Search

Who bears the consequences of administrative problems in health care? We use data on repeated interactions between a large sample of U.S. physicians and many different insurers to document the complexity of health care billing, and estimate its economic costs for doctors and consequences for patients. Observing the back-and-forth sequences of claim denials and resubmissions for past visits, we can estimate physicians' costs of haggling with insurers to collect payments. Combining these costs with the revenue never collected, we estimate that physicians lose 18% of Medicaid revenue to billing problems, compared with 4.7% for Medicare and 2.4% for commercial insurers. Identifying off of physician movers and practices that span state boundaries, we find that physicians respond to billing problems by refusing to accept Medicaid patients in states with more severe billing hurdles. These hurdles are quantitatively just as important as payment rates for explaining variation in physicians' willingness to treat Medicaid patients. We conclude that administrative frictions have first-order costs for doctors, patients, and equality of access to health care. We quantify the potential economic gains—in terms of reduced public spending or increased access to physicians—if these frictions could be reduced and find them to be sizable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the changing technology of healthcare management by examining the range of administrative inputs and costs in the U.S. healthcare industry. Topics discussed include measurement of labor and non-labor administrative inputs for hospital and ambulatory care, the evolution of administrative cost measures and the categories of inputs in hospitals, and the share of resources spent on administration.

The medical-care sector often experiences changes in medical protocols and technologies that cause shifts in treatments. However, the commonly used medical-care price indexes reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics hold the mix of medical services fixed. In contrast, episode expenditure indexes, advocated by many health economists, track the full cost of disease treatment, even as treatments shift across service categories (e.g., inpatient to outpatient hospital). In our data, we find that these two conceptually different measures of price growth show similar aggregate rates of inflation over the 2003-2007 period. Although aggregate trends are similar, we observe differences when looking at specific disease categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rising price of branded drugs has garnered considerable attention from the public and policy makers. This article investigates the complexities of pharmaceutical pricing, with an emphasis on the overlooked aspects of manufacturer rebates and out-of-pocket prices. Rebates granted by pharmaceutical manufacturers to insurers reduce the actual prices paid by insurers, causing the true prices of prescriptions to diverge from official statistics. We combined claims data on branded retail prescription drugs with estimates on rebates to provide new price index measures based on pharmacy prices, negotiated prices (after rebates), and out-of-pocket prices for the commercially insured population during the period 2007-20. We found that although retail pharmacy prices increased 9.1 percent annually, negotiated prices grew by a mere 4.3 percent, highlighting the importance of rebates in price measurement. Surprisingly, consumer out-of-pocket prices diverged from negotiated prices after 2016, growing 5.8 percent annually while negotiated prices remained flat. The concern over drug price inflation is more reflective of the rapid increase in consumer out-of-pocket expenses than the stagnated inflation of negotiated prices paid by insurers after 2016.