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Este artigo procura esclarecer a tese de S. Tomás de Aquino segundo a qual é possível provar que se pode demonstrar a existência de Deus. A partir das análises da Summa theologica I, q.2 e da Summa contra gentiles i (i-xv), procura-se entender o sentido e cabimento desta tese, as suas implicações e a sua pertinência filosófica e teológica. As análises de Tomás de Aquino vincam a importância da distinção entre um conhecimento a respeito da existência de Deus e um conhecimento a respeito da sua essência, acentuando em cada caso um conjunto de dificuldades e fatores de ignorância. Num contexto em que a noção de confusão desempenha um papel central, Tomás de Aquino procura mostrar a) que, por mais confuso que seja o conhecimento sobre Deus e por maior que seja a desproporção entre a perspetiva humana e a perspetiva divina, há uma notícia indelével de Deus, e b) que tal notícia está simultaneamente associada à incapacidade de conhecer a essência de Deus e à capacidade de demonstrar a sua existência por meio de certos efeitos e vestígios de Deus. De tudo isto resulta a peculiar demonstração da existência de um Deus absconditus. É precisamente a descoberta deste Deus que se manifesta e ao mesmo tempo se esconde que permite documentar a possibilidade de demonstrar que Deus existe e que constitui a base sobre a qual assenta toda e qualquer demonstração da existência de Deus. This article attempts to clarify the thesis by St. Thomas Aquinas, according to which it is possible to prove that the existence of God can be demonstrated. On the basis of the analyses in Summa Theologica I, q.2 and Summa contra gentiles I (I-XV), there is an attempt to understand the meaning and relevance of this thesis, its implications and its philosophical and theological significance. Thomas Aquinas’ analyses underline the importance of distinguishing between a knowledge about the existence of God and one regarding his essence, while highlighting in each case a set of difficulties and lack of knowledge factors. In a context where the idea of confusion plays a central role, Thomas Aquinas tries to show that a) no matter how confused knowledge about God is and no matter how large the disproportion between the human and divine perspectives, there is an ineradicable notitia Dei, and b) this notice is linked at the same time to the inability to know God’s essenceand the ability to demonstrate His existenceby means of certain effects and traces of His. This all leads to the peculiar demonstration of the existence of a Deus absconditus. It is pre-cisely the discovery of this God who manifests himself and at the same time hides himself that makes it possible to document the possibility of demonstrating that God exists and that constitutes the foundations on which every and any demonstration of the existence of God rests. Esta publicação foi financiada por Fundos Nacionais através da FCT — Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, no âmbito do Projeto «UID/ELT/00077/2019» info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Commentators found the unit Job 34:26-30, in Elihu's second speech, difficult to interpret and translate because of its thematic incoherence, abrupt style, and use of ambiguous terms. It has been generally assumed that the unit underwent some corruption in the historical transmission process. This paper attempts to restore a sound thematic flow to vv. 26-30 using standard text-critical methods. It is being shown that relatively few minor text-critical emendations allow to obtain a simple and coherent text, having a typical (for the Book of Job) 3:3 meter. The resolution of the difficulties in the unit is premised on the notion that the unit is focused on potentates that have lost their moral compass and God's reaction to their deeds. From this perspective, vv. 26-30 fit contextually the larger unit in which it is embedded (vv. 16-30), which deals with God's righteous management of nations and people. Job's personal problem is addressed only indirectly. Job can deduce from Elihu's words that: his punishments indicate that he sinned; he is ignorant of God's ways and abandoned moral behavior; he has caused anguish to the destitute, which reached heaven; he cannot compel God to confront him; and, God works in mysterious ways. Elihu's message to Job is hard hitting, but it is not devoid of hope.

La thèse démontre que le concept paradoxal de liberté présenté par Luther dans son De servo arbitrio (1525) est la mise en question de la validité des méthodologies de conceptualisation de la liberté assumées par Erasme dans sa critique contre Luther (Diatribé sur le libre arbitre, 1524). Selon Erasme, la position théologique de Luther aboutit à trois absurdités : l'esclavage de l'homme sous l'omnipuissance de Dieu ; l'impossibilité de réaliser les commandements divins ; la négation de l'auto-éducation de l'homme, et de toute logique de mérite-punition. La thèse montre comme la contre-argumentation de Luther est une opération sur la valeur axiomatique des conditions de sens qui fondent ces argumenta ad absurdum. Ce point de vue formel permet une nouvelle conception du Deus absconditus, de la justification, et de la prédestination chez Luther. Ainsi, la théologie qui pense la liberté est elle-même liberté (théologique) du langage de penser la liberté paradoxalement.

“The question of finding a merciful God. Understanding Martin Luther’s relation to metaphysics and ontology” Myrén, Anna. 2017, Master’s Thesis, 30 credits. E-mail: annamyren@live.se The Department of Theology, Uppsala University, Engelska Parken, Thunbergsv. 3B, Box 511, SE-751 20 UPPSALA, Sweden, info@teol.uu.se This thesis examines arguments and premises for understanding Luther’s relationship to metaphysics and ontology. The main theoretical sources are firstly research that, on the one hand argue that Luther’s doctrine of justification has ontological structures and on the other treat his relation to metaphysics, and secondly sources that treat Luther’s development of theological themes and issues from a history of ideas perspective. The thesis concludes that the arguments of Finnish Luther scholars Tuomo Mannermaa and Sammeli Juntunen are helpful for understanding the relationship between Luther, metaphysics and ontology. Their conclusions display different levels of structures in his doctrine; thematic as well as re-oriented structures of thought, showing that Luther is occupied with metaphysical and ontology and presenting strong arguments for his doctrine of justification as ontological. Luther’s doctrinal development can be understood both as a result of criticism of substance-metaphysics, as well as itself ultimately displaying metaphysical and ontological issues. Such contents in his theology should be viewed in the larger perspective of forming theology, a history of ideas context that broadens the question to one of structures of thought, involving themes, issues, forming of doctrine as processual development. However, their thematic, doctrinal focus risks not giving full account for understanding Luther’s relation to metaphysical and ontological issues. An intricacy of the question is displayed and possible to trace when Luther’s theology is addressed from systematical as well as historical perspectives. The thesis finally argues with the help of a history of ideas perspective that the theologia crucis - specifically with its concept of the hidden God, the deus absconditus – is a resource for further inquiry of Luther and metaphysics, in understanding his theology as describing reality. Keywords: Luther, metaphysics, ontology, doctrine of justification, Mannermaa, Juntunen, themes, structures of thought, theologia crucis, deus absconditus.

International audience; When we talk about mysticism, this word evokes the notion of 'pure love', indifferent to the ideas of retribution or punishment, and the total abandonment to God’s will, but above all the ability to feel the sense of the divine presence. We think especially of contemplation, which is the happy side of this situation – raptures, "illuminations", that appear to be an immediate communication with the divine. The other side, the painful side of mysticism, is often ignored: at first, the trial that represents the abandonment of his own will, and even more, moments of dereliction, where the absence of God is felt with the same intensity that his presence in the moments of grace.; Lorsqu'on parle de mystique, on évoque la notion de « pur amour », indifférent aux idées de rétribution ou de châtiment, et l'abandon total de soi à la volonté divine, mais surtout la capacité à éprouver le sentiment vécu d'une présence divine effective. On pense surtout à la contemplation qui en est le versant heureux, aux extases, aux « illuminations », manifestations de ce qui semble être une communication immédiate avec le divin. On ignore souvent l'autre versant, le versant douloureux du mysticisme : d'abord l'épreuve que représente l'abandon de sa volonté propre, et plus encore les moments de déréliction, où le retrait de Dieu se fait sentir avec autant d'intensité que sa présence dans les moments de grâce.

Dok je nauk o sveopćoj „ispraznosti“ života „pod suncem“ pribavio Propovjedniku nazive pesimista i skeptika među biblijskim piscima, njegov govor o Bogu koji šuti, koji je dalek i nedostižan i čije djelovanje u svijetu čovjek ne može do kraja dokučiti, doveo je do toga da ga pojedini egzegeti smatraju čovjekom koji proživljava krizu vjere, agnostikom ili čak ateistom. No pažljivo čitanje njegove knjige pokazuje suprotno: Propovjednik je mudrac „koji živi od svoje vjere“ (usp.: Hab 2,4a). Njegova se vjera prvenstveno očituje u stavu „bogobojaznosti“ (3,14; 5,6; 7,18; 8,12-13) koji se, kako potvrđuju i tekstovi o Božjem sudu (3,17; 8,5-6; 11,9), sastoji u strahopoštovanju prema dalekom i nedostižnom Bogu te poniznom prihvaćanju Njegova nedokučiva djelovanja. No k tome, s druge strane, Propovjednikova vjera uključuje i „radost“, odnosno prepoznavanje i življenje radosti koju Bog čovjeku daruje u svakodnevici njegova ispraznog života i koja predstavlja konkretni znak Njegove blizine, brige i naklonosti (2,24; 3,12- 13.22; 5,17; 8,15; 9,7-9; 11,8-9). Vjera Propovjednikova opstaje tako između dviju krajnosti: između vjere u Boga koji je istodobno dalek i nespoznatljiv te opipljivo blizak. I upravo takva vjera – koja uključuje „bogobojazno“ strahopoštovanje prema Bogu, ali i življenje „radosti“ – omogućuje Propovjedniku nadvladati „ispraznost“ koju otkriva „pod suncem“., Qoheleth, widely acknowledged as a pessimist and sceptic among biblical writers because of his doctrine of universal futility and the vanity of life “under the sun”, is also considered, by some exegetes, as a man who experiences a crisis of faith, an agnostic or even an atheist, because of his image of God as silent, distant and elusive, a 355 figure whose actions in the world man perceives but cannot understand. However, a careful reading of his book shows that Qoheleth is actually a wise man “who lives by his faith” (Hab 2:4a). This is primarily reflected in the attitude of “fear of God” (3:14; 5:6; 7:18; 8:12-13) that includes respect for God and acceptance of his incomprehensible action; it is confirmed by texts on “God’s judgment” (3:17; 8:5-6; 11:9) in which Qoheleth believes, although the timing and criteria remain a mystery. But more significantly, Qoheleth’s faith is reflected in the texts about “joy” (2:24; 3:12- 13,22; 5:17; 8:15; 9:7-9; 11:8-9), which imply that God, even though ultimately inscrutable, reveals his presence to and his care for man in the small, everyday joys he bestows on him during his short and futile life. Qoheleth’s faith thus persists between two extremes: faith in a God who is permanently distant and unknowable and at the same time is palpably close every day. Qoheleth’s response to this image of God is, on the one hand, “fear”, and on the other, “joy” – and it is precisely this response that allows him to overcome the “vanity” that he perceives “under the sun”.

L’intento che muove questo scritto è quello di fare emergere un confronto tra la filosofia di Pascal e quella di Piovani il filosofo italiano della seconda metà del Novecento al quale dobbiamo un’originale teoresi storicistico-esistenziale. Senza nessuna pretesa esaustiva, ci sembra poter avanzare l’ipotesi di un Pascal di Piovani e di come quest’ultimo non potesse non dirsi pascaliano nella messa a punto del suo Storicismo critico, inequivocabilmente erede del pensiero moderno. Infatti, è proprio a partire dalla constatazione della disintegrazione del cosmo classico, maturata dalla scienza moderna, che il Piovani costruisce la propria prospettiva filosofica – in chiave decisamente antimetafisica – al centro della quale trova posto l’inevitabile ricognizione dell’individuale, attraverso un’analisi micrologica intrisa di un paradigma carico di futuro: la conoscenza storica è, si fa coscienza morale. Il grande contributo pascaliano è racchiuso nella sorprendente logica del cuore, filtrata da quell’agostinismo a partire dal quale Piovani pone le basi per la tematizzazione di un’etica umanologica e imperniata su un pluralismo e prospettivismo etico che rifiuta qualsiasi ordine dato, qualsiasi edulcorata armonia, passando – decisamente – dal cielo alla terra. Ma ciò che ci sembra, particolarmente, degno d’attenzione è quanto Piovani non esita a precisare, sul finire, del trivellante scandaglio sull’autore delle Pensées: «Bisognerebbe prendere di petto il difficile argomento di quanto sia tradizionalmente teologico o solo apparentemente teologico nella apologetica di Pascal…» Come dire: si tratta di una raffinatissima indicazione da parte di un brillante recensore quale era Piovani che, ermeneuticamente, invita il lettore a portare l’attenzione sulla paradossalità del cristianesimo pascaliano, attestandone la latente tonalità laica.

Sur certaines convergences entre l'œuvre du philosophe Lev Karsavine et la mystique française du XVIIe siècle.; International audience; Lev Karsavin est surtout connu comme historien de la spiritualité occidentale. Il s'est d'abord intéressé à la pré-Renaissance italienne, à des mystiques comme Angela de Foligno. Parmi ses références favorites, on trouve aussi Richard de Saint Victor et Bernard de Clairvaux. Mais ce sont surtout les mystiques français du XVIIe s. (essentiellement jésuites) qui sont en accord parfait avec les souffrances du renoncement à soi-même décrites dans le Poème de la mort. Certaines phrases de Charles de Condren, par exemple, cité par Henri Brémond, pourraient être mises en épigraphe à cette œuvre. Mais pour définir le type d'attitude mystique qui s'y exprime, c'est aussi le principal ennemi des jésuites, Pascal, qui peut nous guider. Sa présence explicite dans ce texte a été déjà relevée. La polémique autour du " pari " et du refus du monde ne peut masquer une convergence avec le versant mystique de Pascal, le sentiment tragique du retrait de Dieu et l'angoisse d'être confronté au néant devenant une sorte de participation à la kénose divine.; Русский философ Лев Карсавин известен как историк западной духовности. В начале своего творческого пути, он интересовался итальянским пред-Возрождением и великими мистиками того времени, как Анжела из Фолиньо. Он также постоянно ссылался на викторинцев (Ришар из Сэн Виктор) и на Бернарда Клервосского. Но с настроением мучительного отречения от себя, описуемого в его Поэме о смерти, лучше всего совпадает строй мыслей французских мистиков XVII века (прежде всего иезуитов). До такой степени, что некоторые их изречения (например Шарля де Кондрен), приведённые историком французской духовной жизни Анри Бремон, могли бы послужить эпиграфом для Поэмы о смерти. Это тем любопытнее, что определить типологию этих настроений в первую очередь может нам помочь отъявленный враг иезуитов - Паскаль. В Поэме о смерти, Карсавин прямо отсылает читателя к знаменитому "пари" Паскаля. Полемика вокруг пари и отказ Карсавина от того неприятия мира, которое пронизывает всё творчество Паскаля, не заслоняют собой ясное совпадение с его трагическим чувством богоотсутствия. У обоих мыслителей это мучительное прикосновение к "краю небытия" становится своего рода причастием к божественному кеносису.

The main point is presentation of J. Hick’s conception of religious faith freedom and her critics. On this ground article put questions to catholic’s theology. Hick say that faith is experiencing-as, and has almost infinite freedom. God can't to force to believe Him. From the other side. Hick consider that person like Jesus had huge awareness of God’s, that it was no place for freedom. Authors like Perret, Henze, Cheetham try to analyze Hik’s conception. They shows few contradictions and new problems.

Mistika je za protestantizam stoljećima bila negativan pojam. Značajan razlog tome sigurno je bilo krivo shvaćanje mistike. Koliko god je protestantizam bio protiv mistike, što pokazuju i noviji teolozi na čelu s Karlom Barthom, u njemu nikada nije nestalo mistike i mističnoga iskustva. U članku također donosim glavne teze koje se odnose na spočitavanja upućivana mistici, kako bi se moglo zaključiti što ona jest, a što nije. Stoga spočitavanjima ne prilazim apologetski, niti se s njima sukobljavam; cilj mi je iznijeti i kriva shvaćanja pojma mistike. Kada danas promatramo odnos protestantizma prema mistici, onda nailazimo na nemali broj zagovornika mistike, koji, analizirajući kršćanstvu poznata protestantska imena, žele dokazati da mistika uvijek prati protestantizam. Razvidno je to i iz Lutherova stava prema mistici, koji ide od prihvaćanja do odbacivanja i do traženja nekog ‘blažeg’ mističnog iskustva, odnosno mistike u kojoj će se prije svega vidjeti da je ona dar milosti. Na kraju ostaje zaključak da je kritika mistike od strane protestantizma i danas dobrodošla kršćanskoj mistici, ne kako bi ona nestala, nego kako bi se pročistila., Mysticism has been a negative idea for Protestantism for centuries. A major contribution to it has surely been the wrongly understood mysticism. No matter how much Protestantism has been against mysticism, which also testify the new theologians headed by Barth, mysticism and mystical experience has never disappeared from it. In the article I also present the main theses of reproaching to mysticism so that one can see what it is and what it is not. Therefore I do not approach to the reproaches apologetically neither am I confronted with them but my aim is to put forward the distorted perceptions of that idea. If we consider the attitude of Protestantism toward mysticism today, then we come across a considerable number of advocates of mysticism who want to prove, analyzing to Christianity well known Protestant names, that mysticism has always accompanied Protestantism. It is evident from Luther’s attitude toward mysticism, which goes from accepting to rejecting and seeking for a “milder” mystical experience, i.e. the mysticism in which it is evident that it is first of all a gift of grace. At the end it is to conclude that the criticism of mysticism by Protestantism is welcome to the entire Christian mysticism even today, not that it should disappear but become purified.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – CAPES Blaise Pascal is not a thinker who is concerned with any proof of the existence of God. However, in his apology, he presents several fragments intending to persuade his readers of the supposed advantages of believing in His existence. Contrary to the evidence presented at different times by different theologians and philosophers, he makes use of an unprecedented argumentation, based not on empirical or metaphysical evidence, but on probability theory, in order to expound his argument, known as Pascal’s wager. This was developed entirely in the ‘Infinite-nothing’ fragment, chosen exactly to highlight the abyssal and insurmountable distance between the Creator and its creature. Its aim was not to rationally prove the necessary existence of God, but to convince insecure Christians and, above all, nonbelievers that there were advantages in betting: not on the existence of some God, but on a hidden God, that is, One who is concealed for all eternity an at an immeasurable distance from man, who, in a perverse desire for self-sufficiency, was deceived into transgressing the only rule he was determined not to break, under penalty of his perishing. Even so, man’s desire prevailed. Since then, man has fallen from a supposed state of absolute knowledge of God-albeit in due proportion-to a state of blindness whereby he and his descendants were barred from any access to divinity without the aid of a mediator. The objective of this dissertation is to carry out a systematic study of the concept of the hidden God and its relationship with Pascal’s wager, in an attempt to find indications in Pascal’s work of what would be the true reconciliation of the fallen man with the hidden God and how this would be brought about. Therefore, we stand by the hypothesis that the wager, as it is presented, must be understood from a dialectical perspective, in which theology and philosophy, faith and reason, the emotional and the rational engage with each other, seeking to uncover the paths that lead to the reconciliation of man with God through the recovery of his lost dignity. Thus, in order to expound Pascal’s ideas dealing with this subject, we analyze, in four chapters: the context of the appearance of pascalian apologetics; the tragic existence of man after the original sin, the fall of man, and the grounds for believing in the existence of a hidden God; Christianity as the true religion and Christ the true mediator; the role of the wager and its relationship with the idea of a hidden God, a legacy of prophet Isaiah, appropriately borrowed by Pascal to symbolize the absence, the transcendence, the abyss and the incommunicability between the ‘finite’ and the ‘Infinite’ Blaise Pascal não é um pensador preocupado com as provas da existência de Deus. Mesmo assim, em sua apologia fornece vários fragmentos visando persuadir seus interlocutores das supostas vantagens de acreditar na Sua existência. Mas, contrariamente às provas apresentadas em diversas épocas por diversos teólogos e filósofos, serve-se de uma argumentação nunca antes experimentada, baseando-se não em evidências empíricas ou metafísicas, mas, na teoria das probabilidades para expor seu argumento conhecido como a aposta pascaliana. Esta foi desenvolvida integralmente no fragmento ‘Infinito-nada’, escolhido exatamente para marcar a distância abissal e intransponível entre Criador e criatura. Seu objetivo não era provar racionalmente a existência necessária de Deus, mas, convencer os cristãos inseguros e, sobretudo, os incrédulos de que era vantajoso apostar: não na existência de um Deus qualquer, mas em um Deus absconditus, ou seja, aquele que encontra-Se encoberto desde a eternidade e, a uma distância incomensurável do homem, pois, em virtude do seu desejo perverso de autossuficiência foi ludibriado a transgredir a única regra que lhe foi determinada a não violar, sob pena do seu perecimento. Mesmo assim, seu desejo prevaleceu. Desde então, decaiu de um suposto estado de absoluto conhecimento de Deus, ainda que, guardando as devidas proporções, para o estado de cegueira em que foi vedado a ele e sua descendência qualquer acesso a divindade sem auxílio de um mediador. O objetivo dessa tese é realizar um estudo sistemático em torno do conceito de Deus absconditus e sua relação com a aposta pascaliana, na tentativa de encontrar em Pascal, as pistas que sugerem o que seria e como se daria a verdadeira reconciliação do homem decaído com o Deus absconditus. Sendo assim, sustentamos a hipótese de que a aposta, como é apresentada deve ser entendida a partir de uma perspectiva dialética em que a teologia e a filosofia, a fé e a razão, o emocional e o racional dialogam, buscando desvendar os caminhos que levam à reconciliação do homem com Deus através do resgate da sua dignidade perdida. Assim, no intuito de expor as ideias pascalianas que versam sobre o tema, analisamos em quatro capítulos: o contexto do aparecimento da apologética pascaliana; a trágica existência do homem após o pecado original, a queda e os fundamentos para acreditar na existência de um Deus absconditus; o cristianismo como sendo a verdadeira religião e Cristo o verdadeiro mediador; o papel da aposta e sua relação com o Deus absconditus, uma herança do profeta Isaías, devidamente apropriado por Pascal para simbolizar a ausência, a transcendência, o abismo e a incomunicabilidade entre o ‘finito’ e o ‘Infinito’