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The distributed nature of smart grids, combined with sophisticated sensors, control algorithms, and data collection facilities at Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) centers, makes them vulnerable to strategically crafted cyber-physical attacks. These malicious attacks can manipulate power demands using high-wattage Internet of Things (IoT) botnet devices, such as refrigerators and air conditioners, or introduce false values into transmission line power flow sensor readings. Consequently, grids experience blackouts and high power flow oscillations. Existing grid protection mechanisms, originally designed to tackle natural faults in transmission lines and generator outages, are ineffective against such intelligently crafted attacks. This is because grid operators overlook potential scenarios of cyber-physical attacks during their design phase. In this work, we propose a safe Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL)-based framework for mitigating attacks on smart grids. The DRL agent effectively neutralizes cyber-physical attacks on grid surfaces by triggering appropriate sequences of existing protection schemes. The safety of the DRL agent is formally verified through a reachability analysis method. Additionally, our framework is designed for deployment on CUDA-enabled GPU systems, which enables faster execution of these protection sequences and their real-time validation. Our framework establishes a new set of protection rules for grid models, successfully thwarting existing cyber-physical attacks.

The next-generation wireless network, 6G and beyond, envisions to integrate communication and sensing to overcome interference, improve spectrum efficiency, and reduce hardware and power consumption. Massive Multiple-Input Multiple Output (mMIMO)-based Joint Communication and Sensing (JCAS) systems realize this integration for 6G applications such as autonomous driving, as it requires accurate environmental sensing and time-critical communication with neighboring vehicles. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is used for mMIMO antenna beamforming in the existing literature. However, the huge search space for actions associated with antenna beamforming causes the learning process for the RL agent to be inefficient due to high beam training overhead. The learning process does not consider the causal relationship between action space and the reward, and gives all actions equal importance. In this work, we explore a causally-aware RL agent which can intervene and discover causal relationships for mMIMO-based JCAS environments, during the training phase. We use a state dependent action dimension selection strategy to realize causal discovery for RL-based JCAS. Evaluation of the causally-aware RL framework in different JCAS scenarios shows the benefit of our proposed framework over baseline methods in terms of the beamforming gain., Comment: 18 pages, 9 figures, 4 tables, 1 algorithm

Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) consist of numerous control units interconnected by communication networks. Each control unit executes multiple safety-critical and non-critical tasks in real-time. Most of the safety-critical tasks are executed with a fixed sampling period to ensure deterministic timing behaviour that helps in its safety and performance analysis. However, adversaries can exploit this deterministic behaviour of safety-critical tasks to launch inference-based-based attacks on them. This paper aims to prevent and minimize the possibility of such timing inference or schedule-based attacks to compromise the control units. This is done by switching between strategically chosen execution rates of the safety-critical control tasks such that their performance remains unhampered. Thereafter, we present a novel schedule vulnerability analysis methodology to switch between valid schedules generated for these multiple periodicities of the control tasks in run time. Utilizing these strategies, we introduce a novel Multi-Rate Attack-Aware Randomized Scheduling (MAARS) framework for preemptive fixed-priority schedulers that minimize the success rate of timing-inference-based attacks on safety-critical real-time systems. To our knowledge, this is the first work to propose a schedule randomization method with attack awareness that preserves both the control and scheduling aspects. The efficacy of the framework in terms of attack prevention is finally evaluated on several automotive benchmarks in a Hardware-in-loop (HiL) environment., Comment: 12 pages including references, Total 10 figures (with 3 having subfigures). This paper was rejected in RTSS 2024 Conference

Advancement of chip technology will make future computer chips faster. Power consumption of such chips shall also decrease. But this speed gain shall not come free of cost, there is going to be a trade-off between speed and efficiency, i.e accuracy of the computation. In order to achieve this extra speed we will simply have to let our computers make more mistakes in computations. Consequently, systems built with these type of chips will possess an innate unreliability lying within. Programs written for these systems will also have to incorporate this unreliability. Researchers have already started developing programming frameworks for unreliable architectures as such. In the present work, we use a restricted version of C-type languages to model the programs written for unreliable architectures. We propose a technique for statically analyzing codes written for these kind of architectures. Our technique, which primarily focuses on Interval/Range Analysis of this type of programs, uses the well established theory of abstract interpretation. While discussing unreliability of hardware, there comes scope of failure of the hardware components implicitly. There are two types of failure models, namely: 1) permanent failure model, where the hardware stops execution on failure and 2) transient failure model, where on failure, the hardware continues subsequent operations with wrong operand values. In this paper, we've only taken transient failure model into consideration. The goal of this analysis is to predict the probability with which a program variable assumes values from a given range at a given program point.

This work focuses on eliminating timing-side channels in real-time safety-critical cyber-physical network protocols like Controller Area Networks (CAN). Automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs) implement predictable scheduling decisions based on task level response time estimation. Such levels of determinism exposes timing information about task executions and therefore corresponding message transmissions via the network buses (that connect the ECUs and actuators). With proper analysis, such timing side channels can be utilized to launch several schedule-based attacks that can lead to eventual denial-of-service or man-in-the-middle-type attacks. To eliminate this determinism, we propose a novel schedule obfuscation strategy by skipping certain control task executions and related data transmissions along with random shifting of the victim task instance. While doing this, our strategy contemplates the performance of the control task as well by bounding the number of control execution skips. We analytically demonstrate how the attack success probability (ASP) is reduced under this proposed attack-aware skipping and randomization. We also demonstrate the efficacy and real-time applicability of our attack-aware schedule obfuscation strategy Hide-n-Seek by applying it to synthesized automotive task sets in a real-time Hardware-in-loop (HIL) setup.

Intelligent attackers can suitably tamper sensor/actuator data at various Smart grid surfaces causing intentional power oscillations, which if left undetected, can lead to voltage disruptions. We develop a novel combination of formal methods and machine learning tools that learns power system dynamics with the objective of generating unsafe yet stealthy false data based attack sequences. We enable the grid with anomaly detectors in a generalized manner so that it is difficult for an attacker to remain undetected. Our methodology, when applied on an IEEE 14 bus power grid model, uncovers stealthy attack vectors even in presence of such detectors.

Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed CPS-specific attack detection schemes as well as techniques for attack resilient controller design. However, such schemes also incur platform-level overheads. In this regard, some recent works have leveraged the use of skips in control execution to enhance the resilience of a CPS against false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this paper, we provide an analytical discussion on when and how skipping a control execution can improve the resilience of the system against FDI attacks while maintaining the control performance requirement. We also propose a methodology to synthesize such optimal control execution patterns. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has provided any quantitative analysis about the trade-off between attack resilience and control performance for such aperiodic control execution. Finally, we evaluate the proposed method on several safety-critical CPS benchmarks.

Recent developments in the smart mobility domain have transformed automobiles into networked transportation agents helping realize new age, large-scale intelligent transportation systems (ITS). The motivation behind such networked transportation is to improve road safety as well as traffic efficiency. In this setup, vehicles can share information about their speed and/or acceleration values among themselves and infrastructures can share traffic signal data with them. This enables the connected vehicles (CVs) to stay informed about their surroundings while moving. However, the inter-vehicle communication channels significantly broaden the attack surface. The inter-vehicle network enables an attacker to remotely launch attacks. An attacker can create collision as well as hamper performance by reducing the traffic efficiency. Thus, security vulnerabilities must be taken into consideration in the early phase of the development cycle of CVs. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no such automated simulation tool using which engineers can verify the performance of CV prototypes in the presence of an attacker. In this work, we present an automated tool flow that facilitates false data injection attack synthesis and simulation on customizable platoon structure and vehicle dynamics. This tool can be used to simulate as well as design and verify control-theoretic light-weight attack detection and mitigation algorithms for CVs.

Building loads consume roughly 40% of the energy produced in developed countries, a significant part of which is invested towards building temperature-control infrastructure. Therein, renewable resource-based microgrids offer a greener and cheaper alternative. This communication explores the possible co-design of microgrid power dispatch and building HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning system) actuations with the objective of effective temperature control under minimised operating cost. For this, we attempt control designs with various levels of abstractions based on information available about microgrid and HVAC system models using the Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) technique. We provide control architectures that consider model information ranging from completely determined system models to systems with fully unknown parameter settings and illustrate the advantages of DRL for the design prescriptions., Comment: DSD 2021: Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design

Increased dependence on networked, software based control has escalated the vulnerabilities of Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs). Detection and monitoring components developed leveraging dynamical systems theory are often employed as lightweight security measures for protecting such safety critical CPSs against false data injection attacks. However, existing approaches do not correlate attack scenarios with parameters of detection systems. In the present work, we propose a Reinforcement Learning (RL) based framework which adaptively sets the parameters of such detectors based on experience learned from attack scenarios, maximizing detection rate and minimizing false alarms in the process while attempting performance preserving control actions.

In the past decade, high performance compute capabilities exhibited by heterogeneous GPGPU platforms have led to the popularity of data parallel programming languages such as CUDA and OpenCL. Such languages, however, involve a steep learning curve as well as developing an extensive understanding of the underlying architecture of the compute devices in heterogeneous platforms. This has led to the emergence of several High Performance Computing frameworks which provide high-level abstractions for easing the development of data-parallel applications on heterogeneous platforms. However, the scheduling decisions undertaken by such frameworks only exploit coarse-grained concurrency in data parallel applications. In this paper, we propose PySchedCL, a framework which explores fine-grained concurrency aware scheduling decisions that harness the power of heterogeneous CPU/GPU architectures efficiently. %, a feature which is not provided by existing HPC frameworks. We showcase the efficacy of such scheduling mechanisms over existing coarse-grained dynamic scheduling schemes by conducting extensive experimental evaluations for a Machine Learning based inferencing application.

We consider the problem of provably securing a given control loop implementation in the presence of adversarial interventions on data exchange between plant and controller. Such interventions can be thwarted using continuously operating monitoring systems and also cryptographic techniques, both of which consume network and computational resources. We provide a principled approach for intentional skipping of control loop executions which may qualify as a useful control theoretic countermeasure against stealthy attacks which violate message integrity and authenticity. As is evident from our experiments, such a control theoretic counter-measure helps in lowering the cryptographic security measure overhead and resulting resource consumption in Control Area Network (CAN) based automotive CPS without compromising performance and safety., Comment: 9 pages

Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS) is one of the primary drivers behind increasing levels of autonomy, driving comfort in this age of connected mobility. However, the performance of such systems is a function of execution rate which demands on-board platform-level support. With GPGPU platforms making their way into automobiles, there exists an opportunity to adaptively support high execution rates for ADAS tasks by exploiting architectural heterogeneity, keeping in mind thermal reliability and long-term platform aging. We propose a future-proof, learning-based adaptive scheduling framework that leverages Reinforcement Learning to discover suitable scenario based task-mapping decisions for accommodating increased task-level throughput requirements.

We consider the problem of securing a given control loop implementation of a cyber-physical system (CPS) in the presence of Man-in-the-Middle attacks on data exchange between plant and controller over a compromised network. To this end, there exist various detection schemes that provide mathematical guarantees against such attacks for the theoretical control model. However, such guarantees may not hold for the actual control software implementation. In this article, we propose a formal approach towards synthesizing attack detectors with varying thresholds which can prevent performance degrading stealthy attacks while minimizing false alarms., Comment: 4 Pages, Date 2019 Poster Presentation

Modern electronic systems become evermore complex, yet remain modular, with integrated circuits (ICs) acting as versatile hardware components at their heart. Electronic design automation (EDA) for ICs has focused traditionally on power, performance, and area. However, given the rise of hardware-centric security threats, we believe that EDA must also adopt related notions like secure by design and secure composition of hardware. Despite various promising studies, we argue that some aspects still require more efforts, for example: effective means for compilation of assumptions and constraints for security schemes, all the way from the system level down to the "bare metal"; modeling, evaluation, and consideration of security-relevant metrics; or automated and holistic synthesis of various countermeasures, without inducing negative cross-effects. In this paper, we first introduce hardware security for the EDA community. Next we review prior (academic) art for EDA-driven security evaluation and implementation of countermeasures. We then discuss strategies and challenges for advancing research and development toward secure composition of circuits and systems., Comment: To appear in DATE'20

Recent studies have shown that adaptively regulating the sampling rate results in significant reduction in computational resources in embedded software based control. Selecting a uniform sampling rate for a control loop is robust, but overtly pessimistic for sharing processors among multiple control loops. Fine grained regulation of periodicity achieves better resource utilization, but is hard to implement online in a robust way. In this paper we propose multi-mode sampling period selection, derived from an offline control theoretic analysis of the system. We report significant gains in computational efficiency without trading off control performance., Comment: Work in Progress Poster, 51st Design Automation Conference (DAC), San Francisco, CA, 7-11, June 2014