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This study tested the hypothesis that individual differences in cognitive control can predict individual differences in emotion regulation. Participants completed color-word and emotional Stroop tasks while an electroencephalogram was recorded, and then they reported daily stressful events, affect, and coping for 14 days. Greater posterror slowing in the emotional Stroop task predicted greater negative affect in response to stressors and less use of task-focused coping as daily stressors increased. Participants whose neural activity best distinguished errors from correct responses tended to show less stress reactivity in daily self-reports. Finally, depression levels predicted daily affect and coping independent of cognitive control variables. The results offer qualified support for an integrated conception of cognitive and emotional self-regulation.

This study used electroencephalogram (EEG) power spectrum analyses to characterize neural activity during the intertrial interval, a period during which online cognitive adjustments in response to errors or conflict are thought to occur. EEG alpha power was quantified as an inverse index of cerebral activity during the period between each response and the next stimulus in a Stroop task. Alpha power was significantly reduced following error responses compared to correct responses, indicating greater cerebral activity following errors. Reduced alpha power was also observed following Stroop conflict trials compared to no-conflict trials, suggesting that conflict engages processes of mental adjustment. Finally, hemispheric differences in alpha power during the intertrial interval supported the complementary roles of the left and right hemispheres in behavioral activation and inhibition.

Microsaccades, the small saccades made when we try to keep the eyes still, were once believed to be inconsequential for vision, but recent studies suggest that they can precisely relocate gaze to tiny visual targets. Because the cerebellum is necessary for motor precision, we investigated whether microsaccades may exploit this neural machinery in monkeys. Almost all vermal Purkinje cells, which provide the eye-related output of the cerebellar cortex, were found to increase or decrease their simple spike firing rate during microsaccades. At both the single-cell and population level, microsaccade-related activity was highly similar to macrosaccade-related activity and we observed a continuous representation of saccade amplitude that spanned both the macrosaccade and microsaccade domains. Our results suggest that the cerebellum's role in fine-tuning eye movements extends even to the oculomotor system's smallest saccades and add to a growing list of observations that call into question the classical categorical distinction between microsaccades and macrosaccades.

In the search for the function of mirror neurons, a previous study reported that F5 mirror neuron responses are modulated by the value that the observing monkey associates with the grasped object. Yet we do not know whether mirror neurons are modulated by the expected reward value for the observer or also by other variables, which are causally dependent on value (e.g., motivation, attention directed at the observed action, arousal). To clarify this, we trained two rhesus macaques to observe a grasping action on an object kept constant, followed by four fully predictable outcomes of different values (2 outcomes with positive and 2 with negative emotional valence). We found a consistent order in population activity of both mirror and nonmirror neurons that matches the order of the value of this predicted outcome but that does not match the order of the above-mentioned value-dependent variables. These variables were inferred from the probability not to abort a trial, saccade latency, modulation of eye position during action observation, heart rate, and pupil size. Moreover, we found subpopulations of neurons tuned to each of the four predicted outcome values. Multidimensional scaling revealed equal normalized distances of 0.25 between the two positive and between the two negative outcomes suggesting the representation of a relative value, scaled to the task setting. We conclude that F5 mirror neurons and nonmirror neurons represent the observer's predicted outcome value, which in the case of mirror neurons may be transferred to the observed object or action.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Both the populations of F5 mirror neurons and nonmirror neurons represent the predicted value of an outcome resulting from the observation of a grasping action. Value-dependent motivation, arousal, and attention directed at the observed action do not provide a better explanation for this representation. The population activity's metric suggests an optimal scaling of value representation to task setting.