Search

During the last four decades, researchers have observed an increase of the mean age at birth in developed economies (e.g., Frejka and Sardon, 2006). Despite the plethora of studies that incorporate endogenous fertility in models of economic growth (e.g., Galor and Weil, 2000; Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; de la Croix and Doepke, 2009; Vogl, 2016; Strulik, 2017; Futagami and Konishi, 2019), only a limited number have explicitly considered issues pertaining to the timing of childbearing (Iyigun, 2000; Momota and Horii, 2013; d'Albis et al., 2018). In this paper, we present a growth model whose novelty is to explicitly account for the direct, preference-related factors that reinforce the delay in the timing of childbearing. We show that an intermediate stage of demographic change in a developed economy, where cohort fertility actually recuperates, emerges if and only if this preferencerelated factor contributes to the postponement of parenthood. This outcome is consistent with existing views and evidence that link the recuperation of fertility rates to culturally-induced changes that directly affect people's preferences (e.g., Arpino et al., 2015; Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015; Feichtinger et al., 2017; Beaujouan, 2020). Nonetheless, the model also shows that the trend reversal from declining to increasing cohort fertility is followed by yet another reversal towards once more decreasing fertility rates. This latest phase of demographic change will eventually lead to a cohort fertility that is even lower compared to the one that marked the onset of the fertility rate's recuperation. This outcome has major policy implications: It implies that, even when the rebound the fertility is a true change in demographic trends, it is still a temporary one. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis of our results verifies that our model provides a good fit for actual data of the rebound of the completed cohort fertility rates in Nordic countries. The fact that these countries are widely considered as the most progressive ones, in terms of their cultural norms and in terms of their family-oriented policies, offers credence to the hypothesis that our model advances. More generally, our framework provides a platform for research that can uncover empirically relevant, but yet unexplored, mechanisms in the joint analysis of demographic change and economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation & Objective: In recent years, a growing body of research employed models that incorporate elements of cultural change to investigate issues pertaining to economic growth and comparative economic development. However, one cultural aspect that has eluded the attention of researchers involves the role of economic materialism, i.e., the set of values, beliefs, personality traits and attitudes that attach significant importance to the pursuit of material goals, thus promoting the acquisition and consumption of material goods. This oversight is by no means warranted though. On the contrary, it obscures the role of an important cultural factor for economic progress. The objective of this study is to fill this gap, by highlighting the role of economic materialism as a cultural phenomenon of significance in relation to economic transformation and development. Methodology: We construct a model in which we divide the population into two groups that differ in their evaluation of the consumption of material goods for their utilities. Non-materialists only care about the goods they consume. Materialists, on the other hand, have material aspirations, in the sense that the also care about how their standards of living compare to those of their predecessors. The distribution of preferences among the population is endogenous, as it evolves through an intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. Productivity improvements are also endogenous, as they require purposeful investments by agents - activities such as innovation, learning and research - thus enabling them to increase the output they produce. Results: We show that an endogenous cultural change towards more widespread adherence to materialistic values is both a cause and an effect of productivity growth. The main mechanisms of the model are the following: Only materialists find optimal to undertake productivity-enhancing activities, as this choice offers them the income necessary to gratify their material aspirations. At the same time, productivity growth induces more intense cultural instruction in families with materialist parents; consequently, it causes a more widespread adherence to the values and attitudes of economic materialism. Thus, the economy follows a path where the mutuallyreinforcing impact of productivity improvements and more widespread adherence to economic materialism, provides the foundation for the take-off towards sustained economic growth, and shapes long-run cultural outcomes in the sense that, gradually, a significant fraction of the population will end up upholding materialistic values. We also present numerical examples to investigate the quantitative performance of our framework. The model's calibration shows that it performs reasonably well in capturing the differences in the evolution of productivity and income per capita between European countries, from 1500 to 1880. Implications: A cultural-economic complementarity (i) is a powerful mechanism of endogenous productivity growth, and (ii) also determines the prevalence of different cultural values vis-à-vis the prominence of material objectives. In this respect, our study contributes to a better understanding of important, yet unexplored, issues pertaining to comparative economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well documented that individuals are concerned with social comparisons and status, particularly as it pertains to consumption. This paper advances the hypothesis that the degree to which individuals in a society are concerned with status is determined by that society's stage of development, which we proxy by its average level of wealth. Social comparisons in terms of consumption seem to be more important during the early stages of development rather than in later stages, due to, among other factors, the evolution of institutions (education), culture, and social norms that are opposed to, or at least discourage, conspicuous consumption activities. To address this process, we endogenize the degree of status concern, by relating it to average national wealth, and demonstrate that over time, as a country develops, this degree (with respect to consumption) declines. We refer to this mechanism as \endogenous dynamic status preferences." While this is a natural departure from standard assumptions, dynamic status preferences lead to dramatic changes in the implications of the basic model. Our theory replicates the contradictory historical facts of an increasing saving rate along with declining returns to capital over time. Within an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model, we provide a new mechanism to explain the saving rate dynamics (a rising- or inversely U-shaped transitional path) and the comparative development of income inequality across countries. We advance our knowledge about the development of income and wealth inequality by complementing the work of Caselli and Ventura (2000) and Piketty (2014) by introducing a dynamic behavioral factor, as opposed to their technological vehicle. The advantage of our behavioral mechanism is that it can explain the development of income inequality even after economies have technologically been converged (e.g. US vs Europe, Fig. 1 vs Fig. 2). In particular, we showed that differentials in the strength of the dynamic status effect can propagate variation of income inequality that is attributed to the differential response of agents to productivity shocks rather than a technological bias on the factor of production as in Piketty (2014). As a policy implication, our theory suggests that policies that target productivity advancement towards increasing the income of the poor countries may not be sufficient to reduce income inequality when poor countries direct their income to unproductive" uses such as status goods consumption. Instead, institutions that support ways behavioral changes (like educational institutions) turn out to be more effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we unify existing theories and empirical evidence on the origins of obesity and examine the effects of fiscal policy on the dynamic evolution of weight. We build a dynamic general equilibrium growth model, with two sectors, one producing food and the other producing a composite consumption good. Weight is a function of rational choice as well as labor allocation between the two sectors. By estimating utility from weight and calibrating the US economy we show that (i) technological advances in agriculture decrease food prices and increase weight but not necessarily through higher food consumption but through lower calorie expenditure, (ii) reducing capital taxation, initially depresses weight levels through higher food prices; steady state food consumption decreases due to a price substitution effect but weight soars due to lower calorie expenditure, (iii) reducing taxation on food increases food consumption and weight levels in equilibrium. Labor reallocation towards the less sedentary sector on one hand and higher income on the other function as contradictory forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]