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This paper analyzes the strategic decision of basket choice in the National Basketball Association. Before games start, the away team chooses whether to play on offense in front of their bench in the first or second half. Based on eight regular seasons and 9,308 games, we identify the standard strategy for away teams to play on offense at their own benches in the first half. Results indicate that both home and away teams score more points when they play on offense in front of their bench. More importantly, there is a strategic advantage for the away team to play with the offense in front of the bench in the second half, deviating from the standard strategy in the league. Finally, we demonstrate that the choice of the basket for the away team can partially offset the home advantage under normal spectator conditions and entirely nullify it in ghost games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human factor in decision-making in tennis, like so many sports, plays a fundamental part of its ambience and/or drama or entertainment. This is because some line calls by some line umpires can be dubious, or even incorrect. In tennis events that allow for challenges to line calls, an artificial intelligence-based referee, in the form of electronic line calling (ELC), is then used to resolve the challenge, and the result is handed out by the chair umpire. This commentary debates the merits and demerits that may be associated with the total elimination of human line umpires by employing ELC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous literature leaves the impression that betting market inefficiencies are widespread. However, most studies rely upon limited data and ignore biases' persistence. Our simulation-based analyses show (1) the impact of low sample sizes on the chance to detect markets that only appear to be efficient and (2) the frequency of observing inefficient periods within fully efficient markets. Afterwards, we (3) empirically analyze real-world football betting markets for 14 consecutive seasons. While inefficiencies occur in singular seasons, they are not persistent or systematic across leagues. Moreover, our simulation-based analyses suggest that statistically significant effects in single seasons are likely to be observed even under full market efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article empirically explores the impact of intermediate information on contestants' effort. Data involving substituted soccer players of the German Bundesliga indicate only weak evidence of a negative effect of ex ante heterogeneity on effort; in contrast, intermediate information, measured by goal difference at the time of substitution, significantly affects effort. Players exert the greatest effort when their team is leading by one goal and reduce their effort when it is trailing. When intermediate information suggests the contest is already decided, players from both teams reduce effort. This behavior is in line with loss aversion, such that players weight potential losses more than potential gains and adjust their effort accordingly. (JEL Z22, J41,M54), I. INTRODUCTION Rank-order tournaments are a popular field of research in both labor economics and sports, because not only are tournaments part of people's everyday lives, but tournament theory also [...]

This study investigates whether firms are willing to pay higher wages to workers who demonstrate consistent performance than to those whose performance is more volatile. A formal model reflects a production technology view, assuming the law of diminishing marginal product. This model suggests that a more consistent worker produces higher expected output and therefore receives a higher wage. The test of the model uses data from the National Basketball Association. The empirical data support the model: Players whose performances were more consistent than the performances of other players received higher wages on average. (JEL D41. J31, M52, Z20), I. INTRODUCTION When a firm hires a worker, the firm pays the worker a salary to demand some service in return. Some workers provide consistent performance; others exhibit performance that [...]

If a sports competition is broadcasted live, consumers may opt for substituting gate attendance with watching that game live on TV (or online). This might be worrisome for teams, particularly those in lower divisions, whose game day revenues typically exceed broadcasting revenues. So far, however, the literature testing this claim empirically is inconclusive. We examine whether (at least parts of) this confusion might be traced back to shortcomings in the econometric modelling process. We use attendance data for 1,138 games in German third division football from the 2015/16 to 2017/18 seasons and compare results for our demand equations between ordinary least squares (OLS) and endogenous treatment regressions (ETR). ETRs explicitly account for any selection bias, that is, the broadcasters' preference to select the most attractive games for live broadcasting (which are expected to also attract comparably larger gate attendances). While OLS models reveal a significant positive impact of live broadcasts on gate attendance, this effect reverses when estimating ETRs. Even though there is suggestive evidence for postponing ticket demand to some extent to later games, the overall negative effect remains robust and large. Our findings highlight the relevance of controlling for the selection bias when analysing the impact of live broadcasting on stadium attendance. From a managerial point of view, our findings suggest that increasing the number of games broadcasted live in German third division football might not be advisable, since additional broadcasting revenues may not exceed predicted losses in ticket revenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]