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Components of cyber physical systems, which affect real-world processes, are often exposed to the internet. Replacing conventional control methods with Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) in energy systems is an active area of research, as these systems become increasingly complex with the advent of renewable energy sources and the desire to improve their efficiency. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are vulnerable to specific perturbations of their inputs or features, called adversarial examples. These perturbations are difficult to detect when properly regularized, but have significant effects on the ANN's output. Because DRL uses ANN to map optimal actions to observations, they are similarly vulnerable to adversarial examples. This work proposes a novel attack technique for continuous control using Group Difference Logits loss with a bifurcation layer. By combining aspects of targeted and untargeted attacks, the attack significantly increases the impact compared to an untargeted attack, with drastically smaller distortions than an optimally targeted attack. We demonstrate the impacts of powerful gradient-based attacks in a realistic smart energy environment, show how the impacts change with different DRL agents and training procedures, and use statistical and time-series analysis to evaluate attacks' stealth. The results show that adversarial attacks can have significant impacts on DRL controllers, and constraining an attack's perturbations makes it difficult to detect. However, certain DRL architectures are far more robust, and robust training methods can further reduce the impact., Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures

The increasing electricity use and reliance on intermittent renewable energy sources challenge power grid management during peak demand, making Demand Response programs and energy conservation measures essential. This research combines distributed optimization using ADMM with deep learning models to plan indoor temperature setpoints effectively. A two-layer hierarchical structure is used, with a central building coordinator at the upper layer and local controllers at the thermal zone layer. The coordinator must limit the building's maximum power by translating the building's total power to local power targets for each zone. Local controllers can modify the temperature setpoints to meet the local power targets. While most algorithms are either centralized or require prior knowledge about the building's structure, our approach is distributed and fully data-driven. The proposed algorithm, called Distributed Planning Networks, is designed to be both adaptable and scalable to many types of buildings, tackling two of the main challenges in the development of such systems. The proposed approach is tested on an 18-zone building modeled in EnergyPlus. The algorithm successfully manages Demand Response peak events., Comment: 15 pages, 9 figures, to be published in IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering

Microgrids (MGs) are small-scale power systems which interconnect distributed energy resources and loads within clearly defined regions. However, the digital infrastructure used in an MG to relay sensory information and perform control commands can potentially be compromised due to a cyberattack from a capable adversary. An MG operator is interested in knowing the inherent vulnerabilities in their system and should regularly perform Penetration Testing (PT) activities to prepare for such an event. PT generally involves looking for defensive coverage blindspots in software and hardware infrastructure, however the logic in control algorithms which act upon sensory information should also be considered in PT activities. This paper demonstrates a case study of PT for an MG control algorithm by using Reinforcement Learning (RL) to uncover malicious input which compromises the effectiveness of the controller. Through trial-and-error episodic interactions with a simulated MG, we train an RL agent to find malicious input which reduces the effectiveness of the MG controller.