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The article presents information related to a study conducted by the U.S Government Accountability Office related to the reexamination of federal government structure and operations. It is mentioned that the government faces various challenges to enhance performances, ensure accountability and future development. It is discussed that there is a need for the fundamental reconsideration of several trends in the U.S including diffuse security threats, demographic and societal changes.

The article presents a report from Government Accountability Office (GAO) on possibilities to alleviate the potential duplication of government programs to save tax and improve revenue in the U.S. The move helps in disseminating information to government policymakers to address the fiscal pressures and challenges facing the national government. It highlights major examples of duplication on federal programs in areas such as domestic food assistance, employment and training, and homelessness.

The article presents a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that aims to determine key federal requirements that apply to projects under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). The study notes the factors that affect the ability of federal agency officials to select and start projects including higher staff workloads and seasonal weather. A performance audit was conducted in accordance with accepted auditing standards.

The article focuses on the report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which examines the potential effects of increased use and production of biofuels. It mentions that the agency has extensively reviewed several research works, interviewed experts and agency officials to get the contents of the study. It revealed that the country needs to expand its biofuel production to achieve the renewable fuel standard (RFS) requirement of 36-billion gallon by 2022.

The article discusses the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) responsibilities under the American Recovery and Investment Act 2009 to science funding and its plans to carry out the responsibilities under the act in the U.S. The purpose of the act funds include preserving and creating jobs and promote economic recovery. GAO is planning to fulfill the responsibilities by working with inspectors general (IG) to leverage strengths and avoid duplication of effort when its possible.

A safe, efficient, and convenient transportation system is integral to the health of our economy and quality of life. Our nation's vast transportation system of airways, railways, roads, pipelines, transit, and waterways has served this need, yet it is under considerable strain from (1) increasing congestion, (2) the large costs to maintain and improve it, and (3) the human cost of over 44,000 people killed and over 2.5 million injured each year in transportation-related accidents. The Department of Transportation implements national transportation policy and administers most federal transportation programs. For fiscal year 2008, the department has requested $67 billion to carry out these and other activities. While the department carries out some activities directly, such as employing about 15,000 air traffic controllers to make certain that planes stay a safe distance apart, it does not have direct control over the vast majority of activities that it funds, such as local decisions on the priority and placement of airports, public transit, and roads. In other cases, such as railways and pipelines, the infrastructure is owned and operated by industry. This statement presents GAO's views on major transportation challenges facing Congress and the department. It is based on GAO products, including recommendations made, and the products of others. Financing mechanisms for the nation's transportation system are under stress. Our nation's transportation infrastructure is threatened by increasing demand for transportation services, and revenue from traditional funding mechanisms for the nation's highway and aviation systems may be unable to keep pace at current tax rates. In addition, freight traffic is projected to grow substantially, but current planning and financing mechanisms impede public strategies to address needs. Our nation's mobility is threatened because the nation's infrastructure is under great strain. Congestion across modes (e.g., aviation, highways, and rail) is expected to worsen. However, funding by mode and the lack of performance-related goals result in little assurance that funds are being channeled to the most critical mobility concerns and that intermodal approaches can be integrated into the transportation system. Improvements in transportation safety are needed to reduce the number of deaths and injuries from transportation accidents--about 95 percent of which occur on our nation's roads. Increases in congestion across modes as a result of population and economic growth could cause deterioration in transportation safety despite departmental and state efforts to reduce accidents. The transition from the current air traffic control system to a broader and modernized system will be one of the department's most complex undertakings. In previous years, FAA has faced systemic management and acquisition problems that led us to designate its air traffic control modernization program as high risk. While the agency has... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1998, the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) E-rate program has committed more than $13 billion to help schools and libraries acquire Internet and telecommunications services. As steward of the program, FCC must ensure that participants use E-rate funds appropriately and that there is managerial and financial accountability surrounding the funds. This testimony is based on GAO's February 2005 report GAO-05-151, which reviewed (1) the effect of the current structure of the E-rate program on FCC's management of the program, including the applicability of the Antideficiency Act, (2) FCC's development and use of E-rate performance goals and measures, and (3) the effectiveness of FCC's program oversight mechanisms. FCC established E-rate as a multibillion-dollar program operating under an organizational structure unusual to the federal government, but never conducted a comprehensive assessment to determine which federal requirements, policies, and practices apply to the program, to the Universal Service Administrative Company, and to the Universal Service Fund itself. FCC has addressed these issues on a case-by-case basis, but this has put FCC and the E-rate program in the position of reacting to problems as they occur rather than setting up an organization and internal controls designed to ensure compliance with applicable laws. With regard to the Antideficiency Act, we agree with FCC's conclusions that the Universal Service Fund is a permanent indefinite appropriation, is subject to that act, and that the issuance of E-rate funding commitment letters constitutes obligations for purposes of the act. We believe that Congress should consider either granting the Universal Service Fund a two- or three-year exemption from the Antideficiency Act or crafting a limited exemption that would provide management flexibility. For example, Congress could specify that FCC could use certain receivables or assets as budgetary resources. These more limited solutions would allow time for the National Academy of Public Administration to complete its study of the Universal Service Fund program and report its findings to FCC. Congress and FCC could then comprehensively assess, based on decisions concerning the structure of the program, which federal requirements, policies, and practices should apply to the fund and to any entities administering the program. It could then be determined whether a permanent and complete exemption from the Antideficiency Act is warranted. FCC has not developed useful performance goals and measures for assessing and managing the E-rate program. The goals established for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 focused on the percentage of public schools connected to the Internet, but the data used to measure performance did not isolate the impact of E-rate funding from other sources of funding, such as state and local government. In its 2003 assessment of the program, OMB concluded that there was no way to tell whether the program has resulted in the cost-effective deployment and use of advanced telecommunications services. In response, FCC is working with OMB on developing new E-rate measures. According to FCC officials, oversight of the program is primarily handled through agency rulemaking procedures, beneficiary audits, and appeals decisions. FCC's rulemakings, however, have often lacked specificity, which has affected the recovery of funds for program violations. FCC has also been slow to respond to beneficiary audit findings and make full use of them to strengthen the program. In addition, the small number of these audits completed to date do not provide a basis for accurately assessing the level of fraud, waste, and abuse occurring in the program. According to FCC officials, there is also a substantial backlog of E-rate appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A rigorous testing and evaluation program is a critical component of the census planning process because it helps the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) assess activities that show promise for a more cost-effective head count. The Bureau conducted a field test in 2004, and we were asked to (1) assess the soundness of the test design and the extent to which the Bureau implemented it consistent with its plans, (2) review the quality of the Bureau's information technology (IT) security practices, and (3) identify initial lessons learned from conducting the test and their implications for future tests and the 2010 Census. The Bureau's design for the 2004 census test addressed important components of a sound study, and the Bureau generally implemented the test as planned. For example, the Bureau clearly identified its research objectives, developed research questions that supported those objectives, and developed evaluation plans for each of the test's 11 research questions. The initial results of the test suggest that while certain new procedures show promise for improving the cost-effectiveness of the census, the Bureau will have to first address a number of problems that could jeopardize a successful head count. For example, enumerators had little trouble using hand held computers (HHC) to collect household data and remove late mail returns. The computers could reduce the Bureau's reliance on paper questionnaires and maps and thus save money. The test results also suggest that certain refinements the Bureau made to its procedures for counting dormitories, nursing homes, and other "group quarters" could help prevent the miscounting of this population group. Other aspects of the test did not go as smoothly. For example, security practices for the Bureau's IT systems had weaknesses; the HHCs had problems transmitting data; questionnaire items designed to improve coverage and better capture race/ethnicity confused respondents; enumerators sometimes deviated from prescribed enumeration procedures; and certain features of the test were not fully operational at the time of the test, which hampered the Bureau from fully gauging their performance. With few testing opportunities remaining, it will be important for (1) the Bureau to find the source of these problems, devise cost-effective solutions, and integrate refinements before the next field test scheduled for 2006, and (2) Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in resolving these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On June 22, 2004, GAO testified before the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Appropriations on the District of Columbia's structural imbalance and management issues. This letter responds to a request from the subcommittee that GAO provide answers to follow-up questions from the Honorable Richard Durbin, United States Senate. The District of Columbia has made progress in improving management and maintaining fiscal discipline. District officials have taken steps to balance their budgets for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Also, the District's bond rating has been upgraded by all of the major rating agencies in part due to the region's improving economy and better financial management. Further, our recent mandated review of the District's performance and accountability plan for fiscal year 2003 found that the District complied with statutory reporting requirements and that the report provided a comprehensive review of the District's performance. Despite the progress that has been made, challenges still remain, as evidenced by several studies and investigations that have been released since the issuance of our May 2003 report. Ignoring the management challenges that we and others have identified is not acceptable; nonetheless, it is important to consider certain critical points regarding the District's management challenges and their relationship to the fiscal structural imbalance we confirmed in our report. By addressing the management challenges that GAO and others have identified over the years, the District could free up local funds and possibly gain additional federal funds for use in increasing the level of services to its residents and visitors. Due in part to its substantial structural deficit, the District is likely providing a below average level of services even though its tax burden is among the highest in the nation. If raising taxes or cutting services is to be avoided, an alternative option District officials might exercise would be to continue deferring improvements to its capital infrastructure. Federal policymakers are faced with difficult choices regarding what role they should play, if any, in addressing the District's structural imbalance. Federal policymakers could choose not to address the District's structural imbalance and require local officials to deal with the difficult choices it faces to meet its obligations. Alternatively, additional federal assistance for the District could compensate for its structural imbalance. No matter what form this assistance might take, it is important for Congress to have assurances that the funds would be spent efficiently and effectively and be used for any intended purposes. These safeguards should be written into any legislation. It is critical to have clear, transparent reporting and accountability mechanisms in place to ensure the proper use of federal funds. One option for Congress would be to require the District to develop and submit for review a set of capital planning and management policies and procedures that would be reliably followed by all District agencies. A key way to ensure that federal capital funds are spent effectively and efficiently is to have a clear capital decision-making and management system in place. Along these lines, GAO has developed an executive guide that identifies organizational attributes that are important to the capital decision-making process as a whole, as well as capital decision-making principles and practices used by leading state and local governments and private sector organizations. These principles and practices could be applied to any District agency or the District as a whole. Key elements of this guidance are to closely link any planned capital investments to a government's or organization's strategic goals and objectives, ensure that effective information systems are in place to support sound decision making and management, and ensure that city leaders to clearly communicate their vision and goals to project managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluations of past censuses show that certain groups were undercounted compared to other groups, a problem known as "coverage error." To address this, the Census Bureau included in its 2000 Census design the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation Program (A.C.E.) to (1) measure coverage error and (2) use the results to adjust the census, if warranted. However, the Bureau found the A.C.E. results inaccurate and decided not to adjust or plan for adjustment in 2010. Congress asked GAO to determine (1) factors contributing to A.C.E.'s reported failure to accurately estimate census coverage error, and (2) the reliability of the revised coverage error estimates the Bureau subsequently produced. To do this, GAO examined three sets of Bureau research published in March 2001, October 2001, and March 2003 and interviewed Bureau officials. According to senior Bureau officials, increasingly complicated social factors, such as extended families and population mobility, presented challenges for A.C.E., making it difficult to determine exactly where certain individuals should have been counted thus contributing to the inaccuracy of the coverage error estimates. For example, parents in custody disputes both may have an incentive to claim their child as a resident, but the Bureau used rules for determining where people should be countedresidence rules--that did not account for many of these kinds of circumstances. Other design decisions concerning both A.C.E. and the census also may have created "blind spots" that contributed to the inaccuracy of the estimates. The Bureau has not accounted for the effects of these or other key design decisions on the coverage error estimates, which could hamper the Bureau's efforts to craft a program that better measures coverage error for the next national census. Despite having twice revised A.C.E.'s original coverage error estimates, the Bureau has no reliable estimates of the extent of coverage error for the 2000 census. While both revisions suggested that the original estimates were inaccurate, in the course of thoroughly reviewing the revisions, the Bureau documented (1) extensive limitations in the revision methodology and (2) an unexpected pattern between the revised estimates and other A.C.E. data, both of which indicated that the revised coverage error estimates may be questionable themselves. Furthermore, when the Bureau published the revised estimates, it did not clearly quantify the impact of these limitations for readers, thus preventing readers from accurately judging the overall reliability of the estimates. It is therefore unclear how A.C.E. information will be useful to the public or policymakers, or how the Bureau can use it to make better decisions in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As requested, GAO reviewed coordination practices in various metropolitan areas to find regional programs with lessons learned that could be applied in the National Capital Region (NCR) and elsewhere. We addressed the following questions: (1) In selected metropolitan areas, what factors enhance regional coordination? (2) What features of federal programs enhance regional emergency preparedness coordination? (3) How does regional coordination for emergency preparedness in the NCR incorporate features from other areas and federal programs? For detailed analysis, we selected Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Tampa-St. Petersburg--considered by DHS to be high-threat urban areas because of their population and critical infrastructure, among other factors. We also analyzed regional coordination in the planning and implementation of transportation and environmental programs because of their history of requiring such collaboration. DHS and the District of Columbia's Deputy Mayor/City Administrator generally agreed with our report regarding the characteristics of regional coordination and that the NCR's Urban Area Security Initiative governance structure was relatively advanced. GAO's analysis of federal program documents and plans, and interviews with federal, state, and local officials in six metropolitan areas revealed several factors that characterize effective regional coordination of federally supported efforts. Regional coordination efforts are enhanced by the presence of a collaborative regional organization that includes representation from many different jurisdictions and different disciplines. Also, when regional civic and political traditions foster interjurisdictional coordination, flexibility in the membership and geographic area of the regional organization can enhance collaborative activities. In addition, a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals and objectives helps focus resources and efforts to address problems. Finally, funding regional organizations provides incentives for their collaborative planning activities. The federal government can provide support for regional coordination. In particular, through its grant design and requirements, it encourages structures and practices associated with effective regional efforts. For example, federal transportation law requires the existence of metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) before transportation funds can be awarded. Some programs have recognized the importance of flexibility by allowing local jurisdictions to organize themselves in ways consistent with their regional environment. For example, the DHS' Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program allowed three San Francisco Bay programs to pool some of their grant resources to establish a regionwide UASI effort. Moreover, some federal grants require regional organizations to prepare plans that guide funding decisions. Transportation law, for example, requires MPOs to prepare transportation improvement plans as a condition for awards. Finally, federal financial support can facilitate coordination activities. Several programs, including the MPO program, provide such support. The characteristics of effective regional coordination we identified are applicable to the NCR's efforts to coordinate emergency preparedness. If implemented as planned and as observed in its early stage, the NCR's UASI program would include a collaborative regional organization. However, as we reported in May 2004, the NCR did not include a full array of homeland security grants in its planning. The NCR's UASI program plans to address those issues by identifying non-UASI funding sources and collecting information about the funding allocations, expenditures, and purposes, as well as data on spending by NCR jurisdiction. DHS and UASI officials believe these data will enable program managers to avoid duplication of expenditures and to better utilize program funds. Regional approaches are changing quickly, and the nation is still in the early stages of building regional institutions across the country to deal with homeland security issues. Those important developments warrant continued congressional monitoring and oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO was mandated to assess the effectiveness of defense agency performance contracts as management tools. As agreed, GAO also reviewed other tools (performance plans and balanced scorecards) and focused on three defense agencies--the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA). GAO addressed (1) the extent that the defense agencies initially used performance contracts, including whether this tool addressed attributes associated with results-oriented management; (2) defense agencies' efforts to implement performance plans using lessons learned from the initial contracts; and (3) the extent DOD established mechanisms to share lessons learned. GAO reviewed the content of these tools, but not the actual or reported performance. DISA has not yet finalized its scorecard, thus this report discusses only DISA's plans for its scorecard. Since fiscal year 1998, the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented various tools to help manage and oversee the performance of defense agencies. Between fiscal year 1999 and 2003, DLA, DISA, and DODEA initially used "performance contracts"--internal management agreements--to bring specific problems to the attention of senior DOD and agency leadership. While the contracts produced some useful information for decision makers, this tool would have been more effective for assessing performance, making resource allocation decisions, and taking corrective actions if DOD had required the agencies to include certain attributes associated with results-oriented management. Such attributes include aligning agency performance goals and measures with agency strategic plans and departmentwide goals; identifying individuals accountable for achieving results; providing a comprehensive view of organizational performance; linking resource needs to performance; discussing data quality; and providing contextual information, including external factors that affect reported performance. Beginning in fiscal year 2003, DOD renamed the performance contracts as "performance plans" and gave the defense agencies the option to use a "balanced scorecard" approach, a tool used in the public and private sectors to assess organizational performance. Based on experiences using the initial contracts, DOD took steps to strengthen performance plans and scorecards by revising the oversight and review process, requiring performance measures to align with agency and departmentwide goals, and requiring measures to provide a more comprehensive view of agency performance. DLA's scorecard, DODEA's performance plan, and DISA's plans for the agency's scorecard incorporated these changes and other attributes to varying degrees. While these tools have the potential to provide information useful to decision makers, they would be strengthened if DOD had required the agencies to include additional attributes such as designating specific individuals responsible for achieving results; identifying the relationship between resource needs and performance; reporting on data quality; and providing contextual information to allow top leaders to understand the extent of progress made, take corrective actions to achieve goals, and establish realistic performance goals for future years. With these attributes, decision makers would potentially gain additional insights into agency performance and areas needing greater management attention. DOD has developed mechanisms, such as a performance management Web site and roundtables, to help agencies share lessons learned from implementing performance plans and scorecards. In response to GAO's suggestions during this review, DOD recognized the need to continue to hold roundtables more frequently. DLA and DISA have also proactively shared their experiences with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has typically counted overseas members of the military, federal civilian employees, and their dependents. However, it usually excluded private citizens residing abroad. In July 2004, the Bureau completed a test of the practicality of counting all overseas Americans. GAO was asked to assess (1) whether the Bureau implemented the test consistent with its design, and (2) the lessons learned from the test results. The Bureau generally implemented the overseas census test on schedule and consistent with its research design. Still, participation was poor, with just 5,390 questionnaires returned from the three test sites--France, Kuwait, and Mexico. Moreover, because of the low response levels, obtaining those questionnaires proved to be quite expensive--around $1,450 per response, which is far costlier on a unit basis than the 2000 Census. Although the two are not directly comparable because the 2000 Census included operations not used in the overseas test, the 2000 Census cost around $56 per household. Further, boosting the response rate globally might not be practical. On the domestic front, during the 2000 Census, the Bureau spent $374 million on a months-long publicity campaign that consisted of television and other advertising that helped yield a 72-percent return rate. Replicating this level of effort on a worldwide basis would be difficult, and still would not produce a complete count. Ensuring a smooth overseas count could also stretch the Bureau's resources. For example, at each test site the Bureau encountered various challenges that needed to be resolved such as French privacy laws. Moreover, managing a complex operation from thousands of miles away also proved difficult. The approach used to count the overseas population in the 2004 test--a voluntary survey that largely relies on marketing to secure a complete count, lacks the basic building blocks of a successful census. The Bureau has done some initial research on alternatives, but all require more extensive review. Given that the Bureau already faces the difficult task of securing a successful stateside count in 2010, having to simultaneously count Americans abroad would only add to the challenges facing the Bureau. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the fifth consecutive year that we have reviewed the District of Columbia's performance accountability report as mandated by the Federal Payment Reauthorization Act of 1994. The act requires the Mayor of the District of Columbia to submit to the Congress a performance accountability plan containing a statement of measurable and objective performance goals for the coming fiscal year for all significant activities of the District government. After the end of the fiscal year, the District is to submit a performance accountability report on the extent to which the District achieved these goals. This requirement for the District government is similar to the requirements for executive branch federal agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). GAO's report focuses on the continued progress the District has made in performance reporting. Specifically, the objectives of this report were to (1) examine the extent to which the performance accountability report is in compliance with statutory requirements, and (2) summarize some of the District's other significant performance management initiatives and identify additional opportunities for improvement. The District of Columbia's Fiscal Year 2003 Performance Accountability Report generally complied with the statutory reporting requirements and provided a comprehensive review of the District's performance. In general, the act required the District to provide performance goals for all significant activities of the District government in its proposed budget and financial plan. Then, at the end of the fiscal year, the District is required to report on its actual performance for each goal. First, the District provided a statement of the actual level of performance achieved compared to each of the goals stated in the performance accountability plan for the year for almost all significant activities. Second, the District provided the title of the management employee most directly responsible for the achievement of each goal and the title of the employee's immediate supervisor or superior for almost all significant activities. Finally, the District provided a statement of the status of significant court orders applicable to the government of the District of Columbia during the year and the steps it took to comply with such orders. In summarizing some of the District's performance management initiatives, we found that the 2003 performance report provided an update on the expansion and implementation of several performance management programs. The District reported on the expansion of the performance-based budgeting program to 27 additional agencies. The District also reported plans to expand the recommendations and court orders tracking system to begin tracking cost of implementing recommendations and court orders. In addition, the District reported plans to implement an online budgeting and performance program to link agency budgeting and performance reporting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

District of Columbia officials have reported both a current services budget gap and a more permanent structural imbalance between costs and revenue-raising capacity. They maintain that the structural imbalance largely stems from the federal government's presence and restrictions on the District's tax base. Accordingly, at various times District officials have asked the Congress for additional funds and other measures to enhance revenues. In that context, the Subcommittee has asked GAO to discuss its May 2003 report, District of Columbia: Structural Imbalance and Management Issues (GAO-03-666). This testimony addresses the key findings and concluding observations of the May 2003 report. Specifically, this testimony discusses: (1) whether, or to what extent, the District faces a structural imbalance between its revenue capacity and the cost of providing residents with average levels of public services by using a representative services approach; (2) any significant constraints on the District's revenue capacity; (3) cost conditions and management problems in key program areas; and (4) the effects of the District's fiscal situation on its ability to fund infrastructure projects and repay related debt. GAO used a multifaceted approach to measure structural imbalance, which involves comparing a fiscal system's ability to fund an average level of public services with revenues that it could raise with an average level of taxation, plus the federal aid it receives. This approach compared the District's circumstances to a benchmark based on the average spending and tax policies of the 50 state fiscal systems (each state and its local governments). GAO also reviewed key programs as well as infrastructure and outstanding debt. GAO found that the cost of delivering an average level of services per capita in the District far exceeds that of the average state fiscal system due to factors such as high poverty, crime, and a high cost of living. The District's per capita total revenue capacity is higher than all state fiscal systems but not to the same extent that its costs are higher. In addition, its revenue capacity would be larger without constraints on its taxing authority, such as its inability to tax federal property or the income of nonresidents. The District faces a substantial structural deficit in that the cost of providing an average level of public services exceeds the amount of revenue it could raise by applying average tax rates. Data limitations and uncertainties surrounding key assumptions in our analysis made it difficult to determine the exact size of the District's structural deficit, though it likely exceeds $470 million annually. Consequently, even though the District's tax burden is among the highest in the nation, the resulting revenues plus federal grants are only sufficient to fund an average level of public services, if those services were delivered with average efficiency. The District's significant, long-standing management problems in key programs waste resources and make it difficult to provide even an average level of services. Examples include inadequate financial management, billing systems, and internal controls, resulting in tens of millions of dollars being wasted, and hindering its ability to receive federal funding. Addressing management problems would not offset the District's underlying structural imbalance because this imbalance is determined by factors beyond the District's direct control. Addressing these management problems would help offset its current budget gap or increase service levels. The District continues to defer major infrastructure projects and capital investment because of its structural imbalance and its high debt level. If this imbalance is to be addressed in the near term, it is a policy issue for the Congress to determine if it should change federal policies to expand the District's tax base or provide additional support. However, given the existence of structural imbalances in other jurisdictions and the District's significant management problems and the federal government's own fiscal challenges, federal policymakers face difficult choices regarding what changes, if any, they should make in their financial relationship with the District. If the District were to receive additional federal support to compensate for its structural imbalance and enhance its ability to fund capital investments, it is important that the District follow sound practices to avoid the costly management inefficiencies it has experienced in the past. These practices include evaluating and selecting capital assets using an investment approach, integrating organizational goals into the capital decision-making process, and providing transparency and accountability over the use of federal funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past 50 years, the federal government has had a metropolitan area program designed to provide a nationally consistent set of standards for collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal statistics for geographic areas in the United States and Puerto Rico. Before each decennial census, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews the standards to ensure their continued usefulness and relevance and, if warranted, revises them. While designed only for statistical purposes, various federal programs use the statistical areas to determine eligibility and to allocate federal funds. OMB advises agencies to carefully review program goals to ensure that appropriate geographic entities are used in making these decisions. GAO was asked to examine the process used for developing the OMB standards issued in 2000 and their effects on certain federal programs. Specifically, GAO agreed to report on (1) the process used to develop the 2000 standards, (2) how the 2000 standards differed from the 1990 standards, (3) how the application of the standards affected the geographic distribution of counties into statistical areas, and (4) the effect of standards on the eligibility and funding allocations for four federal programs. The new standards for federal statistical recognition of metropolitan areas issued by OMB in 2000 differ from the 1990 standards in many ways. One of the most notable differences is the introduction of a new designation for less populated areas--micropolitan statistical areas. These are areas comprised of a central county or counties with at least one urban cluster of at least 10,000 but fewer than 50,000 people, plus adjacent outlying counties if commuting criteria is met. The 2000 standards and the latest population update have resulted in five counties being dropped from metropolitan statistical areas, while another 41counties that had been a part of a metropolitan statistical area have had their statistical status changed and are now components of micropolitan statistical areas. Overall, the 2000 standards have resulted in changes in every state and nationwide statistical coverage has increased. Under the 1990 standards, 847 counties were in metropolitan statistical areas. Now, there are 1090 counties in metropolitan statistical areas and 690 counties in micropolitan statistical areas. Of the four federal programs GAO reviewed to determine the impact of the 2000 standards, eligibility under one has expanded; eligibility under another is expected to expand in January 2005; the agency overseeing another anticipates under its proposal that program payments for fiscal year 2005 will be affected, but with no net increase in funding; and eligibility under another program is unaffected because the geographic boundaries used to determine eligibility are set by statute. For example, the standards have resulted in new eligibility in fiscal year 2004 for 60 cities to receive a total of $36.2 million in Community Development Block Grants, which provide funds to revitalize neighborhood infrastructure. This funding increase required a 1.2 percent funding cut for all other grantees because a cut is required to offset increases due to expanded eligibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, U.S. military and federal civilian employees overseas were included in the numbers used for apportioning Congress. Currently, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is assessing the practicality of counting all Americans abroad by holding a test census in France, Kuwait, and Mexico. GAO was asked to (1) assess the soundness of the test design, and (2) examine what past court decisions have held about Americans' rights and obligations abroad. Although the overseas enumeration test was designed to help determine the practicality of counting all Americans abroad, because of various methodological limitations, the test results will only partially answer the Bureau's key questions concerning feasibility, data quality, and cost. For example, one research questions asks, "How good is the quality of the data?" However, the Bureau will only measure item nonresponse, which indicates whether a person completed a particular question. As a measure of quality, it is far from complete. Similarly, although a key research objective was to determine the cost of counting Americans overseas, the Bureau's data will not inform the cost of conducting future tests or an overseas enumeration in 2010. Overall, the Bureau overstated the test's ability to answer its key research objectives. Overseas Americans have various rights and obligations to federal programs and activities. For example, Americans abroad are generally taxed on their worldwide income and can vote in federal elections, but are generally not entitled to Medicare benefits. There is nothing in the Constitution, federal law, or court decisions that would either require the Bureau to count overseas Americans, or not count this population group. As a result, Congress would need to enact legislation if it wanted to require the Bureau to include overseas Americans in the 2010 Census. Counting Americans abroad as part of the census would add new risks to an enterprise that already faces an array of challenges. Therefore, it will be important for Congress to decide whether overseas Americans should be counted as part of the census or counted as part of a separate survey or whether there are so many obstacles to a successful count regardless of the approach that the Bureau should shelve any plans for further research and testing. To the extent a second test is required, the Bureau will need to take steps to develop a more rigorous design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) was enacted to address concerns about federal statutes and rules that require state, local, and tribal governments or the private sector to expend resources to achieve legislative goals. UMRA generates information about the nature and size of potential federal mandates to assist Congress and agency decision makers in their consideration of proposed legislation and rules. However, concerns about actual or perceived federal mandates continue. To provide information and analysis regarding UMRA's implementation, GAO was asked to (1) describe the applicable procedures, definitions, and exclusions under UMRA for identifying federal mandates in statutes and rules, (2) identify statutes and final rules that contained federal mandates under UMRA, and (3) provide examples of statutes and final rules that were not identified as federal mandates, but that affected parties might perceive as "unfunded mandates," and the reasons these statutes and rules were not federal mandates under UMRA. GAO focused on statutes enacted and final rules issued in 2001 and 2002 to address the second and third objectives. UMRA generally requires congressional committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to identify and estimate the costs of federal mandates contained in proposed legislation and federal agencies to do so for federal mandates contained in their rules. Identification of mandates is a complex process with multiple definitions, exclusions, and cost thresholds. Also, some legislation and rules may be enacted or issued via procedures that do not trigger UMRA reviews. In 2001 and 2002, 5 of 377 statutes enacted and 9 of 122 major or economically significant final rules issued were identified as containing federal mandates at or above UMRA's thresholds. Of the other federal actions in those 2 years, at least 43 statutes and 65 rules contained new requirements on nonfederal parties that might be perceived as "unfunded mandates." For 24 of those statutes and 26 of those rules, CBO or federal agencies had determined that the estimated direct costs or expenditures would not meet or exceed applicable thresholds. For the remaining examples of statues, most often UMRA did not require a CBO review prior to their enactment. The remaining rules most often did not trigger UMRA because they were issued by independent regulatory agencies. Despite the determinations made under UMRA, some statutes and rules not triggering UMRA's thresholds appeared to have potential financial impacts on affected nonfederal parties similar to those of the actions that were identified as containing mandates at or above the act's thresholds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, the federal government provided $10 billion in temporary fiscal relief payments to states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. commonwealths and territories (herein referred to as states). Generally, use of these funds is unrestricted in nature; the act authorizes funds to be used to "provide essential government services" and to "cover the costs... of complying with any federal intergovernmental mandate." These funds were intended to provide antirecession fiscal stimulus to the national economy and to help close state budget shortfalls due to the recession that began in March 2001. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), in February 36 states reported facing budget shortfalls with a cumulative budget gap of about $25.7 billion. This report responds to the February 13, 2004, request by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Budget to provide information to help Congress assess the use of the temporary state fiscal relief payments. Specifically, we are reporting (1) what is known about the potential impacts of unrestricted fiscal relief on the fiscal behavior of states, (2) how the temporary fiscal relief payments were distributed among the states relative to their fiscal circumstances, and (3) how state budget officials report these funds were used. The temporary fiscal relief payments reviewed in this report were designed to provide assistance to help state and local governments address cyclical deficits prompted by the recent economic downturn. These payments were not intended to address longer term structural fiscal challenges facing state governments, and accordingly our report does not address these issues. Temporary state fiscal relief funds share common characteristics with similar programs enacted in the 1970s that provided unrestricted funds to state and local governments. Past analyses of these programs can provide insights into the potential impacts unrestricted funds can have on the fiscal behavior of state governments. Past studies have also shown that unrestricted federal funds are fungible and can be substituted for state funds, and the uses of such funds are difficult or impossible to track. One study suggested that states could come to rely on federal aid in order to close budget gaps during economic downturns instead of taking actions, such as setting aside budgetary reserves, to stabilize their own finances. We examined the distribution of fiscal relief funds under the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 in terms of its timing relative to national economic trends and its targeting relative to each states' fiscal circumstances. From the perspective of the national economy, the first distribution of fiscal relief funds occurred about 19 months after the end of the recession. However, employment levels continued to decline and this was reflected in continuing fiscal stress facing many states during this period. The funds were not targeted to take into account significant differences among states in the impact of the recession, fiscal capacity, and cost of expenditure responsibilities. Rather, the funds were allocated to the states on a per capita basis, adjusted to provide for minimum payment amounts to smaller states. According to NCSL, in April 2004 states reported facing a cumulative budget gap of $720 million, down from $21.5 billion at the same time the previous year. In all of the states we contacted with the exception of New Mexico, budget officials indicated that they had used their own reserve funds, to varying degrees, to address budget shortfalls. States reported deploying fiscal relief funds in state fiscal year 2003, 2004, or planned to in future years. Many of the 12 states we contacted reported using the funds as general revenue available to support broad state purposes. The one-time federal fiscal relief funds were available to help close budget gaps and reduce the pressure for tax increases or spending cuts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) requires federal agencies to minimize the paperwork burden they impose on the public. The act also requires agencies to obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before collecting covered information. At Congress's request, GAO examined changes during the past fiscal year in federal agencies' paperwork burden estimates and their causes, focusing on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). GAO also examined changes in the number of violations of the PRA. As of September 30, 2003, federal agencies estimated that there was about 8.1 billion "burden hours" of paperwork governmentwide. While it may appear that the paperwork burden decreased by about 116 million burden hours from last year, it is important to note that most of the reduction was achieved through adjustments--actions occurring outside of the agencies' control or as a result of reestimates of current paperwork requirements-- and not through agency-initiated actions. In fact, the total paperwork burden, exclusive of adjustments, actually increased by about 72 million burden hours. IRS alone accounted for about 6.5 billion burden hours (81 percent) of the governmentwide burden-hour estimate as well as for most of the burden-hour reduction attributable to adjustments. OMB and the federal agencies identified 223 violations of the PRA that occurred during fiscal year 2003--a slight reduction in the number of violations that were reported last year, but still progress from fiscal year 1998, when there were over 850 violations. OMB continues to take several actions to address PRA violations since last year's hearing. Still, 223 violations of the law during a single year continue to be troubling and should not be tolerated. OMB and the agencies can do more to ensure that the PRA is not violated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has been in effect for 10 years. In that context, the subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our recent report, Results- Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. Our testimony addresses the effectiveness of GPRA in creating a focus on results in the federal government. GPRA's requirements have established a solid foundation of results-oriented performance planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government. Federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA. GPRA has also begun to facilitate the linking of resources to results, although much remains to be done in this area to increase the use of performance information to make decisions about resources. In our report, we also found agency strategic and annual performance plans and reports have improved over initial efforts. Although a foundation has been established, numerous significant challenges to GPRA implementation still exist. Inconsistent top leadership commitment to achieving results within agencies and OMB can hinder the development of results-oriented cultures in agencies. Furthermore, in certain areas, federal managers continue to have difficulty setting outcome-oriented goals, collecting useful data on results, and linking institutional, program, unit, and individual performance measurement and reward systems. Finally, there is an inadequate focus on addressing issues that cut across federal agencies. OMB, as the focal point for management in the federal government, is responsible for overall leadership and direction in addressing these challenges. OMB has clearly placed greater emphasis on management issues during the past several years. However, OMB has showed less commitment to GPRA implementation in its guidance to agencies and is not using the governmentwide performance plan requirement of GPRA to develop an integrated approach to crosscutting issues. In our view, governmentwide strategic planning could better facilitate the integration of federal activities to achieve national goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of its work to improve the management and the performance of the federal government, GAO monitors progress and continuing challenges related to the five crosscutting initiatives in the President's Management Agenda (PMA). The President cited GAO's high-risk areas and major management challenges in developing these initiatives. GAO remains committed to working with the Congress and the Administration to help address these complex issues. There has been continuing progress in implementing the five crosscutting PMA initiatives to improve the management and performance of the federal government. However, progress has been uneven, and a continuing focus is needed to improve the management and performance of the federal government and ensure accountability. These five crosscutting PMA initiatives are interrelated and must be addressed in an integrated way. Strategic human capital management: Considerable progress has been made in this area since we designated it as high risk in 2001. Serious human capital shortfalls, however, continue to erode the ability of many agencies, and threaten the ability of others, to economically, efficiently, and effectively perform their missions. Budget and performance integration: The administration has set forth an ambitious agenda for performance budgeting but the federal government has a long way to go before it can meet its goals. More explicitly infusing performance information into resource allocation decisions is critical for further progress in government performance and management. Improved financial performance: This initiative is aimed at ensuring that federal financial systems produce accurate and timely information to support operating, budget, and policy decisions. Although a range of improvements is under way, much work remains to be done across government. Expanded electronic government: E-government offers many opportunities to better serve the public, make government more efficient and effective, and reduce costs. Although substantial progress has been made, the government has not yet fully reached its potential in this area. Competitive sourcing: The administration has committed to using competitions to determine whether public or private sources should provide commercial services. OMB has proposed changes to the procedures for conducting public-private competitions under its Circular A-76. However, some of the proposed changes are not consistent with sourcing principles or recommendations of the Commercial Activities Panel. Congressional support has proven to be critical in sustaining interest in management initiatives over time. A focus on the quality of program performance and effective management is critical today, and now is the time to act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To help measure the quality of the 2000 Census and to possibly adjust for any errors, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) conducted the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) program. However, after obligating around $207 million for A.C.E. and its predecessor program, Integrated Coverage Measurement (I.C.M.), from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, the Bureau did not use either program to adjust the census numbers. Concerned about the amount of money the Bureau spent on I.C.M. and A.C.E. programs and what was produced in return, the subcommittee asked us to review the objectives and results of the programs, the costs of consultants, and how best to track future coverage measurement activities. The two programs the Bureau employed to measure the quality of the 2000 Census population data did not meet their objectives. The A.C.E. program achieved results other than those laid out in the Bureau's formal objectives that highlight important lessons learned. They include (1) developing a coverage measurement methodology that is both operationally and technically feasible, (2) determining the level of geography at which coverage measurement is intended, (3) keeping stakeholders, particularly Congress, informed of the Bureau's plans, and (4) adequately testing coverage measurement methodologies. It will be important for the Bureau to consider these as its current plans for the 2010 Census include coverage evaluation to measure the accuracy of the census but not necessarily to adjust the results. Of the roughly $207 million the Bureau obligated for I.C.M./A.C.E. programs from fiscal years 1996 through 2001, we identified about $22.3 million that was obligated for contracts involving over 170 vendors. We could not identify any obligations prior to 1996 in part because the Bureau included them with its general research and development efforts and did not assign the I.C.M./A.C.E. operations unique project codes in its financial management system. To track these costs in the future, it will be important for the Bureau to (1) have a financial management system that has specific project codes to capture coverage measurement costs, (2) establish the project codes as early in the planning process as possible, and (3) monitor the usage of the codes to ensure that they are properly charged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]