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Throughout the twentieth century, Australia stood as a steadfast ally of the United States and other liberal democracies, actively engaging in major conflicts and bolstering the global liberal order. Since 2008, faced with China’s growing assertiveness, Australia has shifted from a supporting ally of the United States to assuming a more proactive, ideational leadership role. This role, often overshadowed by calls for increased material contributions, deserves greater recognition. Canberra’s influence extends beyond traditional security measures to significant ideational contributions. By promoting a narrative of a “rules-based” order, Australia cultivates a sense of solidarity among regional partners, enhancing coalition building. This approach underscores Australia’s pivotal role in shaping the regional order. Building on existing scholarship, this article evaluates how Canberra’s narrative complements traditional burden-sharing, highlighting its multifaceted contributions to regional stability and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is strategic minilateralism a viable option for small powers? What role can a lesser power play in these minilateral groupings? Additionally, how does the 'weak junior link' contribute to and gain from the minilateral? To provide answers to these questions, following a review of the existing literature on minilateralism, we examine the potential role of the Philippines within the framework of strategic minilaterals. We argue that, despite its relative lack of material capabilities compared to other regional actors, factors such as a strong confluence of interests and threat proximity may compel the junior link to play an active role in the minilateral. This can ensure an alternative or complementary way to achieve foreign policy goals, while simultaneously lessening the effects of burdensome alliances. Empirically, we first explore the Philippines' emerging preference for minilateralism. Second, we examine the evidence of recent movements toward a Japan-Philippine-U.S. trilateral pact. This will help investigate the role that a lesser power like the Philippines can play in utilising these minilateral groupings to achieve foreign policy goals, while at the same time securing the grouping's success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates on allies' contributions to alliances focus mainly on the material dimension. Accordingly, smaller partners are often belittled for failing to contribute their fair share to their defensive alliances with more powerful allies. While acknowledging that junior partners' contributions do not match the same level of material capabilities provided by a more significant power like the United States, this study highlights the importance of other intangible contributions. We argue that defensive alliances during peacetime require a crucial, albeit overlooked, ideational contribution by all allies. We examine the US–Japan and ANZUS alliances to explore the process through which junior partners advance the interests of an alliance through ideational contributions. Our findings reveal that Japan and Australia contribute to their respective alliances with the United States by mobilizing fundamental ideas and norms that sustain and promote a specific global order and security vision. We maintain that such intangible contributions are necessary for alliance success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'China threat' has been identified as an important driver of Japan's security agenda and discourse. The threat posed by China has been discussed either as a given factor determining the trajectory of Tokyo's security approach, as a product of identity construction, or as an expression of securitizing processes that facilitate institutional and policy change. This paper contributes to this debate by offering an alternative explanation of the process through which the Abe government constructed China as a threat. Building on securitization theory, the paper examines the modes and strategies employed by the Abe Administration to successfully securitize China. The paper argues that, while Beijing was labeled a 'concern' rather than an 'existential threat,' it was still securitized through a process of securitization that involves an association with those domains in which China engages assertively, namely the maritime commons. The paper suggests calling this type of securitizing pattern 'transversal securitization' and explores how this indirect strategy allowed the Abe government to pragmatically pursue its objectives both domestically and at the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]