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A recent decision by the Australian High Court means that, unless faculty are bound by an assignment or intellectual property (IP) policy, they may own inventions resulting from their research. Thirty years after its introduction, the US Bayh-Dole Act, which vests ownership of employee inventions in the employer university or research organization, has become a model for commercialization around the world. In Australia, despite recommendations that a Bayh-Dole style regime be adopted, the recent decision in University of Western Australia (UWA) v Gray1 has moved the default legal position in a diametrically opposite direction. A key focus of the debate was whether faculty’s duty to carry out research also encompasses a duty to invent. Late last year, the Full Federal Court confirmed a lower court ruling that it does not, and this year the High Court refused leave to appeal (denied certiorari). Thus, Gray stands as Australia’s most faculty-friendly authority to date.

John Harris has previously proposed that there is a moral duty to participate in scientific research. This concept has recently been challenged by Iain Brassington, who asserts that the principles cited by Harris in support of the duty to research fail to establish its existence. In this paper we address these criticisms and provide new arguments for the existence of a moral obligation to research participation. This obligation, we argue, arises from two separate but related principles. The principle of fairness obliges us to support the social institutions which sustain us, of which research is one; while the principle of beneficence, or the duty of rescue, imposes upon us a duty to prevent harm to others, including by supporting potentially beneficial, even life-saving research. We argue that both these lines of argument support the duty to research, and explore further aspects of this duty, such as to whom it is owed and how it might be discharged. © 2008 The Authors.