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In this chapter, we present the problem of dream reports in philosophy and empirical research, examine how the variability of methods and measures influences research results, and suggest that research on the phenomenological features of dreaming could benefit from insights from first-person methods in consciousness research. We consider two interview-based methods developed for acquiring detailed phenomenological reports on waking subjective experience - descriptive experience sampling (Hurlburt, 1990, 2011) and micro-phenomenology (Petitmengin, 2006) - discuss their applicability in dream research, and outline some promising research directions. [Manuscript for a chapter in Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues; prior to peer-review.]

Lucid dreaming (LD) is defined as a state of awareness of the ongoing dream state while sleeping. Lucid dreaming is a rather rare phenomenon; however, it can be learned and trained, and various studies have proposed different techniques to ‘induce’ lucid dreams. Nonetheless, these studies either lacked physiological measurements and were therefore merely limited to self-reported questionnaires, or in the case of including physiological measurements, their generalizability was restricted mainly due to the exclusive recruitment of ‘experienced’ lucid dreamers. Only a few studies attempted to reliably induce lucid dreams in ‘naive’ participants, but they involved small sample sizes and have not yet been replicated. To overcome these limitations, we designed a multi-center study including three laboratories, in the Netherlands, Canada, and Italy respectively, with the aim of recruiting 60 participants overall (i.e. 20 participants per laboratory). This is the largest sample size for a lucid dreaming induction study with physiological measurements to date. We will test the applicability of a combination of two lucid dreaming induction techniques: targeted lucidity reactivation (TLR) and sense-initiated lucid dream (SSILD), which will be implemented by presenting perceptual cues (visual, auditory, and tactile) before and during REM sleep. To do so, we will employ minimal measurement modalities, i.e., an EEG headband and three additional chin EMG electrodes. We will also use this dataset to develop and validate the first open-source dream engineering toolbox, Dreamento (DREAM ENgineering TOolbox, Esfahani et al., 2022). Participants will visit the laboratory three times throughout an approximately two week period, including an intake session and two morning naps (stimulation and control, in counterbalanced order across subjects). During the intake session, participants will receive information about the study and complete preliminary screening questionnaires. Then, participants will complete daily dream diaries for the following two weeks. The morning nap sessions will be held at least one and two weeks after the intake session, respectively. Both nap sessions consist of the same cognitive training procedure during wakefulness, but differ in terms of the sensory stimulation procedure during sleep. Participants will receive sensory cues upon detection of REM sleep during the stimulation session, but not during the control session. They will be instructed to signal their lucidity using a predefined intentional eye movement pattern (left-right-left-right, LRLR) and will be awakened once the REM period ends to report any subjective experience and complete a lucidity questionnaire.

V magistrskem delu raziskujem odnos med dvema pogledoma na človekovo duševnost: znanstvenim pogledom, skozi katerega duševnost opisujejo in razlagajo discipline kognitivne znanosti, in življenjskim pogledom, skozi katerega duševnost doživljamo in razumemo v kontekstu vsakdanjega življenja. Pri orisu teh dveh navidezno nasprotujočih si perspektiv izhajam iz dveh vplivnih filozofskih analiz: iz razprave o utemeljenosti konceptov objektivističnega sveta znanosti v t. i. “življenjskem svetu” vsakdanjega izkustva Edmunda Husserla (1970) ter iz razlikovanja med t. i. manifestno in znanstveno podobo človeka v svetu Wilfrida Sellarsa (1963). Predstavitev in primerjava Husserlove in Sellarsove pozicije odpreta prostor za razpravo o prepletenosti znanstvene in življenjske perspektive, obenem pa predstavljata izhodišče za kritiko naturalizma v raziskovanju duševnosti. Kot pokaže Husserl, naturalistična drža izvira iz pozabe, da je objektivistični svet znanosti zgolj od življenjskega sveta abstrahirana idealizacija, ki jo življenjski svet vseskozi navdaja s pomenom. Husserlovo kritiko naturalizma skozi pregled klasičnega konceptualnega prostora filozofije duha razširim v preizpraševanje osnovnih naturalističnih predpostavk o znanosti in svetu. Pokažem, da je naturalistična drža še posebej protislovna v preučevanju človeških spoznavnih procesov, kjer mora, da bi utemeljila svoje zaupanje v znanost, paradoksalno predpostaviti natanko tiste vidike sveta, ki naj bi jih preiskovala. V sklepu, da se kognitivna znanost ne more zanašati na absolutne metafizične ali epistemološke temelje, predlagam, da mora znanstveno preučevanje duševnosti pripoznati pomen izkustveno-življenjskega pogleda biti duševnost. Ob pregledu večplastne prepletenosti obeh perspektiv se izkaže, da je znanstveni pogled na duševnost utemeljen v življenjskem svetu, obenem pa ga na najrazličnejše načine spreminja in sooblikuje. V opori na udejanjeni pristop h kognitivni znanosti (Varela et al. 1991) in teorijo zankanja človeških vrst Iana Hackinga (1995) konceptualiziram dve dimenziji soodvisnosti znanstvenega in življenjskega pogleda na duševnost. Zaključim s predlogom, da je dosledna kognitivna znanost, ki upošteva nezmožnost ločitve spoznavnega subjekta od spoznanega sveta, primorana nenehoma dopuščati možnost predrugačenja lastnih predpostavk. Raziskovanje duševnosti je tako poklicano k refleksivnosti do svoje teorije in prakse, ki bi pripoznala zgodovinsko, doživljanjsko in družbeno-politično situiranost lastnih konceptov, obenem pa tudi vlogo in odgovornost kognitivne znanosti v oblikovanju družbenih koncepcij duševnosti ter povezanih načinov, na katere je duševnost razumljena, doživljana in živeta v kontekstu vsakdana. The thesis puts forward an exploration of the relationship between two perspectives on the mind: the scientific perspective, through which the mind is described and explained by the disciplines of cognitive science, and the lived perspective, through which the mind is experienced and understood in the context of everyday life. In articulating this apparent duality of views I draw upon two influential philosophical accounts: Edmund Husserl’s (1970) investigation of the life-world and the world of science and Wilfrid Sellars’ (1963) analysis of the manifest and the scientific image of the human being in relation to the world. The presentation and juxtaposition of the two analyses opens a way to an exploration of the interdependence of science and the life-world. It also sets the stage for a critique of naturalism in mind sciences. Following Husserl, I show that the naturalistic attitude stems from forgetting that the idea of the objective scientific reality is but an abstraction from the concrete life-world of experience, value, and meaning. Surveying the conceptual space of philosophy of mind, I further challenge the naturalistic attitude by demonstrating the untenability of its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. As I argue, naturalism amounts to a particularly inconsistent stance in studying human epistemic processes, where it must paradoxically presuppose the very aspects of the world that it set out to disclose. Concluding that cognitive science lacks absolute metaphysical or epistemological foundations, I suggest that studying the mind needs to recognize the importance of the lived perspective of being a mind. I explore the multifaceted ways in which the scientific perspective on the mind is both rooted in the life-world and shapes it in turn. I conceptualize two dimensions of this interrelatedness through the presentation of Varela et al.’s (1991) enactive approach to cognitive science and Ian Hacking’s (1995) theory of the looping of human kinds. I conclude by proposing that consistent study of mind which acknowledges the impossibility of separating the cognizing subject from her cognized world is bound to remain open to revision of its own foundations. Cognitive science is thus imbued with a demand for reflexivity towards its own theory and practice which would recognize the historical, experiential and socio-political embeddedness of its concepts as well as the role which cognitive science itself plays in shaping societal conceptions of the mind and the way in which the mind is concretely understood, experienced, lived, and acted upon in the context of everyday life.