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The First World War, which has been a terrible ordeal for the two main Europeans societies in the conflict—Germany and France—and for the 8 million individuals who had been mobilized in a war of mass killing, has been also an ordeal for Marcel Mauss: deaths of members of his family, friends, and colleagues. From on September 3, 1914 to January 1919, Mauss, volunteered, has been mobilized: interpreter to a combat unit, the Twenty-seventh British Division; officer-interpreter third-class and detached Fifth Australian Division (Australian Imperial Force), etc. We may think the World War have been a trauma and a turning point in Marcel Mauss' life and work. My paper, which is based on a considerable documentation (interviews, archives, correspondence, manuscripts), is divided in three parts: before, during, after the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study undertakes an ethnic analysis of 'the Jews' in John 8:31−59, using Durkheimian and Barthian sociological lenses. What social roles are associated with 'the Jews' ethnic markers, and how do they shape their collective behavior or distinguish them from Jesus? Informed by Emile Durkheim's functionalist approach to social facts and Frederick Barth's theory of social organization and ethnic boundaries, the paper proposes that in John 8:31−59, the ethnic criteria of 'the Jews' operate both as external forces uniting them as a collective and as norms dictating their hostile behavior against Jesus. These markers create boundaries between Jesus and 'the Jews,' shaping their interactions within the narrative. Furthermore, by presenting these ethnic indicators as social facts and ethnic boundaries, the study portrays 'the Jews' as a social entity beyond mere ethnicity. The paper enhances understanding of identity formation and intergroup dynamics globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cultural turn has yet to fully reconfigure 'class' as a set of fictions, tropes, discourses and enduring culture-structures. Existing Durkheimian approaches have stalled at his middle period morphological reductionism. This paper constructs a more radical understanding in the late-Durkheimian idiom. It shows how class operates as a signifier in a language game of purity and pollution, virtue and vice. Taking a lead from studies of the 'unruly' working class, the paper opens up the more subtle pollution that attends to the mythical 'bourgeoisie' and its associated and imagined 'bourgeois' culture. As a sign system this class location is deemed inauthentic, sybaritic, and as strangely deadening to cultural vitality. Although commonly found in contexts of gentrification and commodification that involve class conflict, this critical discourse is also applied within the bourgeois milieu. Such needless auto-critique suggests a relative autonomy from determination by class struggle. The possibilities for this approach are illustrated at length with reference to a paradigm case: the highly bourgeois milieu of the composer Richard Wagner and his Bayreuth Festival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to reconstruct the cultural climate of the crisis fin de siècle in Europe and, above all, in France. The crisis of the foundations of knowledge and the Enlightment legacy coincided with the destabilization of the Law theory and the Jacobin idea of the State. Léon Duguit was, in that context, one of the main actors of the change of paradigm in Law philosophy, tring to hybridize State theory with rising social sciences. The article is intended to highlight the hybridization between social theory and legal doctrine in French Troisième République, and the role of Durkheimian sociology in that process of intellectual contamination. In particular, the article illustrates the sociological positivism of Léon Duguit, in relationship with Durkheim’s social thought and opus, and his revolutionary approach to rethinking of State model, sovereignty, “socialism” and individual in modern Law theory according the category of social solidarity and social interdependence. The article also delves into Duguit’s functionalist reflection on the groupement professionels and the mouvement social of intermediate bodies as orderly responses to the problems of the emerging industrial and labour society. An elaboration precisely comparable, in some respects, to that of a «positivist sociologist». [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ernest Becker described society as a symbolic action system designed to serve as a vehicle for earthly heroism. He advocates for a 'creative solution', which suggests that heroism can manifest itself objectively, through artworks. By further developing this idea (doubled by a Durkheimian perspective, and given that things can be people-like), I argue that some things can become heroic when being archived or put on display. Like heroic individuals, heroic objects are privileged things that distinguish themselves among stuff that goes unnoticed, while also being the central points of earthly heroic systems. Instead, heroic objects constrain the individuals to relate to them in a specific contemplative way, gaining cult value through exhibition. This used to be the case for relics and hero remains, but also the standard metre bar, which Marcel Duchamp cleverly ridiculed, underlining the contingent nature of cultural archived truths. Therefore, after broadly discussing heroic objects, I will narrow it down to the case of the standard metre and the readymades, further developing the idea of things becoming heroic objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an immediate chronological link between Durkheim's criminology courses on crime and punishment, taught between 1892 and 1894, and his first course in religious sociology (1894–1895). Both are included in the cycles of 'General Physics of Law and Morals'. Beyond this observation, the emphasis here is on six points that intellectually connect the two fields of study, always analyzed separately by the commentators of his work. Crime is in itself a means of revealing social solidarity, and the religion that carries it. The penalty is at the articulation between criminal law and religion. The evolution of penalty marks the progressive elimination of the religious substance of modern criminal laws. Durkheim outlines a theory of the sacred by reflecting on the respect and authority of the law. There are also suggestive digressions that link the tattoos of criminals to the institution of totemism. Finally, his typology of crimes is an opportunity to transform religion into an 'explanatory variable', rather than a 'variable to be explained'. Il existe un lien chronologique entre les cours de criminologie de Durkheim sur le crime et la peine en 1892–1894 et son premier cours de sociologie religieuse, dit de la révélation (1894–1895), qui se succèdent sans transition. Les deux domaines s'inscrivent d'ailleurs dans les cycles de 'Physique générale du droit et des mœurs.' Au-delà de ce constat, cet article met l'accent sur six points qui relient intellectuellement les deux domaines d'études, toujours analysés séparément par les commentateurs de son œuvre. Le crime est en soi un moyen de révéler la solidarité sociale et la religion qui la porte. En outre, la pénalité est le lieu d'articulation entre le droit pénal et la religion. Quant aux les 'lois de l'évolution pénale', elles manifestent l'élimination progressive de la substance religieuse des droits criminels modernes. Durkheim esquisse dans sa sociologie criminelle une théorie du sacré en réfléchissant au respect et à l'autorité de la loi, qui est transcendante. On évoque également les digressions suggestives dans lesquelles il rattache les tatouages des criminels à l'institution du totémisme. Enfin, on montre que sa typologie des crimes est l'occasion de transformer la religion en 'variable explicative', plutôt qu'en 'variable à expliquer', ce qui ne manque pas de lui conférer une objectivité scientifique considérable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his 1887 report about the positivist science of morals in Germany, Durkheim referred to two books: Der Zweck im Recht by Rudolf von Jhering and Die socialetische Bedeutung von Recht, Unrecht und Strafe by Georg von Jellinek. Despite the absence of commentary from Durkheim about this 1878 book from the 'young' Jellinek (later known as a master of public law), the analysis of this dissertation (rejected by the University of Vienna) shows that it contained a claim for a social-science-inspired understanding of crime and penalty and had some points of contact with Durkheim's argumentation, notably about the importance of religious feelings in the social reaction against crimes. The article proposes to deepen this comparison between Jellinek's and Durkheim's books with an investigation about their indirect sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi uses self-reflexive symbols. He called himself Watchman and weaved a campaign around it. This article sees Modi's campaign alongside Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: emergence of Modi's Watchman image as a totem, emergence of a clan of believers, collective effervescence, coming of a civilising hero, and Modi becoming a great god. The totem and the clan 'disappeared' on the last day of the elections. Only the great god remained to resurrect in millions of banners in public spaces saying: 'Thank you, PM Modi'. This journey of this Dionysian election campaign with emotive symbols and meticulously planned spectacles built an illusion of a society with religion in its elementary form replacing the modern society for the election period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gaston Richard was not only among the first to be informed of the 'revelation' that Durkheim announced about his reading of William Robertson Smith in 1895. Among all the Durkheimians, Richard was alone in publicly declaring himself on the matter. The radical nature of his witness went far beyond the fact of calling into question the date as well as the subject of this 'revelation'. For Richard, the constitution of Durkheim's religious sociology was ultimately 'only a moment from a more ample study' about obligation. The originality of his analysis derives as much from the fact of having seen the main source of Durkheim's inspiration in the neo-criticism of Charles Renouvier (parts 1 and 2) as from having criticized Durkheim's state-sociology, which was, if not the conclusion, then at least its political translation (part 3). Gaston Richard ne fut pas seulement aux toutes premières loges de la 'révélation' dont Durkheim fit part au sujet de sa lecture de William Robertson Smith, en 1895. De tous les durkheimiens, il fut encore le seul à s'y prononcer publiquement. La radicalité de son témoignage ira bien au-delà du fait de remettre en cause la date tout autant que l'objet de cette 'révélation' : pour Richard, la constitution de la sociologie religieuse durkheimienne ne fut en définitive 'rien qu'un moment d'une étude beaucoup plus ample' sur l'obligation. L'originalité de son analyse tient autant au fait d'en avoir vu la source d'inspiration majeure dans le néo-criticisme de Charles Renouvier (parties 1 & 2) que dans celui d'avoir critiqué la sociologie durkheimienne de l'État, qui en était sinon la conclusion, du moins la traduction politique (partie 3). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What was the nature of the 'revelation' and of the appreciation of William Robertson Smith that, in 1907, Émile Durkheim dated to 1895? This article tracks new developments in his thought after 1895, including an emphasis on creative effervescence. But there was also continuity, involving a search for origins that used the ethnology of a living culture to identify early human socioreligious life with totemism in Australia. It is this continuity, at the core of his thought after 1895, which helps to bring out the nature of his 'revelation' and of his homage to Robertson Smith. It also highlights a problem with his start from an already complex Australian world, yet without a suitable evolutionary perspective available to him. However, a modern re-reading can reinstate Durkheim's interest in origins, in a story of hominin/human evolution over millions of years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

First, we return to the question of 'revelation' that has never been taken as an object of research. There has always been reluctance to take it seriously. However, Durkheim changed his thematic and theoretical perspectives from 1897, focusing on religious facts. Second, we explain how to treat revelation as a 'thing', as an object of research, insisting on the exegetical method by positioning ourselves prior to the emergence of 'revelation' (1895) to identify the paths that were decisive for Durkheim. All the articles in the special issue follow this approach. Third, we show how Durkheim went about 'treating religious facts as things', via the comparative method: by comparing the objectification of religion in other disciplines (history, law, psychology, philosophy), to arrive at a sociological synthesis; by comparing religious facts (and especially sacrifice) within different religions. The six articles in the special issue demonstrate the importance of the comparative method in social science. They ought to be compared with each other. Dans un premier temps, nous revenons sur la question de la révélation en rappelant qu'elle n'a jamais été traitée comme un objet de recherche à part entière. Il y a toujours eu des réticences à la prendre au sérieux. Pourtant, dans les faits, à partir de 1897, Durkheim a bien changé d'optiques, thématique et théorique, en ne s'intéressant plus qu'aux faits religieux. Dans un second temps, nous expliquons comment traiter la révélation 'comme une chose', en insistant sur la méthode exégétique, en se positionnant en amont de la révélation (1895), pour repérer les cheminements décisifs de Durkheim. Tous les articles du dossier suivent cette voie. Dans un troisième temps, nous montrons comment Durkheim s'y est pris pour 'traiter les faits religieux comme des choses'1, via la méthode comparative : en comparant l'objectivation du religieux telle qu'elle était proposée par les autres disciplines (histoire, droit, psychologie, philosophie, ethnologie...), puis en comparant les faits religieux (et spécialement le sacrifice) entre différentes religions. Les six articles du dossier démontrent l'importance de la méthode comparative en science sociale. Ils doivent eux-mêmes être comparés entre eux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we propose a brief reconstruction of Talcott Parsons' writings − from his first major book, The Structure of Social Action, to his later writing on the 1960s and 1970s − in order to clarify his main contributions to a sociological discussion of morality. In so doing, we hope to place Talcott Parsons as one of the forerunners of the sociology of morality conceived as an emerging area of research in the social sciences. Throughout this reconstruction, we also try to situate Parsons in terms of his intellectual lineage pointing out that his formulations reveal important affinities with the theoretical perspective of morality that began with Émile Durkheim. Based on these assumptions, we aim to show, albeit on a preliminary basis, how this dialogue contributes to a more precise delineation of a research program in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to describe the extent to which the Legalist political vision possesses moral concern. Drawing from the Book of Lord Shang (Shang Jun Shu 商君書) and the Hanfeizi 韓非子, I investigate the discipline reinforced by rewards and punishments, the relationship between the state and its subjects, and the interiorization of the law's production of subject self-determination. With a positive sociological lens, this study guides its discussion utilizing a Durkheimian definition of moral education. I argue that its three elements of morality share a very similar pedagogical quality with the interplay of Legalist law and its reinforcements. Moreover, the effects of rewards prove to play a particularly enhanced role in the cultivation of discipline and commitment to impersonal objectives amongst the populace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we will review the classic(well-known/traditional) debate faced by Simiand and Seignobos in the first decade of the 20th century. Generally, the epistemological aspect of the dispute is considered the main matter at stake. The debate is usually remembered due to Simiand's critique on the implicit determinisms (political, individual, chronological idol) in the historians's method. Nevertheless, the purpose of this article is to suggest a change of look in understanding this intellectual dispute. Far from exhausting the discussion on normal scientific practices' confrontation, the dispute will be studied within the framework of a broader struggle in which two candidatures (sociology and history) strives for the hegemony of the human sciences of the French university. To that end, it is necessary to analyze which institutional spaces were respectively filled by the historical and by the sociological discipline within the framework of the republican higher education. Finally, we will reflect on the lack of symmetry that characterized the relationship between both disciplines, to conclude that such disparity may be the cause of the semi-failure of the Durkheimian attack against the historians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

English abstract: It is well known that Durkheim was a major source of influence in most of Boudon's writings. But his vision of Durkheim has evolved a lot over the years. In the 1960s until the 1990s, he presented Durkheim as a positivist, fairly close to Auguste Comte, and he considered The Rules of the Sociological Method as a mediating work which announced all of the Durkheim's thought. In his most recent works, Boudon brings an original perspective that Durkheim was an important theorist of rationality. English abstract: It is well known that Durkheim was a major source of influence in most of Boudon's writings. But his vision of Durkheim has evolved a lot over the years. In the 1960s until the 1990s, he presented Durkheim as a positivist, fairly close to Auguste Comte, and he considered The Rules of the Sociological Method as a mediating work which announced all of the Durkheim's thought. In his most recent works, Boudon brings an original perspective that Durkheim was an important theorist of rationality. French abstract: Boudon a développé une admiration durable pour Durkheim dont il ne s'est jamais départi. Durkheim n'a jamais cessé en effet d'être pour lui un inspirateur, mais la lecture qu'il en fait a néanmoins évolué au fil du temps. Des années 1960 aux années 1990 il le présente comme un auteur positiviste dont il admire la réflexion sur la scientificité de la sociologie. Après 1990 il le présente comme un précurseur malgré lui de l'individualisme méthodologique, et traduit sa sociologie dans le langage de la théorie de l'action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on neo-Durkheimian analysis of suicidality and family dynamics and evaluates the interactive relationship of subjective factors in social institutions. It mentions how individual youths' perceptions of the quality of family life can explain suicidality and subjectivity with Durkheim's sociological rationalism that emphasises the active intelllect of the social agent. It also mentions quantitative analysis of the impact of the quality of family life on youth suicidality.

This paper tries to throw a light upon various sociological methods which were used by great scholars. However, the main focus is on the use of sociological methods and what purpose do they serve in society. This paper also deals with the Durkheim's methodology, first section of this paper incorporates the views of Emile Durkheim on sociology. Further, this paper talks about the subject matter of sociology which, according to Durkheim is "social facts". In the laterhalf of this paper, sociological methods have also been discussed followed with the conclusion which basically talks about the limitations of sociological methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explore modalities of inquiry that fall beyond the Enlightenment's valorization of reason, progress, and knowledge production and embodied existence of the self and its self-conscious cultivation as the outside to biopower. It mentions contemporary shame studies waning influences as a social bond takes a Durkheimian approach to shame, which connects social sickness to threats. It also mentions neurologist Sigmund Freud on legitimacy of literary imagination.

This article investigates the relation between a theorist's theories and his daily life practices, using Émile Durkheim as an example. That theory and practice should be consistent seems not only scientifically proper but also morally right. Yet the concept of consistency conceals several different standards: consistency with one's own theoretical arguments, consistency with outsiders' judgments of oneself, and consistency within one's arguments (and actions) across time and social space. Analysis of 750 pages of Durkheim's letters shows that Durkheim lived a life consistent with and informed by his theories for most of his career. In his professional relations, his personal relations, and his political positions, Durkheim's moral activity usually proceeds from his theoretical commitments. However, the death of his son in combat could not be theorized within the Durkheimian system, and it broke up this long stable pattern. The analysis concludes that under modern conditions, the issue of moral consistency relates closely to the general problem of solidarity and invites more complex theorization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article proposes a comparison of Durkheim's and Habermas's views about public communication and democratic deliberation. They seem to share an understanding that democratic deliberation requires support from the public sphere. Nonetheless, Durkheim believed that rational public communication must gain strength from ceremonies, whereas Habermas essentially focused on communicative rationality and rational discourse within the public sphere. The article thus asks whether Habermas's theory of rational discourse implies a rationalist fallacy, largely because he offers no plausible explanation of the way in which social actors are emotionally motivated to participate in rational discourses, rather than resorting to violence and manipulation. Could Durkheim's view about public communication, and its need to gather strength from collective ceremonies and collective sentiments, resolve this theoretical conundrum in that Durkheim's view is complementary to Habermas's? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In current societies, the freedom of the individual is at the center of mainstream public and political debate. For neoliberals, the individual is conceived as an unattached, self-responsible market player. However, this perspective has highly destructive consequences for societies. We contrast this conception of the individual with that of Durkheim, endorsing Durkheim's. Our thesis is that the neoliberal notion of the individual, freedom, society, and the State rejects any idea of responsibility—of one individual toward others, of the State toward individuals, and even of individuals toward themselves—emphasizing the absolute autonomy of the individual. For neoliberals, society is an environment in which a new kind of individual is formed, whose modus vivendi is focused on self-entrepreneurship and the obsessive acquisition of resources to achieve success in a competitive system. In contrast, Durkheim highlights the moral nature of society and the reciprocal obligations of individuals. For him, the individual is part of the State, not against it, and, consequently, he considers neither the individual nor the State as subordinate to economic freedom and the needs of the market. Thus, Durkheim emphasizes a social vision with regard to freedom, justice, solidarity, and the responsibility of the individual and the State based on his perception that human behavior operates within particular fields of action that are formed by various social engagements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on a 3-year ethnography and participant observation study of a ghetto gym in Chicago, this article purports to (a) de-exoticize the subproletarian bodily craft of boxing by uncovering its embedded social logic and meaning, and (b) contribute to a theory of practice that escapes the false antinomies associated with rational choice and normative models of action. The first part explores the peculiar relation of symbiotic opposition that ties the boxing gym to its proximate social matrix of the black ghetto and to the masculine street culture from which it draws its sustenance and shelters its members. The second part treats boxing as a Durkheimian "social art" whose mastery involves an intensive, ascetic, and strictly regulated manipulation of the body designed to inculcate through direct embodiment the set of corporeal, visual, and mental schemata immanent to pugilistic practice. The social production of the pugilistic habitus as embodied practical reason thus suggests the need to place the socialized lived body at the center of the analysis of social action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: There has been a growing interest in the relationship between culture and crime in recent years, but there is little research investigating the role of religion. To clarify this empirical cleavage, we propose a Durkheimian model of the countervailing effects of religion on violent crime. Methods: We test our propositions with robust linear models and a large country sample (N = 100). Results: We show that religious intensity and belief in an active God are not significantly associated with intentional homicide. However, religious intensity is positively and significantly associated with assault. We also find that belief in an active God is negatively and significantly associated with assault and has a stronger effect than several structural variables. Conclusion: The findings provide partial support for our Durkheimian model and suggest that cultural factors are important for predicting certain types of violent crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For contemporary Durkheim scholars, the presentation of Durkheimian sociology in introductory textbooks is notoriously flawed. In this article, we examine the presentation of Durkheim's work in popular English-language Canadian sociology textbooks. We show that textbooks present two distinct "Durkheims." First, they characterize him as a founder of the discipline and the sociological project of challenging common-sense explanations of social life. Second, Durkheim appears as the father of structural functionalism who advocates a conservative, integrating vision of society. We argue that to understand why these two versions of Durkheim persist in sociology textbooks, we must appreciate the symbolic place of classical authors in the discipline. The two "textbook Durkheims" endure because they operate as symbols for both the coherence and divisions of the discipline. We suggest that integrating contemporary Durkheimian scholarship into textbooks would require revising conventional textbook approaches of sorting classical authors as founders of contending sociological perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his introduction to the first German translation of Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society, Luhmann hails the work as a “classic” of sociology, stressing its continued relevance and the need to persist in thinking with Durkheim. The present study focuses on this interpretative gesture, that is, on how Luhmann read Durkheim and set out a research program for sociology by defining its field of investigation, paying particular attention to his discussion of Durkheim’s approach to modern individuality. According to this interpretation, the French sociologist worked out a “sociological” conceptualization of the individual. On the one hand, in Luhmann’s view, Durkheim’s theory sheds light on a decrease in social control. On the other hand, he stresses that this inquiry into individuality was closely connected with a critical investigation of another conception of the individual that seems to derive from it, namely, the idea of human beings as “self-constituting.” Nevertheless, a complete examination of Luhmann’s interpretative gesture must also consider what is overlooked, namely the political conception of the individual Durkheim aimed to develop. In an attempt to fill this gap, this article highlights the political effects that such an occultation may entail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interview offers a reconstruction of the German reception of Durkheim since the middle of the 1970s. Hans Joas, who was one of its major protagonists, discusses the backdrop that finally permitted a scholarly examination of Durkheim’s sociology in Germany. Focussing on his personal reception Joas then gives an account of the Durkheimian themes that inspire his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relation between Durkheim and Tönnies’ sociological thinking. Instead of focusing on their divergences, it shows how the content of their mutual criticisms, before being naturalized in national sociological traditions, reveals a shared epistemological aim: to rethink modern moral and political obligation via sociological theory. From this perspective, the opposition between Durkheim’s social fact and Tönnies’ social will reveals how classical sociological theory has been engaged in a general critisicm of modern natural law in order to furnish a different understanding of modern poltical concepts, in particular of the notion of state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that the dominant view of reflexivity in contemporary social science is overly decontextualized, despite the value that reflexivity scholars have placed on the dynamic and active nature of individual thought and action. While this problem has been highlighted before, in terms of how habitual actions shape the way that individuals engage in reflexive thought, little attention has been given to the ways in which non-internalized elements of the environment condition this process. I illustrate my argument with examples from Tocqueville’s classic textDemocracy in America. I demonstrate how Tocqueville provided a framework for analyzing the way that societal-level norms and opportunity structures impact personal reflexive capacities. In this respect, his work is unparalleled and as such remains relevant to contemporary debates. I therefore argue for the application of Tocqueville’s work into arenas it has seldom entered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In France over the last four decades increasing interest in the small, the specific and the subjective can be observed. This involves a shift away from a holist approach towards social analysis focused on the individual and often carried out by researchers as specified and reflexive individuals. To be understood, this movement must be situated in the context of the development of French sociology, largely dominated at its origins by Durkheimian sociology. Thus, when the individual has appeared this is often not in his or her own right, but as representative of a social trend or group. As from the 1980s, new perspectives, very often imported from American sociology bring into play individual action, emotions and bodies, often studied as socially shaped. More recently, individual characteristics have been examined as a constraint on the possibilities of action, and discussion has also revolved around the reality of the person as an autonomous subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although sociological research in the Durkheimian tradition has generally accepted that religious involvement protects against suicide, few studies have examined this theoretical proposition outside Western industrialized settings. Using multilevel models to analyze data from the World Health Organization Mortality Database and the World Values Survey (1981-2007) across 42 countries in seven geographical-cultural regions, this study explores whether religious participation is more protective against suicide in some regions than others and, if so, why. Results indicate that while religious participation is protective in Latin America, eastern Europe, northern Europe, and English-speaking countries, it may aggravate the risk of suicide in East Asia, western Europe, and southern Europe. This regional variation is the result of differences in both the degree of integration/regulation of religious communities and suicide underreporting. Overall, the findings support the network perspective of Durkheim's classical theory and suggest that researchers should be more cautious about suicide underreporting in less industrialized settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the social consequences of major soccer events is important for social science researchers and policy-makers alike. On the one hand, socially integrative effects are ascribed to these events. On the other hand, they are suspected of increasing the devaluation of minorities and disadvantaged groups. Sociological theories in a Durkheimian tradition suggest that the emotional entrainment that goes along with football-related rituals might play a role. We thus investigated the effects of the World Cup 2010 on the derogation of minorities and disadvantaged groups in Germany and hypothesized that the emotional entrainment is a predictor of changes in derogation. Results of our naturalistic study show significant increases in derogative attitudes after the World Cup. Contrary to our expectations, emotional entrainment is not associated with this increase. We discuss possible alternative explanations, in particular the influence of public discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Sociology can no longer avoid engagement with biological ideas, but it can incorporate them where they are useful. Most biologically inspired explanations of sociological processes from outside the discipline are simple and, moreover, too reliant on biological rather than sociological models of social processes. Yet, it is possible to engage these efforts by developing sociological concepts and theories that meet those using evolutionary theory from biology. This paper argues that the heavy reliance on Darwinian natural selection limits sociological explanations, although this approach can help sociologists understand the evolved behavioral propensities of humans as evolved apes. These behavioral propensities cannot, however, explain the evolution and dynamics of the layers of sociocultural phenomena studied by sociologists, and efforts to do so with Darwinian notions of natural selection on individual organisms will always be inadequate. As an alternative, we propose that there are other types of natural selection inherent in the organization of what Herbert Spencer termed superorganisms. We label these Durkheimian, Spencerian, and Marxian selection, and they explain what Darwinian selection cannot: the dynamics and evolution of sociocultural phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of taken-for-granted nationalism has been bourgeoning in the last two decades. With Michael Billig's seminal thesis of banal nationalism, it is now more common to see those studies that focus on day-to-day unconscious flagging of national symbols in established (as opposed to new) nations. There are also studies that re-emphasize Durkheimian moments of collective effervescence through ecstatic events (such as the Olympics and the Soccer World Cup) that concretize national identities. By critically engaging with these concepts, this exploratory study delves into the nature of Japanese youth nationalism. What are the sources of their national pride? How proud are they? Or, not? How do the Japanese youth perceive the national symbols such as the national flag and how is it related to the sense of nation? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To consider cosmopolitanism independently, purely as a value, neglects consideration of the way in which people live, how they create collective judgements and how they build their relations with others. Our study counterpoises this abstract idea of cosmopolitanism with the concept ofsocietal cosmopolitanism, which is, in our view, more appropriate for grasping the empirical reality of relations. In this sense, we reject the idea of a generalized universalism of human reason and the associated cultural hegemony of liberal cosmopolitanism. This expression of cosmopolitanism derives froma practical idea of mankindand conceives the ‘social’ as a condition of existence for cosmopolitanism. This, in our view, occurs either through the ‘social incorporating cosmopolitanism’ (in line with Durkheim’s notion ofpatriotisme spiritualisé) or through ‘cosmopolitanism transcending the social without annihilating it’ (based on Simmel’s ‘law of individuality’). In both cases, cosmopolitanism as a condition of existence cannot coincide with a situation or thought detached from reality. Rather, it has to continuously weave itself within the weft of everyday life, without having to give up its tension with universality and with what mankind has in common. This, we posit, sums up our core concept ofsocietal cosmopolitanism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the collectivist analysis of social behavior by German cultural theorist Walter Benjamin that fails to fit a bleak Marxist framework. Topics covered include the instances of Benjamin's fetishism descriptions in French sociologist Emile Durkheim's work, Benjamin's writings that focus on phenomenologies and appearances, and the phenomenological-collective relationship in his work. Also noted is Benjamin's blurring of the distinctions in Marxist and Durkheimian fetishism.