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If in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft the transcendental conditions of possibility of experience transcends the experience itself (sect.1), by Husserl these conditions become immanent to the experience itself and therefore knowable by experience (sect.2). This radical mutation introduces an ambivalence in Husserls phenomenology: that between the absolute character of transcendental subjectivity, an idealistic thesis according to which something is an object of the real world only if it is legitimated in the consciousness (sect.3), and the empiricist thesis of identification of the real world with the sensible (sensous contents) (sect.4). This ambivalence is ineliminable, and for this reason the thematization of the object balances between the two distinct philosophical options: idealist-phenomenological and realist-empirical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper is a concise comparison of the two doctrines of truth, Husserl's and Heidegger's, from the point of view of the identity and its implicates. The concept of identity also allows us to compare and to assess two different interpretations of Heidegger's writings on the truth: Tugendhat's and Gethmann's. And, finally, the same concept of identity is that which does imply reification and in this way leads, essentially, to the self-suppressing of the thematization of the truth on a transcendental basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyse the way in which the transcendental project of the ultimate foundation does contain the premises of its own destruction. In its kantian expression the transcendental difference is that between "experience" and "the transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience". In the Wittgenstein's early philosophy (Tractatus) we we'll find it in the form of the difference between "what can be said" (was sich sagen läßt) and "what only shows itself " (was sich nur zeigt), and in Heidegger's early philosophy in the form of the ontological difference. Both these last philosophical constructions are fraught with insuperable difficulties. The Wittgenstein's transcendental difference leads to the self-suppressing of the expression: the condition of the possibility of expressing is not itself expressible. The Heidegger's ontological difference falls in what is called the aporia of thematization: the thematization of something (the sense of Being) which reveals itself in a non-thematic way. In both cases, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, the result is the same: the selfsuppressing of conceptualization build up on a transcendental basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its special forms of self-reference or diagonalization, the reflexivity of language leads to the paradoxes. How do we manage these paradoxical constructions? In order to answer the question I take two paradigmatic cases: Gödel and Wittgenstein. Even if in both cases the starting point is the same, the Russell's Paradox, as section 2 of this paper shows, the managements of these constructions are very different. In the first case we speak about fundamental results of mathematical logic with substantial philosophical applications: the limitative theorems. Section 1 exemplifies how to construct a Gödel-type sentence using the Diagonal Lemma, and proves its undecidability in Peano Arithmetic. Section 3 argues how the diagonalization leads, via Kleene's Theorem, to the Turing form of Gödel's Theorem, the core of Lucas/Penrose Argument. In the second case, instead, as section 4 shows, the same procedure of diagonalization suppresses the reflexivity of a language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, leading finally to the self-suppressing of the philosophical discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gödel' incompleteness theorems play a key role in a lot of logical and philosophical arguments, two of them being prominent in the contemporary debates: the thesis that meaning transcends use and the Argument Lucas/Penrose. But, these arguments derive some consequences much stronger than those allowed by Godel'sresults. Aswe show below, Godel himself adoptsa more moderateview and that his cautions as to the philosophical interpretations of the incompleteness theorems are wholly justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to reason for the thesis of co-originality of truths (apophantic and hermeneutic truth) by deconstructing two prejudices: the logical one, according to which the enunciation is the "place" of truth and the phenomenological one, which says that the original truth is nondeclarative. The investigation of the co-presence of these two becomes possible by the introduction of the concept of truth as presupposition. As it has the nature of presupposition, it gains the nature of foundation. The presupposition of truth is not contained in language and therefore not to be found there; neither is it independent of language since it is, as presupposition, the condition of its possibility and endowment with sense. Therefore it makes explicit the phenomeno-logical structure of the Dasein and the necessity of rethinking the sense of understanding in terms of the co-originality of truths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]