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Using environmentally friendly packaging (E-packaging) instead of non-environmentally friendly packaging (N-packaging) can mitigate pollution and reduce carbon emissions. However, the market penetration rate of E-packaging is low, and the packaging carbon reduction level is uneven. This study uses game theory models to examine the factors affecting packaging carbon reduction levels and fees as well as firms' package-type decisions. First, we obtain the optimal solutions for packaging manufacturers and firms when they use different types of packaging under monopoly and competition, respectively. We find that green competition reduces the carbon reduction level of E-packaging, whereas price competition can increase it under certain conditions. The unit manufacturing cost of N-packaging and cost coefficient of carbon reduction are critical considerations for package-type decisions. When the unit manufacturing cost of N-packaging is low and the cost coefficient is large, no firm uses E-packaging. We also demonstrate that firms in a competitive market may become trapped in a prisoner's dilemma after making package-type decisions. Interestingly, we show that the firms' package-type decisions can hurt consumers and welfare under certain conditions, depending on the N-packaging's unit manufacturing cost and pollution damage factor. Our findings provide insights for packaging manufacturers, firms, and environmental regulatory agencies, and can help promote E-packaging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strengthening carbon regulations and competitive pressures are forcing supply chains to provide environmental (e-) products to replace traditional (t-) products. However, cap-and-trade policy allows manufacturers, the main carbon emission emitters, to trade their emission permits freely. Considering manufacturers' power and key role in producing and carbon trading, we develop a duopoly model consisting of two competing manufacturers. Despite asymmetrical carbon emission reduction efficiencies, the two manufacturers can independently and simultaneously decide their respective t-/e-products outputs, emission reduction levels, and permits trade quotas. The unique Nash equilibrium is derived with the overall cap. We find that the low-cost manufacturer uses its cost advantage to invest more in emission reduction, then sells the excess emission permits to its rival, but makes its rival more competitive in product market. Interestingly, our results show that cap-and-trade policy triggers an industry collusion in which manufacturers reduce competition and improve the power and profits by reducing overall output and adopting differentiated product strategy. Furthermore, the cost advantage and high product substitution can accelerate low-cost manufacturer's transformation but hinder high-cost manufacturers. The impacts of cap-and-trade policy on consumer surplus and social welfare are also discussed to provide guidance for policy makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The online expert service (OES) market is thriving by providing convenient professional services such as telemedicine consultation, legal advice, and financial planning. However, the practical phenomena, namely information asymmetry and the existence of naive consumers in the OES industry, motivate us to investigate how consumers' two-dimensional heterogeneity and the expert's agency pricing strategy with effort costs affect the OES platform's information disclosure decision and corresponding market outcomes. By building a game-theoretic model, we consider the monopolistic OES platform in which the expert provides service to a mass of consumers, who can be either sophisticated or naive. The platform, as the designer of the disclosure framework, is thus an additional player in the seller-consumer game. Our results show that, when the marginal cost is intermediate, the platform strategically manipulates consumers' valuation beliefs with partial disclosure to increase profitability without significant loss of market coverage. Furthermore, when naive consumers exist, the platform counter-intuitively discloses more information compared to that of all sophisticated consumers. Moreover, interestingly, when the marginal cost is low-to-intermediate, more naive consumers bring about more disclosure and thus obtain more demand for high-end sophisticated consumers, making both the expert and platform better off. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid rise of premium memberships on e-commerce platforms has made it a core strategy for platform competition, attracting widespread attention from the industry and academia. This paper studies two kinds of differentiated membership mechanisms, i.e. the General Pattern (GP) available to all consumers and the Top-tier Pattern (TP) offered only to high-value consumers. We have a detailed description of the consumer's consumption behaviour in line with the real platform competition scenario. We first conducted a separate analysis of the two membership mechanisms and found that the actual implementation effect of TP and GP membership mechanisms are equivalent when there is no membership competition. Then we focussed on the scenario of differentiated member competition. We discuss the interaction between the two membership mechanisms and do a sensitivity analysis of the optimal decisions. The impact of the membership mechanism competition on the member group segmentation and consumption transfer is depicted well and analysed. At last, we use numerical examples to show the relationship between platform profits and some important exogenous variables under differentiated membership competition, and we also find that the differentiated membership mechanisms competition can let the two platforms achieve a win-win result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]