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© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress is made, i.e. the receivers rather than the producers of scientific information. This includes not only scientists themselves, but also various other individuals who utilize scientific information in different ways for the benefit of society as a whole.

In this work, cysteine staples were used as a late-stage functionalization strategy to diversify peptides and build conjugates targeting the melanocortin G-protein-coupled receptors [melanocortin receptor-1 (MC1R) and MC3R-MC5R]. Monocyclic and bicyclic agonists based on sunflower trypsin inhibitor-1 were used to generate a selection of stapled peptides that were evaluated for binding (p

What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topicXconstitutes a scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect toX. The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific results are made publicly available so as to make it possible for anyone to increase their understanding ofX. This account is briefly compared to two rival accounts of scientific progress, based respectively on increasing truthlikeness and accumulating knowledge, and is argued to be preferable to both.

We have designed a new class of highly potent bivalent melanocortin receptor ligands based on the nature-derived bicyclic peptide sunflower trypsin inhibitor 1 (SFTI-1). Incorporation of melanotropin pharmacophores in each of the two turn regions of SFTI-1 resulted in substantial gains in agonist activity particularly at human melanocortin receptors 1 and 3 (hMC1R/hMC3R) compared to monovalent analogues. In in vitro binding and functional assays, the most potent molecule, compound 6, displayed low picomolar agonist activity at hMC1R (pEC50 > 10.3; EC50 < 50 pM; pKi: 10.16 ± 0.04; Ki: 69 ± 5 pM) and is at least 30-fold more selective for this receptor than for hMC3R, hMC4R, or hMC5R. The results are discussed in the context of structural homology models of hMCRs in complex with the developed bivalent ligands.

Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.

A contribution to a Metascience symposium on Steven French's book There Are No Such Things as Theories.

This article presents and argues for an account of objectual understanding that aims to do justice to the full range of cases of scientific understanding, including cases in which one does ...