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It is widely believed that independent central banks produce costless low inflation. Yet a few recent studies indicate that more independent central banks are associated with higher output costs during disinflations. This carries the implication that there are indeed costs associated with autonomy. The author develops and extends those analyses in two important ways. First, he shows that central bank independence (CBI) affects both the output and the unemployment costs of disinflation. Because central banks control only monetary policy, they should not exert a differential effect on the two ratios, and there should be a positive relationship between independence and both the unemployment and the output costs of disinflations. Second, by including a range of potentially significant political and institutional controls, the author demonstrates both the importance of political and institutional determinants of the costs of disinflation and that CBI is a robust predictor of those costs. Keywords: disinflation; partisanship; central banks; sacrifice ratio

Europe has experienced both marked growth in public support for far right parties and growth in public Euro-skepticism. While far right parties have become associated with particularly strident negative orientations towards the European Union (EU), there is considerable variation in the extent of their antipathy, and, in the extent to which they emphasize the EU. Here we examine the conditions under which far right parties can successfully leverage the EU issue to win votes. Specifically, we argue that the extent of societal polarization on the EU constitutes an important intermediating condition. Our findings indicate that individuals are more likely to vote far right when these parties contest the EU, but only if they do so in a context of societal polarization on the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does mainstream party positioning contribute to marginalising or legitimising niche party positions? This article argues that voter perceptions of the legitimacy and credibility of niche party positions play a role in individuals' propensity to vote for niche parties. It finds that the adoption of more restrictive immigration positions by mainstream parties increases the likelihood that those people who do not recognise the issue competence of radical right parties on immigration will vote radical right. However, for individuals who already perceive the radical right to be competent on immigration, mainstream party adoption of more restrictive immigration positions has no effect on propensity to vote radical right. In addition, the increase in the propensity of individuals to vote radical right is predominantly a function of mainstream left parties adopting more restrictive immigration positions. These results imply that mainstream parties risk fuelling radical right party support by adopting more restrictive immigration positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EJPR article 'A rising generation of Europeans?' provided systematic evidence for the existence of generational differences in attitudes towards the European Union (EU). In this research note, it is argued that identifying generational differences in specifically affective orientations is the crucial issue for the future of the EU. Drawing on and extending the earlier work expectations in respect to generational and life-cycle differences in affective orientations are developed and tested, highlighting the existence of the former, their consistency across a range of indicators, and the absence of the latter. The results are an important counterpoint to the growth in ambivalence in attitudes towards the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]