Search

In the first section of this two-part article the author expressed the opinion that the domestic (English) judicial system fails to acknowledge the Strasbourg Court’s accepted opinion that, the right ‘ . . . to a fair [ . . ..] hearing . . .’, as per the right of access to Court, should be differentiated as between: (i) ‘physical’; and (ii) ‘remedial’; access to the court. This second section will deal with two cases illustrating the points the author makes regarding access to the court. The first arises from a Spanish domicile (instructing on DPA terms), abattoir hygiene consultant’s claims for: (a) breach of his former English company’s articles of association; and (b) fraudulent misrepresentation, by his then English domiciled business partner. The second arises from a Paraguayan domiciled, international businessman’s claims for breach of a: (c) multi-jurisdictional crossborder credit transfer agreement; and (d) company director’s personal guarantee, secured on two real property mortgages (in Brazil), as well as other UK-based assets.

In this first section of a two-part article the author expresses the opinion that the domestic (English) judicial system fails to acknowledge the Strasbourg court’s accepted opinion that, the right ‘ . . . to a fair [ . . ..] hearing . . .’, as per the right of access to Court, should be differentiated as between: (i) ‘physical’; and, (ii) ‘remedial’; access to the court. The second section will deal with two cases illustrating the points the author makes regarding access to the court. The first arises from a Spanish domicile (instructing on DPA terms), abattoir hygiene consultant’s claims for: (a) breach of his former company’s articles of association; and, (b) fraudulent misrepresentation, by his then English domiciled business partner. The second arises from a Paraguayan domiciled, international businessman’s claims for breach of a: (c) multi-jurisdictional crossborder credit transfer agreement; and, (d) company director’s personal guarantee, secured on two real property mortgages (in Brazil), as well as other UK based assets. A jurisprudence-based analysis of the potential justice deficit resulting from the judiciary’s seemingly automaton perceptions of their common law and statutory obligations under the Civil Procedure Act 1997 and the consequential Civil Procedure Rules. Accordingly, it is suggested that the premature applicability of (1) the CPR 3.4(2) Strikeout and CPR 24(2) Summary Judgment procedures, as well as (in the domestic litigation context), (2) the CPR 11(1) (including CPR PD 6B para. 3.1(6)) Challenge to Jurisdiction procedure, not only (a) fetter and wrongfully infringe the Respondent’s right to fully test the Applicant’s evidence contrary to Articles 6(1), 6(3) and 13 ECHR, as the astute Applicant acts before disclosure, but also (b) flouts the court’s and judiciary’s section 6(3)(a)-(b) Human Rights Act 1998 public authority duties, failing to note that they: ‘ . . . must consider all matters capable of having a bearing on that judgment, must act equitably as between [the parties], and must [find] accordingly.’ Thus, the court and judiciary acting as decision makers must not follow rules blindly: (i) irrespective of the weight of (I suggest misconstrued) precedent; and, (ii) in light of the degree of discretion purportedly given by Parliament.

This is an allegorical analysis of the currently topical developments in the UK judiciary's approach to human rights law, in the context of inter alia private autonomy versus the public interest as per Articles 3, 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The article is written as a pastiche of a UK Supreme Court judgment in a hypothetical case on euthanasia, which purports to illustrate the UK judiciary's seemingly erred and repeated omission of the fact that legalized euthanasia is prevented by the ECHR. Irrespective of the reader's philosophical perspective, a more transparent alternative is offered, safeguarding the fundamentally important principle of justice through certainty. The approach and analysis of the emerging competing jurisprudential perspectives is both practical and insightful in the resulting solutions offered.

A jurisprudence-based analysis of the judiciary's seemingly mistaken anthropomorphizing of commercial entities through self-misconceived perceptions of their statutory obligations under ss 2 and 3 HRA 1998 which might in fact be a clever mechanically convenient subterfuge, designed to both: (a) appease and appear to conform to the 'elective dictatorship' of their parliamentary masters; and, (b) implement their personal prejudgment of what the individual judge 'in good conscience', perceives as being the best interest outcome for the social majority. Irrespective of the reader's philosophical perspective, a more transparent alternative is offered, safeguarding the fundamentally important principle of justice through certainty. This first part of a two-part article examined all the human rights cases reported in Lloyd's Law Reports and the (commercial) All England Law Reports from October 2000 to December 2010 and analyzes them. This second part of the article contains the author's conclusions.

A jurisprudence-based analysis of the judiciary's seemingly erroneous anthropomorphizing of commercial entities through self-misconceived perceptions of their statutory obligations under ss 2 and 3, HRA 1998, which might in fact be a clever, mechanically-convenient subterfuge, designed to both: (a) appease and appear to conform to the 'elective dictatorship' of the parliamentary masters; and (b) implement the personal prejudgment of what the individual judge, in good conscience', perceives as being the best interest outcome for the social majority. Irrespective of the reader's philosophical perspective, a more transparent alternative is offered, safeguarding the fundamentally important principle of justice through certainty. This first part of a two-part article examines all the human rights cases reported in the Lloyd's Law Reports and the All England Law Reports (Commercial) from October 2000 to December 2010, analysing their significance within the evolving modus operandi of the judiciary. The second part of the article will contain the author's conclusions.

In this paper, we provide a method to generate a three-dimensional detailed design of fishbone layouts. This method takes the desired storage capacity and returns the location ( x , y , z ) of each opening of the warehouse in such a way that the total operational cost – area cost and material handling cost – of the warehouse is minimal. We model the arrangement of the openings using mathematical finite sequences and represent a fishbone layout in terms of four primary characteristics. Next, we develop an algorithm that generates a detailed design of a fishbone layout given values of its four primary characteristics. Then, we present an optimization model that finds the values for the four primary characteristics that minimize the total operational cost of the warehouse. Finally, we solve the optimization model using a genetic algorithm. Our results suggest that in 91.74% of the cases, our optimization procedure reaches a near optimum point – deviated only by 0.587% – in a reasonable computational time (maximum 4.5 min). This paper aims to diminish dependence upon experts and human decision making in the process of implementing a fishbone layout on greenfield projects, and fulfills an identified need of warehouse practitioners by integrating the most recent advances on non-traditional layouts and detailed warehouse design.