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Supplemental material, Appendix_A_B_C for Supersoldiers or Rulebreakers? Unpacking the Mind-Set of Special Operations Forces by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Kirstine Falster Holm in Armed Forces & Society

The Danish engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan has brought the country to the attention of sympathizers of the international salafi-jihadist network inspired by Al-Qaida. Thus, arguably an activist foreign policy must go hand in hand with a robust, flexible, and coordinated homeland security system. This working paper looks at ongoing Danish efforts to enhance civil-military cooperation in homeland security. Drawing on organizational theory and organizational change theory, the paper argues that civil-military cooperation depends on forging the right structures but also on the promotion of a culture of cross-governmental cooperation to reduce friction between civilian and military organizational cultures as well as battles of turf. It suggests that a targeted effort to promote a culture of cross-governmental cooperation through joint strategic level education and common exercising should be an imminent concern in order to make civilian and military agencies comfortable with new structures and requirements for cooperation. Danmarks engagement i blandt andet Irak betyder, at Danmark i stigende grad er kommet i søgelyset af tilhængere af den internationale Al-Qaida inspirerede salafi-jihadisme. En aktivistisk udenrigspolitik må derfor følges op af fleksibelt og velkoordineret hjemligt beredskab mod terrorisme. Dette DIIS Working Paper ser nærmere på den danske indsats for at fremme civil/militært samarbejde indenfor terrorberedskabet. Baseret på organisations teori og teori om forandringer i organisationer argumenteres der for, at effektivt civil/militært samarbejde er afhængigt af skabelsen af de rette strukturer, men også af styrkelsen af en organisations kultur hos såvel civile som militære aktører, der lægger vægt på samarbejde på tværs af sektorgrænser. Indlejringen af tvær-institutionel forståelse og koordinering i de respektive organisationskulturer kan søges fremmet via fælles træning og uddannelse på et strategisk niveau og kan medvirke til at gøre såvel civile som militære aktører mere trygge ved nye krav og strukturer rettet mod at sikre tættere samarbejde.

Der er blevet lukket og slukket i Al-Qaidas træningslejre i Afghanistan og en del af organisationens ledere er sat ud af spillet. Men Al-Qaidas styrke hvilede ikke blot på de centrale strukturer og nu anholdte ledere, men også på et slagkraftigt budskab om voldelig jihad mod Vesten samt et vidtforgrenet netværk af støtter og sympatisører opbygget over 1990erne. Budskabet og det decentrale netværk eksisterer fortsat i bedste velgående. Krigen i Irak og den efterfølgende opstand gav ikke blot netværkets potentielle og eksisterende støtter endnu en sag at samles om, den forsynede dem også med en træningslejr på størrelse med Frankrig. Dette working paper fortæller historien om Al-Qaidas opkomst, styrke og fald, den arv organisationen har efterladt og den konkrete trussel, vi står overfor i dag. Formålet er at tegne et portræt af den nye transnationale Al-Qaida inspirerede terrorisme, dens selvforståelse, operationsform og slagkraft. l Since the U.S. initiated its “war on terrorism” Al-Qaida has lost its headquarters and camps in Afghanistan as well as several top leaders. Yet, the strength of the organization rested on more than these central structures. Al-Qaida’s unprecedented reach and broad appeal were also due to a compelling political message about violent jihad against the Western World as well as a farflung network of members and sympathizers build over the 1990’s. The appeal of Al-Qaida’s message and the decentralized network have not been dismantled by Western efforts. On the contrary, the war in Iraq has turned into a new cause for the network while granting existing and aspiring members an arena for practicing jihad and building new ties. This working paper tells the story about Al-Qaida’s genesis, strengths, and partial demise in Afghanistan. It portrays the new decentralized Al-Qaida network, its ideology, modus operandi, and strength in order to gauge the current threat to Europe.

Bekæmpelse af den transnationale Al-Qaida inspirerede terrorisme har stået højt på den Europæiske Unions dagsorden siden angrebene på USA i 2001. EU-samarbejde er påkrævet, ikke blot fordi Al-Qaida bevægelsen opererer på tværs af grænser og derfor kræver et svar, der er afstemt internationalt, men også fordi den europæiske integrationsproces i sig selv har skabt en række nye sårbarheder. Fri bevægelighed og fri konkurrence indenfor det fri marked modsvares nemlig ikke af et fælles retshåndhævelsessystem eller fælles standarder for infrastruktur- og civilbeskyttelse. Til trods for den megen politiske opmærksomhed og en lang række initiativer, der på papiret ser imponerende ud, spiller EU dog i realiteten fortsat en begrænset rolle. Dette working paper giver et overblik over EU indsats mod den nye terrorisme, diskuterer, hvad det er for nogle faktorer, der lægger begrænsninger på EU’s indsats – politisk uenighed mellem medlemsstaterne om EU’s rolle, at medlemsstaterne sidder tungt på de fleste af terrorbekæmpelsens kernekompetencer, begrænset tillid mellem nationale politi- og efterretningsmyndigheder, komplicerede EU-strukturer og svag koordination af de forskellige tiltag – og diskuterer, hvorledes samarbejdet kunne gøres mere effektivt ved at klargøre og styrke den europæiske anti-terrorkoordinators rolle. Since the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 counterterrorism has been high on the European Union’s political agenda. Rightly so. An effective response to a transnational problem like the Al-Qaida movement requires cross-national cooperation. Moreover, the European integration process has created new vulnerabilities by establishing an area of free movement for goods, services and people without having in place a common law-enforcement system or common standards for infrastructure protection and civil protection. Despite a high level of political attention and numerous different EU initiatives to combat terrorism, however, the Union still plays a limited role. This working paper first provides an overview over EU efforts against terrorism, then discusses the factors hampering those efforts – political disagreement about the role of the Union among the member states, resistance against giving the Union a role in key areas of counterterrorism like law enforcement and intelligence collection, lack of trust between national agencies, a complicated organizational EU structure, and weak coordination of the various EU initiatives – and, finally suggests ways of improving the effectiveness of the Union’s efforts by strengthening the mandate and powers of the EU’s anti-terrorism coordinator.

This thesis aims to explore the responses of university teachers in the USA and Norway to the attempts to make higher education take responsibility for security-related tasks, specifically prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. The two countries have been exposed to terrorist attacks in the past, leading them to face the need to balance freedom and security. Both have adopted a new way to counter terrorism that is a decentralized, whole-of-society approach with a focus on preventing preliminary processes leading to terrorism, namely radicalization and violent extremism. This decentralized responsibility also counts on the higher education sector to partake in the preventive work, as they are considered well-suited to recognize altering behavior with students. Norway has incorporated specified policies into the education sector. The USA has not come this far despite having been more exposed to terrorist attacks in the past and having a significantly different threat picture. The objective is to research what the differences and similarities are in the perceptions of university teachers and explore why they differ in their views and which challenges and dilemmas may arise from the efforts to involve university teachers in the USA and Norway, respectively. A survey was conducted and gathered data from 74 American university teachers and 110 Norwegian university teachers who meet students through lectures. The study’s theoretical framework was based on insights from the securitization theory and previous research on securitizing education. It is suggested that the perceived prevalence of an issue could amplify the receptiveness of the securitizing process for this issue. This study concludes that university teachers in both countries seem to agree that higher education should play a role in preventing radicalization and violent extremism. However, the minor support for repressive measures suggests that most of the university teachers from the American and Norwegian samples oppose a securitization of education. The preferred level of involvement appears to be influenced by how common the problems are perceived to be in the countries. The two countries seem to share similar views on what advantageous opportunities higher education can contribute to in preventive efforts, such as a knowledge-based approach and being a relevant arena to carry out preventive efforts. They also share similar views on some disadvantages of involving universities, such as losing their neutral position and negatively affecting the rights of students to voice opinions. There seems to be a fear of losing the trust of both students and the outside environment, but this worry seems to be more common among American university teachers. Similar challenges between the countries are linked to making university teachers more familiar with the responsibility and better prepared to carry it out. Furthermore, to not risk losing trust, their involvement should not be perceived as them stepping out of their neutral position, nor be perceived as “thought police” preventing students from exploring and developing themselves. The effort should also not be overwhelming for busy teachers to not be able to follow through. However, differences in the perceived prevalence, trust level in authorities and police, as well as the levels of polarization in the two different societies appear to raise more challenges and dilemmas for the USA than for Norway concerning involving universities in preventive efforts.

The increasing attention accorded to radicalization and violent extremism (RVE) has resulted in higher educational institutions finding themselves at the forefront of counterterrorism strategies. In recent years, both Norway and the UK have implemented official policies targeting the prevention of RVE in this sector. However, implementing policies on the prevention of RVE is not problem-free. It is often viewed as a tantamount to a wicked policy problem as there exist high degrees of knowledge gaps, conflicting values and interests, and various stakeholders with differing priorities and tasks. This challenge is also reflected in the two policies. Despite similar aims, their reception varied substantially as the UK policy has been subject to considerable criticism on its potential to endanger educational functions and societal freedoms. This thesis compares and examines the two policies to extract knowledge on their functioning and to explore why they were met with such differing receptions. The policies´ are examined and compared regarding their risk governance strategy and through a theoretical framework building on wicked problems and governance theory. As the effectiveness of prevention concerning its possibilities to reduce RVE is inevitably unknown, the processes and management aspects of the policies illuminate knowledge on their functioning and implications on P/CVE in higher educational institutions. Three key principles for governing wicked problems are thus identified to frame a comparative document analysis. The findings in this research point to similarities and vital differences regarding the risk governance strategies identified within the two countries´ official policy documents. These differences also result in them aligning with insights on governing wicked problems to various degrees. The Norwegian strategy is found to align with research to a high degree, while, the UK policy seems to only reflect research to some degree. Findings also showed that this results in the Norwegian policy offering better pre-requisites for approaching P/CVE at higher educational institutions. The findings also point to the identified differences in the strategies representing a plausible, partial explanation for the criticism targeted towards the UK policy. Consequently, the findings suggest an ought awareness on risk governance strategies as they are not insignificant for how the P/CVE at higher educational institutions unfolds. Simultaneously, more situational research is called for to acquire a broader and a more holistic picture of the policies and their belonging practices.