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Human migration has never been a one-way movement, but over the past several decades, there has been an increasing trend of peoples moving back to their “ancestral homelands.” South Korea is no exception. Beginning in the late-1980s, tens of thousands of ethnic Koreans have returned to South Korea, both on a temporary and permanent basis. There are both underlying and explicit processes and factors that make diasporic return possible, of which state policy—and more specifically diaspora engagement policy—is one of the most salient. This paper purports to identify and explain the forces that have shaped that policy. On the surface, this may not seem to be a particularly difficult task. Yet, under the surface, the issue is more complicated.

The inflow of migrant workers poses many challenges to an ethnically homogenous Korean society. They have different features with regard to citizenship. In this article, I analyze the citizenship of migrant workers in Korea from three dimensions – immigration policies, access to long-term and permanent residency and national citizenship, and the rights of migrant workers. First, I analyze requirements for employment and residency as stipulated in the Departures and Arrivals Control Act and the problems of differential application to target groups. Second, I discuss regulations in the Departures and Arrivals Control Act and the Nationality Act concerning the length of stay and requirements and process of applying for long-term and permanent residency, or Korean nationality. Third, I go over the basic rights of migrant workers: (1) civil rights; (2) social rights such as the rights to engage in work, the three primary rights of labor, social welfare rights, and the right to education of children of migrant ...

The Visit and Employment Program (VEP) for ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship was adopted in 2007 to resolve the 2001 ruling by the Constitutional Court on a provision of the Overseas Koreans Act which calls for differential treatment of overseas ethnic Koreans. Policies specific to ethnic return migration and international migration in general are continuously evolving in Korea. While the policy directives still tend to emphasize economic development, they seem to move toward a point of balance where potentially conflicting goals of promoting human rights, economic development, and a stable civic society can be achieved.

Unlike states in Europe, East Asia settles very few migrants and has not developed a European-style multicultural society. We seek to explain this variation using comparative analysis of two of the most advanced states in East Asia, South Korea and Japan, with several states in Europe. Focusing on family reunification - almost always the precursor to migrant settlement - we examine the effects of several independent variables, including supranational institutions, independent courts, interest groups, political culture, and the perceptions of migrants. We conclude that both Korea and Japan have less migrant settlement because of the lack of regional institutions pushing for family reunification rights, an elite political culture that still maintains the assumptions and repertoires of a “developmental state,” where rights may be sacrificed for economic growth and order, and migrant perceptions of greater immigration control in Asia.

Though nationhood is typically understood to be an equalizing or horizontal concept, the phenomenon of ethnic return migration has shown that states as well as societies can draw hierarchical distinctions between persons of the same ancestry. We demonstrate two dimensions — legal and social — of this `hierarchical nationhood' by analysing the South Korean policy and citizen attitudes regarding Joseonjok, or ethnic Korean Chinese citizens moving to South Korea. On the legal dimension, the Korean state defines Joseonjok as foreigners, allowing them entry mainly for low-wage jobs and excluding them from social benefits, while preferring them over other foreigners. The legal dimension of hierarchy is also institutionalized in a more favourable visa for Korean Americans that excludes Joseonjok. The social dimension of hierarchical nationhood is shown by public opinion data of Korean citizens towards Joseonjok foreign workers and data on reported experiences of discrimination. Finally, the authors show how Korea's hierarchical nationhood is shaped by economic and geopolitical goals, and describe analogous cases in Asia and Europe.

At the end of 2012, there were 1,445,000 foreigners from 199 different countries staying in South Korea (hereafter Korea). There are many different types of stayers in Korea — less- and highly skilled migrant workers, international marriage migrants, overseas ethnic-Korean visa-holders and permanent residents (see Seol, 2014). The number of immigrants by visa status in Korea is determined by demand in the host country’s labour and marriage markets, by Korean citizens’ attitude towards immigration and by the Korean government’s policy on immigration.

International marriage has increased drastically in South Korea in recent years, and by 2005, 13.6 per cent of marriages involved a foreign spouse. The purpose of this study is twofold: to explore the demographic demand and supply of foreign spouses in the marriage market in South Korea, and to examine how social positions of foreign wives vary by their place in the marriage market as determined by their nationality and ethnicity. Data show that the demand for foreign spouses is particularly strong among rural never-married and urban divorced Korean men. Among foreign wives, Chinese, especially Korean Chinese, tend to marry divorced Koreans, partly because many of them have also been married before. The Korean Chinese are the most autonomous among five groups of foreign wives examined, showing the highest rates of Korean citizenship, divorce-separation, and employment. Southeast Asian women tend to marry rural never-married men, and they are the most adaptive to the host society in the way they show among the highest rates of Korean citizenship and employment (after controlling for their poor Korean proficiency and short duration in Korea). Their divorce-separation rate is the lowest regardless of such control. This study demonstrates that marriage migrants adaptation to the host society differs significantly by nationality and ethnic origin.

Introduction The year of 1987 is a turning point not only in the history of Korea’s democratization but also in its international labor migration history. Around this year, outflow of indigenous workers has significantly decreased, while migrant workers from abroad started flowing into Korea to work. Since then, the number of foreign migrant workers rapidly increased with more diversity in their country of origin. Furthermore, Roh Tae-woo government’s Nordpolitik (North-bound Policy) opened up economic and cultural exchanges with China and the USSR and, in the process, the government actively hosted ethnic Koreans’ visit to Korea. Since then, the number ethnic Koreans from China (Joseonjok) and the former Soviet Union including Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Goryeoin) increased in Korea. Whether they were ethnic Korean visitors from China and the former Soviet Union or tourists from the less developed countries in East, South and Southeast Asia, the visitors and tourists settled in Korea as migrant workers. As their numbers increased, Korea became one of the labor-importing countries. The inflow of migrant workers was proof of success of the Korean government’s industrialization policy propelled since the 1960s. The labor market of Korea was suffering from labor shortage in manufacturing sectors. Citizens, having achieved a fast economic development, were no longer willing to take difficult, dirty and dangerous (so called “3-D”) jobs. Thus, small and medium size manufacturing firms and construction companies were experiencing chronic shortage of labor. Furthermore, when the Korean government eased restriction on Koreans traveling abroad, it equally allowed easy entrance to foreigners. As a result, Korea became a “country of opportunity,” where migrant workers could easily enter and find a job. The government, however, did not take any significant action to manage this new phenomenon until 1990. There was no identification card for the foreign migrant workers to legally work in Korea. No single foreign manual worker could find an appropriate document under the Departures and Arrivals Control Act (DACA), thus becoming an undocumented worker. In the pretext of copingwith the labor shortage, the government left the employment of undocumented migrant workers undisturbed until 1991 when it finally adopted the Industrial Technical Training Program (ITTP) for foreigners, which, however, imported “trainees” but not “workers.” ITTP was an expedient policy aimed at providing foreign labor to small and medium size business, while easing criticisms of the trade unions who opposed importation of a foreign labor force. ITTP was put into effect on November 1, 1991 and still exists today as the ITTP of Korean companies with foreign investments. The government designated the period of June 10 to July 31, 1992 as “voluntary self-report period for overstayers” and accepted applications to find out the situation of undocumented migrant workers in Korea. The number of undocumented migrant workers self-reported during that period was 61,126 and the number of employers was 10,796. The government extended the permitted overstay period until the end of that year. In addition, in September 1992, the government imported trainees and placed them in companies with no foreign investment records. Ten 3-D small and medium size manufacturing businesses which included dyeing, gliding, heat-treat, metal works, machinery, shoe manufacturing, glass-work, leather, electronics and electric work were permitted to employ a maximum of 10,000 industrial technical trainees with the recommendation from the Minister of Commerce and Industry. But this policy was suspended within a year since its start in April 1993 (Seol 1999: 118-119). The government tried to replace every undocumented migrant worker with industrial technical trainees by establishing the “1992 Voluntary Self-Report Period.” The government (Ministry of Industry and Commerce) on January 4, 1994 appointed the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSB, Junggihyeop) as the implementing body of ITTP to import industrial technical trainees. Afterwards, the Construction Association of Korea (CAK, Geonhyeop), the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives (NFFC, Suhyeop) and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF, Nonghyup) were added as implementing agencies of ITTP to recruit and manage the industrial technical trainees designated to construction, fisheries, and corporate farming sectors and pasture industries. Before the launch of the Employment Permit Program (EPP) for foreigners on August 17, 2004, ITTP was the key foreign labor policy of Korea. In most cases, “trainees” under the ITTP are not being trained for any specific jobs, but rather filling menial jobs that Koreans refuse to take. Since they are not classified as workers, they are denied the rights of regular workers in Korea, which includes unionizing, collective bargaining and collective action. Therefore, they are regarded as “disguised workers.” Although the formal foreign labor policy of Korea was ITTP, the Korean employers utilized undocumented workers much more than trainees (Seol and Skrentny 2004). Before the regularization of undocumented workers in September 2003, only 16 percent of foreign workers residing in Korea were industrial technical trainees and post-training workers, while 78 percent were undocumented migrant workers. The remaining 6 percent are professionals orhigh-skilled workers. Undocumented migrant workers alleviated Korea’s labor shortage and contributed to its economic development, but suffered from unpaid or delayed wages, industrial accidents, occupational illnesses and unreasonable lay-off or dismissal because of their illegal status (JCMK 2001; HRSWM 2002). The government’s foreign labor policy resulted in uncontrolled illegal overstays of migrant workers, human rights abuses and corruption in recruiting trainees (Seol et al. 2002). Migrant workers who worked in Korea during the late 1980s and early 1990s suffered from extreme wage delays or nonpayment, industrial accidents, physical assaults and sexual violence (see Yoo 1997; Hahm 1997; Seol and Han 2004). Nevertheless, there also were individuals who took care of the migrant workers when they became victims of such human rights violations, by organizing social groups to assist migrant workers. They have also asked the government to abolish ITTP. The government has modified its foreign labor policy when faced with the criticisms by NGOs. The Act on Employment of Foreign Workers, Etc. was passed in the Korean Assembly on July 31, 2003, which was officially announced on August 16 after a one year preparation period, and was put into effect on August 17, 2004. At the turning point of foreign labor policy, the objective of this chapter is to look into Korean citizens’ attitudes toward foreign migrant workers for the previous ten years. Koreans have formed their attitude toward migrant workers through direct encounters with them and have found solutions to the problems. The major actors of Korean society in this issue are small and medium size business owners or managers who employ migrant workers, fellow workers who interact with them in everyday life, trade union activists and human rights campaigners. I examine the responses of the different social groups to the influx of migrant workers in order to understand attitudes of accommodating migrant workers.

Due to recent upsurge in international marriages, the socio-cultural adaptation, the reinforcement of family stability, and the social integration support of marriage-based immigrant family have been the major social issues. This paper tries to show the current status of marriage-based immigrants and their children nation-wide. Specifically, it analyzes the statistical trends in international marriages, traits of marriage-based immigrants and their children, their attitudes towards child raising and education, and presents policy measures to enhance their life quality. (Korean J Pediatr 2009;52:403-409)