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How do scholars formulate arguments about economic inequality? What is the role of empirical analysis? In what ways, if any, is the debate informed by ethical considerations? In this paper, we address these questions by evaluating one of the main arguments in Thomas Piketty's 2014 book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, along with its endorsements and rebuttals. Applying Stephen Toulmin's model of arguments to Piketty unearths a complex argument structure that must be understood for an evaluation to be possible. Of particular importance are the warrants that Piketty used to justify his conclusions from the empirical material. Our analysis revealed that the most influential rebuttals were targeted not at Piketty's empirical inferences but the way he used these inferences to justify his claims. We also found value judgments to be an essential part of the justification process, making Piketty's claims ultimately embedded in ethical considerations. We conclude that value judgments are intrinsic to scholarly arguments not only in economic inequality debates but also more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of GeSec: Revista de Gestao e Secretariado is the property of Sindicato das Secretarias e Secretarios do Estado de Sao Paulo (SINSESP) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal for Business, Economics & Ethics / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts und Unternehmensethik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The field of social and behavior change communication (SBCC) has a history reaching back to the period of decolonization following World War II. Since that period, much has been learned about theories and methods pertinent to this communication subfield. One topic that has received too little attention is the ethical dimension of SBCC. This paper considers the need for an SBCC code of ethics and justification for such a code. Amartya Sen's capabilities approach and Habermas's discourse ethics are reviewed as substantial contributions to such a justification. Habermas's U and D principles are selected as especially useful when the criteria for communicative action are considered, including criteria related to validity claims and general symmetry conditions. The paper argues that discourse ethics is the most suitable general ethical approach for SBCC, offering both a theoretical foundation for SBCC ethics and guidelines for practice in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cadernos de Dereito Actual is the property of Asociacion Xuristas en Accion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this article is to thoroughly research Habermas’ view of technology with regard to his discourse ethics. In the first part of the article, Habermas’ theoretical starting points concerning the question of technology are presented. In the next segment, findings are presented, which can be traced mainly in an indirect way from Habermas’ discussions on media theory and from his theory of the colonization of the lifeworld. In the next step, Habermas’ relation to the phenomenon of mass media is addressed. The mass media are understood as a concrete expression of modern progress and are closely linked to technological development. In the last part of the article, Habermas’ relation to the internet is presented. The internet is widely considered an alternative to the mass media in modern times. The article presents a holistic analysis of Habermas’ relation to technology. It also presents some interesting findings regarding Habermas’ positioning towards the mass media and the internet.

In this article Habermas’s discourse ethics is critically interpreted. The article starts with a brief intellectual biography of Habermas (section 1), showing that his life and work has always had a strong ethical and political dimension – leading to the concept of discourse ethics. Next, it is indicated how Habermas’s work in the 1970s culminated via four steps in his major philosophical work – the Theory of Communicative Action (section 2) published in 1981. In the next two sections Habermas Theory of Communicative Action is applied to ethics and morality in the form of his discourse ethics – the heart of this contribution (section 3). In this process the following four aspects of Habermas’s discourse ethics are discussed: Its qualified Kantian deontological dimension, as well as its universalist, cognitivist, and formalist dimensions. In the following section (4) the discussion of discourse ethics is shifted to Habermas’s theory of law, deliberative politics, and democracy which is a further application of ideas developed in his Theory of Communicative Action. The contribution then ends with some critical remarks on Habermas discourse ethics and sketch of law and politics (section 5) Three arguments are presented in this regard. First, Habermas argument is judged to be too closely related to abstract rationality. Secondly the distinction that Habermas makes between morality and ethics is critically investigated. Finally, the Habermasian use of justification in his argument is critically compared with the concept of application. These points of criticism, though, indicate that the debate on Habermas’s discourse ethics is ongoing. Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article deals with the concept of discourse ethics (in the Kantian tradition of ethics) as developed firstly by Karel Otto Apel and later refined by Jurgen Habermas for his own purposes. The line of argumentation developed here has significant relevance for philosophy, moral theory, law, and theology. Discourse ethics can be considered as a contemporary version of Kantian deontological ethics after the linguistic turn.

Copyright of Co-herencia is the property of Universidad EAFIT and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article addresses Habermas’s recent critique of the digital age, and in particular the risks digital technologies pose to the systemic interaction between speakers within a democratic public sphere. For Habermas, a virtual bubble that exposes the citizens to unstable communication and post-truth narratives has been created. The article also discusses the architecture of discourse ethics by analyzing diverging foundational claims advanced by Apel’s and Habermas’s readings. In specific, these divergences regard: the notion of truth within a consensualist paradigm; the relationship between universal and contextual aspects; the question of justification from an epistemic perspective. The article argues that these divergences test the validity of the discursive approach in relation to the dematerialization of intersubjective relationships, as well as the communication with non-human entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary technologies renew and broaden the definition of communication far beyond the dichotomy of strategy-agreement, utility and the establishment of a common horizon of mutual understanding. Today, the relational pattern itself is made up of communication and information mediated by technologies. The living habitat of the human is not only the dimension of survival, but also a natural and cultural, social, urban landscape structured not for communicative exchange, but by the communication itself. In these profound transformations of human history, the relationship that human beings have with the world, with other subjects and with themselves is involved. The very meaning of ethics is therefore in question, since the living environment in which human beings constitute themselves and act has changed. In particular, one of the most interesting ethical proposal of the twentieth century, the discourse ethics by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, must be rethought, since the communicative environment has deeply changed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the extensive literature on what questionable research practices (QRPs) are and how to measure them, the normative underpinnings of such practices have remained less explored. QRPs often fall into a grey area of justifiable and unjustifiable practices. Where to precisely draw the line between such practices challenges individual scholars and this harms science. We investigate QRPs from a normative perspective using the theory of communicative action. We highlight the role of the collective in assessing individual behaviours. Our contribution is a framework that allows identification of when particular actions cross over from acceptable to unacceptable practice. Thus, this article provides grounds for developing scientific standards to raise the quality of scientific research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to thoroughly research Habermas’ view of technology with regard to his discourse ethics. In the first part of the article, Habermas’ theoretical starting points concerning the question of technology are presented. In the next segment, findings are presented, which can be traced mainly in an indirect way from Habermas’ discussions on media theory and from his theory of the colonization of the lifeworld. In the next step, Habermas’ relation to the phenomenon of mass media is addressed. The mass media are understood as a concrete expression of modern progress and are closely linked to technological development. In the last part of the article, Habermas’ relation to the internet is presented. The internet is widely considered an alternative to the mass media in modern times. The article presents a holistic analysis of Habermas’ relation to technology. It also presents some interesting findings regarding Habermas’ positioning towards the mass media and the internet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Noting that Benhabib's ethical theory has seldom been engaged with by sociologists of morality, this article introduces and interrogates Benhabib's ethical theory from a sociological perspective. It is argued that Benhabib's critiques of Enlightenment conceptions of morality complement sociological theories of morality. Her concepts of the 'concrete' and 'generalized' other and 'interactive universalism' can potentially inform recurrent debates in the sociology of morality about the extent to which cultural plurality precludes the possibility of sociologists providing normative judgements, and the extent to which certain features of moral experiences can be taken to be universal. However, Benhabib's argument that discourse ethics can provide a procedural means to judge between competing moral claims leads her to prioritize the perspective of 'postconventional' Western modernism as the means to adjudicate between the moral tolerability of cultural beliefs and practices. This leads her to characterize 'conventional' moral systems as subordinate, which succumbs to postcolonial critiques of the role of processes of domination in organizing the validity of moral claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Truth is an ethical relation. Facts, whether descriptions of the physical world or of historical events, are necessarily mediated by our frames of reference. This contingency opens a space for disagreement that cannot be adjudicated by an absolute standard of truth. For those seeking power or profit, the temptation to exploit this state of undecidability is strong. When many question the institutions that broker meaning – science, the professions, the media – rumors, misinformation, deliberate distortions and falsehoods all proliferate. In the digital age, the 'made' is swiftly supplanted by the made-up. The remedy for this predicament is not technological or factual, but ethical and social. The normative resources for this project lie in our everyday ethic of communication and in the ideal of democracy as shared authority. Whether we can address this predicament effectively is uncertain. But the nature of the problem is clear: It is not that we live in a 'post-truth' age, but rather that we are facing a crisis of democratic society as such. It is not so much that we lost sight of truth, as that we have lost sight of one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The profound influence of Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee's integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) on the field of business ethics has been challenged by Andreas Scherer and Guido Palazzo's Habermasian approach, which has achieved prominence of late with articles that expressly question the defensibility of ISCT's hypernorms. This article builds on recent efforts by Donaldson and Scherer to bridge their accounts by providing discursive foundations to the hypernorms at the heart of the ISCT framework. Extending prior literature, we propose an ISCT* framework designed to retain ISCT's practical virtue of managerial guidance while answering the demands of Scherer and Palazzo's discursive account. By subscribing to a suitable portfolio of discursively justified hypernorms, we argue, companies unlock the valuable moral guidance of ISCT*, which says to treat these hypernorms as unequivocal outer bounds to the pursuit of business and as a starting point to tailor local norms through discursive stakeholder engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years we have seen a newfound engagement with Jürgen Habermas's work in philosophy of education, focusing on his conception of argumentative dialogue, or discourse, as the origin of both truth‐related epistemic judgments and justifications of moral norms that claim rightness rather than truth. In this article, Krassimir Stojanov first reconstructs the way in which Habermas determines the relation between truth and rightness, and he then shows that moral rightness functions as a "truth‐analogue" since moral norms, like true facts, transcend the actual and local practices of their justification. In the case of moral rightness, this transcendence occurs as an infinite process of inclusion of the perspectives and interests of all potentially concerned persons — also (and foremost) the perspectives and interests of those who are strange to each other in their respective values, worldviews, and interests. With this account of "truth‐analogue" moral rightness, Habermas conceptualizes a kind of processual and "difference‐sensible" universalism, which is very different from the substantialist universalism of some traditional conceptions of education, or Bildung. In the final section, Stojanov shows why including children in their otherness as children in the discursive process of production of moral knowledge, and thus treating them with a kind of epistemic respect, is a constitutive condition for that process. The demand for the discursive inclusion of children follows from the discourse ethics approach, but it requires an enlargement and some corrections of that approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of indoctrination is typically used to characterize the actions of individual educators. However, it has become increasingly common for citizens to raise concerns about the indoctrinatory effects of institutions such as schools and universities. Are such worries fundamentally misconceived, or might some state of affairs obtain under which it can be rightly said that an educational institution is engaged in indoctrination? In this paper Christopher Martin outlines what the concept of institutional indoctrination could mean. He then uses Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory in order to develop a specific conception of institutional indoctrination: an educational institution indoctrinates when it exercises its authority in order to support the deliberative norm that some belief P ought to be exempt from tests of or challenges to its truth or rightness just because it is belief P. Martin argues that this norm undermines conditions of symmetrical and inclusive public discourse essential to the development of knowledge and understanding among free and equal citizens. That is, institutional indoctrination involves a closing of the public mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some ideas expressed in the collective monograph Universality in Morality (2020), edited by Ruben Apressyan, are here critically examined. The book is based on the results of a large-scale study by professional ethical philosophers devoted to the question of the nature of universality in morality and the mechanisms of universalisation of individual maxims and norms from antiquity to modern ethical theories, represented above all by the analytical tradition in philosophy. Of great interest is the analysis of related phenomena in morality, which makes it possible to determine the causes and nature of the transformation of morality in different eras and the accompanying change in the terminological apparatus of absolute ethical universalism, considered to be the starting point in the analysis of key modern concepts of moral universality. The article also suggests possible avenues for continued research in this area which could prompt modifications not only to the history of the concept of universality in morality, but also to our assessment of the contribution of individual authors and entire eras to the progress of human civilisation. This concerns above all the moral theory of contractarianism and the Enlightenment. Focus on their ideas goes a long way to determining the direction of current historical-philosophical research that reconstructs the history of ethical teachings and individual concepts. The importance attached today to a new view of the theory of the social contract, considered not only from socio-political but also from moral positions, forces us to approach in a new way the question concerning the universality of the key philosophical categories developed within this theory throughout its history. Elaborating the ideas set forth in the monograph, the author also stresses the relevance of the problem of justifying the thesis about the moral law as an analogue of the universal law of nature in the modern context.

This study attempts to measure the deliberation quality of the Democratic Opening Debates in the Turkish Parliament through the Discourse Quality Index (DQI). The majority of studies have been conducted on the deliberation quality of relatively homogenised and developed Western societies and on less conflictual or contentious topics. In these countries, democratic culture has been institutionalised. On the contrary, Turkey is a developing country and has been going through an ethnic conflict involving violence for many decades. Thus, this case study aims to make an original contribution to empirical deliberation studies. Researchers have examined the 88-page stenographic records of the Democratic Opening Debates and put forward a DQI score. According to the findings, the controversial debates fulfill only 40% of high-level deliberative discourse ethics. This result demonstrates that the ideal deliberation process does not exist in Turkey even though a convenient atmosphere is created for deliberations by means of official procedures. Ethnic division in the society has a profoundly negative impact on the quality of deliberations.

The transition from modern to postmodern society leads to changing expectations about the purpose and responsibility of leadership. Habermas’s social theory provides a useful analytical tool for understanding current societal transition processes and exploring their implications for the responsibility of business vis-à-vis society. We argue that integrative responsible leadership, in particular, can contribute to the reconciliation of business with societal goals. Integrative responsible leadership understood in a Habermasian way is not only a strategic endeavor but also a communicative endeavor. An essential part of integrative responsible leadership in light of the current societal transformation processes is the facilitation of discourses about a shared base of norms and values. This is exemplified alongside current societal developments like the European migration crisis or the emerging nationalist and fundamentalist movements in some countries. We specify how and when leadership should resort to communicative action and discuss the implications for leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the first of two special issues on philosophical approaches to leadership ethics. In it, we show some of the ways that philosophy contributes to the study of leadership and leadership ethics. We begin with an overview of how philosophers have treated some of the ethical aspects and challenges of leadership. These include discussions of self-interest, the problem of dirty hands, responsibility, moral luck, power, gender and diversity, and spirituality. The articles in this issue draw on philosophy to explore a variety of ethical questions related to leadership and the relationships that leaders have with followers and others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have been invited to reflect on "Discourse communities and the discourses of experience" a paper co-authored by Little, Jordens, and Sayers and discuss how their analysis of discourse communities has influenced the development of bioethics and consider its influence now and potential effects in the future. Their paper examines the way different discourse communities are shaped by different experiences and desires. The shared language and experiences can provide a sense of belonging and familiarity. These can be positive aspects of a discourse community, but there are also risks restricting the voices and experiences that can be heard and recognized. In this essay I hope to weave together three threads: an analysis of Little, Jordens, and Sayer's research on discourse communities; the narrative interview I conducted with Little about his own experiences in establishing a bioethics centre; and my own experience of the bioethical discourse community established by Little. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initially offered as a digital public sphere forum, comments sections became the preferred democratic arena for gatekeepers to encourage their readers to engage in constructive dialogue about relevant issues. However, news sites require commenters to remain civil in their interactions, which led users to seek alternative ways of commenting on the news. This article explores in-depth the contents of a sample of 98,426 user-comments collected between February–March 2019 from three major Spanish digital native newspapers: ElDiario.es, ElEspañol.com, and ElConfidencial.com. The main goals were to analyze whether comments in news outlets are deliberative, to assess the quality of the debate that takes place in them, and to describe their specific features. Discourse ethics were explored to determine the discussions’ impact, the language used, the acceptance of arguments, and the recognition and civility of participants. Findings reveal that comments sections in news outlets do not have a dialogic nature and that the debates have a low-quality profile. Nonetheless, the degree of mutual respect in interaction is acceptable, with slightly observed levels of incivility. Finally, the data suggest that the focused comments are higher on social media and that memes and emojis represent a new form of digital discourse.

By synthesizing the argumentation theory of new rhetoric with research on heuristics and motivated reasoning, we develop a conceptual view of argumentation based on reasoning motivations that sheds new light on the morality of decision-making. Accordingly, we propose that reasoning in eristic argumentation is motivated by psychological (e.g., anxiety reduction) or material (e.g., vested interests) gains that do not depend on resolving the problem in question truthfully. Contrary to heuristic argumentation, in which disputants genuinely argue to reach a practically rational solution, eristic argumentation aims to defeat the counterparty rather than seeking a reasonable solution. Eristic argumentation is susceptible to arbitrariness and power abuses; therefore, it is inappropriate for making moral judgments with the exception of judgments concerning moral taboos, which are closed to argumentation by their nature. Eristic argumentation is also problematic for strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making because it impedes the search for the right heuristic under uncertainty as an ecologically rational choice. However, our theoretical view emphasizes that under extreme uncertainty, where heuristic solutions are as fallible as any guesses, pretense reasoning by eristic argumentation may be instrumental for its adaptive benefits. Expanding the concept of eristic argumentation based on reasoning motivations opens a new path for studying the psychology of reasoning in connection to morality and decision-making under uncertainty. We discuss the implications of our theoretical view to relevant research streams, including ethical, strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Laguna: Revista de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Social entrepreneurship is not just an objective description of a phenomenon; it also carries a positive normative connotation. However, the academic discourse barely reflects social entrepreneurship's inherent normativity and often grounds it implicitly on the mission of a social enterprise. In this paper, we argue critically that it is insufficient to ground social entrepreneurship's inherent normativity on a social mission. Instead, we will show how such a mission-centric conception of social entrepreneurship, when put into practice, is prone to enhance rather than diminish societal grievances. In order to give social entrepreneurship an explicit and sound ethical grounding, we draw on integrative economic ethics as a frame of reference. From this perspective, social entrepreneurship necessitates adherence to the discourse-ethically reasoned moral principle in order to live up to its inherent normative validity claim of good entrepreneurship. The consideration of social entrepreneurship practices is crucial to make this approach less vulnerable to ethical critique. The addition of a practice dimension overcomes the mission-centric view of social entrepreneurship and opens up a typology of enterprise forms, thereby enabling a more fine-grained distinction between social enterprises and other forms of organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]