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This article investigates group fragmentation in the al-Qaeda and Islamic State ecosystems, employing network analysis to examine the impact of specific network conditions on the probability of a f...

This article argues for recognition of fringe fluidity as a distinct radicalization pathway. Most studies on individual-level radicalization examine how relatively normal people come to accept viol...

This Research Paper aims to analyse in depth the global propaganda strategy of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) by looking at the methods through which this grand strategy is carried out as well as the objectives that IS wants to achieve through it. The authors first discuss IS’ growth model, explaining why global expansion and recruitment of foreign fighters are pivotal to IS success. Having in mind this critical role, the authors then explore the narratives and themes used by the group to mobilise foreign fighters and jihadists groups. Third, the paper analyses how IS deploys its narratives in those territories where it has established a foothold. Fourth, it outlines IS’ direct engagement strategy and how it is used to facilitate allegiance of other jihadist groups. The final section of the paper offers a menu of policy options that stakeholders can implement to counter IS’ global propaganda efforts.

A broad trend fundamentally changing world politics is the decline of the nationstate’s monopoly over political and military force and the rise of the violent nonstate actor (VNSA). The overarching factor contributing to the decline of the nation-state is escalating technological advances. The Islamic State in particular shows how a VNSA can hold its ground in the face of a military onslaught by the world’s most powerful countries. This changing political order is mirrored in the business world, where startups are surpassing legacy companies. To embrace the startup mentality, the state must loosen bureaucratic practices, adjust hiring policies, and allow the incentive structure to work or risk further erosion of its legitimacy and power.

Since the fall of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, the country has been challenged by the growth of a domestic salafi jihadist movement. The most significant salafi jihadist organisation is Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), which by 2013 established a strategy based around dawa and hisba violence. Since May 2013, violence between AST and the Tunisian state significantly increased, prompting Tunisia’s government to designate AST a terrorist organisation in late August. In this Research Paper, ICCT Associate Fellow Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Bridget Moreng and Kathleen Soucy analyse the likely future of the conflict between AST and the Tunisian state, making three arguments. First, it explains how strategic thinking and political considerations drove the Tunisian government to escalate its fight against AST despite ambiguities in the evidence concerning who bore ultimate responsibility for the violence that prompted this escalation. Second, it argues that new revelations about AST make it seem less like the local organisation many observers perceived a year or two ago, and more connected to international jihadism. Third, the Paper describes the strategic thinking behind the recent targeting choices of Tunisian jihadists, who are attempting to undermine the country’s economy.

This article is a detailed case study examining Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (born Carlos Bledsoe), a lone wolf jihadist who carried out a fatal shooting at a joint Army-Navy recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 2009. The article explores his early life, including involvement in violent and criminal activities that caused Muhammad to get into trouble with authorities, after which he decided to explore religion as an alternative that could keep him out of trouble. Muhammad found that he was attracted to the Islamic faith, and converted at the age of nineteen. The article explores Muhammad's subsequent turn toward Salafism, and chronicles his increasing extremism with reference to academic debates about the concept of radicalization and the role of religious ideas. Finally, the article explains Muhammad's attack on the recruiting center, and the manner in which he was able to continue his jihad even while imprisoned.

In May 2013 the most significant clashes since the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali occurred between the Tunisian government and the country’s largest salafi jihadist organisation – Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST). ICCT Visiting Fellow Daveed Gartenstein-Ross argues that AST’s future in the country is highly uncertain. Combining a field visit to Tunisia with more traditional research, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross analyses AST’s current strategy and potential future transition from missionary work to jihad. He takes into consideration the group’s leadership, outlook, structure, size, and international connections. Concluding, he provides recommendations for engagement in Tunisia and the prevention of a long-term security problem connected to AST.

These video conference proceedings present panel discussions from a daylong conference on the evolving terrorist threat, which took place on June 27, 2017, in the Washington office of the RAND Corporation. RAND researchers Seth Jones, Colin Clarke, Lynn Davis, Ben Connable, Andrew Hoehn, Jack Riley, and Linda Robinson, along with experts from the larger national security community discuss the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), al-Qa'ida, and other terrorist groups.

This article provides a detailed examination of how the Salafi-jihadi movement perceives the “Arab Spring” revolutionary events. Although Western scholars almost unanimously agree that these events will have an enormous impact on Al Qaeda and other groups that share its ideology, the voice of the jihadis has not been examined in detail. This article addresses this critical gap in the literature through an analysis of 101 significant documents produced by jihadi thinkers within a year following the movement's very first statement on the uprising in Tunisia. These include statements released by jihadi spokesmen, interviews with the movement's intellectual leaders, and discussions on jihadi Web forums. The article concludes that Al Qaeda and the jihadi movement largely believe that the uprisings provide them a great deal of new opportunities, and outlines the movement's developing strategy to capitalize on rapidly changing events on the ground.

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, over 11,000 foreign fighters from across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have joined the ranks of Sunni militant groups in Syria and Iraq. Initially, MENA States had a lax approach to fighters travelling abroad. Some States opposed Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and thus at least implicitly supported this flow of fighters, while other States hoped that allowing their militants to go abroad would alleviate domestic security pressures. But as jihadist groups’ dominance over the rebel landscape in Syria became apparent, MENA States’ policies began to shift. These countries now have employed a number of responsive strategies, including counter-messaging designed to curb recruitment, travel restrictions, intelligence sharing, targeted counterterrorism policies, and arrest and prosecution once foreign fighters come home. This chapter examines the efforts of five MENA States, each a significant source of foreign fighters: Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon. Essentially, the growing challenge posed by foreign fighters took many MENA States by surprise, forcing these countries to piece together hurried and ad hoc policies. The search for best practices in the region will continue.

In this Research Paper, ICCT Associate Fellow Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr provides a detailed examination of the armed conflict in Libya between the Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn military coalitions. The conflict erupted in May 2014, when Dignity leader Khalifa Hifter announced the launch of his campaign, which was aimed at ridding eastern Libya of Islamist militias, beginning with Benghazi. This offensive shattered a fragile status quo. Revolutionary forces concentrated in the city of Misrata and Islamist politicians perceived Hifter’s offensive as a direct affront and, following parliamentary elections that these factions lost, the Misrata-Islamist bloc announced the launch of the Libya Dawn offensive, aimed at driving pro-Dignity forces out of Tripoli. More broadly, the Dawn offensive was an effort to change facts on the ground in order to ensure that the Misrata-Islamist bloc retained political influence. The Dignity and Dawn offensives have contributed to the continuing political and geographic fragmentation of Libya. Libya now has two separate parliaments and governments, while much of the country has been carved into spheres of influence by warring factions. The Dignity-Dawn conflict has also caused a deterioration of security, which has played into the hands of a variety of violent non-state actors, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates that have capitalized on Libya’s security vacuum to establish bases of operation. This report provides a blow-by-blow account of the military conflict between Dignity and Dawn forces, then assesses the implications of the Libyan civil war on regional security and potential policy options for Western states.

While the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act generally prevents foreign states from being the subject of lawsuits in U.S. courts, countries that have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism by the Secretary of State are exempted from this protection. Judgments entered under this "terrorism exception" already total more than $4 billion, with a number of suits still pending. These judgments may pose difficulties for the United States by shifting foreign policymaking power from the executive to the courts, encouraging retaliatory legislation, provoking hostility internationally, and posing barriers to normalization of relations with defendant states. In this Note, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross argues that, because the costs of the terrorism exception are substantial and the benefits minimal, the terrorism exception is a harmful piece of legislation. He explores alternatives policies that the United States can pursue.