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Nobody should profit from crime; this fundamental moral principle is uncontroversial. At the level of public declaration, few people are likely to disagree with this statement; however, controversies arise when the implementation of this principle is under discussion. Numerous provisions exist that aim to strip criminals of the proceeds from their crimes, but not all aspects of this issue are immediately apparent. For example, a significant question is how to treat profits that a criminal makes from activities including recounting stories about their criminal activities, publishing books describing their actions, or creating YouTube videos presenting details about their crimes. Such profits are either treated as legitimate or are targeted by complicated legal methods of deprivation. The view presented in this paper could facilitate the ability to strip criminals from these forms of profit. This article argues that revenue accruing from knowledge gained from association with crime should be treated as indirect proceeds of crime and, as such, should be forfeited.

The cross-border character of the designer drugs crimes forced the UE countries to cooperate in criminal prosecution. At first sight, in European Union law, there are proper instruments to enforce such cooperation. The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant introduces the model of cross-border prosecution and abandons the requirement of double criminality in case of the group of the 32 crimes, listed in the Article 2 (2) of the FD EAW. The question is whether such a simple variant of EAW (without checking double criminality) may be enforced in designer drug cases. The work presents an argumentation that the normative meaning of Article 2 (2) of the FD EAW has to be established under European and international law. As long as a particular new drug is not internationally recognized as ‘psychotropic substance’ or ‘narcotic drug’, its trafficking cannot be treated as one of the 32 crimes, mentioned above.

Mr John Doe, a citizen of state X and a multimillionaire, has a serious heart problem. He needs an immediate transplant to survive. Unfortunately, the law of state X prohibits any kind of organ trafficking. Because of that fact, Mr Doe decides to travel to state Y, where such transactions are legal. What is more, under the provisions of Y’s law, it is allowed for a living person whose family is destitute to sell his or her organ and such a transaction could provide for the maintenance of the children of the donor until they become adults. Mr Doe finds such a person, a citizen of state Y, and makes a deal – he pays for euthanasia and transplantation and comes back to his country in good health. The above short story raises a question: “What shall state X do with Mr Doe upon his arrival?” Is everything correct? Can we, as a society, agree to such a patently criminal act which deserves condemnation? Should we try to fight them by domestic policy? Does the state have any authority over social situations that occur abroad? The answer to these questions is not simple and depends on factors specific to each situation. Further consideration contains the argumentation for the thesis that every state possesses wide competence to punish acts committed abroad. This competence is limited only by the duty of protection of values commonly respected internationally. This article presents a method of interpreting norms of national substantive criminal law in the international context, taking into account the achievements the theory of criminal law.

Dozór elektroniczny funkcjonuje w polskim systemie prawnym od 2007 roku, nowelizacją prawa karnego z 2015 roku zmieniono jednak całkowicie jego przeznaczenie. Obecnie wykorzystywany jest przy wykonywaniu kary ograniczenia wolności oraz przy środkach karnych i środkach zabezpieczających - wcześniej stanowił głównie sposób wykonywania krótkoterminowych kar pozbawienia wolności. Przepisy o dozorze elektronicznym stały się częścią k.k.w. i wprowadziły podział na trzy rodzaje dozoru: stacjonarny, zbliżeniowy oraz mobilny. W artykule omawiane są poszczególne rodzaje dozoru, wraz ze wskazaniem problemów, które mogą się pojawić w toku funkcjonowania nowych przepisów. Electronic surveillance is functioning in the Polish legal system since 2007, however, an novelisation of the criminal law of 2015 completely changed his usage. Nowadays electronic surveillance is used for the purpose of punishment of restriction of liability and for criminal and safety measures. Previously a main usage was connected with short-term imprisonment sentences. The provisions on electronic surveillance become part of the Executive Penal Code. There is division into 3 types of electronic surveillance: stationary, proximity and mobile. This article discusses various types of electronic surveillance and indicates some problems that may arise during the functioning of the new provisions.