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Proponents and opponents of data caps make conflicting claims about the effect of data caps on prices, network capacity and speeds, subscription, congestion, and consumer surplus. In this paper, we survey the academic literature on data caps and analyze the relationship between the characteristics of each paper's model or data and the paper's results. We find that model or data assumptions about service differentiation, purpose of the data cap, and amount of competition strongly influence each paper's results. Consequently, conclusions about the effect of data caps are often limited to certain types of service providers (fixed or mobile) and/or to certain types of data caps (heavy-users or profit-maximizing). We find that most proponents’ claims about data caps in fixed broadband service are incorrect, and that most proponents’ claims about data caps in mobile broadband service are likely to be correct if and only if data caps increase competition. We also discuss how data caps may be evaluated under the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order. We find that heavy-users caps on mobile broadband service are likely to satisfy the Order's rules, that profit-maximizing caps on mobile broadband service may or may not satisfy the rules, and that caps on fixed broadband service are unlikely to satisfy the rules.

Abstract We examine the extent to which the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 2015 "Open Internet" and 2018 "Restoring Internet Freedom" orders constrain anti-competitive and discriminatory pricing. We show that without regulation of interconnection agreements, and by allowing Internet Service Providers to cap bandwidth while also engaging in "zero rating," the prescriptive regulations promulgated by the FCC in its 2015 order left the door open for both anti-competitive and discriminatory pricing. Conversely, by undoing the Title II underpinning for its 2015 adopted rules, the FCC may bind itself from being able to remedy anti-competitive or discriminatory pricing in the future. Highlights • The FCC, 2015 Open Internet order did not ban paid interconnection or zero rating. • Similar ISPs could have priced interconnection to produce cartel-like behavior. • Zero rating could leave ISPs and consumers worse off than termination fees. • Thus, the 2015 order left room for anti-competitive and discriminatory pricing. • By reversing the 2015 order, the FCC has little recourse against such pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Broadband has become ubiquitous across OECD countries, yet because it is typically sold as part of a bundle of services, each with its own set of options, little research has explored how it is priced. In this paper we assemble a new dataset of more than 25,000 residential and business broadband plans from all OECD countries from 2007 to 2009 to explore how data metering, service contracts, and bundling voice, video, and data affect the prices consumers pay. We find that faster speeds are correlated with higher prices, although prices increase at a decreasing rate as speeds increase. Additionally, bundles including voice and video are more expensive than standalone service, and plans with more channels included in video bundles are more expensive than plans with fewer channels. Finally, the analysis shows tradeoffs consumers and suppliers make: plans with data caps are less expensive than those without caps and plans with contracts are less expensive than month-to-month plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]