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Introduction 1227 I. Collaborative Business Networks in Opportunity Zones and the Value Added by Community Banks 1228 II. Regulatory Reforms to Harness the Power of Community Banks 1235 Conclusuon 1243 [...]

What would the 'sharing economy' look like if platform providers optimised for racial and other forms of diversity? This article considers that question. Following the Introduction, Part 2 of this article reviews the widespread nature of race and other forms of discrimination in platform technologies. Part 3 uses core strands of property theory to analyse the ways in which racial privilege translates into property entitlements. Part 4 discusses a range of reforms within property law that can contribute to eliminating the value – and ultimately the fact – of whiteness as a property entitlement in the platform economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autocorrect presumes Whiteness. Across a range of products and applications, autocorrect consistently "corrects" names that do not look White or Anglo. Sometimes autocorrect changes names to their closest Anglo approximations (as in Ayaan to Susan). Sometimes it suggests replacements that are not proper names (as in DaShawn to dash away). Often, autocorrect asserts the implausibility of non-Anglo names by underlining them in red. Autocorrect's changes to names such as these are not just trivial product glitches. In a world rife with the multiplying effects of algorithmic bias in increasingly essential domains of decision-making, autocorrect produces social and cultural harms that disproportionately affect communities of color and those who do not have Anglo identities. Harnessing both empirical evidence and theory, this Article argues that while autocorrect's Anglo bias harms such individuals and communities, it adds value to the intellectual property of autocorrect's proprietors as well as to the "status property" of more privileged users. We all increasingly rely on smartphones, tablets, word processors, and apps that use autocorrect. Yet autocorrect incorporates a set of defaults--including dictionaries--that help some of its users to communicate seamlessly at the expense of others who cannot. It is a simple but powerful means of self-realization, providing a modern forum for the reinstantiation of Cheryl Harris's concept of Whiteness as property. It is a medium for governing social relations that depends on the devaluation of non-Anglo names. It is a form of smart technology that maintains structural racism today. The essential nature of autocorrect technology--and its far-reaching effect in structuring social, cultural, and even epistemic understandings of our world--demands legal intervention to fix autocorrect's Anglo bias. Drawing on core norms from property law, as well as consumer law and culture, this Article proposes design principles for ensuring more transparency, access, and participation in the design and deployment of autocorrect technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a country where good fences are believed to make good neighbors, sharing is surprisingly in vogue. The success of sharing economy icons such as Airbnb and Uber has generated a wave of commentary on the cultural, philosophical, and social impacts ofsharing. In the legal realm, however, a disturbing dissonance exists between excitement over this seemingly new way of doing business and regulatory floundering. Is Airbnb a hotel chain, a rental agency, ora website provider? Is Uber a taxicab service employing hundreds of drivers or a developer of an app? These questions remain unanswered. Yet policy makers cannot regulate the sharing economy without answering them. This legal dissonance is caused by the failure to recognize the sharing economy as a distinct capitalist system that requires new regulatory approaches. To date, both regulators and scholars have evaluated sharing against a Coasian norm that assumes the dominance of the traditional firm, the primacy of private ownership, and the asymmetrical leveraging of information. This approach obscures the answers to basic, but crucial, questions about how the sharing economy operates. Using "varieties of capitalism " theory, this Article argues that the sharing economy is a nascent form of a coordinated market economy, a form that flourishes in some parts of Europe. The key task in regulating this alternative capitalist system is to understand and regulate the institutions that support it. On the basis of this theoretical insight, this Article proposes a regulatory model that prioritizes an inquiry into the institutions of the sharing economy as a means to answer the questions vexing policy makers. It also applies the model to two of the pressing problems of the sharing economy, namely concerns about worker equity and consumer safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Property law has a particular problem with non-owners. Although property law clearly identifies the rights of property "owners," the rights of "non-owners" are vague. This problem is significant because modem property law is often called upon to balance the rights and needs of owners and non-owners. Property law cannot adequately perform this function without clearly establishing both sets of rights. The New fersey Supreme Court case State v. Shack exemplifies this problem because it purports to be a case about protecting non-owners. This Article examines both the case and the texts upon which the court relied to argue that the New fersey Supreme Court could not adequately protect the non-owners in the case because the court could not understand their rights. Instead, in its effort to evince a set of rights powerful enough to overcome the property owner's rights, the court eliminated the voices of the migrant workers it claimed to protect. This Article draws upon postcolonialist theory both in examining the problem and in prescribing a solution. In its prescription, the Article proposes a pragmatic form of postcolonialist inquiry as a theoretical foundation for protecting non-owners in property law. Relying on the less iconic case of Hilder v. St. Peter, this Article proposes three devices within the common law tradition that are well suited to the task of representing and protecting nonowners. Ai Hilder demonstrates, legal decision-makers can more fully consider and protect the rights and needs of non-owners through the pragmatic use of storytelling, the personalization of claims, and the precise matching of remedies to harms and needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sharing is an indispensable part of American property law, often mediating the harsh implications of ownership rights. Yet sharing is also a hidden component of this legal structure. In both theory and doctrinal manifestations, sharing is overshadowed by the iconic property right of exclusion. This Article argues that property law suffers a critical loss from its under-recognition of sharing because it fails to use sharing to correct distributional failures in a world of increasingly scarce resources. Sharing could be the basis for developing a rich range of outcomes in common property disputes. Instead, as described by Calabresi and Melamed in their famed article on remedies, outcomes are tagged to exclusion in the form of blanket property rules and "keep out" signs. As a result, sharing currently functions merely to create very narrow exceptions to broad rights of ownership. To correct this failure, this Article presents a model for sharing as a preferred outcome in property disputes. Sharing as an outcome is a powerful means of addressing property inequalities, limiting harmful externalities, preserving efficiency, and harnessing the extraordinary potential of outcomes in property law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his exposition of an economic theory of property rights, Harold Demsetz reinforced a foundational assumption in property law: that private ownership is the best way to harness resources for wealth-building purposes. Implicit in Demsetz's model is the largely undefined belief that private ownership will incentivize appropriate use of the property because such use produces higher exchange value. This Article identifies a blind spot in Demsetz's theory that has largely escaped attention in property law and theory. While fully acknowledging the powerful connection between use and exchange value delineated by Demsetz, it argues that, in disparate markets for new or emerging forms of property, the grant of property rights produces the opposite result from his prediction. As a consequence of failures in or deteriorations of use, a fundamental disconnect occurs in the process of developing exchange value. Rather than creating individual and systemic wealth, property ownership in these settings produces rent-seeking and systemic instability. Because use appears to derive inevitably from ownership, property law does little to incentivize use. To correct this omission, this Article provides a framework for incentivizing use by owners of emergent property. It provides both a more detailed definition of use and a spectrum of interventions for this purpose. This normative framework sheds new lights on recent debates about commodification of such things as human organs and cultural property. It also provides insights on property's role as a stabilizer of markets that are prone to bubbles and crashes. A greater sensitivity to use can guide appropriate policy choices in each of these difficult areas of market malfunction. By undertaking a theoretical analysis of use's potential as a facilitator of stable market exchange, this Article provides a framework for analyzing and solving instability at the core of many markets for emergent property. The concept of use has been under-theorized and underappreciated for its prescriptive potential. This Article begins the work of correcting that omission in property scholarship by giving use the more instrumental place it deserves in the owner's bundle of rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]