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While creativity anxiety has been found to have negative relationships with various creative outcomes, whether creativity anxiety would also negatively influence creative cognitive styles (i.e. idea generation; idea selection) and the mechanisms underlying these impacts are still unknown. Based on the Self-Efficacy Theory (SET) and the Dual Pathway to Creativity Model (DPCM), we designed cross-sectional and cross-lagged models to examine the potential chain mediating effects of creative self-efficacy and novelty seeking in the influence of creative anxiety on creative cognitive styles. Five hundred and ninety-one participants were recruited to complete self-report measures of creativity anxiety, creative self-efficacy, novelty seeking, and creative cognitive styles at Time1, with 301 participants conducting a second wave of surveys within a year interval (Time 2). Results in both models showed that creativity anxiety negatively predicted idea generation and selection. More importantly, both mediation analyses showed that creativity anxiety negatively predicted idea generation indirectly through creative self-efficacy and then novelty seeking. However, creativity anxiety negatively predicted idea selection only through creative self-efficacy. This study provides empirical evidence for the negative effect of creativity anxiety on creative cognitive styles and illustrates that creative self-efficacy and novelty seeking could explain these impacts in different mediating patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most robust relations in cognition is that between spatial and mathematical reasoning. One important question is whether this relation is domain general or if specific relations exist between performance on different types of spatial tasks and performance on different types of mathematical tasks. In this study, we explore unique relations between performance on five spatial tasks and five mathematical tasks. An exploratory factor analysis conducted on Data Set 1 (N = 391) yielded a two-factor model, one spatial factor and one mathematical factor with significant cross-domain factor loadings. The general two-factor model structure was replicated in a confirmatory factor analysis conducted in a separate data set (N = 364) but the strength of the factor loadings differed by task. Multidimensional scaling and network-based analyses conducted on the combined data sets reveal one spatial cluster, with a central node and one more tightly interconnected mathematical cluster. Both clusters were interconnected via the math task assessing geometry and spatial sense. The unique links identified with the network-based analysis are representative of a "small-world network." These results have theoretical implications for our understanding of the spatial--mathematical relation and practical implications for our understanding of the limitations of transfer between spatial training paradigms and mathematical tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of top-down control in divergent creativity remains heavily debated. An outstanding question about the state dynamics of creativity concerns acute shifts between heightened and lowered creative states. Particularly, do transitions between creative states incur a "switch cost" as observed in other domains of cognition? Prior research showed that asymmetric switch costs are often incurred such that reaction time is asymmetrically slower when participants switch from a task involving more top-down control to a task involving less top-down control. We tested the hypothesis that frequent acute transitions from creativity-cued responding (associated with heightened creative state) to uncued responding (associated with lowered creative state) would incur an asymmetric switch cost such that uncued responding would be disproportionately impacted by state changes. We utilized the "thin slices" verb generation task in a task-switching paradigm. Consistent with the hypothesis of asymmetric switch costs in shifts between creative states, we observed a substantial switch cost when switching from creativity-cued trials to uncued trials, but no switch cost when switching from uncued trials to creativity-cued trials. These findings provide indirect evidence that heightened creative states may require substantially more top-down control than lowered creative states, supporting the theory that divergent creativity requires increased top-down control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]