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This paper studies consequences of the very large exchange rate depreciation occurring in June 2016 due to the UK electorate unexpectedly voting to leave the European Union. As news of a leave vote came in, the value of sterling plummeted, recording the biggest one day depreciation of any of the world’s four major currencies since the collapse of Bretton Woods. The prospect of Brexit really happening generated sizable differences in how much sterling depreciated against different currencies. Coupled with pre-referendum cross-country trade patterns, this generated variations in exchange rate depreciations facing businesses in different industries. The paper first considers revenue and cost channels operating through trade price responses, offering evidence of a cost shock from the price of intermediate imports rising by more in higher depreciation industries, but with no revenue offset from exports. Workers were impacted by the increased cost pressures facing businesses, not in terms of job loss but through relative real wage declines and stagnation for workers employed in industries facing larger depreciations.

The Brexit vote precipitated the unravelling of the UK's membership of the world's deepest economic integration agreement. This paper reviews evidence on the realized economic effects of Brexit. The 2016 Brexit referendum changed expectations about future UK-EU relations. Studying its consequences provides new insights regarding the economic impacts of news and uncertainty shocks. Voting for Brexit had large negative effects on the UK economy between 2016 and 2019, leading to higher import and consumer prices, lower investment, and slower real wage and GDP growth. However, at the aggregate level, there was little or no trade diversion away from the EU, implying that many of the anticipated long-run effects of Brexit did not materialize before the new UK-EU trade relationship came into force in 2021.

International audience; Resource-based theories propose that firms grow by diversifying into products that use common capabilities. We provide evidence for common-input capabilities, using a policy that removed entry barriers in input markets to show that the similarity of a firm’s and an industry’s input mix determines firm production choices. We model industry choice and economies of scope from input capabilities. When the model is estimated for Indian manufacturing, input complementarities make firms 5% more likely to produce in an industry and are quantitatively as important as time-invariant drivers of coproduction rates. Upstream entry barriers were equivalent to a 9.5% tariff on inputs.

Deep trade agreements are widespread and have taken the world beyond tariff liberalization in goods trade. As the importance of global supply chains and the services sector increased across the world, shallow tariff reductions gave way to deeper commitments that address non-tariff barriers and behind the border barriers to trade. This paper shows that deep trade agreement commitments increase trade by 25% for trade in goods and by even more for trade in services. Taking reduced form estimates to a quantitative model enables general equilibrium analysis of the trade and welfare impacts of deep trade agreements. We find that China, India, and the Eastern European bloc have benefited the most from trade agreements since the Uruguay Round. While a large share of the gains to Eastern Europe come from deep commitments during its accession to the EU, gains for China and India come largely from tariff reductions. Applying the framework to ex-ante analysis of the UK’s departure from the deepest trade agreement in the world suggests that the potential benefits the UK may gain, post-Brexit, from future deep agreements with the EU and selected nonEU trade partners would not offset its losses from leaving the EU. Overall, deep trade agreements have contributed over 40% to the welfare gains from trade globally and even more so for advanced economies.

In India-Export Measures, the United States challenged a range of Indian measures as prohibited export-contingent subsidies, and a WTO panel largely agreed. This article examines the factors at play in the United States’ decision to bring the challenge. At the level of policy, the United States case reflects India’s graduation from the protections afforded developing nations’ export-contingent subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. A closer examination, however, shows that India ramped up its export-contingent subsidies just as the SCM Agreement required it to wind those subsidies down. Moreover, the expanded Indian subsidies led to increased import competition with the politically influential metals and pharmaceutical sectors in the United States, which pushed the U.S. challenge. We reflect on the larger implications of the challenge for the future of trade rules on industrial policy. In particular, we note that the United States pursued a trade enforcement policy that would have the effect of increasing pharmaceutical prices in the United States, by reducing subsidies for imported generic drugs, at a time at which the Trump administration allegedly was trying to reduce the price of prescription drugs. This disconnect suggests the need for both greater transparency in trade policy and greater governmental coordination on the connection between trade policy and other policy priorities.

This paper uses a new field survey of low-wage areas of urban India to show that employment and earnings were decimated by the lockdown resulting from the Covid-19 crisis. It examines workers’ desire for a job guarantee in this setting. Workers who had a job guarantee before the crisis were relatively shielded by not being hit quite so hard in terms of the increased incidence of job loss or working zero hours and earnings losses. A stated choice experiment contained in the survey reveals evidence that low-wage workers are willing to give up around a quarter of their daily wage for a job guarantee. And direct survey questions corroborate this, with informal, young and female workers being most likely to want a job guarantee, and to want it even more due to the current crisis.

Policies to encourage agribusinesses-led development of crop markets are high on the agenda of many policy-makers. Since the 1980s, several countries have moved to a model in which agribusinesses provide market access to farmers. The motivation behind these policies is to raise income and wellbeing, particularly for low-income rural households. Yet, systematic analyses of the overall impact of such policies on household welfare are scant. This paper provides a novel modelling framework to study the role of agribusinesses in shaping the gains from trade and the share accruing to small farmers. Exploiting a national policy change in Kenya in 2004, we find that the shift to the agribusiness model reduced farmer incomes from policy-affected crops, relative to other crops. The relative fall in incomes was higher for farmers selling primarily to large agribusinesses. Correspondingly, agribusiness firms specialized in policy-affected crops saw larger increases in profit margins. Farmers in villages with a comparative advantage in policy-affected crops saw larger reductions in consumption, especially of durable assets. The findings contribute to the academic and policy debate on the impact of market power on the size and distribution of the gains from trade.

This paper presents new evidence on international trade and worker outcomes. It examines a big world event that produced an unprecedentedly large shock to the UK exchange rate. In the 24 hours in June 2016 during which the UK electorate unexpectedly voted to leave the European Union, the value of sterling plummeted. It recorded the biggest depreciation that has occurred in any of the world’s four major currencies since the collapse of Bretton Woods. Exploiting this variation, the paper studies the impact of trade on wages and worker training. Wages and training fell for workers employed in sectors where the intermediate import price rose by more as a consequence of the sterling depreciation. Calibrating the estimated wage elasticity with respect to intermediate import prices to theory uncovers evidence of a production complementarity between workers and intermediate imports. This provides new direct evidence that, in the modern world of global value chains, it is changes in the cost of intermediate imports that act as a driver of the impact of globalization on worker welfare. The episode studied and the findings add to widely expressed, growing concerns about poor productivity performance relating to skills and to patterns of real wage stagnation that are plaguing contemporary labour markets.

Resource based theories propose that firms grow by diversifying into products which use common capabilities. We provide evidence for common input capabilities using a policy that removed entry barriers in input markets to show that the similarity of a firm's and industry's input mix determine firm production choices. We model industry choice and economies of scope from input capabilities. Estimating the model for Indian manufacturing, input complementarities make firms 5% more likely to produce in an industry and are quantitatively as important as time-invariant drivers of co-production rates. Upstream entry barriers were equivalent to a 9.5% tariff on inputs.