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While its relationship with competition law remains under debate, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) concerns fundamental rights, public values, and the control of power in digital markets. In limiting the scope of the freedom to conduct a business, the DMA seeks to safeguard conflicting and colliding fundamental rights and public interests. For the DMA to gain recognition as a legitimate and future-proof governance framework for digital markets, it must be based on participatory democracy. Meaningful participation in procedures that could impact one's position is a fundamental element of a democratic legal system governed by the rule of law. Although the DMA permits some form of dialogue, participatory democracy is constrained in scope, a bilateral logic rather than a multi-stakeholder approach is employed, and much is left to the discretion of the enforcer. Using a law-oriented and constitutional approach, we elaborate on how participatory democracy, engagement, and deliberation can be enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last twenty years, the digital economy – driven primarily through large digital platforms that have been mostly unregulated to date – has brought enormous economic and societal benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend by making digital platforms central to the global economy and society and by highlighting further opportunities, but, importantly too, risks and threats. Digital platforms, representing the increasingly important and maturing online platform economy, are now being described as critical infrastructure and even utilities. Digital platform policy, particularly the future regulation of the large far-reaching dominant platforms, is a major focus of the European Union (EU) as part of its response to the COVID-19 crisis. The literature on platform regulation highlights two major themes that emerge concerning digital platform regulation, and that are consequently the focus of future regulation: competition and online content. This article presents research findings in these areas through a critical analysis of and reflection on emerging digital platform regulatory practices which are being progressed under the groundbreaking EU Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act package. This includes assessing implications for national implementation, regulatory enforcement, and governance. A particular emphasis is placed on the Digital Services Act where there is less literature, knowledge, and experience on how to best regulate online content. In this context, the paper provides insights into how Ireland, where many of the large platforms are established and so is their de-facto regulator, is dealing with regulatory implementation issues driven by the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last twenty years, the digital economy – driven primarily through large digital platforms that have been mostly unregulated to date – has brought enormous economic and societal benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend by making digital platforms central to the global economy and society and by highlighting further opportunities, but, importantly too, risks and threats. Digital platforms, representing the increasingly important and maturing online platform economy, are now being described as critical infrastructure and even utilities. Digital platform policy, particularly the future regulation of the large far-reaching dominant platforms, is a major focus of the European Union (EU) as part of its response to the COVID-19 crisis. The literature on platform regulation highlights two major themes that emerge concerning digital platform regulation, and that are consequently the focus of future regulation: competition and online content. This article presents research findings in these areas through a critical analysis of and reflection on emerging digital platform regulatory practices which are being progressed under the groundbreaking EU Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act package. This includes assessing implications for national implementation, regulatory enforcement, and governance. A particular emphasis is placed on the Digital Services Act where there is less literature, knowledge, and experience on how to best regulate online content. In this context, the paper provides insights into how Ireland, where many of the large platforms are established and so is their de-facto regulator, is dealing with regulatory implementation issues driven by the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Over the last twenty years, the digital economy – driven primarily through large digital platforms that have been mostly unregulated to date – has brought enormous economic and societal benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend by making digital platforms central to the global economy and society and by highlighting further opportunities, but, importantly too, risks and threats. Digital platforms, representing the increasingly important and maturing online platform economy, are now being described as critical infrastructure and even utilities. Digital platform policy, particularly the future regulation of the large far-reaching dominant platforms, is a major focus of the European Union (EU) as part of its response to the COVID-19 crisis. The literature on platform regulation highlights two major themes that emerge concerning digital platform regulation, and that are consequently the focus of future regulation: competition and online content. This article presents research findings in these areas through a critical analysis of and reflection on emerging digital platform regulatory practices which are being progressed under the groundbreaking EU Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act package. This includes assessing implications for national implementation, regulatory enforcement, and governance. A particular emphasis is placed on the Digital Services Act where there is less literature, knowledge, and experience on how to best regulate online content. In this context, the paper provides insights into how Ireland, where many of the large platforms are established and so is their de-facto regulator, is dealing with regulatory implementation issues driven by the EU.

Conceived as institutions funded by the public purse and intended to exist devoid of political influence, the mandate of public service media (PSM) entities is to disseminate reliable news content and high-quality audiovisual productions to all demographic segments, inclusive of marginalized communities and audiences that are typically under-served. Over the previous ten years, the rise in prominence of global platforms in national media systems has precipitated many changes in the media sector, including unique challenges for PSM institutions guided by specific public service values. Using a holistic conceptual framework for assessing the implementation of these values, this article analyzes the impact of platformization on Europe’s PSM and discusses how the Union’s policy approaches affect related challenges to PSM. The analysis indicates that while the European Union (EU) has accorded a high priority to PSM within its media policy framework, the role that Brussels plays in protecting the independence and efficacy of PSM has been circumscribed, given that the onus of regulating PSM entities rests with national governments. This has engendered contrasting experiences wherein certain PSM outlets enjoy political independence and command significant public trust while others function as state-controlled propaganda vehicles, advancing the objectives and interests of governing bodies. The EU has addressed global platform power in recent attempts to safeguard its digital future, including the Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). However, these acts do not adequately address PSM’s two central and often interconnected problems: funding challenges and political pressures.

Competition authorities and other regulators already rely on data science to monitor markets and check compliance with applicable rules. The Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act have made the use of data science by regulators even more relevant, given the scale and complexity of the oversight required. The existing use of data science shows that regulators are able to adapt their organizations and processes to realize the potential of using technology tools in their activities. At the same time, the use of data science poses challenges in terms of data reliability and individual privacy. Beyond involvement in specific investigations, data science also has the potential to reform the work of regulators by moving towards a more proactive form of enforcement. The sharing of data science expertise and tools between regulators deserves to be further facilitated to increase collaboration and share resources in monitoring the platform economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines predatory pricing in the context of two-sided digital platforms, arguing that traditional tests based on Average Variable Cost (AVC) may be inadequate for these markets. While predatory pricing by dominant firms is prohibited in both EU and US competition law, the current standards may not effectively capture predatory behavior in platform markets characterized by strong network effects and low marginal costs. The paper analyses cases where cross-subsidization between platform sides had predatory elements and resulted in findings of abuse of dominant position. Given platforms' unique characteristics, it proposes a modified test under Article 102 TFEU for super-dominant platforms and those within the scope of Article 3 of Digital Markets Act's scope. The proposal extends the Akzo test by presuming prices below Average Total Cost (ATC) to be abusive, rather than using AVC, with LRAIC as a proxy for ATC. This addresses the current test's limitations for low marginal cost businesses while allowing for objective justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the EU Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) are complementary tools that could apply concurrently to mergers involving gatekeepers. Yet, potential tensions between the DMA and the EUMR have been unexplored. It is this paper's objective to shed light on the interplay between the EUMR and the DMA, in the context of commitments design for gatekeeper acquisitions. This paper argues that the DMA could influence the EUMR in designing remedies, since these tools may be taking a similar approach to addressing the harmful effects of gatekeepers’ practices. Accordingly, the new DMA obligations could impact future commitments design under the EUMR in two ways. First, at the theory of harm stage, because of the DMA's deterrent effect. Second, at the remedy design stage, because of the principle of proportionality. Therefore, the DMA could restrict the EUMR's power to design merger commitments, in the context of gatekeeper acquisitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Nowadays, the use of digital services is indispensable to the daily activity of businesses or end users. Digital services and online platforms contribute to the internal market by opening new business opportunities, increasing industry competitiveness, and widening consumer choice. While digital services have contributed to boosting innovation and developing new business models, a few online platforms act as gatekeepers by controlling a large digital market, likely leading to unfair practices and conditions for business users and end users. Against this background, this paper discusses the rationale and the necessity for regulating digital technology development in the digital market. It analyses the EU's approach to adapting competition policy for the digital age. This paper argues that the Digital Markets Act will undoubtedly impact business models in the digital market and regulatory framework at the national level. However, its fundamental success will depend on whether the Commission has the appropriate tools to address the development of new technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the ever-expanding digital realm, a systematized and coherent legal framework regulating data-driven competition has emerged as a paramount concern in the European Union. At the heart of this intricate puzzle lie the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) governing data protection and market contestability respectively. While the 'without prejudice' clause enshrined in the DMA seeks to harmonize their coexistence, the true extent of their compatibility and complementarity remains elusive. The juxtaposition of these two legislative pillars unveils nuanced conflicts and potential vulnerabilities at their intersection. If disregarded, these glaring blind spots might become an Achilles heel of the DMA and risk to weaken the DMA's data-related ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceived as institutions funded by the public purse and intended to exist devoid of political influence, the mandate of public service media (PSM) entities is to disseminate reliable news content and high-quality audiovisual productions to all demographic segments, inclusive of marginalized communities and audiences that are typically under-served. Over the previous ten years, the rise in prominence of global platforms in national media systems has precipitated many changes in the media sector, including unique challenges for PSM institutions guided by specific public service values. Using a holistic conceptual framework for assessing the implementation of these values, this article analyzes the impact of platformization on Europe's PSM and discusses how the Union's policy approaches affect related challenges to PSM. The analysis indicates that while the European Union (EU) has accorded a high priority to PSM within its media policy framework, the role that Brussels plays in protecting the independence and efficacy of PSM has been circumscribed, given that the onus of regulating PSM entities rests with national governments. This has engendered contrasting experiences wherein certain PSM outlets enjoy political independence and command significant public trust while others function as state-controlled propaganda vehicles, advancing the objectives and interests of governing bodies. The EU has addressed global platform power in recent attempts to safeguard its digital future, including the Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). However, these acts do not adequately address PSM's two central and often interconnected problems: funding challenges and political pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Digital market regulations respond to technological changes and global dynamics, but also to how political actors shape markets. Focusing on the Digital Markets Act, this article explains the EU's marketcraft as the result of a struggle in the policy field between political actors promoting competing economic ideas in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical context. We show that significant discursive and policy change in digital market governance has occurred because of shifting coalitions between three constellations of actors, which we call market-correctors, market-busters, and market-directors. Tracking the ongoing campaign to challenge Big Tech and define the meaning of digital sovereignty, we argue that market-directors have ushered in potentially comprehensive policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the EU and UK regulations for competition in digital markets, specifically the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the UK Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCCA). It highlights three key issues that are often overlooked in the literature: what actions to take, how to implement them, and what to avoid. The article explores the goals of fairness and contestability, the challenges of vertical and horizontal competition, and the potential impact on the emergence of EU/UK BigTech companies. It emphasizes the need for a new regulatory philosophy and mindset, as well as a strategic vision and policy for digital competition. The article also mentions the 'Digital Markets Research Hub', a YouTube channel that features discussions with experts in the field of digital competition law. [Extracted from the article]

The article explores the Digital Markets Act (DMA) implemented by the European Union to regulate platform services offered by Big Tech companies. It specifically focuses on the potential impact of platform integration and the emergence of "super-apps" within the EU, using Meta's WhatsApp as an example. The article examines whether the DMA is equipped to address new competitive concerns and ensure fairness in digital markets. It emphasizes the importance of swift and effective enforcement of the DMA. Additionally, the article discusses the potential impact of super-apps and FM-fueled chatbots on the consumption of digital services, highlighting concerns such as barriers to entry and favoritism towards their own services. It concludes that while the DMA can address many concerns, it should be adaptable to future changes and work alongside traditional antitrust law. [Extracted from the article]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) are important regulations in the European Union (EU) that aim to create fair and safe digital environments. The effectiveness of these regulations depends on their enforcement. The DMA focuses on addressing the market power of large online platforms, while the DSA aims to regulate digital services more broadly. The principle of effectiveness is crucial in assessing compliance with these laws. The effective implementation and enforcement of the DMA and the DSA require the involvement of various actors, including enforcement authorities, national regulators, third parties, and the European Commission. Private enforcement mechanisms, such as representative actions, can complement public enforcement efforts. Overall, effective enforcement is essential for achieving the objectives of these regulations and ensuring a fair and safe digital environment. [Extracted from the article]

The European Union (EU) Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims to increase competition and fairness in the EU digital markets by reducing entry barriers and ensuring a better distribution of value generated by digital platforms. The DMA is enforced by the European Commission, which has become a fully-fledged 'federal' regulator for the first time. The DMA is part of a broader EU regulatory framework for digital platforms, and it aims to achieve principles of a Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles, including increasing user choice and promoting fair competition and innovation. The DMA imposes obligations on the biggest digital platforms, known as gatekeepers, to increase transparency, prohibit anti-competitive practices, reduce entry barriers, and open up platforms and data. The DMA does not break up the biggest platforms but aims to create competition while preserving network and ecosystem effects. The implementation of the DMA will lead to changes in technical architecture, market dynamics, and social norms, and it presents an opportunity to regain some of the early promises of the internet. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the role of the P2B Regulation in the European Union's regulatory framework for the platform economy. While the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) have received more attention, the P2B Regulation is seen as a complement to these regulations. The P2B Regulation aims to ensure fairness and transparency in the platform economy, including smaller niche platforms. However, effective enforcement is crucial for the P2B Regulation to fulfill its role. The article suggests that public enforcement is necessary and highlights the need for coordination between the enforcement of the P2B Regulation, DMA, and DSA. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the prospects for concurrent private enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Article 102 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The DMA aims to ensure fair and contestable markets in the digital sector, and private litigation is seen as a supporting role in its enforcement. The author argues that claiming a concurrent violation of the DMA and Article 102 TFEU could provide procedural benefits for private litigants, but it may also bring about complexities. The role of the European Commission is crucial in setting the stage for private enforcement, and it is suggested that similar mechanisms enhancing private litigation should be introduced for claims based on the DMA violations alone. [Extracted from the article]

This document explores the complementarity between the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the antitrust rules in the European Union. It discusses how the European Commission and national competition authorities have the choice to enforce market conduct by designated gatekeepers either under the DMA or as an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. However, there is a risk of duplication of enforcement actions, which can lead to inefficiency or under-enforcement. The document emphasizes the importance of coordination and the ne bis in idem principle in parallel proceedings. Overall, while the DMA and antitrust rules are seen as complementary, their application and coordination will need to be tested in practice. [Extracted from the article]

The introduction of the Digital Markets Act (the 'DMA') marked the beginning of a new regulatory framework for limiting the impact of strong platforms in digital markets. With the aim of ensuring fairness and contestability in digital markets, the new Regulation provided for a detailed administrative process, in the form of market investigations, for determining which of the digital platforms act as gatekeepers in their respective markets, whether the designated gatekeepers comply with their obligations, and to what extent new obligations must be introduced to account for new developments. This article discusses some preliminary issues related to the European Commission's administrative procedure for enforcing the new regulation. Upon summarizing the key elements of the DMA procedure, it focuses on four issues: the relationship between the DMA and competition law and problems regarding their parallel application; the obligation for recording interviews conducted for the purposes of gathering information regarding the subject matter of a market investigation; access to file limitations; and the absence of provisions regarding private enforcement and the possibility for third parties to claim damages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the rules applicable to algorithmic bias taking the form of self-favouring by hybrid digital platforms in the EU. In this paper, it is argued that the recently introduced prohibition of self-favouring by digital platforms should not apply across the board in the same manner. It may be necessary to consider the nature of the underlying products or services, the business models, and the monetization strategies of digital platforms. Differences in these aspects may alter their ability and incentives to engage in self-favouring potentially leading to foreclosing rivals and harming consumers. This suggests that the approach put forward by section 19a of the German Competition Act (GWB) may be better from an error-cost perspective than that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Section 19a of the GWB grants more discretion to enforcers and allows for a broader justification of the impugned conduct. In the context of the DMA, some sort of balancing exercise seems to be possible only if the European Commission makes extensive use of the possibility to further specify the prohibition of self-favouring contained in Article 6(5) of the DMA in light of the principles of effectiveness and proportionality. Finally, the paper touches upon the potential disproportionate burden, legal fragmentation, and legal uncertainty across the EU resulting from the interplay between EU competition law, the DMA, and national laws tackling similar self-favouring practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In digital markets, antitrust law and special regulations aim to ensure that markets remain competitive despite the dominating role that digital platforms play today in everyone's life. Unlike traditional markets, market participant behavior is easily observable in these markets. We present a series of empirical investigations into the extent to which Amazon engages in practices that are typically described as self-preferencing. We discuss how the computer science tools used in this paper can be used in a regulatory environment that is based on algorithmic auditing and requires regulating digital markets at scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intensifying concerns about online platform firms’ rapid rise, expansion, and growing asymmetric power have attracted political scrutiny and undermined the legitimacy of a minimalist regulatory regime that is giving way to intense debate and increasingly interventionist governmental policies and enforcement actions. First, we view the rise of, and recent political responses to, the often-predatory power and manipulative conduct of platform firm in terms of a ‘Polanyian’ double movement in which the destabilising and destructive effects of unchecked corporate activities and market development eventually generates political and regulatory responses to constrain private power that threaten the social, political, and economic order. Second, incipient legal changes, most notably the EU’s proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, indicate a shift in regulatory emphasis from competition (and antitrust) policy and law towards more intensive and encompassing forms of socio-economic regulation. Finally, these regulatory changes will likely vary in character and significance across political jurisdictions, and embody distinctive and possibly divergent developmental trajectories. The EU may have a first-mover advantage in regulating platform firms, but we are only at the very beginning of a protracted and conflictual transformational process.

Competition authorities worldwide are increasingly inclined to review and challenge mergers. They are using an ever-wider range of tools to claim jurisdiction over transactions that traditionally fell outside their authority (such as those that fell below the corresponding thresholds). They base this new approach on a broader analysis of criteria that goes beyond what were considered the boundaries of competition law. In this context, the substantive assessment of mergers is also evolving, with competition authorities taking into account factors such as sustainability, employment, data/digital markets issues and innovation, and weighing them up against predicted efficiencies to determine a merger's benefits and risks. In addition, commitments for clearance are increasingly being used to address non-traditional concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on Khan's work on Amazon by transferring her normative framework to Apple. It explores the company's anti-competitive business practices, main antitrust concerns, and the currently proposed reform measures from an innovative business ethics and law (i.e., ordoliberal) perspective. The paper argues that one of the key issues with Apple is the company's closed ecosystem combined with its role as an internet gatekeeper. The E.U.'s Digital Markets Act, which aims to open Apple's ecosystem – via data portability, interoperability, and multi-homing requirements – is a necessary step in the right direction. Yet, it is insufficient to prevent the lock-in effects of a 'walled product garden' and ensure complete device and platform neutrality. That is, additional steps must be taken to overcome Apple's dual role as a platform operator and service provider and inhibit the company from engaging in anti-competitive business conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Platform power poses a number of challenges for competition authorities. One concern is that big tech companies may harm competition through the acquisition of emerging companies with a high competitive potential. Such acquisitions may escape ex ante merger control if they do not reach the turnover threshold for mandatory notification. The Commission sought to bridge this enforcement gap with its Article 22 guidance and the Digital Markets Act. This paper evaluates the steps taken by the Commission to increase scrutiny of such mergers. Building on this discussion, the paper examines the AG opinion in Towercast and analyses the residual gap-closing function of Article 102 TFEU. The aim of this paper is to bring the new developments surrounding digital merger control together and assess whether they represent an adequate response to the challenges posed by the digital economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the European Commission's approach to tackling various Apple anti-competitive strategies. It considers why the European Commission has not applied excessive pricing abuse of dominance jurisprudence to challenge Apple's high commission fees charged to app developers, instead preferring to use a variety of other approaches to restore competition to certain parts of Apple's closed ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Soochow University Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition is the property of Soochow University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

L’articolo analizza gli obblighi dei gatekeepers come definiti nel Digital Markets Act. Particolare attenzione è prestata all’influenza dei vari ordinamenti europei, precisamente di quello tedesco, nell’evoluzione della materia. La nutrita schiera di obblighi che il DMA impone ai gatekeepers è suddivisa in due macrocategorie al fine di razionalizzarne la trattazione. Così da un lato si descrivono i profili anticoncorrenziali collegati al controllo dei dati personali da parte dei gatekeepers e, dall’altro si riuniscono quelli riconducibili ad’idea di neutralità della piattaforma. Per definire quest’ultimo ambito, si attinge nuovamente ad una metodologia comparativa, anche fuoriuscendo dagli schemi del diritto europeo, per meglio definire il concetto di neutralità della piattaforma. This article analyses the obligations of gatekeepers as defined in the Digital Markets Act. Particular attention is paid to the influence of the various European legal systems, especially the German one,, in the evolution of the subject matter. The extensive array of obligations that the DMA imposes on gatekeepers is subdivided into two macro-categories to rationalize their conceptualization. Thus, on the one hand, the anti-competitive profiles connected to the control of personal data by gatekeepers and those related to the idea of platform neutrality are described. In the latter area, a comparative methodology is once again drawn upon, even outside the framework of European law, to better define the concept of platform neutrality.

Nowadays, the use of digital services is indispensable to the daily activity of businesses or end users. Digital services and online platforms contribute to the internal market by opening new business opportunities, increasing industry competitiveness, and widening consumer choice. While digital services have contributed to boosting innovation and developing new business models, a few online platforms act as gatekeepers by controlling a large digital market, likely leading to unfair practices and conditions for business users and end users. Against this background, this paper discusses the rationale and the necessity for regulating digital technology development in the digital market. It analyses the EU’s approach to adapting competition policy for the digital age. This paper argues that the Digital Markets Act will undoubtedly impact business models in the digital market and regulatory framework at the national level. However, its fundamental success will depend on whether the Commission has the appropriate tools to address the development of new technologies.

The right to data portability is a relatively new legal right introduced and enshrined by the General Data Protection Regulation with the objective of empowering data subjects to exercise agency over their data, and how data controllers interact and safeguard the personal data entrusted to them. Most recently, the Digital Markets Act and the Data Act have also introduced tertiary legal provisions building on the right to data portability, therefore adding previously unforeseen nuance. However, due to many factors, the right to data portability has found little or no practical application. In this context, this paper explores the current landscape of the right to data portability, with an examination of possible complementarities and conflicts between the GDPR, the Digital Markets Act and the Data Act. This analysis will take into consideration the underlying objectives of these three Regulations, not only with the purpose of proceeding with a comparative analysis of the contours of the right to data portability under the aegis of these Regulations, but to advance with a holistic analysis of the tangible application of the right and how these Regulations might permit or hinder this application for the benefit of data subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The rise of digitalization has bolstered the dominance of certain enterprises that hold sway over entire ecosystems, creating significant barriers for potential competitors to penetrate. To address these concerns and foster fair competition within the internal market, the European Union has enacted a regulation aimed at ensuring accessibility and fairness in the digital sector, particularly for both business users and end users of core platform services. This regulation diverges from traditional approach by streamlining procedures to tackle potential anti-competitive practices, with specific provisions tailored for platforms identified as gatekeepers. The objective is to supplement existing competition rules and address previously overlooked scenarios, drawing insights from past competition cases and challenges. Special emphasis will be placed on analyzing specific obligations to promote a competitive and equitable digital market. These obligations reflect precedents from familiar cases and are structured on a case-by-case basis to a varying extent. However, clarification will be necessary regarding the black and grey lists to facilitate regulators and undertakings in implementing the regulation effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is dedicated to my esteemed colleague Richard S. Markovits. It deals with ownership of data and with alternative methods to regulate Internet platform providers. It rejects the view that the subjects of information should have ownership rights over their personal data, which extend beyond what is necessary for privacy protection. Also, data controllers should not have an exclusive ownership right but share anonymized data with competitors. Even though the wealth of data harvested and stored by Internet firms are only weakly protected by trade-secret law, this together with effective encryption technologies develops into an exploitative de facto property over information, if effective market opening rules do not exist. The paper shows that the rule of abuse of dominant position of traditional competition law could not sufficiently check unfair trade practices of platform providers. Its adjudication is information intensive and leads to overly lengthy and costly proceedings. The Digital Markets Act of the European Union drew a radical conclusion from these experiences and regulates the biggest Internet firms with simple per se rules, which are relatively easy to administer but less flexible. Still, the Digital Markets Act should be welcomed as an important step forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stricter competition regulation in digital markets is a growing trend in the Global North, with the Digital Markets Act in Europe being the poster child of a more interventionist approach. In this article we do not focus on the debate surrounding these European efforts (which has meritorious arguments on both sides in our view), but instead examine similar developments elsewhere in the world, namely in South Africa, India, China, and Brazil. With reference to recent enforcement activities in these countries (such as industry investigations, greater scrutiny of mergers and of individual firm conduct, and in some cases ex ante regulations targeted at specific categories of firms), we provide our views on the potential adverse consequences of seeking to replicate the European approach in instances where digital markets may be less mature. In particular, while it is generally understood that heavy-handed regulation can stifle innovation and chill competition, we argue that such risks are more acute in countries outside of Europe (and North America), which thus warrants more cautious regulation methods. This is especially the case where the policy objectives deviate from the traditional one of protecting competition rather than competitors, since such an approach runs the risk of promoting short term gains at the expense of long-term benefits, which may ultimately harm the very stakeholders that such regulation is designed to advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) obligations will start to apply to the designated gatekeepers starting in March 2024. Its main objectives are set out in Article 1(1) as those of ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present, to the benefit of both business and end-users. However, the definition and the interpretation the Commission will provide for both objectives are far from clear. In turn, this makes future-proofing the DMA a more difficult task for gatekeepers, regulators and third parties, insofar as its obligations are construed upon one of the two stated goals depending on the provision or on both of them more generally. The paper addresses this problem by narrowing the gap between those concepts in their relationship with their underlying economic theorems. Later on, it observes the manifestations of contestability and fairness throughout the text and the regulation’s legislative process accounting for their four distinct expressions: objectives, indicators, and the legal bases for triggering the supplementary and precautionary measures of the instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act is a new European Regulation which entered into force on October 2022. It will apply to "gatekeepers", namely undertakings providing core platform services, with the aim of fostering "fairness" and "contestability" in the digital sector. If these objectives appear at first sight both relevant and legitimate, this paper sheds light on the dark side of this Regulation by arguing that it will undermine the Rule of Law. Indeed, for several reasons which will be discussed, the Digital Markets Act will impede or limit the respect of principles which are deeply rooted in the legal tradition of European countries. This leads to an important question: is the cure worse than the disease? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]