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Düşük karbonlu enerji teknolojileri arasında karbon yakalama ve depolama (KYD) farklılık arz eden bir teknolojidir. Tek varoluş sebebi iklim değişikliğinin yavaşlatılması ya da önüne geçilmesi olup sürdürülebilir bir dönüşüm için en uygun maliyeti olan teknolojik çözümlerden biri olarak görülmektedir. Ancak, uluslararası düzeyde KYD çalışmalarının yavaşladığı bir döneme şahitlik etmekteyiz. Bu makalenin amacı enerji, ağır sanayi ve yakıt imalat sektörlerinde karbon dioksit (CO2) salınımlarını azaltmak için kilit bir teknoloji olmasına rağmen KYD’nin neden istenilen düzeyde kullanılmadığını irdelemektir. KYD’den büyük ölçekte faydalanabilmek ve KYD’nin iklim değişikliğiyle olan mücadelede etkili olabilmesi için güçlü ekonomik saiklere ihtiyaç vardır. Bu politikalar genellikle iki şekildedir. Bunlardan birincisi talebin getirdiği (market-pull) diğeri de teknolojinin sürüklediği (technology-push) politikadır. Talebin getirdiği politikaya örnek olarak karbon emisyonlarının fiyatlandırılması (vergilendirilmesi) verilebilir. Gelecekte KYD’nin rolü (i) belirlenecek karbon fiyatı seviyesine (ii) ülkelerin hali hazırdaki enerji portföylerine ve (iii) diğer düşük karbonlu enerji üretim teknolojilerinin, teknolojik gelişme ve öğrenmeye bağlı olarak, zamanla değişecek olan (birim) üretim maliyetlerine göre şekillenecektir., Among low-carbon energy technologies, carboncapture and storage (CCS) is a distinct type of technology. The main reason forits existence is to slow down climate change, and it is considered as one ofthe most cost-effective solutions for a sustainable energy transformation. Eventhough CCS is a crucial technology to capture emissions from emissions-intenseindustrial processes, such as energy, cement, steel, and petrochemicals, we arewitnessing a period of slow growth in its activity. This article discusses thereasons for this slow progress and, by using a simple economic model, presentsfactors, such as a sufficiently high carbon price or a pure CCS subsidy, thatcan promote CCS. The study highlights that political support is a criticalfactor for the development of CCS technologies and that CCS and renewableenergy are complementary in combating climate change

We assess the extent to which Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and R&D on this abatement technology are part of a socially efficient solution to the problem of climate change. For this purpose, we extend the intertemporal model of climate and directed technical change developed by Acemoglu et al. (2012, American Economic Review, 102(1): 131–66) to include a sector responsible for CCS. We show that two types of solutions exist: a renewable energy regime where current CCS technology is only temporarily used but never further developed; and a fossil energy regime where CCS is part of a long term solution and is further developed at about the same rate as fossil energy technology. Our computations show that for current estimates of the marginal cost of CCS, the renewable energy regime clearly dominates the fossil fuel energy regime.

Bu makalede, fosil yakıtlar ve değişken yenilenebilirenerji kaynaklarıyla enerji üretiminin yapıldığı, ve üretilen enerjinin enerjidepolama sistemleri aracılığıyla depolanabildiği bir ekonomi göz önündebulundurulmaktadır. Bu kurgu dahilinde, enerji depolamanın optimal olduğudurumlar belirlenmekte, ve ekonomi-enerji değişkenlerinin uzun dönemdeki eğilimlerianaliz edilmektedir. Ulaşılan sonuçlar iki yönlüdür. İlk olarak, ekonomidedepolanan enerji miktarı talep ve arz eğrilerinin biçimleriyle büyük orandailişkilidir. Özellikle, marjinal fayda eğrisindeki konveksite, fosil enerjimarjinal maliyet eğrisindeki konveksite, ve yenilenebilir enerji üretimindekideğişkenliğin büyüklüğü enerjinin depolanmasını teşvik etmektedirler. İkinci olarak,yenilenebilir enerji kapasitesinin düşük ve fosil yakıtlar kullanılaraküretilen enerjinin birimi maliyetinin sabit olduğu durumlarda, enerjinindepolanması refah artışı sağlamamaktadır. Enerji depolamanın enerji üretimkararlarına olan etkisini gösteren bu çalışmanın, enerji-ekonomi modellerinikullanarak yapılacak yeni çalışmalarda enerji arzının daha genel bir biçimdeele alınabilmesine olanak sağlayabileceği düşünülmektedir., I consider an economy with fossil fuels, intermittentrenewable energy, and energy storage, identify the conditions under whichenergy storage is optimal, and analyze the long-run tendencies of the economyenergy variables. The findings are twofold. First, the amount of energy storedin the economy is highly dependent on the shape of the demand and supplyschedules. In particular, energy storage is fostered by the convexity of themarginal utility, the marginal cost function for fossil fuel energy, and thedegree of volatility in renewable energy. Second, considering a low level ofrenewable energy capacity, storing energy is not welfare improving when theunit cost of providing fossil fuel energy is constant. By showing the influencethat energy storage can have on energy generation decisions, I believe that thecurrent work can be influential in a more generous treatment of energy supplyin future energy-economy models.

It is expected that the renewable share of energy generation will rise considerably in the near future. The intermittent and uncertain nature of renewable energy (RE) calls for storage and grid management technologies that can allow for increased power system flexibility. To assist policy makers in designing public policies that incentivize RE generation and a flexible power system based on energy storage and demandside management, better knowledge as to the willingness to pay for the corresponding devices is required. In this paper, we appraise the willingness of a household (HH) to pay for a 1.9 kW peak photovoltaic (PV) system and smart grid devices, namely, a smart meter and a home storage battery. Results indicate that having access to a storage device is key for the HH decision to install a smart meter. We also find that it is beneficial for the HH to install the PV system regardless of the pricing scheme and the ownership of the battery pack. It is, nevertheless, barely desirable to install the battery pack regardless of the presence of the PV system; an outcome pointing to the fact that the high cost of storage is a drawback for the wider use of these systems. When storage is constrained in such a way that only the generated power can be stored, the willingness to install the battery pack reduces even further. The investment decisions made when legislation prohibits net-metering are also analyzed.

As renewable energy depends on meteorological shocks and is non-controllable, the overall energy production becomes riskier with the rising renewable share. Although this has led to a renewed interest in storage technologies, not much consideration has been given to energy storage due to precautionary motives. In our study, we look at to what extent a convex marginal utility (prudence) and a convex marginal cost (frugality) can spur precautionary energy storage. We set up a simple theoretical model of energy consumption and production with intermittent renewable sources, dispatchable systems, and energy storage. First, we characterize the optimum and demonstrate how prudence and frugality can lead to higher levels of energy storage. By applying our findings to perfectly competitive markets, we further show that prudence and frugality increase the market energy price through higher demand for energy storage and decrease price volatility. Our analysis can have implications for inventory decisions in various other industries where firms face capacity constraints and are exposed to production risks.

I consider an economy with fossil fuel and renewable energy and energy storage, and search for the conditions that lead to welfare improvements when energy is stored. I then solve for the optimal decision rule and analyze the long-run tendencies of the economy-energy variables. The ndings are threefold. First, energy storage is fostered by the convexity of the marginal utility (prudence), the marginal cost function for fossil fuel energy, and the degree of intermittency. Second, considering a low penetration of renewable energy to the power grid, energy storage is not welfare improving if the fossil fuel energy cost function is linear. Third, energy storage creates an added value to renewable energy investments when actively used. By showing the in uence that energy storage can have on energy generation and investment decisions, I hope that the current work can be in uential in a more generous treatment of energy supply in future energy-economy-climate models.

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is considered a critical technology needed to curb CO2 emissions and is envisioned by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as an integral part of least-cost greenhouse gas mitigation policy. In this paper, we assess the extent to which CCS and R&D in CCS technology are indeed part of a socially e cient solution to the problem of climate change. For this purpose, we extend the intertemporal model of climate and directed technical change developed by Acemoglu et al. (2012, American Economic Review, 102(1): 131{66) to include a sector responsible for CCS. Surprisingly, even for an optimistic cost estimate available for CCS ($60/ton of CO2 avoided), we nd that it is not optimal to deploy CCS or devote resources to R&D in CCS technology either in the near or distant future. Indeed, it is only when the marginal cost of CCS is less than $12/ton that a scenario with an active CCS sector (including R&D) becomes optimal, though not in the near future.

ÖZETİşbirlikçi olmayan oligopol oyunları üzerine oluşturulmuş geniş bir literatür mevcuttur. Fakat bu literatür indirgeme oranını belirli ve sabit olarak dikkate almıştır. Bu tezin amacı gelecekteki indirgeme oranlarındaki belirsizliğin firmaların gizli anlaşmalara yaklaşımlarını nasıl etkilediğini bulmaktır. Bu doğrultuda Weitzman (2001)'den faydalanarak indirgeme oranlarının gamma dağılımından geldiklerini varsaydık. Tezde elde ettiğimiz sonuçlara göre indirgeme oranında belirsizlik artığında (dağılımın varyansının artması), firmaların daha çok gizli anlaşmalara yönelmesi beklenmektedir. Bunu `ihtiyatla gizli anlaşmalara yönelmek' ve/veya `fiyat savaşlarından/cezalandırmalardan ihtiyatla kaçınmak' diye isimlendirdik. Öte yandan, ilgili literatürle tutarlı olarak, daha yüksek beklenen değerlerin (daha yüksek ortalamaların) işbirlikçi olmayan anlaşmaları olumsuz etkileyecekleri beklenmektedir. Bu yüzden, firmaların daha sabırsız olduğu bir ortamda gizli anlaşmaların bozulacağını düşünmekteyiz. Ulaştığımız sonuçlar, faiz oranlarındaki değişkenliği azaltan ve böylece gizli anlaşmaların/işbirlikçi hareketlerin önüne geçip rekabetçi bir ortam sağlayabilecek politikaların uygulanabilirliğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu sebeple elde ettiğimiz sonuçların herhangi bir rekabet kurulu ve/veya devlet kuruluşu için önemli sonuçlar sunduğuna inanmaktayız. ABSTRACTThere is a huge literature built on non-cooperative oligopoly games. However, this literature has grown taking discount rates always as certain and fixed (geometric discounting in infinite horizon). Moving from this point, the thesis aims to discover how uncertainty over future discount rates affects firms' attitudes towards collusive behavior. In doing this, the distribution of discount rates is assumed to have a gamma distribution, as suggested by Weitzman (2001). Our research finds that, the more uncertain the future rates are (higher variance), the more collusive firms are expected to behave. We would call this behavior as `precautionary collusion' and/or `precautionary avoidance of price war/punishment'. Moreover, higher expected discount rates (mean) are found to be anti-collusive, which is consistent with the relevant literature. Therefore, as impatience increase, firms become more induced to deviate from collusion. With this kind of information at hand, policies could be constructed that reduce the variability in interest rates, and therefore promote the competitive attitudes by discouraging collusive behavior of oligopolistic firms. Hence, we believe that the results here present important policy implications for any competition authority and/or public/governmental body.