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The Model Penal Code’s “De Minimis” provisions (§ 2.12) cover different kinds of case in which, for reasons of equity, a prosecution should be dismissed. An exploration of these different cases illuminates some important general issues about the structure of the criminal process, and about the processes of criminalization. These include the significance of the difference between dismissing a case and acquitting the defendant, and of the distinction between offences and defenses; whether criminal offences should always be so defined that they specify at least a pro tanto wrong, or may sometimes legitimately specify only a prima facie wrong — and whether this is consistent with the presumption of innocence; what kinds of conduct we can properly be expected to answer for in a criminal court; and the proper division of labor, and of responsibilities, between legislatures, prosecutors and courts in determining what kinds of conduct are to be defined and treated as criminal wrongs.

The de minimis principle states that some risks are so trivial that they can be ignored or treated categorically differently from non-trivial risks. Lundgren and Stefánsson criticize the de minimis principle, arguing that it either has to be applied locally or globally and that problems arise whichever application is chosen. Aven and Seif respond to Lundgren and Stefánsson’s argument and defend the de minimis principle as a “meaningful and useful perspective for handling risk in practice.” The response highlights some aspects of the argument in Lundgren and Stefánsson that needs clarification, which is what we do in this note.

Anayasa Mahkemesinin (AYM) gittikçe artan iş yükü, mahkemeninetkin ve verimli çalışması bakımından endişelerin oluşmasına yolaçmıştır. AYM istatistikleri incelendiğinde bireysel başvuruların işyükünün artışında ciddi etkisinin olduğu görülmektedir. Nitekimgüncel verilere göre derdest bireysel başvuru sayısı 121.977’dir. Temelhak ve özgürlüklerin korunmasında önemli bir rol üstlenen bireyselbaşvuru yolunun etkinliğini yitirmesini önlemek için iş yükü sorunununçözümüne yönelik yasal reformlar yapılması gerekmektedir. Buçalışmada, kabul edilebilirlik kriterlerinden olan anayasal ve kişiselönem koşulu, iş yükü sorunu ekseninde tartışılmakta ve alternatif çözümönerileri değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışmada, iş yükü sorunu istatistikselveriler aracılığıyla analiz edilmiş, anayasal ve kişisel önem kriteri Türkhukuku ve karşılaştırmalı hukuk kapsamında incelenerek AYM’ninyaklaşımı ortaya konmuş ve anayasal ve kişisel önem kriteri, iş yüküsorunu bağlamında incelenerek alternatif çözüm önerileri tartışılmıştır.

Summary Anthropogenic climate change produces two conceptually distinct negative economic externalities. The first is an expected path of climate damage. The second, the focus of this paper, is an expected path of economic risk. To isolate the climate-risk problem, we consider three mean-zero, symmetric shocks in our 12-period, overlapping generations model. These shocks impact dirty energy usage (carbon emissions), the relationship between carbon concentration and temperature and the connection between temperature and damages. By construction, our model exhibits a de minimis climate problem absent its shocks. However, due to non-linearities, symmetric shocks deliver negatively skewed impacts, including the potential for climate disasters. As we show, Pareto-improving carbon taxation can dramatically lower climate risk, in general, and disaster risk, in particular. The associated climate-risk tax, which is focused exclusively on limiting climate risk, can be as large as, or larger than, the carbon average-damage tax, which is focused exclusively on limiting average damage.

‘De minimis risk’ is a basic concept and principle of risk analysis, which states that risks which are sufficiently small can be ignored. This principle is commonly used in practical risk analysis and related decision-making, but its rationale is debated. Recently, authors have argued that de minimis reasoning has no place in rational decision-making. The present paper provides a perspective on the foundation and use of this principle in a risk analysis context. The main aim of the paper is to gain new knowledge about the meaning and scope of the principle in view of contemporary risk science. We evaluate the extent to which different perspectives on risk can explain the disputes concerning the suitability of the principle. Current discussions of the principle have to a large extent been based on probabilistic-based frameworks, whereas the present study also addresses uncertainty-based risk perspectives. Examples are used to illustrate the discussion.

In this paper the author analyses de minimis state aid as an exception from the principle of prohibiting the state to help some undertakings in order not to privilege them among other undertakings and to violate their equality on the market. Author explains the notion of de minimis aid, justification of this exception from the prohibition of granting the state aid, privilege that its provider and beneficiary enjoy in comparison with other types of allowable ("compatible") state AIDS, as well as the methods of preventing the circumvention of rules about its granting. Th e author compares the rules of European Union and Serbia in this question, pointing to differences between them. Th e conclusion is that Serbia regulates de minimis aid superficially and vaguely, with important deviations from the EU law. Besides, author contemplates the adequacy of the EU allowable sum of de minimis aid within Serbian economic conditions.

The paper examines the basis and domain of application of the rule of reason to restrictive agreements. When the agreement will not be qualified as restrictive, and furthermore by which of five level basis a transaction is separated out of a prohibition regime and consequence of nullity annulled? The result of the paper is a three-category legal model that assumes the application of quantitative and then qualitative indicators, which further imply subjective-objective criteria for assessing the anti-competitive potential of the agreement. After the application of the de minimis rule, the transaction is being subject of a systematic and target consecutive analysis, and then by applying the rule of reason - considering the circumstances of the individual case and categorizing them as anticompetitive risk, and possible wider positive effect - in the last instance allowed the possibility of one of the five scenarios of exceptions to the initial principle of absolute prohibition.

E-commerce presents a broad range of challenges for policy makers. In the tax context, it has the potential to obscure the relationship between a firm and the appropriate taxing jurisdiction. This article explores the goods and services tax (GST)/harmonized sales tax (HST) obligations of non-resident e-commerce firms with no physical presence in Canada—specifically, whether those firms may be required to register for, collect, and remit GST/HST in respect of their activities in the Canadian market. Recent developments in the common law (albeit in a non-tax context) indicate that non-resident e-commerce firms with no physical presence in Canada may be found to be carrying on business in Canada. Since carrying on business in Canada is a key element in determining a person's GST/HST obligations, it is likely that non-resident e-commerce firms that are found to meet the requirement will be subject to such obligations in respect of taxable supplies made digitally in the Canadian market. That said, there is at present a great deal of uncertainty about the specific factors to be used in determining whether the activities of a non-resident e-commerce firm are sufficient to meet the carrying-on-business threshold. The author of this article recommends that Parliament should address this uncertainty by amending the Excise Tax Act to deem non-resident e-commerce firms to be carrying on business in Canada if they exceed specific de minimis sales thresholds.

In this article we aim to highlight the activities that fall under the scope of the de minimis aid scheme “Aid for the establishment of social enterprises” and those for which the scheme is not applicable, the certification requirements for social enterprises, the necessary elements of a business plan, but also the underlying principles of its selection, the eligible expenses and the reasons for fully or partially reimbursing the de minimis aid. It is mandatory for all these facts to be known by all those involved in order to prevent any departure from the regulation in this field.

This is a response to ten critiques of my 2018 book The Realm of Criminal Law, by Stephen Bero and Alex Sarch, Kim Ferzan, Stuart Green, Doug Husak, Nicola Lacey, Sandra Mayson, Victor Tadros, Patrick Tomlin, Alec Walen, and Gideon Yaffe. I take the opportunity to explain the main aims and themes of the book, to clarify some of its arguments, and to note some of the ways in which those arguments need expansion, development, or revision. Topics discussed include: the usefulness and limits of ‘rational reconstruction’ as a method of normative theorising; public wrongs and the scope of the criminal law; the idea of civil order as central to a political theory of criminal law; wrongness constraints on criminalization; mala prohibita and regulatory offences; the ‘De Minimis’ principle; and criminal law ‘abolitionism’.

Full aptness is the most important concept in performance-based virtue epistemology. The structure of full aptness, in epistemology and elsewhere, is bilevelled. At the first level, we evaluate beliefs, like performances, on the basis of whether they are successful, competent, and apt—viz successful because competent. But the fact that aptness itself can be fragile—as it is when an apt performance could easily have been inapt—points to a higher zone of quality beyond mere aptness. To break in to this zone, one must not merely perform aptly but also in doing so safeguard in skilled ways against certain risks to inaptness. But how must this be done, exactly? This paper has two central aims. First, I challenge the credentials of mainstream thinking about full aptness by raising some new and serious problems for the view. I then propose a novel account of full aptness—what I call de minimis normativism—which keeps all the advantages of the canonical view, avoids its problems entirely, and offers some additional payoffs.

This Article analyzes the value of behavioral economics for EU judicial decision-making. The first part introduces the foundations of behavioral economics by focusing on cognitive illusions, prospect theory, and the underlying distinction between different processes of thought. The second part examines the influence of selected biases and heuristics, namely the anchoring effect, availability bias, zero-risk bias, and hindsight bias on diverse legal issues in EU law including, among others, the scope of the fundamental freedoms, the proportionality test as well as the roles of the Advocate General and Reporting Judge. The Article outlines how behavioral economic findings can be taken into account to improve judicial decision-making. Accordingly, the adaptation of judicial training concerning cognitive illusions, the establishment of a de minimis rule regarding the scope of the fundamental freedoms, and the use of economic models when determining the impact of certain measures on fundamental freedoms is suggested. Finally, an “unbiased jury” concentrating exclusively on specific factual issues such as causal connections within the proportionality test is necessary, if the hindsight bias is to be avoided. While it is of great importance to take behavioral economic findings into account, judicial decision-making is unlikely to become flawless based on natural intelligence. Despite bearing fundamental risks, artificial intelligence may provide means to achieve greater fairness, consistency, and legal certainty in the future.

According to the class of de minimis decision principles, risks can be ignored (or at least treated very differently from other risks) if the risk is sufficiently small. In this article, we argue that a de minimis threshold has no place in a normative theory of decision making, because the application of the principle will either recommend ignoring risks that should not be ignored (e.g., the sure death of a person) or it cannot be used by ordinary bounded and information‐constrained agents.

Glyphosate is one of the most widely used herbicides in the world, but it has also been the focus of discussion and restrictions in several countries since it was declared 'probably carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A)' by the International Agency for Research on Cancer in 2015. Since that time, several regulatory agencies have reviewed the public literature and guideline studies submitted for regulatory purposes and have concluded that it is not a carcinogen, and revised acceptable daily intakes (ADIs) and the reference dose (RfD) have been published. Also, restrictions on use have been lifted in many locations. Risk assessment for any pesticide requires knowledge of exposure in humans and the environment, and this paper is an update on a previous review in 2016 and includes papers published after 2016. These exposure data for air, water, bystanders, the general public, domesticated animals, pets, and applicators were combined and compared to the revised exposure criteria published by regulatory agencies. In all cases, measured and estimated systemic exposures to glyphosate in humans and animals were less than the ADIs and the RfD. Based on this large dataset, these exposures represent a de minimis risk. © 2019 Society of Chemical Industry.

Prevailing research in market microstructure posits that liquidity providers bypass queue lines on exchanges by offering liquidity in dark venues with de minimis sub-penny price improvement, thus exploiting an exception to the penny quote rule. We show that (a) the SEC enforces the quote rule to prevent sub-penny queuejumping in dark pools unless trades are “pegged†to the NBBO midpoint and (b) the documented increase in dark trading due to investor queue-jumping stems from increased midpoint trading. Although encouraging pegged midpoint orders can subject traders to direct feed arbitrage, we estimate that less than 2% of shares traded per year present exploitable trading opportunities for this form of latency arbitrage, yielding annual gross potential profits of less than $20 million.

This paper analyses the regulation of Article 9 point 2 of the Act of 9 September 2000 on the tax civil law transactions (CLT). The said provision applies to the exemption from the sales tax if the object of sale is a farm holding or a property included in a farm holding. The amendments of 2015 to the above mentioned Act added a sentence which provides that “such exemption constitutes a de minimis help in agriculture referred to in Regulation EC No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 concerning the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union regarding the de minimis help in the agricultural sector”. This new wording of Article 9 point 2 of the Act on CLT has entailed many doubts regarding the allowable level of exemption, the principles of its calculation and recovery. Hence the need to analyse the relevant legal provisions of the EC Regulation. In the author’s opinion the Regulation contains no provision stating that if the combined sum of help exceeds the predetermined ceiling it will be exempted from the provision, even if only up to the level not exceeding the ceiling. Under the current provisions the de minimis help in agriculture may not exceed EUR 15 000, also in the event referred to in Article 9 point 2 of the Act on CLT. Due to the lack of consistent legal provisions regarding tax exemptions, the authoress decided to present in the article other instruments available under Polish law, which provide for the de minimis help in agriculture.

We investigate if a regional policy shift by the federal state government of Saxony in 2007 enhanced the innovation performance of local SMEs compared to similar firms in other East German regions. From the perspective of innovation policy, the policy shift in Saxony is remarkable for its novel approach to overcome the so-called “valley of death” for innovative SMEs, which addresses the difficult transition from a scientific invention to its successful commercial exploitation. While public support to the design and development of market-ready new products and services together with their market launch is typically highly restricted by EU state aid law, Saxony’s novel innovation policy makes use of the EU’s de minimis principle. This principle permits unconditional public funding up to EUR 200,000 over three tax years. While such amounts cannot be expected to provide additional incentives for larger firms, however, de minimis-based funding may be an essential tool to foster innovation activities in SMEs. Our regional benchmarking approach based on micro data from the IAB Establishment Panel shows that micro and small firms in Saxony have become significantly more innovative than similar firms in other East German regions after the introduction of the novel policy in 2007. Our findings suggest that this new pathway to an SME-focused, close-to-the-market innovation policy may be a promising blueprint for EU innovation policy in structurally weak regions.

This article argues that while South Africa’s International Trade Administration Amendment Bill and the attendant proposed regulations may generally be regarded as a positive legislative intervention, to a large extent, the new regulatory regime goes against the spirit, object and purport of the World Trade Organization (WTO) anti-dumping agreement and is even in conflict with South Africa’s International Trade Administration Act itself. In order to substantiate the above reservations, this article first outlines the basics of WTO dumping and anti-dumping law before proceeding to point out aspects of South Africa’s anti-dumping law and practicewhich incorporate WTO tenets. With the aid of selected WTO disputes and examples from comparative WTO member states, this article also comments on selected impugned changes likely to be introduced by the Bill and the new regulations and concludes that the proposed new law is unlikely to be WTO compliant. This conclusion is premised on the fact that South African dumping and anti-dumping law relating to confidentiality, the process of conducting investigations, termination of investigations based on de minimis margins and interested party hearings does not always mimic the legal position as espoused in the WTO anti-dumping agreementand interpreted in selected WTO disputes.

A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, orde minimisrequirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about the distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not thede minimisrequirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative—cost–benefit analysis—does not deliver.