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INTRODUCTION 1302 I. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF SELF-INCRIMINATION SCHOLARSHIP 1306 A. The Privilege as a Means to Fulfill the Goals of the Legal System 1307 B. The Privilege as the [...], A debate has raged for decades, or even centuries by some measures, about the justification for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Why have it? Some think it protects a deep-seated moral interest in silence, whereas others think it is, at most, a means of promoting an effective or restrained criminal system. Neither camp has made progress, and in the late 2000s, many came to believe it was futile to seek an overarching justification for the privilege. This paper seeks to unsettle that belief by showing that the debate about the privilege was never as stagnant as it seemed. More importantly, it seeks to push the debate forward with an upgraded argument. Specifically, I argue that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a distinct aspect of a person s mental privacy. This general idea has steadily developed to meet various objections over its lifetime, but its current elaboration is still problematic. It can be further improved by understanding the role of memory in developing and sustaining personhood and the value of shielding its operation from the ideology of the community, even when the latter is eminently justified. Persons have a moral interest (and a First Amendment interest) in developing a conception of themselves firsthand through unmediated cognitive contact with the circumstances of their lives. One urgent instance of this interest--what I call the "interest in firsthand thinking" or the "firsthand interest" for short--is the opportunity to reckon with one's (mis)deeds. Elaborating the legal consequences of this interest yields, in turn, what I refer to as the "Firsthand Theory" of the privilege against self-incrimination. This theory can address several objections to previous mental-privacy theories of the privilege. It also answers three enduring questions: Why should juries be prohibited from inferring a silent defendant's guilt from their silence? Why is the privilege unavailable in civil proceedings? When, if ever, will immunity permit compelling someone to incriminate themselves?

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 331 II. BACKGROUND 334 A. What Is Facial Recognition? 334 B. Problems with Facial Recognition 335 1. Operational Flaws 335 2. Algorithmic Flaws 337 C. [...]

INTRODUCTION 267 I. THE COERCIVENESS OF COERCIVE CONTROL: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 272 A. Coercive Control Defined 272 B. Coercive Control as Criminal Offense 274 C. Human Trafficking as Coercive Control [...], Coercing someone is sometimes wrong and sometimes a crime. People subject to coercion are sometimes eligible for criminal defenses, such as duress. How, exactly, does coercion operate in such contexts? Among legal scholars, the predominant understanding of coercion is the "wrongful pressure" model, which states that coercion exists when the coercer wrongfully threatens the target and, as a result of this threat, the target is pressured to act in accordance with the coercer's threat. Some tokens of coercion do not fit neatly within existing legal categories or the wrongful pressure model of coercion. For example, coercive control is a psychological phenomenon of interpersonal abuse in which one person pervasively regulates the choices of another. Coercive control is sometimes carried out through violence or threats of violence but often through ostensibly non-violent forms of degradation (such as humiliation and isolation). Coercive control is often evinced in abusive intimate relationships, including in human trafficking. People subject to coercive control are undeniably coerced. Yet the wrongful pressure model cannot adequately explain why. Those subject to coercive control are ineligible for coercion-based criminal defenses, such as duress and affirmative defenses for victims of human trafficking, in part because of the inadequacy of the wrongful pressure model. This Article articulates and defends an alternative understanding of coercion that, after philosopher Scott Anderson's theory of the same name, we call the "enforcement approach" to coercion. According to the enforcement approach, coercion involves the coercer's using power to determine what the target will or will not do. The enforcement approach is superior to the wrongful pressure approach as an explanation for what makes coercion wrong and why being subject to coercion should provide a defense to criminal liability. Furthermore, the enforcement approach better explains how coercion operates pervasively, such as in coercive control contexts. The enforcement approach also invites a broader rethinking of coercion-based criminal defenses. The enforcement approach grounds a model of criminal defense for those subject to coercive control that would supplement existing defenses.

INTRODUCTION 394 I. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES IN PLEA BARGAINING 395 II. INSUFFICIENCIES OF CURRENT LITERATURE AND POLICIES 400 A. Open-File Discovery Literature 400 B. Criminal Discovery Shortcomings 401 III. THE NEED [...], Criminal defense attorneys often engage in plea negotiations on behalf of their clients without knowledge of material, exculpatory information that the prosecution may possess, placing the defense at an unfair disadvantage. The recent proliferation of electronically-stored information ("ESI") is further exacerbating this informational imbalance. Without proactively accounting for ESI in criminal discovery, the informational gulf existing between the prosecution and the defense during plea negotiations will continue to foster uninformed legal representation, inconsistent results, and an enduring lack of public confidence in the criminal justice system. Although scholars have promoted open-file criminal discovery as a cure to narrow this informational gap, neither the literature nor recently enacted open-file criminal discovery have sufficiently considered the importance of digitizing open-file criminal discovery to fix the imbalance. This Article argues for the nationwide implementation of digitized open-file criminal discovery schemes as a means of correcting the current pre-plea informational asymmetry, leading to more reliable results and improved defense lawyering. Digitizing open-file criminal discovery will produce a digital ecosystem of accountability benefitting both defendants and prosecutors alike.

Contents INTRODUCTION I. THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT A. A Brief Background of the FCA B. Factual Falsity C. Legal Falsity as Grounds for FCA Liability II. UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE [...]

In McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018), the US Supreme Court held a "defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when [...]

Six years have passed since the inaugural installment of this column, in which readers were encouraged to consider "what happens next?" when attempting to process, distribute, and argue about the [...]

When a lawyer accepts a "celebrity" criminal case, descent to the bottom of the Looking Glass is sudden and steep. All the usual participants in the criminal justice process--prosecutors, police, [...]