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Algorithmic Institutionalism is the first book to conceive algorithms as institutions in contemporary societies, focusing on different dimensions of how they structure decision-making and enact power relations. In many situations in contemporary societies, algorithms structure social interactions, resulting in patterns of action and human behavior in collective contexts. Almeida, Filgueiras, and Mendonca discuss how algorithms are gradually occupying an institutional space in societies, deciding on different aspects of social life and shaping collective and individual human behaviors. As institutions, algorithms work as decision systems that define what is allowed, hindered, facilitated, or made impossible as well as positions within society's organizational structures. Algorithmic institutionalism uses the perspective of institutional theories to explain the functioning of these decision systems and how they establish patterns and norms that affect human behavior and lead to deep changes in contemporary society. The book points to the challenges of political orders that are gradually institutionalized with algorithms, comprising new dynamics of interaction between humans and machines. These disruptive dynamics of interaction between humans and machines create new challenges related to the democratization of algorithms and the impasses that emerge with technological advancement through digital technologies. Providing an analytical framework for an adequate comprehension of the social and political implications of algorithmic systems, Algorithmic institutionalism applies this framework to make sense of recommendation systems, the platformization of governments, and the deployment of algorithms in security. It then addresses the challenge of developing approaches to democratize the new political order influenced by the global expansion of algorithmic decision-making, pointing to key democratic values that are relevant once we consider the construction of legitimate decisions in contemporary societies.

Motivational hedonism (often called “psychological hedonism”) claims that everything we do is done in pursuit of pleasure (in the widest sense) and to avoid pain and displeasure (again, in the widest sense). Although perennially attractive, many philosophers and experimental psychologists have claimed to refute it. Human Motives shows how decision-science and the recent science of affect can be used to construct a form of motivational hedonism that evades all previous critiques. On this view, we take decisions by anticipating and responding affectively to the alternatives, with the pleasure / displeasure component of affect constituting the common currency of decision-making. But we do not have to believe that the alternatives will bring us pleasure or displeasure in the future. Rather, those feelings get bound into and become parts of the future-directed representation of the options, rendering the latter attractive or repulsive. Much then depends on what pleasure and displeasure really are. If they are intrinsically good or bad properties of experience, for example, then motivational hedonism results. Carruthers argues, in contrast, that the best account is a representational one: pleasure represents its object (nonconceptually, in a perception-like manner) as good, and displeasure represents it (nonconceptually) as bad. The result is pluralism about human motivation, making room for both genuine altruism and intrinsic motives of duty. Clearly written and deeply scientifically informed, Human Motives has implications for many areas of philosophy and cognitive science, and will be of interest to anyone wanting to understand the foundations of human motivation.

This book develops an original theory of decision-making based on the concept of plausibility. The author advocates plausible reasoning as a general philosophical method and demonstrates how it can be applied to problems in argumentation theory, scientific theory choice, risk management, ethics, law, economics, and epistemology.Human decisions are conditioned by formidable uncertainty. The standard resource for dealing rationally with uncertainty is the mathematical concept of probability. The probability calculus is well-known, but since the numerical demands for applying it cannot usually be met, it is not widely applicable. By contrast, the concept of plausibility is widely applicable, but it is little known. This book relies on a generalized concept of plausibility whose strength is its adaptability. The adaptability is due to a novel form of decision theory that takes plausibilities as inputs. This form of decision theory remains applicable to decisions informed by sharp probabilities and utilities, but it can also be applied to decisions that must be made without them. It can aid in the rationally critical enterprise of discriminating good arguments from bad, and this can foster philosophical progress. A Plea for Plausibility will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in argumentation theory, philosophy of science, ethics, epistemology, economics, law, and risk management.

Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are'just feelings'and not necessarily'imbued with reason'or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.

Kathleen Touchstone applies the philosophies of Objectivism, rule-utilitarianism, and neo-Aristotelianism to strategies of risk management. She proposes a risk index model which accounts for probability, virtue, and consequences, utilizing philosophical insight into the gauging of success.

This book critically examines the debate on Martin Heidegger's concept of Entscheidung ('decision') and his engagement and confrontation with Nazism in terms of his broader philosophical thought. It argues that one cannot explain Heidegger's actions without accounting for his idea of'decision'and its connection to his understanding of individual'fate'and national (and European)'destiny.'The book looks at the relation of biography to philosophy and the ethical and political implications of appropriating Heidegger's thinking in these domains of inquiry. It highlights themes such as Heidegger's differences with the neo-Kantians in Germany; Heidegger on Kant and practical reason; and his reading of Nietzsche and Hegel. It offers a philosophical assessment grounded in Heidegger's own texts, with reference to historical and other philosophical commentaries on the rise of National Socialism in post-Weimar Germany and the philosophical issues associated with the interpretation of Nazi genocide and ideology. An important intervention in Western philosophy, this book will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of political philosophy, continental philosophy, German philosophy, philosophy in general, and political studies.

Advancing current readings of the deconstructive work of Jacques Derrida, Deconstructing Undecidability critically explores the problematic nature of decision, including the inherent exclusivity that accompanies any decision. In discourses where a pursuit of justice or liberation from systemic oppression is a primary concern, Michael Oliver argues for an appreciation of the inescapability of making limited, difficult decisions for particular forms of justice. Oliver highlights a similarly precarious predicament in the context of philosophical and religious negotiations of divine decision, pointing to the impossibility of safely navigating this issue. While wholeheartedly affirming the problem of exclusivity that inevitably accompanies decision, this book offers a renewed sense of undecidability that highlights a mistaken, illusory position of indecision as a reflection of power and privilege. Ultimately, this book aims to gain a greater appreciation for the complexity of the problem of decision, in order to be more rigorous and transparent in our continued engagement with it.

This book examines reality using verbs in their real time, which, like a segment of clock time, runs from the occurrence of the cause to the inevitable effect. As argued here, errors in our decisions often result from a ‘noun approach'to the problem. A good decision depends on whether it is made on the basis of real premises and whether the decision-maker is able to define what is ‘good'. These two eternal issues, ‘truth'and ‘goodness'are the subject of inquiry here. The findings presented in this book invalidate the paradigm of ‘noun philosophy'of the 20th century. It will appeal to philosophers, as well as managers and decision makers.

A revelatory alternative to the standard economic models of human behavior that proposes an exciting new way to understand decision†‘making “Willful is a breakthrough in economics. Richard Robb's tremendously insightful book shows how much of our behavior is not explained by existing theories of human action and explains in sparkling prose why understanding decisions made seemingly without reason presents a fuller picture of our world.”—Edmund S. Phelps, Nobel Laureate in Economics Why do we do the things we do? The classical view of economics is that we are rational individuals, making decisions with the intention of maximizing our preferences. Behaviorists, on the other hand, see us as relying on mental shortcuts and conforming to preexisting biases. Richard Robb argues that neither explanation accounts for those things that we do for their own sake, and without understanding these sorts of actions, our picture of decision†‘making is at best incomplete. Robb explains how these choices made seemingly without reason belong to a realm of behavior he identifies as “for†‘itself.” A provocative combination of philosophy and economics that offers a key to many of our quixotic choices, this groundbreaking volume provides a new way to understand everything from investing to how hard we work to how we manage daily interactions.

Thinking about self-control takes us to the heart of practical decision-making, human agency, motivation, and rational choice. Psychologists, philosophers, and decision theorists have all brought valuable insights and perspectives on how to model self-control, on different mechanisms for achieving and strengthening self-control, and on how self-control fits into the overall cognitive and affective economy. Yet these different literatures have remained relatively insulated from each other. Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality brings them into dialog by focusing on the theme of rationality. It contains eleven newly written essays by a distinguished group of philosophers, psychologists, and decision theorists, together with a substantial introduction, collectively offering state-of-the-art perspectives on the rationality of self-control and the different mechanisms for achieving it.

When a doctor tells you there's a one percent chance that an operation will result in your death, or a scientist claims that his theory is probably true, what exactly does that mean? Understanding probability is clearly very important, if we are to make good theoretical and practical choices. In this engaging and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy of probability, Darrell Rowbottom takes the reader on a journey through all the major interpretations of probability, with reference to real-world situations. In lucid prose, he explores the many fallacies of probabilistic reasoning, such as the'gambler's fallacy'and the'inverse fallacy', and shows how we can avoid falling into these traps by using the interpretations presented. He also illustrates the relevance of the interpretation of probability across disciplinary boundaries, by examining which interpretations of probability are appropriate in diverse areas such as quantum mechanics, game theory, and genetics. Using entertaining dialogues to draw out the key issues at stake, this unique book will appeal to students and scholars across philosophy, the social sciences, and the natural sciences.

This book carries out an epistemological analysis of the decision, including a critical analysis through the continuous reference to an interdisciplinary approach including a synthesis of philosophical approaches, biology and neuroscience. Besides this it represents the analysis of causality here seen not from the formal point of view, but from the'embodied'point of view. ​

Since Mill's seminal work On Liberty, philosophers and political theorists have accepted that we should respect the decisions of individual agents when those decisions affect no one other than themselves. Indeed, to respect autonomy is often understood to be the chief way to bear witness to the intrinsic value of persons. In this book, Sarah Conly rejects the idea of autonomy as inviolable. Drawing on sources from behavioural economics and social psychology, she argues that we are so often irrational in making our decisions that our autonomous choices often undercut the achievement of our own goals. Thus in many cases it would advance our goals more effectively if government were to prevent us from acting in accordance with our decisions. Her argument challenges widely held views of moral agency, democratic values and the public/private distinction, and will interest readers in ethics, political philosophy, political theory and philosophy of law.

Karl N. Llewellyn was one of the founders and major figures of legal realism, and his many keen insights have a central place in American law and legal understanding. Key to Llewellyn's thinking was his conception of rules, put forward in his numerous writings and most famously in his often mischaracterized declaration that they are “pretty playthings.” Previously unpublished, The Theory of Rules is the most cogent presentation of his profound and insightful thinking about the life of rules. This book frames the development of Llewellyn's thinking and describes the difference between what rules literally prescribe and what is actually done, with the gap explained by a complex array of practices, conventions, professional skills, and idiosyncrasies, most of which are devoted to achieving a law's larger purpose rather than merely following the letter of a particular rule. Edited, annotated, and with an extensive analytic introduction by leading contemporary legal scholar Frederick Schauer, this rediscovered work contains material not found elsewhere in Llewellyn's writings and will prove a valuable contribution to the existing literature on legal realism.

Standard-setting represents one of the main constitutional functions of UNESCO and an important tool for realizing the goals for which the Organization was created. In addition to conventions and recommendations, the declarations adopted by the General Conference promulgate principles and norms intended to inspire the action of Member States in specific fields of activity.This second of a two-volume work on Standard-Setting in UNESCO collects the complete texts of all UNESCO instruments. Part I of Conventions, Recommendations, Declarations and Charters adopted by UNESCO (1948-2006) contains conventions and agreements adopted by the General Conference and by intergovernmental conferences convened by UNESCO itself or jointly by UNESCO and other international organizations. Part II includes the recommendations issued by the General Conference, while Part III features all UNESCO declarations.CO-PUBLICATION WITH: UNESCO

L'élaboration de règles internationales est l'une des principales fonctions de l'UNESCO. C'est en même temps un outil important pour la réalisation des buts de l'Organisation pour lesquels elle a été créée.Outre les conventions et les recommandations, les déclarations adoptées par la Conférence générale promulguent un ensemble de principes et de normes qui doivent guider l'action des États membres dans un domaine d'activité précis.Ce deuxième volume de cet ouvrage en deux tomes sur l'action normative de l'UNESCO contient la version intégrale des instruments normatifs adoptés à ce jour par l'Organisation. La première partie de Conventions, Recommandations, Déclarations et Chartres adoptées par l'UNESCO (1948–2006) contient les conventions et accords adoptés soit par la Conférence générale soit par des conferences intergouvernementales convoquées par l'UNESCO seule ou conjointement avec d'autres organizations internationales. La deuxième partie regroupe toutes les recommandations adoptées par la Conférence générale et la troisième partie toutes les déclarations.CO-PUBLICATION WITH: UNESCO

L'élaboration de règles internationales est l'une des principales fonctions de l'UNESCO. C'est en même temps un outil important pour la réalisation des buts de l'Organisation pour lesquels elle a été créée. Outre les conventions et les recommandations, les déclarations adoptées par la Conférence générale promulguent un ensemble de principes et de normes qui doivent guider l'action des États membres dans un domaine d'activité précis.Ce premier volume de cet ouvrage en deux tomes sur l'action normative de l'UNESCO contient les actes du colloque organisé à l'occasion du 60e anniversaire de l'Organisation. Les themes développés dans Élaboration de règles internationales sur l'éducation, la science et la culture couvrent les méthodes d'élaboration et de mise en oeuvre ; les objectifs constitutionnels et les obligations légales ; la collaboration internationale ; et les aboutissements.CO-PUBLICATION WITH: UNESCO

Standard-setting represents one of the main constitutional functions of UNESCO and an important tool for realizing the goals for which the Organization was created. In addition to conventions and recommendations, the declarations adopted by the General Conference promulgate principles and norms intended to inspire the action of Member States in specific fields of activity.This first of a two-volume work on Standard-setting in UNESCO contains the essays presented at a symposium held on the occasion of its sixtieth anniversary. Topics addressed in Normative Action in Education, Science and Culture include methods of elaboration and implementation; constitutional objectives and legal commitments; international collaboration; and impact.CO-PUBLICATION WITH: UNESCO

The world of policy represents the confluence of a number of intellectual strands in which the clinician brings science together with intuition, and uses his or her experience to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for treatment. This important volume brings together leading scholars to explore the'how'of thinking about policy - the questions, values, judgments and experience the analyst brings to bear.

Philip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book deals with the rule-following character of thought. The second discusses the many factors to which choice is rationally responsive - and by reference to which choice can be explained - consistently with being under the control of thought. The third examines the implications of this multiple sensitivity for the normative regulation of social affairs. Thus the volume covers a large swathe of territory, ranging from metaphysics to philosophical psychology to the theory of rational regulation. The connections that Pettit makes between these areas are original and illuminating. Each part of the book develops a key theme. The first is that thought succeeds in following rules - and overcomes Wittgenstein's rule-following problem - so far as it is response-dependent; it is a sort of enterprise that is accessible only to creatures like us for whom certain responses are primitive and shared. The second is that while human choice may be sensitive to discursive reasons, as we would expect in a thinking subject, it can at the same time be subject to the control - the virtual control, in the model developed here - of rational self-interest. And the third is that the rational interest of agents in achieving esteem in the eyes of others, and in avoiding disesteem, exercises a virtual form of control that can explain the emergence of norms and various other aspects of social life.