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In his latest book Mechanical Choices, Michael Moore provides an explication and defence of the idea that responsibility comes in degrees. His account takes as its point of departure the view that free action and free will consist in the holding of certain counterfactuals. In this paper, I argue that Moore's view faces several familiar counterexamples, all of which serve to motivate Harry Frankfurt's classic insight that whether and to what extent one is responsible for one's action has more to do with what actually caused that action than with what one could or couldn't have done instead. I then go on to sketch an alternative approach to degrees of responsibility that takes seriously this insight. I'll argue that Moore ought to be sympathetic to this approach, inasmuch as it combines two familiar Moorean ideas: the idea that causal contribution comes in degrees, and the idea that acting freely is compatible with, and indeed entails, the fact that one's action was caused by prior states of affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal responsibility is a basic principle in holding individuals to account for criminal actions. Making exemptions to criminal responsibility when individuals cannot be held responsible for their actions is equally central, and most countries have frameworks allowing for such exemptions for reasons of serious mental health problems. However, despite the recent years' enormous interests in the possible links between individual 'mental health' and involvement in terrorism, the issue of criminal responsibility has apparently so far not been the subject of much interest in the field of terrorism research. This Research Note makes the simple point that criminal responsibility should be of particular interest to terrorism researchers, for two main reasons: the centrality of (political, religious, ideological) motivations for defining a crime as terrorism-related and the sometimes-difficult boundary-setting between such motivations and (psychotic) delusions; and the political nature of terrorism-related crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The defence of diminished responsibility reduces a murder conviction to one of manslaughter where the defendant successfully demonstrates that their actions were impaired by a recognized medical condition. While this partial defence to murder exists in several common law jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, it is not recognized in Canada. This paper explores whether diminished responsibility should find its way into Canadian law. To do so, Part I of this paper contends that the current state of defences applicable to homicide laws is crying out for further reflection and legislative reform. Part II then critically examines diminished responsibility as enacted in the United Kingdom. Part III explores alternatives to the defence of diminished responsibility and concludes that, despite its imperfections, the defence of diminished responsibility ensures that convictions and sentences are commensurate to the level of moral blameworthiness, given that a murder conviction carries the most severe stigma and punishment. Consequently, the defence should be recognized in Canadian criminal law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stigma is an established consequence of the Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) diagnosis. This diagnosis is subject to revision in the International Classification of Diseases–11th Revision (ICD–11). Using the legal issue of diminished responsibility, this study applied an experimental mock-jury methodology to explore the impact of diagnostic stigma of BPD on jury decision-making. Participants were allocated to one of two versions of a simplified fictitious homicide trial. The group whose defendant was described as having a 'severe personality disorder, borderline pattern' rated the defendant as more dangerous, and more in need of segregation and coercive treatment, than controls where the defendant was described as having a 'complex mental health problem'. Between-group differences in other measures, including the decision to agree a verdict of diminished responsibility, were not found. The ICD-11 'severe personality disorder, borderline pattern' diagnosis may adversely impact the attitudes of jurors considering the question of diminished responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The defence of mental incapacity raises unique challenges in the particular context of mass atrocity and international criminal law. Yet, it has remained largely unexplored in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. The Trial Chamber judgment issued by the International Criminal Court in the case of Dominic Ongwen offered a unique opportunity to remedy this and clarify the legal contours of the defence. Unfortunately, the court engaged minimally with these issues. This article examines the court's reasoning in the Ongwen case and the lessons that may be learnt from it about the operation of the defence, particularly in relation to the treatment of expert evidence. It is contended that while there were significant shortcomings in the claim put forward by Ongwen in the aftermath of the judgment, the prospects of advancing a successful defence of mental incapacity based on control-related disorders in the future appear limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main issues before the CFA were whether the discretion exercised by the CA miscarried and, if so, whether a third retrial should be ordered upon the CFA's exercise of discretion. Keywords: Retrial; discretion; murder; provocation; diminished responsibility EN Retrial discretion murder provocation diminished responsibility 138 142 5 05/19/22 20220401 NES 220401 Legislation: Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap.221) s.83E(1) This is an unusual case with a tragic background. The CFA could have laid down some presumption(s) applicable to the exercise of discretion in the context of ordering a retrial, or specifically to an order of third retrial. [Extracted from the article]

The sex-specific doctrine of infanticide provides a merciful method of dealing with women who kill their newborn children in circumstances of psychological distress. This article examines the contentious medical rationale which underpins infanticide legislation with the purpose of providing a substantiated argument for the abolition of this antiquated doctrine. Specifically, a two-pronged approach is taken. First, by utilising the views of contemporary medical science, the scientific credibility of the medical rationale is scrutinised. Second, by drawing upon feminist legal theory, a myriad of concerns associated with the medicalisation of female offenders are critically discussed. Ultimately, it is suggested that the offence/defence of infanticide should be abolished and that crimes of this nature should be readily subsumed under the current partial defence of diminished responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following from the Scottish Law Commission's Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility, the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 codified the plea of diminished responsibility. Part of the justification for this codification arose from the need to clarify the rule in relation to drugs and alcohol. With this change there existed scope to develop the plea in a way which appreciated the complex interplay between mental conditions and intoxication- something which was absent under common law. At a time when mental health law is under review in Scotland, this paper seeks to examine the landscape of diminished responsibility, asking whether s51B is able to properly appreciate the realities of offending and whether it is applied to all accused fairly and consistently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bias-apparent or actual bias-defendant charged with murder but claiming diminished responsibility on basis of drug addiction-juror sending notes tojudge containing apparent moral judgments-whether judge wrong not to discharge juror. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Expert Shopping": Appeals Adducing Fresh Evidence in Diminished Responsibility Cases: R v Foy [2020] EWCA Crim 270 Keywords: Murder; manslaughter; diminished responsibility; fresh evidence; expert evidence; intoxication; appeals EN Murder manslaughter diminished responsibility fresh evidence expert evidence intoxication appeals 249 254 6 06/06/20 20200601 NES 200601 Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act (CAA) 1968 provides the framework for the admission of fresh evidence in criminal appeals in the Court of Appeal. Without the support of Dr Isaac, and without other psychiatric evidence to rely upon, F abandoned the defence of diminished responsibility prior to trial. Between [50] and [65], Davis LJ drew a distinction between the circumstances where evidence was not available at trial, evidence that was available but was overlooked, and evidence that was available, was appropriately considered and then reasonably rejected. [Extracted from the article]

The revolution of the partial defences to murder by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 may have had a catastrophic impact on cases of mercy killing.1 While previously shoehorned into the diminished responsibility plea, the medicalisation of this defence may prevent such a ploy. However, a recent case has offered insight into the circumstances which may still result in a manslaughter conviction for mercy killers through a new avenue previously thought impermissible. This article will discuss the case and those similar, alongside charging decisions and just results. Mercy killing remains a grey area in the criminal justice system, but is there light at the end of the tunnel? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently the role of neuroscience in assessing criminal responsibility has become an issue of academic and practical debate. The question that arises is the role that neurological or brain disorders can play in assessing criminal responsibility. Within the context of South African criminal law, the question arises as to whether these disorders will meet the threshold requirements for the defence of pathological criminal incapacity. Various medico-legal issues arise when assessing the role of neurological disorders in relation to criminal responsibility. In this contribution, the reflections are provided pertaining to the role of neuroscientific evidence in explaining criminal responsibility within the context of selected areas of application. Evidentiary aspects pertaining to the presentation of neuroscientific evidence are further canvassed as well as the role of neuroscientific evidence advanced in support of mitigation of punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information about the Supreme Court decision in Golds [2016] UKSC 61. It clarified the courts' approach to cases involving mental health considerations outside the jury's experience where the sole issue at trial was the partial defence of diminished responsibility and the psychiatric experts were substantially agreed as to the mental health of the killer at the time of the homicide.

There are few societies in which child abuse is not a serious issue, with homicide being the extreme form of such victimisation. Child homicide occurs in a wide array of circumstances but there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that many offenders who kill children are suffering from sometimes quite acute mental distress. There may also be other factors impacting on an offender's ability to think rationally, which may not amount to any recognised disorder. While it is imperative that we prosecute and prevent child homicide, in doing so we must avoid overlooking the realities of other vulnerable people. In rejecting a binary approach to victims and offenders, this article argues that sometimes offenders may also be vulnerable due to an impaired ability to reason or to act in a truly voluntary way. New Zealand has repealed the defence of provocation and, apart from infanticide, offers no mitigation by way of diminished responsibility. Offenders who commit child homicide, but who do not meet the legal definition of insanity, will be liable for murder even though their capacity may have been impaired or overborne by circumstances. While, in this regard, New Zealand law is particularly deficient, there is an argument that other jurisdictions also fail to adequately respond to vulnerable offenders who kill children. This article seeks to outline the failures in existing legal frameworks to assign legal responsibility for these vulnerable offenders in a way that corresponds with their moral culpability. The article will then identify and evaluate proposals for reform. As Ulbrick and others observe, in the context of arguments about defensive homicide and mentally impaired defendants, it is critical that we 'advocate for a greater range of legal responses to cover the nuance and complexities of lethal violence' (Madeleine Ulbrick, Asher Flynn and Danielle Tyson 'The Abolition of Defensive Homicide: A Step Towards Populist Punitivism at the Expense of Mentally Impaired Offenders' (2016) 40 Melb Univ Law Rev 324, 330). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the effectiveness of mental capacity tests in helping address problems of control such as anorexia nervosa and alcoholism. Topics discussed include the Mental Capacity Act, the case A NHS Foundation v. Ms X, and a case wherein heroin was prescribed as treatment for drug dependency.

This article assesses sentencing guidelines recently issued by the Sentencing Council for the offence of manslaughter. The guidelines are considered in the context of escalating sentences for the offence generally, and the statutory reforms to manslaughter made by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The article concludes that the guidelines are impressive, sophisticated, and likely to provide flexibility in practice, but that there are unanswered questions about the relationship between manslaughter sentencing and the murder minimum term starting points inSch.21. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the legal frameworks of diminished criminal responsibility in eighteen civil law jurisdictions across the globe—Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Turkey. Specifically, it reports the legal standards and main features of partial responsibility, associated penalty reductions, and potential dispositions following a partial responsibility finding. It also surveys empirical data on the prevalence of diminished responsibility as compared to criminal nonresponsibility. This article, which reflects contemporary penal codes and draws from both English and non-English sources, is the only known existing source to compile these partial responsibility standards or to delineate their precise sentencing consequences. It is also the only known source in English to describe Portugal's and Chile's treatment of diminished responsibility. Providing a comparative overview of graduated responsibility in nearly twenty countries invites global discussion on whether and how society should recognize partial responsibility, as well as the punitive and therapeutic consequences that should attend this finding. • Examines the partial criminal responsibility standards of 18 civil law countries. • Countries vary in whether partial responsibility results in penalty reduction. • Countries vary in the extent involuntary hospitalization is a possible disposition. • Diminished responsibility can be more, or less, prevalent than nonresponsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Murder--at time defendant was suffering from a psychotic episode and had consumed alcohol and drugs--fresh evidence lodged post-conviction--defence of diminished responsibility--whether available--whether fresh psychiatric evidence admissible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diminished Responsibility is a statutory partial defence to the charge of murder in the Homicide Act 1957 which has been amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. In R v Brennan, the Court of Appeal described the new criteria as relating 'entirely to psychiatric matters'. This article will explore to what extent such a conclusion is warranted. The statutory wording of the 2009 Act will be analysed and the role of expert psychiatric evidence will be considered. It will conclude that the new Diminished Responsibility is not a purely psychiatric matter. This is because of the moral dimensions inherent in the defence, the ambiguity in the statutory wording and the fundamental problems of psychiatry usurping the function of the jury in relation to the ultimate issue. This results in inconsistent application and role confusion in relation to the defence and asks psychiatric evidence questions it cannot answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the 2017 British court cases R. v. Rejmanski (Bartosz) and R. v. Gassman (Charice), wherein the validity of the loss of control and diminished responsibility arguments are the focus in the murder cases.

This article focuses on the case of young man M, who had planned to assassinate the Governor-General of Finland in 1878. The Physician-in-Chief Thiodolf Saelan conducted a psychiatric assessment on M's mental state and concluded that M suffered from moral insanity. Saelan backed up his argument with cases of political violence in Europe and in the United States that Finnish newspapers had reported with great detail. I argue that Saelan had specific aims in presenting M's case to the public, and the main aim was to defend the category of diminished responsibility in criminal law. He stressed the role of psychiatric expertise in evaluating responsibility. Saelan's arguments were a success, as the category of diminished responsibility was included in the Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although much has been written about the level of impairment required in diminished responsibility as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Golds, there has been little discussion of the three "impairment factors" contained in the reformed s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957. This paper will discuss and evaluate how the appellate courts and psychiatric experts have addressed these factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the court of the case pertaining to personality disorder and mental condition in the U.S. It provides overview of the background of the case that involves three men living in a the same house and the reason behind the death in one of them. It also outlines the result of the investigationa and the judgment of the court based on facts presented.

The article reports the decision of the British Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the cases "R. v Kay (Robert)" and "R v Joyce (Trevor)" concerning issues manslaughter and diminished responsibility.

The aim of the study is to explore the relationships between results of forensic psychiatric evaluation on "mental status at the time of the offense (MSO)" and the final decision of the courts after the amendment of the Criminal Code in 2005. All criminal cases referred to Taipei City Psychiatric Center for MSO evaluation from July 1, 2006, to December 31, 2015, were reviewed, and only the completed trials were included. Concordance rates in each category of MSO conclusion and the court decision were analyzed and compared. The sample consisted of 366 MSO evaluations. Overall concordance was 95.6% (350/366). The concordance rate in conclusions of "full responsibility", "diminished responsibility", and "insanity" were 98.3% (177/180), 97.7% (126/129) and 91.9% (34/37) separately, and these three groups showed no statistical significance after compared with the other. Conclusions of "intentionally or negligently induced insanity or diminished responsibility" reached the lowest concordance at 65.0% (13/20) and compared with the other three groups all showed statistical significance. We found, after the amendment of Criminal Code, the lowest concordance rate in those conclusions of "insanity" before change seemed diminished. But the conclusions of "intentionally or negligently induced insanity or diminished responsibility" became the major origin leading to discordance. Comparing to the previous finding in the same hospital which revealed separate conclusions resulted in statistically significant concordance rates, the effect of the amendment seems likely to improve the consensus among psychiatric experts and trial judges except substance and alcohol related mental condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the case R. v Markham (Stan Lucas) of Court of Appeal of Great Britain, wherein the court ruled that offending had few parallels in modern criminal history may be thought to be entirely apt, and sentenced murder for the young offender.

The Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45 provides a defence for individuals compelled to commit a criminal offence because of slavery and/or exploitation. Many offences, including murder, are excluded from the ambit of this defence. In cases where s.45 does not apply, reliance must be placed on duress and necessity, prosecutorial discretion, and the power to stay a prosecution. These approaches are heavily circumscribed in murder cases where duress and necessity are inapplicable, the fact that there has been a killing tends towards prosecution and the power to stay is invoked in exceptional circumstances. The introduction of s.45 and the approaches to be adopted where the defence does not apply provides an opportunity to consider afresh whether a (partial) defence to murder based upon compulsion ought to be available. A review of domestic law suggests that failure to provide a (partial) defence is based on policy and possibly confusion regarding the excusatory nature of duress. This article advances a bespoke partial defence for slavery/human trafficking victims who kill based upon compulsion, which would sit cogently alongside the Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a case of the British Court of Appeal related to diminished responsibility (DR). It states that according to the ruling a defendant seeking to plead DR must ‘meet the criteria' set out in the Homicide Act 1957 of Great Britain, and mentions significance of trial judge's direction to the jury on the point and the decision to reject the appeal. It notes that the defendant failed to persuade the jury that his mental abnormality was caused by a medical condition.

The article discusses the British Court of Appeal case R v Blackman (Alexander Wayne) related to murder. It states that the case attracted a significant amount of media attention, and the public ostensibly supported the petition to have the murder conviction replaced with manslaughter, and mentions that there was more leeway for the jury to assess an individual's moral culpability. It notes that medical expert evidence was central to repudiation of the murder conviction.

In Golds, the United Kingdom Supreme Court recently reviewed the meaning of ''substantially impaired" in the reformed diminished responsibility plea. This article assesses the significance of that decision. In doing so, it not only provides insights into the Supreme Court's findings on "substantially impaired", but also highlights broader implications of the judgment. Such implications relate to the future interpretation of diminished responsibility and, more generally, the role of partial defences to murder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]