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Two dimensions of the intensity of interparty rivalry are used to test the hypothesis that greater interparty competition enhances government efficiency. Using data from a set of 14 large Indian state governments between 1957 and 2018, we find confirmation for two political rivalry hypotheses. The first is that the ex-post size of the first versus second place seat share winning margin is a useful metric of the (in)effectiveness of rival party policing of incumbent spending behavior. The second is the hypothesis that excessive spending by the incumbent governing party is decreased by the expectation of greater election contestability and that contestability is related to the expected effective number of competing parties (ENPSeats) nonmonotonically. Our analysis suggests that contestability across Indian States reaches a maximum when the incumbent faces an expectation of ENPSeats that is closer to 5 than to Duverger's 2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the classic model of Besley, Persson and Strum voters are viewed as either committed to a political party or uncommitted, available for capture by the offer of policies that better reflect the programs they desire. Through an inter-party electoral competition for the support of such swing voters government services become aligned with those most desired by the electorate and the efficiency by which government services are provided is enhanced. In this paper, we extend the BPS model to incorporate voter turnout, develop a new method of measuring the salience of noneconomic issues and then test the model's predictions on election data from 14 Indian States between the years 1957 and 2018. The results are broadly consistent with the predictions of the model but fit particularly well the lesser developed, so-called BIMAROU states. That is, an election is more competitive, as measured by having a smaller first versus second place vote share margin, when voter turnout is higher and both the proportion of asymmetrically adjusted safe seats and the state distribution of vote volatilities across constituencies are lower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consequences of variations in economic growth for vote volatility are analyzed on a panel of 14 Indian states between 1957 and 2013. Two measures of volatility are used: changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and changes in the state average of vote volatilities constructed at the constituency level. While the results find that both vary inversely with income growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be more sensitive to growth rates. Examination of the periodicity of income growth's impact finds that growth in the final year of governance has a stronger effect on volatility than does the average growth rate arising over the incumbent's tenure. We confirm for Indian states that vote volatility responds more to negative changes than positive changes in the growth rate and, by decomposing volatility we find, contrary to most studies, that growth rates affect internal vote shifting more than shifting between exiting parties and newcomers. The responsiveness of volatility to economic and political characteristics of the state reinforces the hypothesis that theories of economic voting have an important role to play in understanding electoral volatility and may provide a more insightful way of approaching the political business cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we argue that the political budget cycle test for opportunistic spending is weakened by the absence of a strong reason for why spending increases should be restricted to the time period leading into the next election. One would expect that a targeted benefit should elicit the same degree of voter support whenever it is received. Here we argue that while the political need to fulfill a list of pre-election promises serves to constrain excessive spending, the characteristic that some expenditure items better demonstrate the contributions of the current government to voters (with depreciating memories) leads to a predictable reallocation of the composition of budgetary spending across the life of a government. Our test for a predictable timing pattern to subcomponents of the budget uses capital expenditures as the budgetary item with greater visibility spillovers and a data set of 14 Indian states over 54 years (1959/60–2012/13). The predictions that capital expenditures relative to both total government expenditure and government consumption should rise across the governing interval are found to be consistent with the data and provide a better fit with the data than more traditional political budget cycle models that use aggregate spending/deficits in the pre-election period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, it has been argued that political competition may have similar effects on economic performance as it does on market competition. This study empirically examines this proposition by linking political competition with the Human Development Index (HDI) of the Indian states. The findings suggest that politically-competitive governments perform well along the HDI. A more detailed analysis also shows that rural India benefits most from the intense political competition compared to urban India. We also found that if the same government rules a state for a relatively long period, it helps the state to achieve a higher HDI score. Increasing voter participation is found to be positively associated with HDI score, but this finding is confined to the sample of major Indian states. Increasing public spending on developmental activities is also found to have a positive and significant effect on HDI performance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]