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This chapter draws upon the archaeological and philosophical literature to offer an analysis and diagnosis of the popular ‘ancient aliens’ theory. First, we argue that ancient aliens theory is a form of conspiracy theory. Second, we argue that it differs from other familiar conspiracy theories because it does distinctive (and distinctively problematic) ideological work. Third, we argue that ancient aliens theory is a form of non-contextualized inquiry that sacrifices the very thing that makes archaeological research successful, and does so for the sake of popular accessibility. Rather than merely dismissing ancient aliens as ‘pseudoarchaeology’ on demarcationist grounds, we offer a more complicated account of how the theory works, and what ideological work it does.

Entrenched biases in favour of large, charismatic mammals, towards predators, towards terrestrial animals and towards species that have cultural importance can influence the selection of candidate species for de-extinction research. Often, the species with the highest existence value will also be the ones that raise the most serious animal welfare concerns.

Lately there has been a wave of criticism of the concept of living fossils. First, recent research has challenged the status of paradigmatic living fossil taxa, such as coelacanths, cycads, and tuataras. Critics have also complained that the living fossil concept is vague and/or ambiguous, and that it is responsible for misconceptions about evolution. This paper defends a particular phylogenetic conception of living fossils, or taxa that (a) exhibit deep prehistoric morphological stability; (b) contain few extant species; and (c) make a high contribution to phylogenetic diversity. The paper shows how this conception of living fossils can make sense of recent research on contested cases. The phylogenetic living fossil concept has both theoretical and practical importance: theoretical, because it picks out an important explanatory target for evolutionary theory; and practical, because it picks out taxa that we might wish to prioritize for conservation. The best way to defend the concept of living fossils is to get clearer about the reasons for defending living fossil taxa.

Some scientific explanations are distinctively historical. The aim of this paper is to say what gives such explanations their historical character. A secondary aim is to describe what makes an explanation a stronger or weaker historical explanation. We begin with a critical discussion of John Beatty's and Eric Desjardins' work on historicity and historical narrative. We then offer an alternative account of historical explanation that draws on the work of earlier philosophers (Gallie, Danto, Mink, and Hull). In that alternative account, we highlight four features of narrative explanation that Beatty and Desjardins underemphasize: central subjects; historical trajectories; the idea that historical narratives are known retrospectively; and criteria for determining what is a stronger or weaker historical narrative.

This paper offers a paleobiological perspective on the debate concerning the possible use of biotechnology to bring back extinct species. One lesson from paleobiology is that extinction selectivity matters in addition to extinction rates and extinction magnitude. Combining some of Darwin’s insights about artificial selection with the theory of species selection that paleobiologists developed in the 1970s and 1980s provides a useful context for thinking about de-extinction. Using recent work on the prioritization of candidate species for de-extinction as a test case, the paper argues that de-extinction would be a form of artificial species selection in which humans influence which species persist vs. go extinct. This points to a serious gap in our ethical theory: Much work has been done to clarify the value(s) of biological diversity, but we also need theoretical guidance for decisions that amount to species sorting, and that will shape the macroevolutionary future.

At least five Middle to Late Pleistocene advances of the northern Cordilleran Ice Sheet are preserved at Silver Creek, on the northeastern edge of the St Elias Mountains in southwest Yukon, Canada. Silver Creek is located 100 km up-ice of the Marine Isotope Stage (MIS) 2 McConnell glacial limit of the St Elias lobe. This site contains ~3 km of nearly continuous lateral exposure of glacial and non-glacial sediments, including multiple tills separated by thick gravel, loess and tilted lake beds. Infrared-stimulated luminescence (IRSL) and AMS radiocarbon dating constrain the glacial deposits to MIS 2, 4, either MIS 6 or mid-MIS 7, and two older Middle Pleistocene advances. This chronology and the tilt of the lake beds suggest Pleistocene uplift rates of up to 1.9 mm a−1 along the Denali Fault since MIS 7. The non-glacial sediment consists of sand, gravel, loess and organic beds from MIS 7, MIS 3 and the early Holocene. The MIS 3 deposits date to between 30–36 14C ka BP, making Silver Creek one of the few well-constrained MIS 3-aged sites in Yukon. This confirms that ice receded close to modern limits in MIS 3. Pollen and macrofossil analyses show that a meadow-tundra to steppe-tundra mosaic with abundant herbs and forbs and few shrubs or trees, dominated the environment at this time. The stratigraphy at Silver Creek provides a palaeoclimatic record since at least MIS 8 and comprises the oldest direct record of Pleistocene glaciation in southwest Yukon.

Historical scientists, from cosmologists to archaeologists, tackle important but difficult tasks: reconstructing the events and entities which populate the deep past, understanding their formation and development, and learning how to see our contemporary world in terms of its long history. Of late, philosophers have paid increasing attention to these epistemic challenges and the nature of such sciences (see Turner 2014). The papers collected here offer both a (by no means exhaustive) look at the variety of epistemic practices and targets found in the historical sciences and illustrate new directions in the philosophy of historical science. We take ‘historical scientists’ to be those involved in the scientific investigation of the deep past. Maureen O’Malley focuses on how molecular data has revolutionized phylogenetic reconstruction – and the epistemic challenges bred by that very success. Lindell Bromham uses a series of case studies to demonstrate the comparative method’s (see below) power in investigations of macroevolution. Both discuss how our incapacity to experiment directly on past subjects can be mitigated—mitigated in ways highly reminiscent of experimental method. Adrian Currie identifies a connection between the use of comparative data in biology and archaeology, which underwrites a re-evaluation of evidence in the latter. Derek Turner revisits inferences about extinct lineages based on fossilized remains, using a mistaken prediction of his own to discuss the difficulty, but necessity, of making predictions about future scientific success or otherwise. Somewhat serendipitously, each paper explores past targets at different scales. Currie looks at the archaeological challenge of interpreting rock art and the use of the ‘comparative method’ in paleoanthropology. Such methods involve comparing different cases, and using those comparisons to make empirical inferences. For instance, Currie discusses the use of island dwarfism in elephants and hippopotami to test theories of the same in hominids. He covers the shallow end of the deep past: a few thousand years for archaeology, a little over ten thousand for paleoanthropology. Wading deeper, Turner looks at recent efforts to extract information about dinosaur coloration from the fossil record—on a scale of tens of millions of years. Bromham discusses larger-scale questions, for instance the frequent evolution, but short lifetime, of salt-tolerant plant lineages. Such investigations not only expand our temporal scale to many millions of years, but our scope of concern: as opposed to considering the color of a few lineages, salt-tolerance is examined across the plant kingdom. Finally, O’Malley is interested in the use of molecular data to tackle questions about phylogenetic relationships among the earliest eukaryotes: the deep oceans of time, hundreds of millions of years ago (still

During the late twentieth century and up to the present, paleobiologists’ thinking about evolution has had an uneasy relationship with the Darwinian tradition. In this chapter, I use the concept of stasis as a guiding thread for exploring these tensions. Beginning in the 1970s, paleobiologists put stasis on the agenda of evolutionary biology, and in doing so, they challenged Darwinian tradition in at least three ways: (1) famously, the theory of punctuated equilibria implied that stasis, rather than gradual, selection-driven change, is the hallmark of evolutionary history; (2) subsequent attempts to explain evolutionary stasis have shown the limits of neo-Darwinian explanations that emphasize the power of stabilizing selection, pointing to the need for a more hierarchical approach; and (3) the issue whether stasis vs. change should be the default expectation for evolutionary systems remains unsettled.

The distinction between idiographic science, which aims to reconstruct sequences of particular events, and nomothetic science, which aims to discover laws and regularities, is crucial for understanding the paleobiological revolution of the 1970s and 1980s. Stephen Jay Gould at times seemed conflicted about whether to say (a) that idiographic science is fine as it is or (b) that paleontology would have more credibility if it were more nomothetic. Ironically, one of the lasting results of the paleobiological revolution was a new way of doing historical science that defies categorization as idiographic or nomothetic. Yet the tension between (a) and (b) persists in some recent work in the philosophy of science, with Carol Cleland defending a version of (a) and Dan McShea and Robert Brandon defending a version of (b). In placing Cleland's work into conversation with that of McShea and Brandon, this paper defends a third (c) synthetic approach that emphasizes the blending of idiographic and nomothetic work.

Sedimentary deposits from two Middle to Late Pleistocene glaciations and intervening non-glacial intervals exposed along the White River in southwest Yukon, Canada, provide a record of environmental change for much of the past 200 000 years. The study sites are beyond the Marine Isotope stage (MIS) 2 glacial limit, near the maximum regional extent of Pleistocene glaciation. Non-glacial deposits include up to 25 m of loess, peat and gravel with paleosols, pollen, plant and insect macrofossils, large mammal fossils and tephra beds. Finite and non-finite radiocarbon dates, and twelve different tephra beds constrain the chronology of these deposits. Tills correlated to MIS 4 and 6 represent the penultimate and maximum Pleistocene glacial limits, respectively. The proximity of these glacial limits to each other, compared to limits in central Yukon, suggests precipitation conditions were more consistent in southwest Yukon than in central Yukon during the Pleistocene. Conditions in MIS 5e and 5a are recorded by two boreal forest beds, separated by a shrub birch tundra, that indicate environments as warm or warmer than present. A dry, treeless steppe-tundra, dominated by Artemisia frigida, upland grasses and forbs existed during the transition from late MIS 3 to early MIS 2. These glacial and non-glacial deposits constrain the glacial limits and paleoenvironments during the Middle to Late Pleistocene in southwest Yukon.

Abstract Starting with Ben-Menahem’s definition of historical contingency as sensitivity to variations in initial conditions, we suggest that historical events and processes can be thought of as forming a complex landscape of contingency and necessity. We suggest three different ways of extending and elaborating Ben-Menahem’s concepts: (1) By supplementing them with a notion of historical disturbance; (2) by pointing out that contingency and necessity are subject to scaling effects; (3) by showing how degrees of contingency/necessity can change over time. We also argue that further development of Sterelny’s notion of conditional inevitability leads to our conclusion that the topography of historical contingency is something that can change over time.

Western camel (C. hesternus) fossils are rare from Eastern Beringia, thus there is little available information on their chronology, paleoecology, and biogeography in this region. In August of 2010, a partial proximal phalanx of a western camel was recovered from a sedimentary exposure along the White River, in the formerly glaciated terrain of southwest Yukon, northwest Canada. The fossil specimen was recovered in situ from sediments that are correlated by stratigraphic, tephra and radiocarbon data to the Marine Isotope Stage (MIS) 5 interglacial period (Sangamonian). Associated paleoenvironmental data indicates that this western camel inhabited a shrub tundra ecosystem that did not include spruce trees or boreal forest during a relatively cold interval between MIS 5e and 5a. This is the oldest reliably dated western camel fossil from Eastern Beringia and supports the model of range expansion for this species to the high latitudes of northwest North America during the last interglacial (sensu lato).

This paper develops responses to several critics who commented on an earlier paper that we published in this journal (Feldman and Turner 2010). In that paper, we argued that there is nothing necessarily wrong with NIMBY claims or those who make them. The critics raised some important issues, such as whether “NIMBY” is essentially a pejorative term; the possibility that NIMBY claimants are saying something deep about the noncomparability of places; what exactly it means for policy makers to defer to a NIMBY claim; the relationship between NIMBY and environmental justice claims; and whether there is any principled way to distinguish good from bad NIMBY claims. We explore these issues further, and in the course of responding to the critics, we develop some further reasons for skepticism about the prospects for distinguishing good from bad NIMBY claims in a principled way.

This paper develops a critical response to John Beatty’s recent (2006) engagement with Stephen Jay Gould’s claim that evolutionary history is contingent. Beatty identifies two senses of contingency in Gould’s work: an unpredictability sense and a causal dependence sense. He denies that Gould associates contingency with stochastic phenomena, such as drift. In reply to Beatty, this paper develops two main claims. The first is an interpretive claim: Gould really thinks of contingency has having to do with stochastic effects at the level of macroevolution, and in particular with unbiased species sorting. This notion of contingency as macro-level stochasticity incorporates both the causal dependence and the unpredictability senses of contingency. The second claim is more substantive: Recent attempts by other scientists to put Gould’s claim to the test fail to engage with the hypothesis that species sorting sometimes resembles a lottery. Gould’s claim that random sorting is a significant macroevolutionary phenomenon remains an intriguing and largely untested live hypothesis about evolution.

Daniel Steel addresses one of the most serious objections against the precautionary principle (PP). According to the dilemma objection, strong versions of the PP are incoherent or self-defeating, w...

One of the first questions that paleontologists ask when they identify a large-scale trend in the fossil record (e.g., size increase, complexity increase) is whether it is passive or driven. In this article, I explore two questions about driven trends: (1) what is the underlying cause or source of the directional bias? and (2) has the strength of the directional bias changed over time? I identify two underdetermination problems that prevent scientists from giving complete answers to these two questions.

We demonstrate here that covalent dimerization of 5-HT 1 ligands is an effective design strategy to modulate affinity and selectivity of 5-HT 1 ligands. This approach was applied to LY-334370, a selective agonist of 5-HT 1F receptor, to generate structurally well-defined divalent molecules. Radioligand binding assays to three cloned 5-HT 1 receptor subtypes (5-HT 1B, 5-HT 1D, 5-HT 1F) demonstrated that the affinity of a series of homologous dimers varied significantly upon exploration of three structural variables (linker length, attachment position, functionality). In particular, the series of C 3-to-C 3 linked dimers derived from a monomer ( 3) showed high binding affinity to 5-HT 1D (for example, K i approximately 0.3 nM for dimer 8) but did not bind to 5-HT 1F ( K i > 0.01 mM), providing >10000-fold subtype selectivity. Results from a functional assay (rabbit saphenous vein contraction) demonstrate that certain dimers are 5-HT 1 receptor agonists.

The relatively subdued topography of British Columbia’s northern interior plains does not reflect the irregular, buried bedrock surface. Many areas have been deeply incised by preglacial rivers that have subsequently filled with a succession of Quaternary sediments. In this study, oil and gas petrophysical logs, drill chip samples, water well logs, and surficial and bedrock outcrop maps were used to model the bedrock topography of the Fontas map sheet (NTS 94I). The modelled data produced several depressions that are interpreted to be paleovalleys incised into the soft Cretaceous shale of the Fort St. John Group. Understanding the geometry, thickness, and stratigraphy of the drift has considerable safety and resource management implications as artesian aquifers and natural gas were encountered in the drift during oil and gas well drilling. Four major paleovalleys are suggested. The most dominant paleovalley (Kotcho–Hoffard Paleovalley) is located south of the Etsho Plateau and trends west-southwest across the map area. A second depression occurs within the loop of the Hay River and may be a tributary of the Kotcho–Hoffard Paleovalley that links with the Rainbow Paleovalley in Alberta. A third paleovalley is mapped south of the Sahtaneh River (Kyklo Creek Paleovalley) and is either a tributary to, or crosscuts the Kotcho–Hoffard Paleovalley. The Niteal Creek Paleovalley is located between the Fontas and Sikanni Chief rivers. Its geometry is speculative as there are sparse data, but it may be a tributary of the Kotcho–Hoffard Paleovalley.

This paper describes a prescribed methodology for tailoring Command Media derived from the Carnegie Mellon®1 University's Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model® Integration for a company's business areas. The paper illustrates a case study for a specific Harris GCSD business area, Cronus, whose methodology was tailored to be generally applicable to the projects executed within the Cronus Business Area and still be compliant with Harris GCSD CMMI® Level 3 Command Media requirements. This tailoring becomes the basis for all projects within Cronus without the need for additional waivers and tailorings. This does not preclude any project from adopting the more general methodology; from further tailoring the Cronus methodology; or, continuing the process further to differentiate between studies, development contracts, quick-react contracts, and other program types. This paper represents the results of the case study and may be applicable to other business areas within Harris and at other companies.

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative.

One “big question” of macroevolutionary theory is the degree to which evolutionary history is contingent. A second “big question” is whether particular large-scale evolutionary trends, such as size increase or complexity increase, are passive or driven. Showing that a trend is passive or driven is a way of explaining it. These two “big questions” are related in both a superficial and a deep way. Superficially, defending historical contingency and showing that major trends are passive are two complementary ways of downplaying the importance of natural selection in evolutionary history. A passive trend is one that’s not explained by selection. In order to appreciate the deeper connection between the two issues, it is necessary to distinguish different senses of contingency (especially sensitivity to initial conditions vs. unbiased sorting). It’s plausible that passive trends are generally due to unbiased sorting processes. Serendipitously, thinking of contingency as unbiased sorting also helps to clarify its relationship to species selection, which some think of as biased sorting. Macroevolutionary theory thus turns out to have considerable unity.

By focusing too narrowly on consequentialist arguments for ecosabotage, environmental philosophers such as Michael Martin (1990) and Thomas Young (2001) have tended to overlook two important facts about monkeywrenching. First, advocates of monkeywrenching see sabotage above all as a technique for counteracting perverse economic incentives. Second, their main argument for monkeywrenching - which I will call the ecodefence argument - is not consequentialist at all. After calling attention to these two under-appreciated aspects of monkeywrenching, I go on to offer a critique of the ecodefence argument. Finally, I show that there is also a tension between the use of cost/benefit analysis to justify particular acts of ecosabotage and the clandestine nature of those acts.

Carman argues, in ‘The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth’, that we may have more reason to be realists about dinosaurs than about electrons, because there are plenty of observable analogues for dinosaurs but not for electrons. These observable analogues severely restrict the range of plausible ontologies, thus reducing the threat of underdetermination. In response to this argument, I show that the observable analogues for ancient organisms are a mixed epistemic blessing at best, and I discuss some cases from the history of paleontology in which the observable analogues—ducks, shrimp, and lizards—have led scientists into persisting error. I also give reasons for thinking that underdetermination will be just as serious a problem in historical as in experimental science. I conclude that Carman has not succeeded in showing that dinosaurs ‘come off better’ than electrons.

A number of people, from William James to Dave Foreman and Vandana Shiva, have suggested that humans are at war with nature. Moreover, the analogy with warfare figures in at least one important argument for strategic monkeywrenching. In general, an analogy can be used for purposes of (1) justification; (2) persuasion; or (3) as a tool for generating novel hypotheses and recommendations. This paper argues that the analogy with warfare should not be used for justificatory or rhetorical purposes, but that it may nevertheless have a legitimate heuristic role to play in environmental philosophy.

David Lewis (1979) defends the thesis of the asymmetry of overdetermination: later affairs are seldom overdetermined by earlier affairs, but earlier affairs are usually overdetermined by later affairs. Recently, Carol Cleland (2002) has argued that since the distinctive methodologies of historical science and experimental science exploit different aspects of this asymmetry, the methodology of historical science is just as good, epistemically speaking, as that of experimental science. This paper shows, first, that Cleland's epistemological conclusion does not follow from the thesis of the asymmetry of overdetermination, because overdetermination (in Lewis's sense) is compatible with epistemic underdetermination. The paper also shows, contra Cleland, that there is at least one interesting sense in which historical science is epistemically inferior to experimental science, after all, because local underdetermination problems are more widespread in historical than in experimental science.

The precautionary principle states, roughly, that it is better to take precautionary measures now than to deal with serious harms to the environment or human health later on. This paper builds on the work of Neil A. Manson in order to show that the precautionary principle, in all of its forms, is fraught with vagueness and ambiguity. We examine the version of the precautionary principle that was formulated at the Wingspread Conference sponsored by the Science and Environmental Health Network in 1998. That version fails to indicate who must bear the cost of precaution; what constitutes a threat of harm; how much precaution is too much; and what should be done when environmental concerns and concern for human health pull in different directions. Whether this vagueness is a strength or weakness of the principle, depends on what purpose(s) the precautionary principle is supposed to serve.

Scientific realism is fundamentally a view about unobservable things, events, processes, and so on, but things can be unobservable either because they are tiny or because they are past. The familiar abductive arguments for scientific realism lend more justification to scientific realism about the tiny than to realism about the past. This paper examines both the “basic” abductive arguments for realism advanced by philosophers such as Ian Hacking and Michael Devitt, as well as Richard Boyd’s version of the inference to the best explanation of the success of science, and shows that these arguments provide less support to historical than to experimental realism. This is because unobservably tiny things can function both as unifiers of the phenomena and as tools for the production of new phenomena, whereas things in the past can only serve as unifiers of the phenomena. The upshot is that realists must not suppose that by presenting arguments for experimental realism they have thereby defended realism in general.