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The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to review and report annually to the congressional defense committees on the ACV program until 2018. In April 2014 GAO produced the first of the mandated reports describing the status of the Marine Corps' efforts to initiate an ACV program. This second mandated report discusses (1) the current ACV acquisition approach and (2) how the ACV acquisition approach compares to acquisition management best practices. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed program documentation and other materials for the ACV acquisition, including Acquisition Decision Memorandums, relevant analyses of alternatives, and a briefing on the most recent analysis of alternatives update. GAO also reviewed documentation and budget information for the AAV Survivability Upgrade Program and the Marine Personnel Carrier program. GAO identified acquisition best practices based on its prior body of work in that area and DOD guidance. GAO also interviewed program and agency officials. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its efforts on this program are aligned with GAO s best practices and it will continue to monitor the program and ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. In GAO s upcoming review, additional analysis will assess how well the program is aligned with best practices., Report to Congressional Committees

Why the GAO Did This Study. Each year, the federal government spends billions of dollars to development and acquire advanced technologies in order to maintain U.S. superiority in military technology. The U.S. government permits and facilitates the sale and transfer of its technologies to allies in order to promote U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic interests. However, these technologies can be targets for theft, espionage, reverse engineering, illegal export, and other forms of unauthorized transfer. Accordingly, the U.S. government administers programs to identify and protect its critical technologies. GAO (1) assessed the progress of the various agencies' efforts and identified implementation challenges, if any, to reform programs and processes to protect critical technologies; and (2) determined the extent to which cognizant agencies are coordinating with stakeholder agencies on their respective reform efforts to ensure effective collaboration. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance, as well as documentation of agency initiatives to reform programs that protect critical technologies and interviewed officials from lead and stakeholder agencies., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Air Force s C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), which entered development in 2001, was to standardize and upgrade the cockpit and avionics for various configurations of the C-130 fleet. The C-130, a four-engine turboprop aircraft also known as Hercules that is used primarily for military transport, was originally designed in the 1950s. The AMP upgrades were intended to ensure that the C-130 can satisfy the navigation and safety requirements it needs to operate globally while at the same time reducing crew size by one. The program would also have replaced many systems for which manufacturers no longer exist a situation referred to as diminishing manufacturing sources. In 2007, the program experienced a critical breach of a statutory cost threshold,1 and in February 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) proposed cancelling the C-130 AMP. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA) stated that the Secretary of the Air Force may not cancel the program until 90 days after the Secretary provided the Congressional defense committees a cost benefit analysis conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The NDAA required the Secretary to seek an agreement with IDA to conduct an independent study of the costs and benefits of upgrading and modernizing the legacy C-130H airlift fleet via AMP compared to the costs and benefits of a reduced-scope program IDA began its work in March 2013 and produced the required study in September 2013, followed by a detailed annex in December 2013. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that we review IDA s analysis.

The Department of Defense (DOD), the federal government s largest purchaser of contractor-provided services, reported that it obligated about $187 billion more than half of its total contract obligations on service contracts in fiscal year 2012. DOD relies on contractors to perform functions as varied as professional and management support, information technology support, medical services, and weapon system and intelligence support. In recent years, Congress has enacted legislation to improve DOD s ability to manage its acquisition of services; to make more strategic decisions about the right workforce mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel; and to better align resource needs through the budget process to achieve that mix. For example, Section 2330a of title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to annually compile and, for the military services and defense agencies to review, an inventory of services contracted for or on behalf of DOD during the preceding fiscal year, in part, to help provide better insight into the number of contractor full-time equivalents (FTE) providing services to the department. Further, the military services and defense agencies are required to use the inventory to inform strategic workforce planning decisions, and DOD is required to use the inventory to better align resource needs through the budget process. Within DOD, the offices of the Comptroller and the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), and Personnel and Readiness (P&R) have shared responsibility for issuing guidance for compiling and reviewing the inventory.

The United States continues to face an uncertain and complicated security environment, as major disasters and emergencies, such as the Boston Marathon bombings and Hurricane Sandy illustrate. DOD supports civil authorities response to domestic incidents through an array of activities collectively termed civil support. In July 2012, DOD began to plan for federal military support during a complex catastrophe such as a large earthquake that causes extraordinary levels of casualties or damage, and cascading failures of critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to assess DOD s planning and capabilities for a complex catastrophe. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes, and (2) established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents. To do so, GAO analyzed civil support plans, guidance, and other documents, and interviewed DOD and FEMA officials., Report to Congressional Requesters.

Over the next couple of years, maintenance work available to the ship repair industrial base supporting Naval Station Mayport is expected to decrease. Section 1017 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required the Navy to analyze the costs and benefits of stationing additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Naval Station Mayport and to include other considerations. It also required GAO to provide an assessment of the Navy s analysis. The Navy provided its analysis in a report submitted to Congress on December 31, 2012. GAO s objectives were to describe the extent to which the Navy s analysis (1) demonstrated the use of applicable best practices for an analysis of costs and benefits and (2) provided information on other considerations, as required by Section 1017. In conducting our assessment, GAO identified applicable best practices for analyzing costs and benefits and discussed the Navy s documentation and methodology with knowledgeable officials. GAO also reviewed the information in the Navy s analysis, interviewed Navy and private ship repair firm officials, and visited Naval Station Mayport. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD and the Department of the Navy reviewed a draft of this report and did not have formal comments. The Navy provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate in the report., Report to Congressional Committees

Due in part to challenges the Department of Defense (DoD) faces in reducing excess infrastructure, DoD's Support Infrastructure Management is on GAO's High Risk List of program areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. Since 1988, DoD has relied on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process as a primary means of reducing excess infrastructure or capacity and realigning bases to meet changes in the size and structure of its forces. In 1998 and 2004, Congress required DoD to submit reports that, among other things, estimated the amount of DoD's excess capacity at that time. Also, in March 2012, DoD testified that it had about 20 percent excess capacity. The methods used to develop such preliminary excess capacity estimates differ from the data intensive process -- supplemented by military judgment -- that DoD has used to formulate specific base closure and realignment recommendations. A Senate Armed Services Committee report directed GAO to review how DoD identifies bases or facilities that are in excess of its needs. The objective of this report is to discuss how DoD has estimated its excess capacity, outside of the BRAC process. To do so, GAO reviewed excess capacity estimates from 1998, 2004, and 2012; analyzed DoD's data; reviewed supporting documentation; assessed assumptions and limitations of DoD's analysis; and interviewed DoD officials. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD stated that GAO had properly highlighted the limitations of its approach to estimating excess capacity and contrasted it with the method used to develop BRAC recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

The 2005 BRAC round was the biggest, most complex, costliest BRAC round ever. Unlike the four previous rounds, which focused on reducing infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense saw BRAC 2005 as a unique opportunity to adjust DoD's base structure to meet new challenges, such as international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and to meet future challenges, such as designating where forces returning from overseas would be located. While DoD's stated goals for BRAC 2005 included eliminating unneeded infrastructure, they also included furthering the transformation of DoD's force structure and fostering joint capabilities among the military services, resulting in recommendations of unprecedented scope and complexity. As GAO found in June 2012, BRAC implementation costs grew to about $35 billion, exceeding the initial 2005 estimate of $21 billion by 67 percent. As part of its fiscal year 2013 budget request, DoD asked for two more rounds of BRAC in 2013 and 2015. Congress has not acted on this request. As directed by the House Armed Services Committee, this report discusses lessons learned that could be applied if Congress chooses to authorize future BRAC rounds. GAO assessed the following: (1) how DoD estimated BRAC costs and savings and any ways in which its methodology could be improved, (2) OSD leadership over BRAC 2005, and (3) any legislative changes Congress may wish to make that could enhance oversight of any future round., Report to Congressional Committees.

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the federal government has undertaken extensive efforts to protect U.S. airspace. As a part of the federal government s overall efforts to protect U.S. airspace, the Department of Defense (DOD) performs Operation Noble Eagle, which consists of several missions, including aerospace control alert (ACA). The ACA mission includes aerospace control forces arrayed in a rapid response posture to conduct both air sovereignty and air defense operations against airborne threats. Among other things, this includes fighter aircraft and trained personnel on alert 24-hours a day, 365 days a year, at 16 alert basing locations across the contiguous United States and one each in Alaska and Hawaii to deter, respond to, and if necessary defeat airborne threats over the United States and Canada. These fighter aircraft and trained personnel can be the last line of multiple layers of the air defense of the United States. Our prior work has highlighted improvements and challenges in the planning and management of the ACA operation, including challenges related to the North American Aerospace Defense Command s (NORAD) and DOD s ability to balance risks, costs, and benefits when making decisions about the ACA operation. Specifically, in January 2009 we reported on shortcomings in DOD s management approach to the ACA operation. Among other things, we reported that NORAD faced difficulty determining the appropriate levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft for the ACA operation. We made five recommendations to DOD to improve management of the ACA operation, including conducting routine risk assessments as part of a risk-based management approach. DOD fully or partially agreed with all our recommendations. In January 2012, we reported that the Air Force had taken steps to implement one recommendation and partially implement the other four recommendations.

Why GAO Did This Study. Defending U.S. territory and citizens is the highest priority of DOD, and providing defense support of civil authorities is one of the department s primary missions. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility for homeland defense, whereas for civil support missions DOD provides assistance to the lead civilian federal agency, such as DHS, when requested by the agency or directed by the President for major disasters, emergencies, and special events. This report examines the extent to which DOD has issued current guidance, including doctrine, policy, and strategy, for its homeland defense and civil support missions. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD homeland defense and civil support guidance and plans and met with select DOD and National Guard officials. What GAO Recommends. This report makes several recommendations to address gaps in DOD s guidance for homeland defense and civil support, including for DOD to assess and, when needed, update its primary strategy; develop implementation guidance on the dualstatus commander construct; and align guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities. In comments on the draft report, DOD concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations. DOD concurred with our strategy and dual-status commander recommendations and partially concurred with our domestic cyber recommendation. DHS concurred with our domestic cyber recommendation., Report to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

Since 2002, the military services have introduced seven new camouflage uniforms with varying patterns and colors: two desert, two woodland, and three universal. In addition, the Army is developing new uniform options and estimates it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace its current uniform and associated protective gear. GAO was asked to review the services' development of new camouflage uniforms. This report addresses the following: (1) the extent to which DoD guidance provides a consistent decision process to ensure that new camouflage uniforms meet operational requirements; and (2) the extent to which the services have used a joint approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection, and manage costs. To do this, GAO reviewed DoD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and GAO acquisition guidance and key practices; examined statutory requirements and policies; interviewed defense officials; and collected and analyzed records about uniform development. GAO recommends that DoD take four actions to improve the development of camouflage uniforms and enhance collaboration among the services: ensure that the services have and use clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, establish joint criteria, develop policy to ensure equivalent protection levels, and pursue partnerships where applicable to help reduce costs. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified planned actions., Report to Congressional Requesters.

The Department of Defense (DOD) operates a complex, multibillion-dollar distribution system for delivering needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces across the world. DOD's goal in operating its global distribution system is to deliver the right item to the right place at the right time, and also at the right cost. The materiel distribution system covers multiple legs, from the movement of supplies in the continental United States to tactical movement on the battlefield, and must be capable of reaching its military customers whether they are located on large, well-established bases or at small, remote outposts. As we have reported, the federal government is facing serious long-term fiscal challenges, and DOD may confront increased competition over the next decade for federal discretionary funds. Given the fiscal environment DOD must operate in now and into the future, the distribution of supplies and equipment to the warfighter must be performed as effectively and efficiently as possible to ensure the best use of limited resources. Strategic guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012 emphasized that DOD must continue to reduce the cost of doing business, in particular finding further efficiencies in overhead, business practices, and support activities.

To assess DoD's cost estimates of implementing BRAC 2005, we examined the initial cost estimates in the BRAC Commission's Report to the President and compared them to our analyses of data in DoD's fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress. In addition, we discussed with the military departments' BRAC offices the reasons for cost increases and reviewed OSD's business plans for recommendations that had the largest increases in costs to determine the reasons for the changes, and discussed them with OSD officials, and officials in the military departments and defense agencies as appropriate. To evaluate changes in DoD's projected 20-year net present value estimates from the BRAC Commission's 2005 estimates, we examined the data in DoD's fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress. For consistency in making comparisons to the BRAC Commission's original estimates, we applied the same formulas and discount rate of 2.8 percent that the BRAC Commission used to calculate the 20-year net present value estimates in 2005. To evaluate changes in DoD's projected net annual recurring savings from the BRAC Commission's 2005 estimates through fiscal year 2011, we used data OSD provided to us for estimated savings in fiscal year 2012 -- the year after OSD expected all recommendations to be completed. We determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of addressing the objectives of this report. We performed this work from March 2012 to June 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, combined with an expected increase in human activity -- shipping traffic, oil and gas exploration, and tourism in the Arctic region -- could eventually increase the need for a U.S. military and homeland security presence in the Arctic. As a result, the Department of Defense (DoD) must begin preparing to access, operate, and protect national interests there. House Report 111-491 directed DoD to prepare a report on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, and specified five reporting elements that should be addressed. House Report 112-78 directed GAO to review DoD's report. GAO assessed the extent to which the following were accomplished: (1) DoD's Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Arctic Report) addressed the specified reporting elements, and (2) DoD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic. GAO analyzed DoD's Arctic Report and related documents and interviewed DoD and U.S. Coast Guard officials. GAO recommends that DoD develop a risk-based investment strategy and timeline for developing Arctic capabilities needed in the near-term; and establish a forum with the Coast Guard to identify collaborative Arctic capability investments over the long-term. DoD and the Department of Homeland Security generally agreed with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD officials are seeking to approach strategic communication as a process that leaders, planners, and operators should follow to integrate foreign audience perceptions into policy making, planning, and operations at every level. However, descriptions of strategic communication in several key documents including the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Framework for Strategic Communication characterize it differently. For example, the Quadrennial Defense Review describes strategic communication as the coordination of activities such as information operations2 and public affairs, among other things. According to DOD officials, these varying descriptions of strategic communication have created confusion within the department. To address this confusion, DOD is drafting an instruction to clarify the steps of the strategic communication process, which DOD officials expect to be completed in late spring or early summer 2012.

In the 11 years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has put forth extensive efforts to protect the nation's aviation sector and airspace. These efforts include air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations, for which the Air Force provides personnel and fully fueled, fully armed aircraft sitting on constant alert at 18 sites across the United States. In 2009, GAO found shortcomings in the Department of Defense's (DoD) management of ASA operations, leading to a number of GAO recommendations. For this report, GAO examined the extent to which the following recommendations have been met: (1) the Air Force has implemented GAO's 2009 recommendations, (2) DoD has implemented a risk-based management approach for ASA operations, and (3) the Air Force has accurately identified expenditures for ASA operations. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant strategies, planning documents, guidance, and expenditure data; and interviewed North American Aerospace Defense Command, Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and other DoD officials. Congress may wish to consider requiring the Air Force to fully implement GAO's 2009 recommendations. In addition, GAO recommends that DoD improve its risk management of ASA operations and improve the Air Force's ability to accurately identify ASA expenditures. DoD fully or partially agreed with all of GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

To carry out complex national security initiatives--such as combating illicit financing of terrorist activities, undertaking development projects in conflict zones, and countering piracy off the Horn of Africa--U.S. government agencies must coordinate with a large number of organizations in their planning efforts. Our prior work on the federal government's national security initiatives has determined that U.S. agencies face a number of challenges to effectively collaborating with one another, potentially resulting in gaps and overlaps in policy implementation. In particular, we have found that agencies face challenges to developing overarching strategies to achieve common goals, creating effective mechanisms for operating across agencies, and sharing sensitive information. For example, our work has shown that the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have different planning time frames than the Department of Defense (DOD), which poses a challenge for the three organizations.

Since 2008, the international community has taken steps to respond to the growing piracy problem, including patrols by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and others in waters near Somalia; the establishment of a multinational naval task force with a specific mandate to conduct counterpiracy operations; and several United Nations Security Council resolutions such as the one that led to the formation of a multilateral Contact Group to coordinate international counterpiracy efforts. Recognizing that vibrant maritime commerce underpins global economic security and is a vital national security issue, the United States has also developed policies and plans to collaborate with its international partners and to mobilize an interagency U.S. response. In December 2008, the National Security Council (NSC) published the Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan. The Action Plan seeks to involve all nations, international organizations, industry, and other entities with an interest in maritime security in taking steps to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa. The interagency initiatives of the Action Plan are to be coordinated and undertaken by DOD, as well as the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, subject to the availability of resources. The international community, shipping industry, and international military forces also have been instrumental in efforts to prevent and disrupt acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa and facilitate prosecutions of suspected pirates. Our recent report on this subject, published in September 2010, includes more information on the U.S. agencies and many of the key international and industry partners involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa with whom the United States collaborates and coordinates.

Afghanistan and Iraq, military medical personnel are among the first to arrive and the last to leave. Sustained U.S. involvement in these operations has placed stresses on the Department of Defense's (DOD) medical personnel. As the U.S. military role in Iraq and Afghanistan changes, the Army must adapt the number and mix of medical personnel it deploys. In response to Congress' continued interest in the services' medical personnel requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD has assessed its need for medical personnel in theater to support ongoing operations, (2) the Army has adapted the composition and use of medical units to provide advanced medical care, and (3) the Army fills medical personnel gaps that arise in theater. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD policies and procedures on identifying personnel requirements, deploying medical personnel, and filling medical personnel gaps in Iraq and Afghanistan, and interviewed officials. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that (1) DOD clarify the level of routine medical care that deployed DOD civilian employees can expect in theater and (2) the Army update its doctrine and the organizational design of split medical units. In response to a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense's (DOD) cost estimates to implement recommendations from the most recent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round have steadily increased each budget year since 2005. This BRAC round is the fifth such round undertaken by DOD since 1988 and, by our assessment, it is the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever. With this round, DOD plans to execute hundreds of BRAC actions affecting over 800 defense locations and relocate over 123,000 personnel. Before it can realize savings from BRAC, DOD must first invest billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front expenses. To implement BRAC 2005, DOD plans to spend nearly $35 billion-an unprecedented amount, given that it has spent only about $25 billion to implement the four previous BRAC rounds combined. At the outset of BRAC 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicated its intent to reshape DOD's installations and realign DOD forces to meet defense needs for the next 20 years. Moreover, both DOD and the BRAC Commission reported that their primary consideration in making recommendations for the BRAC 2005 round was military value. As such, instead of base closures, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations involve complex realignments, such as designating where military forces returning to the United States from overseas bases would be located; establishing joint military medical centers; creating joint bases; and reconfiguring the defense supply, storage, and distribution network. The BRAC statute requires DOD to implement all BRAC 2005 recommendations by September 15, 2011.

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has heavily used its reserve components -- the Army National Guard and Army Reserve -- for ongoing operations even though they were envisioned and resourced to be strategic reserves. A congressional commission, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Army have concluded that the Army will need to continue to use its reserve components as an operational force. The transition will require changes to force structure as well as manning and equipping strategies that could cost billions of dollars. The 2009 Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study this transition. This report provides additional information on the following: (1) progress and challenges the Army faces, (2) to what extent the Army has estimated costs for the transition and included them in its projected spending plans, and (3) the effect of the operational role on the Guard's availability to state governors for domestic missions. GAO examined planning, policy, and budget documents, and relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code; and met with DoD, Army, reserve component, and state officials. GAO recommends that the Army finalize an implementation plan and cost estimates for the transition to an operational force, and include transition costs in its funding plans. In comments on a draft of this report, DoD agreed with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD has begun planning for the construction, implementation, and operations and support for the European missile defense sites, including coordinating with international partners and U.S. stakeholders; however,several challenges remain that are affecting DOD's plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified the bilateral Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and bilateral supplementary agreements to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The ratification votes remain delayed, in part, because of a desire on the part of both the Polish and Czech parliaments to wait for an indication from the new U.S. administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses in Europe. As long as these agreements remain unratified, DOD's ability to finalize key details about how the sites will operate, such as whether security will be provided by the host nation, will be limited. Second, DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met before the transfer of specific European missile defense sites to the services. MDA has been directed by DOD since 2002 to begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel needed in order to deliver an effective transition of responsibility. In addition, our prior work assessing interagency collaboration has shown that agreed-upon roles and responsibilities that clarify who will do what, organize joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making are important to agencies' capability to enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts.

Since 1997, federal agencies have followed a common set of personnel security investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines for determining whether servicemembers, federal workers, private industry personnel, and others are eligible to receive security clearances. Security clearances are required for access to certain national security information, which is classified at one of three levels: top secret, secret, or confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of protection required for information and the amount of damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably cause to national security. The degrees of expected damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause are "exceptionally grave damage" for top secret information, "serious damage" for secret information, and "damage" for confidential information. We have previously reported problems-including significant delays in processing clearances-associated with DOD's security clearance processes, and in 2005, 2007, and again in 2009, we identified not only delays in completing the end-to-end clearance processing but also incomplete investigative and adjudicative reports. More recently, we reported that although the executive branch has met current IRTPA timeliness requirements-under which adjudicative agencies are to make a determination on at least 80 percent of all applications for a security clearance within 120 days, on average, after the date of receipt of the application-executive branch reports to Congress do not capture the full range of time that OPM and DOD took to make clearance determinations.

While DLA has taken steps to minimize potential disruptions to depot operations as a result of its planned consolidation efforts and has made progress in implementing the SS&D consolidation actions, the most difficult tasks still lie ahead, posing challenges for DLA in completing those actions. DLA has taken steps in its plans to mitigate risks to the depots mission by implementing a number of key actions several of which are considered best practices for organizational transformation such as ensuring that leadership drives the transformation and involving military stakeholders in decision making. Senior DLA officials we spoke to told us that they will consider consolidation actions complete when the agreed-upon SS&D functions, personnel positions, and associated personnel have been transferred from the military service to DLA and when related applicable military and DLA inventories have been physically consolidated. As of May 2009, the Air Force had completed the transfer of all positions and associated personnel at all 3 of its affected depots; the Navy had completed transfers at 4 of its 5 locations, and the Marine Corps and the Army had not yet begun to transfer positions. In addition, as of May 2009, DLA had not physically consolidated any inventories and the first is not scheduled to occur until August 2009, which represents a 3-month slippage from the milestones set forth at the beginning of our review. DLA does not currently plan to consolidate any inventories at 5 of the 13 locations 3 Army and 2 Marine Corps locations because, according to DLA and military service officials, neither of these services have any applicable inventories to consolidate.

In response to challenges the Department of Defense (DoD) was facing to repair, renovate, and construct military family housing, Congress enacted the Military Housing Privatization Initiative in 1996. The initiative enables DoD to leverage private sector resources to construct or renovate family housing. As of March 2009, DoD had awarded 94 projects and attracted over $22 billion in private financing. DoD plans to privatize 98 percent of its domestic family housing through 2012. Since GAO's last housing privatization report in 2006, major force structure initiatives have placed new demands on DoD for housing. GAO was asked to assess the following: (1) the progress of DoD's housing privatization program, (2) the occupancy rates of the housing projects, (3) the impact of various force structure initiatives and DoD's efforts to mitigate any challenges, and (4) the effect of financial market turmoil on some projects. To perform this work, GAO visited 13 installations with privatization projects; analyzed project performance data; and interviewed DoD officials, real estate consultants, and private developers. GAO recommends that DoD provide more current information on investment caps and the impact of the current financial market on projects in its semiannual report to Congress. In response to a draft of this report, DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations., Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

The concurrent implementation of several major Department of Defense (DoD) force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the ability of traditional military construction to provide enough permanent living and working space for service members and other DoD personnel. As a result, the services are using some movable -- or relocatable -- facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities, dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities to meet short-term needs. In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Committee on Armed Services directed GAO to review the subject. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is providing oversight of the services' use of relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure needs, and (2) DoD has a strategy for managing such facilities. GAO assessed data reported to OSD on relocatable use and cost as well as visited seven defense installations selected from those identified as having a sizeable number of relocatable facilities. GAO is making recommendations to improve OSD's oversight and management of the services' use of relocatable facilities by clarifying its definition of these facilities; developing a mechanism for collecting data on them; and developing a strategy for using, disposing of, and redistributing them. DoD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

Since September 11, 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in addition to funding in DoD's base budget. Prior GAO reports have found DoD's reported GWOT cost data unreliable and found problems with transparency over certain costs. In response, DoD has made several changes to its cost-reporting procedures. Congress has shown interest in increasing the transparency of DoD's cost reporting and funding requests for GWOT. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO assessed the following: (1) DoD's progress in improving the accuracy and reliability of its GWOT cost reporting, and (2) DoD's methodology for reporting GWOT costs by contingency operation. For this engagement, GAO analyzed GWOT cost data and applicable guidance, as well as DoD's corrective actions. GAO is recommending that DoD do the following: (1) establish a methodology for determining what portion of GWOT costs is attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom versus Operation Enduring Freedom, and (2) develop a plan and timetable for evaluating whether certain expenses are incremental and should continue to be funded outside of DoD's base budget. DoD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second., Report to Congressional Committees.

Why GAO Did This Study: A fundamental principle of military readiness is that the military must train as it intends to fight, and military training ranges allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to accomplish this goal. According to DOD officials, heightened focus on the application of environmental statutes has affected the use of its training areas. Since 2003, DOD has obtained exemptions from three environmental laws and has sought exemptions from three others. This report discusses the impact, if any, of (1) environmental laws on DOD's training activities and military readiness, (2) DOD's use of statutory exemptions from environmental laws on training activities, (3) DOD's use of statutory exemptions on the environment, and (4) the extent to which DOD has demonstrated the need for additional exemptions. To address these objectives, GAO visited 17 training locations; analyzed environmental impact and readiness reports; and met with officials at service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, federal regulatory agencies, and nongovernmental environmental groups., Report to Congressional Committees.

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most complex, and costliest ever. The Department of Defense (DoD) viewed this round as a unique opportunity to reshape its installations, realign forces to meet its needs for the next 20 years, and achieve savings. To realize savings, DoD must first invest billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front expenses to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, recent increases in estimated costs have become a concern to some members of Congress. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO did the following: (1) compared the BRAC Commission's cost and savings estimates to DoD's current estimates, (2) assessed the potential for change in DoD's current estimates, and (3) identified broad implementation challenges. GAO compared the BRAC Commission's estimates, which were the closest estimates available associated with final BRAC recommendations, to DoD's current estimates. GAO also visited 25 installations and major commands, and interviewed DoD officials. GAO recommends that DoD explain its estimated BRAC savings from personnel reductions as compared to other savings to provide more transparency to Congress. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendation and agreed to explain savings estimates in its BRAC budget material to Congress., Report to Congressional Addressees.

Why GAO Did This Study: The Department of Defense (DOD) operates one of the largest and most complex health systems in the nation and has a dual health care mission -- readiness and benefits. The readiness mission provides medical services and support to the armed forces during military operations. The benefits mission provides health care to over 9 million eligible beneficiaries, including active duty personnel, retirees, and dependents worldwide. Past GAO and other reports have recommended changes to the military health system (MHS) structure. GAO was asked to (1) describe the options for structuring a unified medical command recommended in recent studies by DOD and other organizations and (2) assess the extent to which DOD has identified the potential impact these options would have on the current MHS. GAO analyzed studies and reports prepared by DOD's Joint/Unified Medical Command Working Group, the Defense Business Board, and the Center for Naval Analyses, and interviewed department officials. What GAO Recommends: GAO is recommending that DOD address the expected benefits, costs, and risks for implementing the fourth option and provide Congress the results of its assessment. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.

COCOMs have taken numerous management and operational actions to prepare for an influenza pandemic, and the COCOMs' efforts are evolving. Each of DOD's nine COCOMs has established or intends to establish a working group to prepare for an influenza pandemic. Additionally, eight of he nine COCOMs have developed or are developing a pandemic influenza plan. Half of the COCOMs have conducted exercises to test their pandemic influenza plans and several are taking steps to address lessons learned. Five of the nine COCOMs have started to use various media, training programs, and outreach events to inform their personnel about pandemic influenza. Each of the geographic COCOMs has worked or plans to work with nations in its area of responsibility to raise awareness about and assess capabilities or responding to avian and pandemic influenza., Report to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.5 This guidance represents an important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations and DOD officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD learns more about the capabilities of UAS and other ISR assets and their application in combat operations. However, the guidance does not address, on a DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance coordination, which CENTCOM has recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient deployment and utilization of assets and by allowing the combatant commander time to plan to support incoming assets. In the absence of such guidance, CENTCOM has established procedures for the services to coordinate system requirements prior to ISR assets arriving into CENTCOM s theater of operations. These procedures apply only to CENTCOM s theater of operations. However, we found that CENTCOM s procedures for advance coordination were not always followed because the services indicated that they were not aware of the requirement. According to CENTCOM officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM s service components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, but were not aware if they were distributed further, and the service officials we interviewed were not aware of the requirement. As a result of this lack of advance coordination, CENTCOM is not always aware, on a timely basis, of assets entering theater, which can potentially exacerbate existing operational challenges such as limited interoperability and communications bandwidth.

From fiscal year 2001 through April 2007, Congress has provided DOD with about $454 billion for its efforts in support of GWOT. DOD has reported obligations of about $407.1 billion for military operations in support of the war from fiscal years 2001 through 2006 and from the beginning of fiscal year 2007 through February 2007, the latest available data. The $46.9 billion difference between DOD's GWOT appropriations and reported obligations can generally be attributed to certain fiscal year 2007 appropriations and multi-year funding for procurement; military construction; and research, development, test, and evaluation from previous GWOT-related appropriations that have yet to be obligated, and obligations for classified activities, which are not included in DOD's reported obligations. DOD's total reported obligations related to GWOT have demonstrated a steady annual increase each fiscal year through 2006.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has spent about $107 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. DoD has set key decision points for deciding whether to further invest in capabilities to destroy missiles during the initial phases after launch. In March 2006, DoD issued a report on these capabilities in response to two mandates. To satisfy a direction from the House Appropriations Committee, GAO agreed to review the report. To assist Congress in evaluating DoD's report and preparing for future decisions, GAO studied the extent to which DoD did the following: (1) analyzed technical and operational issues, and (2) presented complete cost information. To do so, GAO assessed the report's methodology, explanation of assumptions and their effects on results, and whether DoD followed key principles for developing life-cycle costs. The report DoD's Missile Defense Agency submitted to Congress in March 2006 included some useful technical and operational information on boost and ascent phase capabilities by describing these elements, listing upcoming decision points, and discussing geographic areas where boost and ascent elements could intercept missiles shortly after launch. However, the information in the report has several limitations because the analysis did not involve key DoD stakeholders such as the services and combatant commands in preparing the report and did not clearly explain modeling assumptions and their effects on results as required by relevant research standards. To support future decisions, DoD should include key stakeholders in assessing operational issues, report on technical progress, and update and verify life-cycle cost estimates in accordance with key principles for developing life-cycle costs. In comments on a draft of this report, DoD agreed to include stakeholders and assess technical progress but did not agree to prepare or report life-cycle costs in accordance with key principles., Report to Congressional Committees.