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This article analyses attempts by the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the sovereign wealth fund of Libya, to challenge the domestic implementation of asset-freezing measures requested by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy. The UNSC requested that states freeze LIA assets in early 2011 before partially easing the restrictions imposed in September of the same year, while the ICC requested the freezing of assets belonging to the then Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and two further accused persons shortly thereafter. The article scrutinises how these measures were incorporated into the legal orders of the UK and Italy before analysing how the LIA has challenged these actions in the Italian courts and those of England and Wales. In so doing, it aims to demonstrate that domestic courts offer additional fora in which individuals (and entities) might seek to enforce the legal protection to which they are entitled when faced with their assets having been frozen by states at the request of the UNSC and/or the ICC.

Aiming to improve connectivity by building ‘roads’ that will channel economic development and achieve certain geopolitical and strategic objectives, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a critical element in China’s more comprehensive strategic play for a new and enhanced role in global economic governance. While often hyped by some as a modern form of the Marshall Plan, the BRI has been built on a weak foundation which threatens the economic and geopolitical objectives of the Initiative. This article focuses on the security of the Chinese international investment regime for private and state-owned investors confronting political and legal risks in BRI projects in various countries. Perhaps the greatest legal risk to Chinese investors is that China’s network of international investment treaties is insufficient to deal with the risks that Chinese investors face. After reviewing specific provisions and jurisprudence stemming from China’s treaties, the article provides possible mitigation strategies and solutions which China and investors can use to mitigate such risks

This article examines the interaction between United Nations Security Council sanctions and the transnational governance of sovereign wealth funds through the lens of the experience of the Libyan Investment Authority, the sovereign wealth fund of Libya. The fund is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, a group of sovereign wealth funds whose members endorse the Santiago Principles, a set of guiding principles aimed at improving the governance, independence, and transparency of such entities. In early 2011, the United Nations Security Council requested States to freeze the assets of the Libyan Investment Authority because of their potential utility to then Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, as a source of funding for his regime, which was engaged in a civil war with rebel forces. These assets remain frozen, seven years after Gaddafi’s death in October 2011. This article critically analyzes the establishment and governance of the Libyan Investment Authority, and the impact of the continued sanctions on its assets. The article questions the contemporary validity of the narrative summary of reasons provided by the Libya Sanctions Committee for the fund’s present listing, arguing instead that the latter stems from the threat of potential misappropriation as a result of governance issues. The article proposes that engagement by the fund with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and adherence to the Santiago Principles are vital for its better governance and could equally help to address longstanding problems related to transparency and risk management. At the same time, such institutional engagement will help the fund to meet its objectives as laid out in its constituent law and to operate for the benefit of the people of Libya, for whom it was established.

Aiming to improve connectivity by building ‘roads’ that will channel economic development and achieve certain geopolitical and strategic objectives, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a critical element in China’s more comprehensive strategic play for a new and enhanced role in global economic governance. While often hyped by some as a modern form of the Marshall Plan, the BRI has been built on a weak foundation which threatens the economic and geopolitical objectives of the Initiative. This article focuses on the security of the Chinese international investment regime for private and state-owned investors confronting political and legal risks in BRI projects in various countries. Perhaps the greatest legal risk to Chinese investors is that China’s network of international investment treaties is insufficient to deal with the risks that Chinese investors face. After reviewing specific provisions and jurisprudence stemming from China’s treaties, the article provides possible mitigation strategies and solutions which China and investors can use to mitigate such risks.

Key Points: - As part of a long-term strategy, China needs to improve investment treaty network to enhance protections for foreign investors. - In the short and medium-term, investors need to carefully consider investment insurance products to protect their foreign investments. - BRI investors need to be aware of existing venues for the solution of BRI disputes, such as the HKIAC, CIETAC, and the newly established CICC. - Mediation is a viable and increasingly effective way to solve BRI disputes.

Mainland Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and construction projects in countries in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) have increased by 85% and 33%, respectively, since the start of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with growth concentrated in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.Although most countries have effectively controlled the spread of COVID-19, the pandemic has led to recessions in most countries, leading to delays but not cancellation of the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI) projects. Countries in Southeast Asia are part of a large and increasing number of multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements that enhance their attractiveness as global value chains are adjusted in response to the US-China trade war and the pandemic.The majority of mainland Chinese greenfield FDI in ASEAN is in the resource sector. In some countries, Chinese companies are increasing both greenfield and brownfield investments in renewable energy projects.In most countries in Southeast Asia, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a leading role in large mainland Chinese FDI projects. At the same time, the role of private enterprises is also significant and increasing faster than SOEs in most of the countries studied.Some mainland Chinese projects have been criticised for not complying with local regulations, treating local workers unfairly, or polluting the environment. Mainland Chinese firms can avoid such unwanted outcomes by doing due diligence in evaluating the economic, social and environmental impacts of proposed projects ahead of time, and by improving their engagement with affected groups.

Vietnam is increasingly participating in the global economic integration as part of its strategy in transition into a free market economy, and has recently concluded the negotiations with the European Union (EU) on the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA). The EVFTA is the first Vietnam concluded FTA that specifies obligations with particular emphasis on trade defence instruments. This article analyses the international, as well as Vietnamese legal framework in light of the trade commitments under the EVFTA trade defence instruments. The article examines the situation in Vietnam with regard to compliance both in law and practice with commitments in the aspects of anti-dumping, subsidies and safeguards. This article further identifies the main gaps, including enforcement issues and provides relevant recommendations on the necessary legal steps and timeframes (new acts, amendments or repeal of existing legal texts) to promote the consistency of the Vietnamese legal system with the EVFTA obligations. The analysis also assesses the impact on the Vietnamese legal system of specific parts of the EVFTA. In totality, the EVFTA rules, reviewed in this article, do not contain highly demanding norms which would be expected to affect a great number of domestic rules. Rather, the EVFTA contains soft commitments with limited implementation issues which suggest and support reforms in Vietnam with regards to trade defence, and indirectly, state-owned enterprises and competition law.

Investments from emerging economies have increased since the beginning of the century and notably a large proportion of the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) coming from emerging economies is executed by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) both typical contemporary forms of State Controlled Entities (SCEs). Such trend that has been further reinforced since 2008/2009 and SCE’s investment activism has reflected into a systemic shift that has transformed State capitalism into a key feature of contemporary global economy. At the time, investment arbitration, which was designed to allow foreign private investors to sue sovereign States, has transformed since host States can now be judged at the initiative of another State owning enterprises making investments. The thesis of this chapter is that the international regime for foreign investment, which includes both substantive rules and arbitration principles, is gradually adjusting to the emergence of SCEs in the investment sphere. This adjustment implicitly means that the rules and practice of international investment are reshaped by actors, which were not initially at the center of the regime. Actually, and it is a great paradox, the regime for foreign investment, as designed in the last three decades, was intended to serve the interest of private investors, seen as the main driver of the global economy. Instead of excluding SCEs from its realm and favoring the emergence of different rules, the international investment regime is gradually absorbing State capitalism and allows foreign SCEs to sue host States before arbitration. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the forces driving this transformation, of the flexibility of the international norms that apply to SCEs, of the rights that SCEs are acquiring, and, finally of the increased exposure of sovereign States to be judged by international tribunals at the initiative of other States. The chapter initially deals with the relevant norms of international economic law to understand which would best fit the need of SCEs in their transnational activities. Then the following section addresses the critical issue of the legal standing of SCEs under investment treaties since it determines the ability of SCEs to effectively benefit from the investment treaties protections through investor-State arbitration. In addition the chapter reviews a number of cases in which the legal standing of SCEs has been discussed. Finally, the chapter analyses the substantive rights which can benefit SCEs and which will drive the investment strategies of many SCEs in the coming years.