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Though China looms large in the Mexican consciousness as an economic competitor, the same is not the same from the Chinese perspective. This study of the reporting of Mexico in China reflects on the lack of understanding of Mexico in China other than as a function of China’s international political economy. Though the prospects for greater cooperation may appear significant, the likelihood of this happening should clearly not be exaggerated. Mexico-China relations are asymmetrical and likely to stay that way for some time. Mexico’s value to China lies in its relationship to the USA, and not for anything intrinsic in the Mexican economy or society.

[S]tudies have revealed a high level of intergenerational transfer of class and social status, privileged and otherwise.

There has been considerable discussion about whether and how China’s political economy will change with economic growth and development. The debate has focused for the most part on the possibilities for either market transition or continued path dependence, and in particular, research has centred on the emergence of business activities and the changing role of local business elites. The results of interviews with 469 members of the new economic elites in five cities suggest that while local politics may indeed have adjusted to the new environment, in elite formation, the market plays a role alongside and sometimes secondary to status and political power. There is a significant pattern of elite privilege that reaches back into the era of state socialism, with further origins for some to be found in the pre-1949 local elites. Even where there are reasons to be sceptical about long-term status claims, there can be no gainsaying the strength of such narratives as motivational forces in business and elite behaviour.

A China Threat – the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese – has been an ever present in the politics of Australia since even before there was a Commonwealth of Australia. It was both a major cause of Federation in 1901 and a determinant of Australia's foreign policy thereafter. In the last 20 years, concerns about China have come to focus less on migration and more on economic integration and China's political influence. There are as always distinct paradoxes in the China Threat. It may be a useful vehicle for making a political point at election time but China has a place in the Australian economy that has led Australia's leaders to at least modify their resistance once in office.

Background Acute uncomplicated cystitis (AUC) is a frequent infection that requires antibiotic treatment that is seen in women who seek care at urgent care centers.1 The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) has published guidelines for the management of AUC. They recommend nitrofurantoin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, or fosfomycin as the first-line agents for the treatment of AUC in healthy adult women.1 Previous evaluation of prescribing practices at Tower Health Urgent Care Centers demonstrated a 16% compliance rate with treatment guidelines for AUC. Subsequently, provider education and an AUC medication order set in the electronic medical record (EMR) were implemented. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of these interventions on prescribing practices for AUC. Methods A retrospective electronic chart review was performed evaluating the antibiotic treatment of patients diagnosed with AUC between January 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, excluding July 2018 to September 2018, the washout period during which education was provided. Inclusion criteria included age ≥ 18 years, female, and treated at one of three Tower Health Urgent Care Centers. Results 1,455 patients met inclusion criteria during our study period. Our three-month washout period included 273 of those patients. 421 patients were included in the pre-education analysis with 761 patients in the post-education analysis. When both first and second-line antibiotic prescriptions were evaluated in conjunction with considering patient allergies and concomitant infections, compliance was 59% in our post-education analysis (improved from 16% compliance at baseline). Conclusion Provider education and an AUC medication order set in the EMR were successful in increasing the compliance rate with antibiotic treatment guidelines for the management of AUC in adult females in the urgent care setting. Disclosures All Authors: No reported disclosures

The middle class has emerged as a political phenomenon in China since 2002 through a state-sponsored discourse that sees it as a universal and universalising class. Although the evidence from other countries suggests that the growth of middle classes leads to regime change, this seems to be an unlikely outcome for China. In the first place, China’s middle class discourse has uncertain sociological foundations. Secondly, where the middle classes are identifiable they still probably constitute no more than 12% of the population. Thirdly, China’s middle classes have a very close relationship to the Party-state. Most of the professional and managerial middle classes are part of, or closely associated with, the Party-state; and the entrepreneurial middle class has either emerged from within the Party-state or has been incorporated into it.

Studies of higher education often assume that there is a close relationship between economic growth, social change, and political transformation. It is argued that economic growth leads not simply to a demand for the expansion of higher education but also an increase in social equity in admissions to universities. Students become more radicalised through this process; and both through economic growth and the expansion of higher education, academic staff who are the core after all of a society’s public intellectuals, also become the voice for political transformation. The evidence from the People’s Republic of China is that while there has been massive economic growth during the last thirty years, and an equally dramatic expansion of higher education since 1997, the consequences for higher education in terms of social change have

An awful lot of nonsense is often talked about China, including the notion that it is already the equal of the USA in world politics and is on track to replace the latter's ‘manifest destiny’ with ...

An important part of the China Dream is the development of a comfortable middle class lifestyle for all. This is not such a surprising development since a public discourse surrounding the emergence of a middle class has been in the making for over a decade. There is though nonetheless an apparent paradox in a Communist Party embracing the middle class. Understanding how and why this has occurred, as well as attempting to identify the consequences for social stratification in China is clearly important. While it would seem reasonable to attempt to analyse China’s middle class in terms of wealth, or occupation or even lifestyle, it is argued that this is fairly meaningless: in this context the middle class is more a discourse than social structure.

The War of Resistance to Japan (1937–1945) has long been recognised as the most important stage in the Chinese Communist Party's rise to power in 1949. Particularly in its North China base areas, the Chinese Communist Party is said to have pursued moderate, inclusive, and mobilisatory tactics during the war years to build a movement for national salvation from the bottom up, which eventually led to the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The evidence from the heart of the Taihang Base Area suggests the possibility of another contrasting history, masked by current interpretations, in which 1939–1940 was a crucial turning point in that process. Starting in September 1939, and for the following six months, there is evidence of more explicitly revolutionary endeavour. The Chinese Communist Party seized power locally from its allies and destroyed the opposition; it engaged in violent land reform and wealth redistribution; and it attempted to proletarianise itself. Understanding the causes of these...

The rapid economic development of the People's Republic of China has not only been spectacular since 1978 but also suggests that there is a specific China Model of the relationship between the state, society and the market. In particular, this model would seem to have particular application to the less developed economies of the world. Certainly the emergence of a Beijing Consensus to replace the democratic capitalist Washington Consensus of the 1990s would seem to suggest the purchase that China's rise has brought in many parts of the world. An examination of six prominent different accounts of China's growing economic and political importance suggests that there are distinct limits to the conceptualisation of China's development in terms of a model, though there may be lessons about the interaction of public and private to be learnt more widely.

Academic commentary has long emphasised the asymmetry in Mexico-China relations. In particular, much attention has focussed since the early 1990s particularly from the Mexican side on the economic imbalance in trade and investment that has become and remains acute with the expansion of the economy of the People's Republic of China. This is though far from the only sense in which the relationship between the two countries is asymmetrical. There is also a severe imbalance in the relative importance of politics and economics as determinants of this relationship for both China and Mexico. The Mexican Government seems to be more concerned with its economic relationship with China. In contrast, the PRC Government seems more concerned with its political relationship with Mexico. Moreover, there is a further asymmetry in the respective significance that each appears to have to the other as a partner. Mexico plays a small role in China's outlook but China looms large in Mexico's worldview. Identification ...

There can be few books in the field of contemporary China studies which have been as significant as Chalmers Johnson's (1962a) Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. 1 By current standards the bo...

Although the People's Republic of China turns 60 in 2009, popular and to some extent academic perceptions of its political system remain over-determined by the experience of its first 30 years. The socio-economic impact of the policies of the last three decades is well recognised but not the context in which these have occurred. In particular, there is a tendency to differentiate sharply between dramatic economic growth and its consequences and the lack of political change. While it is clearly the case that the Chinese Communist Party remains in power it is equally as obvious that economic reform has had and been accompanied by major political change. Studies on the state in transition at local levels certainly suggest that change has been significant. Moreover, these local studies also indicate the need to further conceptualise understanding of the state in China. The state idea is rather too general a concept and too blunt an instrument for analysis compared to research that considers the state...

Aunque la RPC cumple 60 anos de existencia en 2009, percepciones populares y hasta cierto punto academicas de su sistema politico continuan condicionadas en exceso por la experiencia de sus primeros 30 anos. El impacto socioeconomico de las politicas de las ultimas tres decadas es sobradamente conocido, pero no el contexto en el que estas se han producido. En particular, existe una tendencia a diferenciar entre un espectacular crecimiento economico y sus consecuencias, y la falta de cambio politico. Mientras que claramente el Partido Comunista de China sigue en el poder, es igualmente obvio que la reforma economica ha ido de la mano de un gran cambio politico. Estudios sobre el estado de transicion a niveles locales ciertamente sugieren que el cambio ha sido significativo. Ademas, estos estudios locales tambien indican la necesidad de conceptualizar mas lo que se entiende por Estado en China. La idea de Estado es un concepto demasiado general y un instrumento de analisis demasiado contundente, comparado con la investigacion que considera los valores y la ideologia del Estado, la base social del poder politico, las estructuras y los procesos del sistema politico, los responsables con autoridad para tomar decisiones, la burocracia y la administracion, y las interacciones internacionales del Estado.

La reforma economica de la Republica Popular China (rpc) ha visto desde 1980 el surgimiento de nuevas categorias de riqueza y poder. En forma colectiva y coloquial, estas nuevas categorias se conocen como los “nuevos ricos”. Se les ha denominado tambien, tanto fuera como dentro de la rpc, como la nueva clase media (o clases medias) por diferentes razones. Si bien existen buenos motivos para aceptar esta designacion, la evidencia de encuestas sobre los nuevos empresarios ricos realizadas desde principios de 1990 en diferentes partes de la rpc (Zhejiang, Shanxi, Qinghai, Sichuan y Hainan) sugiere precaucion. En terminos de jerarquia de riqueza, estatus y poder, los nuevos ricos representan no solo un componente significativo de la clase gobernante actual, sino quizas y de manera mas importante resaltan las dimensiones de un futuro a largo plazo.

During the last decade three books have had a disproportionate impact on China Studies because of their controversial interpretations: Jenner's The Tyranny of History, which predicts the disintegration of the Chinese state; Menzies' 1421: The Year China Discovered the World, which describes how Chinese sailors circumnavigated the globe well before any Europeans; and Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's biography Mao: The Unknown Story. All are revisionist histories that amongst other (usually controversial) conclusions suggest there has been a conspiracy to keep the information they convey hidden. Considering their arguments and the manner of their enquiry and expression is interesting in more general ways about the construction of narrative and the nature of conspiracy, as well as about the lessons for academic research.

The campaign to Open Up the West that started in 2000 has been presented as a major state project of nation-building directed at the interior provincial-level jurisdictions in order to encourage endogenous economic growth, to reduce socio-economic inequalities, and to ensure social and political stability in non-Han areas of the PRC. Despite appearances to the contrary it is more of an adjustment to the PRC's regional development policy than a radical change, not least because of debate and imprecision about its goals, processes and finance. Its impact is perhaps best viewed from provincial and local perspectives. These stress not only the importance of the west's varied social and economic ecology, but also the significance of the sub-provincial as a focus for analysis.

Qinghai is one of China's poorest provincial-level jurisdictions, least internally integrated and least integrated with the rest of the People's Republic. Its social complexity and fragile environment repeatedly created significant political and economic problems during the first half-century of the PRC, which were then exacerbated by policies that rapidly proved over-simplistic and counter-productive. Since January 2000 the PRC government's new policy initiative to develop the Western Region – the call to “Open Up the West” – has provided the provincial leadership with the opportunity to resolve some of the province's long-term difficulties through adopting markedly different perspectives on development. A more gradual approach has emerged, concentrating on the development of the province's infrastructure and environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, there remains a danger that in concentrating on economic solutions to the province's problems its inherent political, social and cultural contestations may be ignored to the detriment of the leadership's wider goals.

In retrospect, 1991–1992 may well prove to be a pivotal period in the evolution of the People's Republic of China. The reform era ushered in by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the Third Plenum of its 11th Central Committee in December 1978 had dramatically restructured the economy and the state, but in the aftermath of the events of June 1989, it appeared to falter. Partly through reactions from outside China, and partly because of resistance within (including elements within the leadership of the Party), the programme of ‘reform and openness’ seemed challenged and about to topple.

One of the more interesting aspects of politics in the People's Republic of China during the 1990s was the attempt by many provincial leaders to create a specifically provincial discourse of development that entailed the reformulation of provincial identity. Both inside and outside the People's Republic of China, provincialism has often been held to challenge the unity of the Chinese state. However, an examination of the provincial discourse of development in Shanxi during the 1990s suggests that provincial and indeed more local identity politics are more complex and finely nuanced than might at first seem to be the case. Shanxi's new provincial identity was neither exclusive nor opposed to other identities, but one of a series of multiple and overlapping identities, structured within a hierarchy of place and identity that reached down to and interacted with the more local levels of county and village, as well as up to the national level. At the same time it is clear that the appeal to localism has started to influence the ways in which provincial leaders participate in national politics. Moreover, there is some indication that the emphasis on localism may have resulted in the county and the town or city becoming more significant locales for identity formation than the province, though the consequences of this for provincial and local politics remain unclear.