatiently by choosing instant gratification. Nonetheless, when we can make the same decision ahead of time and plan for the future, we tend to make more patient choices. Here, we explored whether great apes share this core feature of human decision-making, often referred to as dynamic inconsistency. We found that orangutans, bonobos, and gorillas tended to act impatiently and with considerable variability between individuals when choosing between an immediate reward and a larger-later reward, which is a commonly employed testing method in the field. However, with the inclusion of a front-end delay for both alternatives, their decisions became more patient and homogeneous. These results show that great apes are dynamically inconsistent. They also suggest that, when choosing between future outcomes, they are more patient than previously reported. We advocate for the inclusion of diverse time ranges in comparative research, especially considering the intertwinement of intertemporal choices and future-oriented behavior.

When presented with the option of either an immediate benefit or a larger, later reward, we may behave impatiently by choosing instant gratification. Nonetheless, when we can make the same decision ahead of time and plan for the future, we tend to make more patient choices. Here, we explored whether great apes share this core feature of human decision-making, often referred to as dynamic inconsistency. We found that orangutans, bonobos, and gorillas tended to act impatiently and with considerable variability between individuals when choosing between an immediate reward and a larger-later reward, which is a commonly employed testing method in the field. However, with the inclusion of a front-end delay for both alternatives, their decisions became more patient and homogeneous. These results show that great apes are dynamically inconsistent. They also suggest that, when choosing between future outcomes, they are more patient than previously reported. We advocate for the inclusion of diverse time ranges in comparative research, especially considering the intertwinement of intertemporal choices and future-oriented behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper experimentally investigates the potential existence of dynamically inconsistent individuals in a situation of ambiguity. The experiment involves participants making two sequential decisions concerning the allocation of a sum of money, with an ambiguous move by Nature occurring after first decision, and again after the second. We conducted two between-subject sessions: one incentivised and one unincentivised. By analysing the resulting data, we are able to classify participants into four distinct decision-making types: Myopic, Resolute, Sophisticated and Expected Utility (EU). Our results suggest that a significant proportion of the participants do not exhibit dynamic inconsistency being either Resolute, Sophisticated or EU. We discuss how monetary incentives can change the dynamic consistency of decision-makers and the salience of the Ambiguity. Differently from the incentivised treatment, we detect a slight increase of the proportion of Myopic behaviour in the hypothetical case, suspecting that incentives might affect dynamic consistency. A noteworthy observation is that, in the majority of cases, ambiguity tends to simplify to risk in the absence of monetary incentives. These findings have implications for economic decision-making and policymaking. By identifying the different types of decision-makers and understanding how they make choices, we can develop more effective strategies to promote desirable outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A non-Bayesian decision maker forms posterior beliefs through an – ever so slightly – violation of Bayes' rule. A naive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium for a multiperiod complete markets economy such that every economic agent – Bayesian or non-Bayesian – assumes that all economic agents are Bayesian decision makers. If all agents are indeed Bayesian decision makers, the naive equilibrium coincides with the standard concept of an arbitrage-free equilibrium for which dynamic price ratios are comprehensively pinned down as the equilibrium price ratios of Arrow–Debreu securities in a static economy. If at least one agent is a non-Bayesian decision maker, however, some equilibrium price ratios will change over time. These changing price ratios imply the existence of unrealized dynamic arbitrage opportunities in a naive equilibrium with non-Bayesian decision makers. • A non-Bayesian decision maker forms posterior beliefs in violation of Bayes'rule. • In a naive equilibrium every agent incorrectly assumes that all agents are Bayesians. • If there is some non-Bayesian, the state price ratios will change over time. • A naive equilibrium is arbitrage-free iff all economic agents are Bayesians. • A naive equilibrium is arbitrage-free iff the representative agent is a Bayesian. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a decision-framing design problem: a principal faces an agent with frame-dependent preferences and designs an extensive form with a frame at each stage. This allows the principal to circumvent incentive compatibility constraints by inducing dynamically inconsistent choices of the sophisticated agent. We show that a vector of contracts can be implemented if and only if it can be implemented using a canonical extensive form, which has a simple high–low–high structure using only three stages and the two highest frames, and employs unchosen decoy contracts to deter deviations. We then turn to the study of optimal contracts in the context of the classic monopolistic screening problem and establish the existence of a canonical optimal mechanism, even though our implementability result does not directly apply. In the presence of naive types, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effort discounting describes the devaluation of rewards that require effort to obtain. The present study investigated whether discounting of cognitive effort depends on how near the effort is in time. The present study also investigated whether effort discounting, and its modulation by temporal distance to the effort, might depend on need for cognition, a personality trait that describes how much one enjoys cognitively demanding tasks. Participants performed a validated effort discounting task that measured the extent to which they subjectively devalued a $20 reward when effort was required to receive it. Immediacy of the effort was manipulated by having participants imagine exerting varying levels of effort either immediately, in a day, or in a month. Results revealed linear increases in discounting of rewards as a function of both how much effort was involved and how imminent the effort was. The extent to which both these variables influenced discounting correlated with need for cognition. Individuals low in need for cognition exhibited more effort discounting overall and a linear increase in effort discounting as the effort grew imminent. Individuals high in need for cognition engaged in less effort discounting, which was not modulated by how imminent the effort was. These results indicate that people exhibit dynamic inconsistency in effort-related decisions, such that the degree to which they discount effort depends on how soon the effort is. Additionally, this tendency is linked with systematic individual differences in need for cognition. Lastly, this study demonstrates that these tendencies can be quantitatively operationalized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a three-period model to explore the optimal asset transfer that a present self, aware that her near future self is present-biased but better informed, will make to protect her far future self against income shocks. The model captures the present self's trade-off between using illiquid savings as a commitment mechanism, restricting the near future self from its consumption temptations; and giving flexibility to the near future self to adjust consumption after knowing the shock size. We adopt a class of utility functions, à la Epstein–Zin, to vary risk aversion while holding time preferences fixed. Our main result states that a more risk-averse agent would purchase more illiquid assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stress leads to unhealthy food choices since the school-age stage. Yet, there is limited evidence particularly in low- and middle-income countries regarding the impact of stress-reduction strategies on school-age children's food choices. Such aspects were crucial during the recent COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated psychological distress and unhealthier food choices among children. Two years after the pandemic began, we conducted a field experiment in southern Mexico to assess the impact of stress-reduction strategies on the food choices of over 1400 children aged 9–12. Half of the school-classes in the sample were randomly assigned to a stress reduction strategy namely meditation, which comprised six audios with basic relaxation techniques and intuitive messages to guide food choices. Additionally, all participants received information signalling that an amaranth snack was nutritious (i.e., the healthy snack), which was paired with a chocolate bar (i.e., the unhealthy snack) as part of a snack choice experiment. Students that practiced meditation were slightly more likely to choose the healthy snack than those in the control group, but the effect was not statistically significant. Upon collecting their snack, students had the chance to exchange their original choice for the other snack. Students that meditated were more likely to exchange their originally chosen "unhealthy snack" towards the healthy snack than students in the control group. The meditation program effectively reduced chronic stress among treated children. The effect was larger among students attending schools in lower-income areas. Our study sheds some light on the challenges to translate an improved psychological well-being into healthier food choices at school. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Weigh-In-Motion (WIM) data have been collected by state departments of transportation (DOT) in the U.S. and are anticipated to grow as state DOTs expand the number of WIM sites in order to better manage transportation infrastructure and enhance mobility. Traditional approaches for monitoring the vehicle weight measured in WIM systems include conducting statistical tests between two datasets obtained from two calibration visits. Depending on the frequency of visits, these traditional approaches are ineffective or resource-demanding for identifying calibration needs. Excessive vehicle-weight drifts exceeding 10% are usually indicative of poor performance by WIM systems. However, it has been difficult to consistently monitor such performance due to the sheer amount of data. In Georgia, the number of WIM sites have expanded from 12 to 29 in the past 3 years. This paper proposes a deep-learning-based temporal prediction approach for modeling sequential data and monitoring the time-history of the live loads imposed on roads and bridges. In total, 29 WIM sites in Georgia are analyzed to examine the effectiveness of a proposed temporal prediction approach for evaluating observed live loads. This study finds that the Jensen–Shannon divergence method is more effective than statistical difference tests, particularly when screening for live load anomalies. It is concluded that a LSTM neural network is able to capture temporal dynamics underlying the sequential load patterns observed in the WIM data and serves as an effective model for consistently monitoring the performance of WIM systems over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spread of face forgery videos is a serious threat to information credibility, calling for effective detection algorithms to identify them. Most existing methods have assumed a shared or centralized training set. However, in practice, data may be distributed on devices of different enterprises that cannot be centralized to share due to security and privacy restrictions. In this article, we propose a Federated Learning face forgery detection framework to train a global model collaboratively while keeping data on local devices. In order to make the detection model more robust, we propose a novel Inconsistency-Capture module (ICM) to capture the dynamic inconsistencies between adjacent frames of face forgery videos. The ICM contains two parallel branches. The first branch takes the whole face of adjacent frames as input to calculate a global inconsistency representation. The second branch focuses only on the inter-frame variation of critical regions to capture the local inconsistency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to apply federated learning to face forgery video detection, which is trained with decentralized data. Extensive experiments show that the proposed framework achieves competitive performance compared with existing methods that are trained with centralized data, with higher-level security and privacy guarantee. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Newcomb's problem has spawned a debate about which variant of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument against what is probably the most popular variant: causal decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT's recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. The second scenario extends the first to a diachronic Dutch book against CDT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A sender ranks information structures knowing that a receiver processes the information before choosing an action affecting them both. The sender and receiver may differ in their utility functions and/or prior beliefs, yielding a model of dynamic inconsistency when they represent the same individual at two points in time. I take as primitive (i) a collection of preference orderings over all information structures, indexed by menus of acts (the sender's ex ante preferences for information), and (ii) a collection of correspondences over menus of acts, indexed by signals (the receiver's signal‐contingent choice(s) from menus). I provide axiomatic representation theorems characterizing the sender as a sophisticated planner and the receiver as a Bayesian information processor, and show that all parameters can be uniquely identified from the sender's preferences for information. I also establish a series of results characterizing common priors, common utility functions, and intuitive measures of disagreement for these parameters—all in terms of the sender's preferences for information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study contracts between naive present‐biased consumers and risk‐neutral firms. We show that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon grows. This is true both when bargaining power is on the consumers' and on the firms' side, when consumers cannot commit to long‐term contracts, and when firms do not know the consumers' naiveté. However, the welfare loss from present bias does not vanish when firms do not know the consumers' present bias or when they cannot offer exclusive contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global economy is in the midst of a recession triggered by the ongoing pandemic of a novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). The shutdown of the economy and a surge in the unemployment rate also cause stress to the US housing and mortgage system and create significant impacts on the default behaviour of mortgage borrowers. The potential rise in mortgage defaults may renew the long-standing debate over the empirical observation of why some mortgage borrowers do not default as "ruthlessly" as the finance theory predicts. In this paper, we propose an alternative theory to explain for the different default behaviours among mortgage borrowers. We hypothesize that the difference among time preferences across mortgage choices is one of the underlying factors that causes the heterogeneity in default patterns. Borrowers can either have a present-biased preference (overvaluing immediate outcomes), or a time-consistent preference (with standard exponential discounting). Borrowers with a present-biased preference are more likely to accept back-loaded mortgages that minimize up-front costs, even though this increases their risk of going "underwater" and entering default when an adverse shock, such as the one from the ongoing pandemic, occurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study argues that post-crisis discussions on central bank independence are less about a choice of a level of independence but more about a relation between the independence and the central bank mandate in financial stability. An offered hypothesis states that an increasing role of financial factors in the macroeconomic policy agenda has led to emerging of two approaches to the central bank independence. Within the orthodox approach, responsibility for the financial stability is a challenge to the accepted model: one mandate – one goal – one instrument. Interference into the financial cycle impairs transparency and distorts responsibility, while deflation bias risks get in conflict with price stability principles, adherence to which is exactly what central banks are granted independence for. In terms of the heterodox approach, a wider responsibility of central banks for financial stability requires more independence to protect the legitimacy of interference into the financial cycle and implementation of a more prudent regulatory regime. Orthodox view is contradictory in its nature, while the vulnerability of the second approach lies in quality of institutional environment. Price stability mandate is argued to remain the first priority, while the financial stability issues should be institutionalized in a clearer way to secure independence.

This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of economics training on behavior by examining the link between hyperbolic discounting and the number of economics classes taken by a sample of 1310 college graduates at Ohio University. A strong negative correlation is found between economics training and hyperbolic discounting behavior. Regression analysis shows that dynamic consistency is a determinant of taking economics classes. Once the endogeneity of these variables is accounted for, economics training is no longer a statistically significant determinant of hyperbolic discounting. Thus, the selection effect of studying economics outweighs the training effect. Behavioral variables are found to be more important in explaining hyperbolic discounting than demographic variables. The study suggests the importance of controlling for both the selection effect and the training effect for all studies that examine the role of economic training on behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • The number of times a choice is made in dynamic settings has welfare implications. • Commitment yields Pareto gains if the number of choices exceeds a low threshold. • Typical behavioral welfare analysis may align with a multiself Pareto criterion. Abstract The standard approach to welfare analysis under dynamically inconsistent preferences is to assume that the welfare of an individual is maximized if he can commit to his initial goal. We study a potential rationale for such welfare analysis. In some prominent, well-studied examples with intertemporal tradeoffs (like the choice between investing in a project now or later, doing an unpleasant task now or procrastinating it until later, and eating a cake), we find that the commitment allocation can multiself Pareto dominate the non-cooperative equilibrium allocation if the number of time-dated selves exceeds a low threshold. While a common concern with behavioral welfare analysis is that the later selves of an individual are unfairly hurt as a result of committing the individual to his initial goal, our findings indicate that this concern may be more relevant for settings where the number of sequential choices is very low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Dynamic inconsistent behavior of the fuel cell stack with severe aging cells is investigated. • Theoretical changing trend of voltage difference between normal and abnormal cells is derived. • Slower dynamic response inside the abnormal fuel cell compared to normal cells is revealed. • Deterioration of the abnormal fuel cell to the dynamic consistency of the stack is quantified. • Accurate diagnosis of in-stack abnormal cells based on Bollinger band and entropy is realized. The abnormal cells within a fuel cell stack can reduce the stack's lifetime and reliability due to the "barrel" effect. In this paper, the dynamic inconsistency of a 20-kW fuel cell stack with two abnormal cells is studied. These abnormal fuel cells with severe aging have a lower voltage but without faults. First, the voltage difference change trend between abnormal and normal fuel cells under different current densities is analyzed by theoretical derivation and experiments. Further, the inconsistent dynamic response of the fuel cell stack under different current steps is investigated. The results show that the voltage difference's variation rate between normal and abnormal fuel cells is greater than 0.005 V·cm2/A at any current density. The particular is that this variation rate increases significantly at high current densities due to the increasing concentration polarization loss inside the abnormal cell. Besides, the slower dynamic response of abnormal cells during the current step deteriorates the stack's dynamic consistency. The voltage standard deviation of the stack is reduced by a maximum of 37.5% when abnormal cells are not taken into account. Therefore, a diagnosis method utilizing voltage information with small computation is proposed. The method can accurately identify in-stack abnormal fuel cells by combining qualitative analysis of voltage values based on the Bollinger band and quantitative measurement of voltage fluctuation degree using Shannon entropy. These efforts provide guidance for fuel cell system control and fault diagnosis. [Display omitted] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The magnitude effect is one of the main anomalies shown by people in the context of intertemporal choice. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to provide a general procedure to obtain a general discount function able to explain this paradox. By this methodology, we will to mathematically deform time in a discount function, more specifically to multiply the variable “time” by a certain power of the reward amount. However, in most cases, the existing literature presents some ad hoc discounting models to describe a unique anomaly. In order to solve this limitation, we will apply the former methodology to the q -exponential discount function introduced by Cajueiro (2006). In this way, we will obtain a mathematical setting able to jointly explain the delay and the magnitude effects, depending on the values of parameters q and α involved in the model. Moreover, another advantage of this amount-based q -exponential function is its convergence to the time-deformed exponential, hyperbolic and linear discounting, depending on the value of q in the joint interval ( − ∞ , 1 ) ∪ ( 1 , + ∞ ) . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to obtain the family of the so-called generalized Weibull discount functions, introduced by Takeuchi (Game Econ Behav 71:456-478, 2011), by deforming the q-exponential discount function by means of the Stevens’ “power” law. The obtained discount functions exhibit different degrees of inconsistency and so they can be classified according to the value of their characteristic deforming parameters. Moreover, we extend the construction of the generalized Weibull discount function starting from any discount function instead of the q-exponential discounting. In any case, the value of the parameter θ of these new discount functions is extended from (0, 1] to the union of the intervals (-∞,0)∪(0,+∞). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that policymakers may have personal interests in policy restraints channeled through public oversight. Self-imposition of public oversight can be beneficial for the policymaker because it may help alleviate the dynamic inconsistency problem that she otherwise faces. In the setting studied herein, self-imposed public oversight takes the form of a ceiling on tax rates, which can be overridden only with the legislature’s consent. Such a mechanism is shown to credibly commit the policymaker to future tax restraint, thus inducing larger productive effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A stream of intertemporal payoffs X first-order (second-order) temporarily dominates another stream Y if (the area below) the cumulative payoff function of X up till any moment of time is always at least as high as that of Y; or, equivalently, any rank-dependent discounted utility maximizer with a strictly increasing (concave) utility function and a strictly decreasing (convex) discount function prefers X over Y. An individual A is relatively more patient than an individual B if, whenever B is willing to undertake some investment project, A is moreover so; or, equivalently, for any stream of payoffs, A’s present-day equivalent is at least as high as that of B; or, equivalently, A’s discount factor is at least as high as that of B and B’s utility function is “more concave” than that of A. Related concepts of absolute patience and comparative probabilistic patience are briefly discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history‐dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium outcomes for any given preference profile, and (ii) the set of preference profiles for which equilibrium is unique. Based on this characterization, I establish that a weak notion of present bias—implied, for example, by any hyperbolic or quasi‐hyperbolic discounting—is sufficient for equilibrium to be unique, stationary, and efficient. Conversely, I demonstrate how certain violations of present bias give rise to multiple (non‐stationary) equilibria that feature delayed agreement under gradually increasing offers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Credibility is crucial for managing inflation expectations in countries adopting inflation targeting. This study focuses on measurement of credibility and its relation with the interest rates. It aims to determine which measures of credibility best predict the variations of interest rates by using monthly data from Turkey in 2004−2012 period which adopted infla#on targe#ng in 2002. Nine credibility indices are considered in the analysis. We find empirical evidence supporting the claim that higher credibility will lead to lower variations in interest rates of both monetary policy and the market. We also demonstrated that CICK (proposed by Cecchetti and Krause, 2002) is the best credibility index in explaining the variations in both monetary policy interest rate and market interest rate.