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To an individual, pain is unambiguously real. To a caregiver, assessing pain in others is a challenging process shrouded in doubt. To explain this challenge, many assume that pain "belongs" exclusively to the bearer of that experience and accept the dogma that pain is private. However, privacy also entails that it is not possible to identify, share, or communicate that experience with others. Obviously, this is not true and the consequences of pain privacy would be devastating for healthcare. Pain is indeed unique and subjective, but not necessarily private. Pain is in fact readily communicable, though perhaps not as effectively and reliably as caregivers would like. On the other hand, healthcare systems mandate objective metrics in pain diagnosis. Smiley face caricatures are a staple of clinical practice and a universal standard for reporting pain levels. These conditions create a double paradox: Assess a private experience that is inaccessible, and use numerical scales to measure subjective attributes. Navigating this stressful environment, medical professionals experience intellectual dissonance, patients are frustrated, and value-based care is undermined. Offering a way out, first, we refute the privacy and objectification of pain citing philosophical, behavioral, and neuroscientific arguments. We discuss Wittgensteinian views against privacy, explore the clear evolutionary advantage of communicating pain to others, and identify neural circuits in the mammalian brain that contribute to empathy. Second, we highlight the subjectivity of pain, embracing the complexity and uniqueness of an individual's pain. We also provide compelling evidence for brain mechanisms that actively shape the pain experience according to predictive coding principles. Third, we offer a vision for the development of biomarker technologies that assess pain fairly without engendering bias against the patient's narrative. Our recommendations are based on the overwhelming appreciation that "medicine by emoji" is inadequate for capturing the multidimensional nature of pain. Our view is that the most promising candidates for pain biomarkers consist of self-reports as ground truth augmented by physiological signatures of biological relevance to pain. Integration of subjective and objective multimodal features will be key for the development of comprehensive pain assessment models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Descartes claimed that the Cogito is 'so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it'. This paper aims to demonstrate that this claim is false by presenting a sceptical scenario for the Cogito. It is argued that the story 'The Circular Ruins' by J. L. Borges illustrates that one can doubt one's own existence and that pace Descartes (and many others) the claim 'I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind' is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here I consider Georges Canguilhem's remarkable essay 'On Science and Counter-Science' (1971) as a reflection on both the life and the philosophy of his departed friend Jean Hyppolite. I begin by suggesting that Canguilhem's essay takes up and critiques Hyppolite's critique of empirical reason in Logic and Existence (1953). Drawing upon materials from the Canguilhem archives, I then demonstrate that Canguilhem composed the 1971 essay by returning to and drawing from a seminar he gave in 1955–56 on 'Science and Error'. I consider the significance of this 'return' as a kind of memento mori. In 'On Science and Counter-Science' Canguilhem pursues a vivid account of the significance of error within (scientific) reason, as caught between the twin poles of Cartesian correction and Nietzschean affirmation. In his refusal to choose between these poles, Canguilhem affirms the restless vital quality of the trace of the concept, which destabilises the perfection of death and the absolute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to show (1) that scepticism, in both its traditional forms and contemporary forms, poses no real threat to obtaining inferential empirical knowledge, even if such knowledge requires certainty and (2) that there are some significant lessons to be learned from the traditional sceptics about what constitutes a plausible argument for scepticism and how to obtain knowledge while avoiding dogmatism and (3) that contemporary scepticism is based on several serious mistakes about what is required to obtain empirical knowledge because it both conflates knowing with being dogmatic and inflates the requirements for obtaining empirical knowledge. I will focus on inferential empirical knowledge, rather than knowledge in general, in order to eliminate the necessity of defending one of the various responses to the problem of the regress of reasons. I will limit the discussion to inferential empirical knowledge because it has been the primary target of contemporary arguments for scepticism. I aim to show that we are justified in rejecting the sceptic’s arguments but that we should not be certain that the sceptic is wrong. I hope that it will become obvious that such a seemingly incoherent set of beliefs is part of the correct description of our epistemic position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to apply the methodology of minimal ontological commitments to moral and political philosophy. As minimal metaphysics in the philosophy of science endorses scientific realism, so we subscribe to moral realism, arguing that the presumption of liberty is the fundamental assumption defining a person. What needs to be justified then are restrictions to liberty and, in particular, the application of coercion upon persons. In examining knowledge claims about normative facts going beyond the presumption of liberty, such as, for instance, facts about a common good, we show that an ontological commitment to such normative facts is at odds with minimal metaphysics. We thus show how minimal metaphysics vindicates a Kantian deontological stance in moral and political philosophy: moral realism is limited to the obligations that follow from extending the presumption of liberty to all human beings in virtue of them being rational animals, hence to respect every person as an end in itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anselm described god as "something than which nothing greater can be thought" [1, p. 93], and Descartes viewed him as "a supreme being" [7, p. 122]. I first capture those characterizations formally in a simple language for monadic predicate logic. Next, I construct a model class inspired by Stoic and medieval doctrines of grades of being [8, 20]. Third, I prove the models sufficient for recovering, as internal mathematics, the famous ontological argument of Anselm, and show that argument to be, on this formalization, valid. Fourth, I extend the models to incorporate a modality fit for proving that any item than which necessarily no greater can be thought is also necessarily real. Lastly, with the present approach, I blunt the sharp edges of notable objections to ontological arguments by Gaunilo and by Grant. A trigger warning: every page of this writing flouts the old saw "Existence is not a predicate" and flagrantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the 17th century philosophers, in general, was to show that, by taking as an example the success of the human mind embodied in science, definitive knowledge could be achieved in philosophy, just as in science. To this end, firstly, they described in detail the method to be followed in order to obtain the knowledge. In science, the efforts of scientists such as Kepler, Galileo, and Newton to explain the universe based on mathematics led mathematics to stand out as a way of thinking. In this period, while mathematical research methods enabled the examination of physical phenomena, philosophy, on the other hand, was seen as a model to reach exact knowledge. Rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all agree that people should use their own minds, not authorities, and moving from this idea, mathematics is the method that will lead us to the truth. This paper aims to show how these three great philosophers applied mathematics to their own philosophies, based on their differences and similarities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an attempt to answer the question whether Descartes had read Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. At first glance, the question seems trivial. This question, however, is of historico-philosophical significance in that it reveals, even if only partially, what Descartes, who is regarded as the father of early modern philosophy, inherited from his earlier intellectual legacy in formulating his own philosophy. I first compare statements from Sextus's Outlines with corresponding statements from Descartes's writings to identify their similarities in terms of content. This comparison focuses on their views regarding four subjects: the syllogistic, moral guidelines, the use of definitions, and true opinions. I then analyse and discuss whether the degree of similarity between these sets of statements is sufficient to conclude that the particular work of Descartes is based on Sextus's arguments. This preliminary study can only provide indirect evidence that Descartes had read Sextus, for a thorough clarification of whether he read anything other than the works he himself stated that he had read (e.g., Cicero, Suárez), would require further circumstantial evidence, however weak it may be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many literary works, the characters transform into a "new man". For example, Tom Joads in Grapes of Wrath is transformed from a selfish character who prioritizes his own survival under the social background of the Great Depression. After traveling with his family to California. Young Joads gradually become sober towards the suffering of lower class Americans, turning into a righteous man who fights for social justice. Nevertheless, I disagree with the concept "new man", because despite the ceaseless stream of time and transformative experiences we undergo, our personal essence is constant through time. Meaning that we do not form a complete new self through the transformation of time and experience. To understand this we will be examining the concepts of personal identity defined by memory and consciousness throughout the period of human life. Locke believes that experiences form a human being, and that the concept of individual consciousness will demonstrate the inherent continuity and persistence of the self that are presented through a comprehensive understanding of nature's capacity for transformation over the span of time. Therefore factors such as individual perceptions and impressions in shaping one's sense of self, along with the influence of moral development and virtue on individual identity do not alter the core of identity. Indeed, Descartes, who views the human consciousness as the only object that holds true in the universe, agrees that we are not able to perceive the objective truth. The view point we will argue is in contrast to that of Hume and his bundle theory of identity; we will, therefore, first give an exposition on Hume's critique of a stable personal identity, which it separated into qualitatively identify, and numerical identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although academic work on conspiracy theory has taken off in the last two decades, both in other disciplines as well as in epistemology, the similarities between global sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories have not been the focus of attention. The main reason for this lacuna probably stems from the fact that most philosophers take radical scepticism very seriously, while, for the most part, regarding ‘conspiracy thinking’ as epistemically defective. Defenders of conspiracy theory, on the other hand, tend not to be that interested in undermining radical scepticism, since their primary goal is to save conspiracy theories from the charges of irrationality. In this paper, I argue that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories exhibit importantly similar features, which raises a serious dilemma for the ‘orthodox’ view that holds that while we must respond to radical scepticism, global conspiracy theories can just be dismissed. For, if, as I will show, both scenarios can be seen to be epistemically on a par, then either radical sceptical scenarios are as irrational as global conspiracy theories or neither type of scenario is intrinsically irrational. I argue for the first option by introducing a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ sceptical scenarios and showing how this distinction maps onto contemporary debates concerning how best to understand the notion of a ‘conspiracy theory’. I demonstrate that, just as in the case of scepticism, ‘local’ conspiracies are, at least in principle, detectable and, hence, epistemically unproblematic, while global conspiracy theories, like radical scepticism, are essentially invulnerable to any potential counterevidence. This renders them theoretically vacuous and idle, as everything and nothing is compatible with what these ‘theories’ assert. I also show that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories face the self-undermining problem: As soon as global unreliability is posited, the ensuing radical doubt swallows its children – the coherence of the sceptic’s proposal or the conspiracy theorist’s preferred conspiracy. I conclude that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories are indeed partners in crime and should, therefore, be regarded as equally dubious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mevzu is the property of Ali Sever and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The following remarks have been rigorously argued for in a detailed interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion presented in 2000. This new reading of Anselm's argument cannot be reproduced here in extenso. However, I will draw on its key insights in order to shed light on Descartes' approach to the Proof of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decades the specialists in Descartes’ philosophy have focused on the question whether the nature of the methodical doubt raised in the first meditation must be considered as a systematically rigorous worry or, on the contrary, it corresponds to a trick that performs an instrumental value inside of the approach provided by the author. The hope is that the answer to that question may clarify the process that guides the ‘Meditations’. The interpreters who hold that the methodical doubt is feigned as well as those who think that it must be considered rigorously appeal to a conceptual distinction noted by Descartes itself to validate their respective proposals, namely: the distinction between metaphysical and moral certainty. The present paper proposes that the more suitable interpretation is the one maintained by those who consider the methodical doubt, in certain degree, as genuinely rigorous. To justify our adhesion the paper will evaluate the explanatory capacity of both interpretations, as regars to the progressive order contemplated in the first meditation as well as to the approximation to other philosophical problems contemplated in the ‘Meditations’.

Democracy is admired for fostering deliberation, debate and innovation. Yet there is also the persistent suspicion that it is anti-intellectual. This article turns to one of the foremost theorists of modern democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, to assess his contribution to the debate on democratic anti-intellectualism. It argues that Tocqueville denies democracy is anti-intellectual, yet he also claims democracy favours a distinctive intellectual life, informed theoretically by a Cartesian scepticism and practically by the dominance of a practical and commercial perspective in the sciences, arts and literature. The article concludes by examining the technocratic implications of this form of intellectualism for democratic stability and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last years, knowledge about animals welfare has been developing very dynamically. One of the key problems, in addition to adequate nutrition and living conditions, is the increasingly discussed mental welfare, including pain and its impact on animals. Pain and its management is now a subject of interest for every veterinarian. This paper aims to show how pain in animals was perceived and what influenced the assessment of the significance of this complex phenomenon in animals. Until Descartes, no one questioned the feeling of pain in animals. Then, the Cartesian concept of the animal machine, changed the perception of pain in animals for almost three centuries. Pain was not an important factor in veterinary medicine, often an overlooked factor. It was not until the 1960s that this position has dramatically changed. However, it must be remembered that in fact the Descartes concept was in force until the end of the eighties of the twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a hermeneutic study of Heidegger's text The Word of Nietzsche: "God is Dead". We attempt to read Heidegger's remarks in the context of the "period of transition" that, according to Nietzsche, is occurring in the history of western thought and culture. This essay unfolds in the following manner: beginning with Heidegger's contention that Nietzsche's philosophy is the "fulfilment" of Platonism, we go over the problem of nihilism in relation to the metaphysics of the will to power, which for Heidegger requires revising Cartesian subjectivity in search of a new ontology. Heidegger's critique of modernity encompasses a narrative that goes from "Plato" to "Nietzsche", leading to a reconsideration of the notions of art and truth. Finally, we attempt to interpret the meaning of the "madman's lament" voicing the passing of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how deduction preserves certainty and how much certainty it can preserve according to Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind. I argue that the certainty of a deduction is a matter of four conditions for Descartes. First, certainty depends on whether the conjunction of simple propositions is composed with necessity or contingency. Second, a deduction approaches the certainty of an intuition depending on how many "acts of conceiving" it requires and—third—the complexity or difficulty of the acts of thinking, which is determined by the content of the thoughts and on external factors. Fourth, certainty depends on the intellectual aptitude of the person using the deduction. A deduction lacks certainty when it relies on memory such that it is not apprehended with immediacy. However, the mental capacity and speed of a mind can be increased by training the special mental faculties of perspicacity and discernment. Increasing one's intellectual aptitude allows for more steps of a deduction to be inferred in fewer acts of conceiving, thereby helping preserve the certainty of a deduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A spatial turn is increasingly being recognised across education, the humanities, and social sciences to critique Western Cartesian assumptions treating space as either empty or a diametric opposition bringing dualistic splits between reason/emotion and mind/body. Bacon's vision of human subjugation of nature as a tool for human progress is examined as a diametric spatial projection, where humans are above and apart from nature, in a mirror-image inverted symmetry of above/below hierarchy and side-by-side assumed separation as diametric space. Building on an interdisciplinary synthesis between an aspect of the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, De Beauvoir's othering, and Bronfenbrenner's social-ecological systems in psychology, allied with a Heideggerian critique of being as needing a mode of 'being alongside the world', a shift in experiential and conceptual space is proposed in this conceptual review article for education. This shift is towards a framework of concentric spatial systems of sustainability. Concentric relational spaces of assumed connection and relative openness and away from diametric spaces of splitting and closure have been developed recently for sustainability concerns regarding inclusion in education. This article goes further to interrogate systems of concentric relational space for belonging with and encountering the natural world for environmental sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

O presente artigo procura investigar como a partir da modernidade, com base na filosofia de Descartes, a compreensão da experiência humana, do sujeito moderno, passou a se valer de alguma noção de negativo. A fim de verificar de que modo isso chega à contemporaneidade, é também realizado o estudo de como a psicanálise, em sua vertente freudiana e lacaniana, descreve a experiência do sujeito também a partir de uma ideia de negativo. A hipótese que defendemos é a de que uma certa noção de negativo surge como indispensável para a adequada discussão da experiência humana desse sujeito que surge na modernidade: em primeiro lugar, por parte da filosofia cartesiana ao propor o conceito de paixões da alma; e, em segundo lugar, por parte da psicanálise ao formular a ideia de pulsão. Por fim, cabe indicar que tomamos principalmente o Tratado das paixões de Descartes e os textos sobre metapsicologia, teóricos, da psicanálise como pontos de partida.

To an individual, pain is unambiguously real. To a caregiver, assessing pain in others is a challenging process shrouded in doubt. To explain this challenge, many assume that pain “belongs” exclusively to the bearer of that experience and accept the dogma that pain is private. However, privacy also entails that it is not possible to identify, share, or communicate that experience with others. Obviously, this is not true and the consequences of pain privacy would be devastating for healthcare. Pain is indeed unique and subjective, but not necessarily private. Pain is in fact readily communicable, though perhaps not as effectively and reliably as caregivers would like. On the other hand, healthcare systems mandate objective metrics in pain diagnosis. Smiley face caricatures are a staple of clinical practice and a universal standard for reporting pain levels. These conditions create a double paradox: Assess a private experience that is inaccessible, and use numerical scales to measure subjective attributes. Navigating this stressful environment, medical professionals experience intellectual dissonance, patients are frustrated, and value-based care is undermined. Offering a way out, first, we refute the privacy and objectification of pain citing philosophical, behavioral, and neuroscientific arguments. We discuss Wittgensteinian views against privacy, explore the clear evolutionary advantage of communicating pain to others, and identify neural circuits in the mammalian brain that contribute to empathy. Second, we highlight the subjectivity of pain, embracing the complexity and uniqueness of an individual's pain. We also provide compelling evidence for brain mechanisms that actively shape the pain experience according to predictive coding principles. Third, we offer a vision for the development of biomarker technologies that assess pain fairly without engendering bias against the patient's narrative. Our recommendations are based on the overwhelming appreciation that “medicine by emoji” is inadequate for capturing the multidimensional nature of pain. Our view is that the most promising candidates for pain biomarkers consist of self-reports as ground truth augmented by physiological signatures of biological relevance to pain. Integration of subjective and objective multimodal features will be key for the development of comprehensive pain assessment models.

Reflections on the book: Fokin, S. L. (2023). Genius of Crooked Thinking. René Descartes and the French Literacy of the Great Age. New Literary Review. (In Russian).

In this paper, I aim to address a specific issue underpinning Cartesian metaphysics since its first public appearance in the Discourse right up until the Meditations, but which definitely came to the surface in the Second and Fifth Replies. It involves the possibility that to be thinking and to be extended do not actually contrast as two entirely different properties; hence, these two essences cannot serve as the basis for a disjunctive, real distinction between two corresponding substances, the mind and the body. I dub this problem the ‘thinking matter issue.’ I suggest that Descartes’s concerns about the ‘thinking matter issue’ characterizes and structures the entirety of Meditation Two and its connection with Meditation Six, especially in the attempt to covertly implement what I refer to as Descartes’s ‘prejudice strategy.’ The core of the ‘prejudice strategy’ lies in the idea that the ‘thinking matter issue’ is just a false problem, one raised by the inadequate notions of the mind and the body that we apply to this problem. In section 1, I set out the way in which the ‘thinking matter issue’ emerged in Descartes’s philosophy after the first exposition of his metaphysics in the Discourse. Section 2 deals with the new argumentative path Descartes draws for the Meditations and with the new role that he assigns to the inference about the mind’s non-physical nature after the cogito. In section 3, I contend that the ‘prejudice strategy’ structures Meditation Two and, partially, Six. Section 4 shows that Descartes himself reveals this in his Replies to the Second and the Fifth Set of Objections. In section 5, I delve into Descartes’s foundational theory of the ‘prejudice strategy,’ i.e. his theory of infancy as set out especially in the Replies to the Sixth Set of Objections.

Divine infinity in the Cartesian corpus can be diffracted into an infinity of distance, proper to the creation of eternal truths (1630), and an infinity of substance, identifiable in Meditatio III (1641). This distinction reveals the structure of Cartesian metaphysics: the conquest by rationality (accomplished by infinity of substance) of the foundation of rationality (manifested by infinity of distance). Hence the duality of infinity: infinity is a Janus bifrons, both founding and founded. To unfold this paradox, we first need to show that infinity fits into the tradition of metaphysics established by Duns Scotus, according to whom being obeys the primacy of concept, intelligibility and therefore univocity. As a result, the Cartesian idea of infinity paradoxically inherits the Scotian tradition, as further demonstrated by its determination of idea maxime vera, against any suspicion of material falsity. Thus, the metaphysical extraterritoriality of infinity may constitute a paradox at the very heart of the idea of infinity itself.

The 17th century is the century that records the greatest number of meanings attributed to prima philosophia, a sign that this is evidently one of the notions for which a reformulation is needed. It is possible to find at least five definitions of prima philosophia, in addition to the more widespread one according to which philosophy is said to be ‘prima’ both by virtue of the universality (being qua being) and the eminence (God and separate intelligences) of its object, and which derives from a reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This paper intends to reconstruct, without any claim to exhaustiveness, some of the main definitions of prima philosophia that occurred in the 17th century, starting with the most innovative one due to Descartes, which certainly had the most influence on subsequent history, surpassing, in fact, the other definitions, including the one that arose within the reformed scholasticism and of which Clauberg represents, at least at first, a spokesman. On the other hand, I will include in this review a brief survey of some theses that are more or less eccentric to Descartes’ position, namely those of Thomas Hobbes, Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus and Francis Bacon.

Il presente articolo mira a chiarire l’uso e il significato della nozione cartesiana di soggetto, domandando anzitutto la legittimità del suo impiego in relazione alla filosofia di Descartes, muovendo dalle critiche che tradizionalmente le sono state rivolte. Dopo aver esaminato le ricorrenze del termine ‘subjectum’ nelle Regulæ, mostrerò come esso venga assunto nelle Meditationes e poi nel dibattito con Hobbes: ivi, il termine ‘soggetto’ viene talvolta associato all’ego cogito, e rivela un’equivocità intrinseca di cui. Da ultimo, dunque, cercherò di rendere ragione delle diverse accezioni (almeno cinque) ricoperte dalla nozione cartesiana di ‘subjectum’.

At the very beginning of the first Meditation, Descartes states: "I have sometimes felt that these senses were deceitful, and it is prudence never to trust entirely those who have once deceived us". Doubt about the senses thus seems to be advanced as a rule of prudence. This formula raises several questions. We examine its sources, meaning and scope.

Descartes consolidates the transition from the science of truth to the science of man. In this science a cura sui prevails, that will end up empowering the subject internally, while blurring the other. Every man could be wise. However, not through the experience of consciousness as a methodical and theoretical exercise of the soul, but through a forma vitae that taught the strengthening of the will. The form of virtue is generosity, and even though it includes the diverse forms of love, the cartesian cogito fails to escape self-referential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article defends that according to Descartes there are two kinds of sensorial perception. One that operates on impulse, confusing properties of the physical things with our ideas of them; and another one that proceeds by deduction and distinguishes between those properties of physical things that have an adequate representation in our ideas and the properties that do not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts an analysis of the foundations and consequences rooted on the cartesian conception of knowledge. The conclusión achieved is that Descartes' reflection can be read as well as a philosophy of history that gives place to the modern and contemporary idea of progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to contribute to counteracting the negative perception of Descartes' philosophical legacy. The article addresses a specific aspect of the supposed human dominance over nature, that of the animal question. Against the accusation of "speciesism," a hierarchy that considers humans superior and justifies their domination and cruelty towards animals, it is argued that Descartes did not regard animals as completely insensible, that his position was not as categorical as often presented, and that he can be interpreted not as a speciesist but as an environmental advocate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The articles in this second monographic issue dedicated to Descartes are another outcome of the research project --funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation, [Reference PID2021-126133NB-I00]-- entitled Ethics and Metaphysics of Affections. The Modern Genesis of the Present (EMAP). The following are Cartesian reinterpretations that emphasize the revision of certain topics attributed to the thinking of the father of modernity, who is more often mentioned than read and studied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses Foucault's thesis of the reduction of philosophy to a form of knowledge in Descartes and the consequent abandonment of classical spirituality, that is, of philosophy conceived as a way of life based on self-care. From here, as well as observing that Foucault himself will qualify this thesis, it will be shown that in Descartes philosophy is still essentially linked to spirituality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Antonomase forgée à l'aide du célèbre personnage cervantin, le quichottisme représente cette distorsion du réel survenue après une immersion romanesque immodérée. Avant l'heure, Don Quichotte promeut simultanément l'anti-cogito, l'anti-pensée et l'anti-héros. Autrement dit, il est l'incarnation d'un modèle à abattre pour les philosophes du XVIIe siècle. Le présent article propose donc de reprendre la dénonciation du roman espagnol, lancée conjointement par Descartes et Sorel, en montrant leur double perspective critique. La confrontation de leurs méthodes respectives, établies dans le but d'extraire le lecteur des limbes de la fiction, laisse entrevoir un élément épistémologique commun : la présence d'une triple instance narrative. Dès lors, une navigation discursive dangereuse s'amorce entre la Scylla sorélienne, visant à guérir l'amateur de roman parodique par son jumeau satirique l'anti-roman, et la Charybde cartésienne, substituant à l'immersion fictionnelle, créatrice de naïveté, un pacte de lecture qui lui serait soi-disant antithétique. Ce dialogue entre les deux auteurs permet de développer plus avant l'hypothèse de John Lyons sur la récurrence du mot extravagance chez Descartes, qui semble viser Sorel. Mais construit au contact des romanciers qu'il fustige, le Discours de la méthode ne devient-il pas, à son tour, un anti-roman comme les autres ? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pierre-Sylvain Regis, once a well-known defender of Cartesianism, offers an unusually rich and innovative refutation of Spinoza. While many of his early modern contemporaries raised narrower objections to particular claims in Spinoza's Ethics , Regis develops a broader anti-Spinozistic position, one that threatens the very core of Spinoza's metaphysical ambitions and offers a philosophically robust alternative. However, as with any far-reaching philosophical commitment, Regis's gambit comes with substantive costs of its own, including creating instabilities within the core of his own philosophical system. Far from diminishing the significance of Regis's anti-Spinozism, this critical appraisal helps us better appreciate both the conceptual pull of Spinozism within early modern metaphysics and one sweeping, albeit costly way of escaping its orbit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the conceptual origins of Newton's draft scholia to Propositions IV through IX of Book III of the Principia to a manuscript booklet of observational data. By coordinating passages marked by dog-eared pages in Newton's books with his correspondence and working papers, it is possible to date these references to a time when he was still actively working on the Principia itself. This provides the basis for a new interpretation of Newton's uses of Egyptian and Graeco-Roman antiquity to counter rival histories of astronomy and philosophy influenced by Descartes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkey Journal of Theological Studies is the property of Turkey Journal of Theological Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)