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Lobbying, and its role in the policy process, has been extensively studied in democratic states, but much less is known about similar practices in authoritarian political systems. Although a few studies have identified lobbying in China, most have focused on big businesses and national policy making, and some have argued that it is unaffected by differences in political institutions. Our paper challenges this portrayal of business lobbying in autocracies. Through a study of the lobbying activities of business associations based on documentary research and fieldwork in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin between 2011 and 2013, we show that although business associations have similar lobbying motivations to their counterparts in democracies, their specific practices are often shaped by authoritarian political institutions. While they are similar in seeking to build informal relationships with public officials, provide expertise to shape policies, and raise their profile through public relations activities and media engagement, they differ in focusing their relationship‐building efforts on helping officials with routine work, helping Communist Party organizations establish cells in businesses, and brokering between businesses and government. Rather than donating to political campaigns like their counterparts in democracies, they become legislators themselves, hire retired officials, and seek positions on advisory bodies. Rigged elections, an unreliable legal system, and restrictions on media and freedom of movement are key authoritarian institutions that shape these distinctive lobbying practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compared outcomes for 140 preservice special educators enrolled in either an online or on-campus graduate course on behavior management. Performance on multiple choice quizzes throughout the course and follow-up of classroom behavior management during student teaching as observed by a master teacher and university supervisor found no significant differences between the two groups. (Contains references.) (DB)

Chapter seven similarly shows how, despite censorship and propaganda, netizens' counter-censorship activities sometimes prevailed. ISBN 9780231200479 Guobin Yang's book is a vivid and highly readable account of the first months of what became the COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan as revealed through the online diaries of Wuhan residents. In chapters eight and nine, Yang deals with the important topics of COVID nationalism, and "mourning and remembering.". [Extracted from the article]

The Hu–Wen era has been characterized as a "lost decade" for economic and political reform, but a "golden era" in terms of economic growth and political stability. Yet, relatively little attention has been paid to the social policies introduced during Hu and Wen's decade in power. These important policies, however, abolished agricultural taxes, extended health insurance, pensions and income support to almost all rural as well as urban residents, and built a civic welfare infrastructure to address migrants' grievances. These policies, some of which were developed under the preceding Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji leadership, were introduced for a complex mix of reasons. Their aim was not only to reduce inequalities but also to stimulate domestic consumption and sustain economic growth, offset the effects of China's entry to the WTO and the global recession of 2008, and maintain social stability. They were the product of domestic bureaucratic politics and experimentation. They were also strongly influenced by China's integration into the international economy, as well as by international governmental and non-governmental organizations and the ideas they introduced into China's domestic policy networks. Although Hu–Wen era social policy reforms had only limited effects on reducing income inequality and involved complex politics, they did establish for the first time entitlements to social security and safety nets for all China's population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has credited China's top leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, with the social policies of their decade in power, arguing that they promoted these policies either for factional reasons or to achieve rational, problem-solving goals. But such arguments ignore the dominant "fragmented authoritarian" model of policymaking in China that centres on bargaining among bureaucratic agencies. This article asks whether top leadership factions, rational problem solving, or "fragmented authoritarianism" can explain the adoption of one of the Hu and Wen administration's flagship policies, New Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes. Based on a careful tracing of this policy's evolution, it finds little evidence for these explanations, and instead uncovers the role played by international events and organizations, and ideas they introduced or sustained within policy networks. The article highlights some of the effects that China's international engagement has had on policymaking and the need to go beyond explanations of the policy process that focus solely on domestic actors. It proposes a new model of policymaking, "network authoritarianism," that centres on policy networks spanning the domestic–international, state–non-state, and central–local divides, and which takes account of the influence of ideas circulating within these networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Center and Provinces: China 1978-93. Power as Non-Zero Sum. By Linda Chelan Li. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998. 342p. $85.00. Linda Li begins by discussing the 'crisis' in the relationship between the [...]