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This article makes an argument about the right place of the likelihood of success principle in just war thinking. Its analysis is grounded in a neoclassical reading of just war that is applied to the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The article starts with an exploration of the status of the likelihood of success principle in contemporary just war thinking. Noting that the difficulty of applying this principle has been pointed out by various thinkers, the chapter adapts the distinction between the so-called deontological and prudential just war principles found in neoclassical just war thinking. This distinction holds that the deontological principles hold primary importance within the logic of just war, and the prudential principles, including likelihood of success, are of secondary importance only. The article continues with an assessment of the practical implications of this distinction by applying it to two different types of warfare, namely so-called "wars of necessity" and "wars of choice." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The growth of positive psychology has birthed debate on the nature of what "positive" really means. Conceptualizations of positive attributes vary across psychological perspectives, and it appears these definitional differences stem from standards for "positive" espoused by three normative ethical frameworks: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. When definitions of "positive" do not align with one of these ethical schools, it appears researchers rely on preference to distinguish positive attributes. In either case, issues arise when researchers do not make their theoretical alignment explicit, leading to value‐laden, often subjective criteria being smuggled into science as a description of what is positive. Objective: To foster a deeper critical understanding of the different approaches, we examine how these conceptual definitions of positive attributes (mis)align with their ethical traditions or fail to align with an ethical school. Method: We review several positive attribute theories across psychological disciplines that serve as examples of the ethical and non‐ethical sources of "positivity." Through this, we assess the conceptual criteria for what each approach considers "positive," note the degree of alignment between definition and ethical school, and draw attention to potential issues. Conclusion: We advance the conceptual assessment of positive attributes by considering the implications of failing to explicitly address the theoretical foundation from which a construct is defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a book titled "Understanding Bakhtin, Understanding Modernism" edited by Philippe Birgy, which explores the work of Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin and its relationship to modernism. The book contains essays that cover various aspects of Bakhtin's ideas, including his unique use of language and his views on the novel and carnival. It also examines how Bakhtin's ideas can be applied to different fields, such as literature, poetry, and technology. However, some essays in the book struggle to align Bakhtin's ideas with modernist or post-colonialist perspectives. The article presents different perspectives on Bakhtin's work and his relevance to modernism, including essays on re-enchantment, crisis time in modernism, connections to Charles Dickens and James Joyce, and challenges to Bakhtin's views on embodied performance in modern dance. The article concludes by reflecting on Bakhtin's enduring significance and his ability to adapt to changing times. [Extracted from the article]

This study examines the influence of ethical rules on Turkish planners' ability to carry out their duties. Researchers used qualitative and quantitative methods, including a survey with hypothetical scenarios and prioritization tests, to measure ethical preferences. Findings indicate that planners in Turkey make ethically inappropriate choices in providing information outside their field of expertise and publishing information on demand. However, their responsibility to the public and public interest principle come to the forefront in planners' ethical preferences. Planners preferred deontological ethics in performing their professional duties, but also preferred more political and hybrid roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Branded content in its informative modality is based on publications that imitate the style and character of editorial content, trying to make its sponsored status go unnoticed by the audience. This research aims to analyse the journalistic quality of these publications through two specific objectives. Firstly, a qualitative methodological proposal is developed to evaluate these sponsored contents. This index considers ten fundamental criteria of journalistic quality and assigns a rating (<10) on a four-level scale (poor, minimal, good and excellent). Secondly, the index is applied to a sample of items published during one month (N=372) in six of the main Spanish digital media. The results reveal minimal standards in informative branded content. Only one of the six analysed media meets the standards of good quality, with a rating of 6.8, while the rest show poor levels of journalistic rigour. Four of the media do not even achieve an overall rating of five out of ten. From a journalistic point of view, informative branded content is concerned with the selection of topics of interest to the public and with the journalistic roles of service and social journalism. However, the sources are few, linked to the sponsoring company, and often unsuitable for addressing the topic. The close link between the content and the brand highlights the risk that branded content poses in guaranteeing the distance between editorial and commercial content. The financial salvation attributed to this advertising becomes, paradoxically, a threat to the legitimacy and independence of journalistic enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Trolley Problem" edited by Hallvard Lillehammer is a valuable resource for those interested in the philosophical debate surrounding this ethical dilemma. The book covers a range of perspectives, including deontological, virtue ethical, and empirical approaches. It also explores the application of the Trolley Problem to areas such as self-driving cars and healthcare. While the book does not provide a clear answer to what the Trolley Problem actually is, it offers a comprehensive and thought-provoking exploration of the various moral issues raised by this classic thought experiment. [Extracted from the article]

The central inquiry of this article concerns the ethical orientation within post-structuralism, specifically questioning its potential affinity with deontology. While the "philosophers of difference" offer divergent perspectives on the doctrine of judgment, Jacques Derrida folds it within Deconstruction as a nomo-aporetic transcendental horizon. To understand this operation and its potential ethical significance, I suggest Jean-François Lyotard offers the best counter-model with which to compare against Derrida's. Amongst their direct and indirect exchanges with each other is a dialogue concerning the law and its fundamental ground. Through their respective readings of Kafka – Derrida's reading of "Before the Law" and Lyotard's reading of "In the Penal Colony" – both attempt to delineate how the specific nature of the ground of the law determines the way in which an individual becomes subject to the law. Despite the enigmatic nature of their discourses, their comparison reveals converging and diverging trajectories in their ethical reflections as they push toward thinking the limits of lawfulness. Through such a comparative study of their texts, this exploration aims to unveil the shared fugitive vector of their ethical contemplations within the post-structuralist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incorporating one's preexisting ethical values into targeted messages has the capacity to increase message persuasiveness. The following study explores this idea by appealing to the ethical frameworks of deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics in ethical climate messaging in order to determine which appeal is seen as the most persuasive among the religious demographic. Current literature demonstrates the relationship between religious individuals and their preference for assessing ethical situations deontologically. A nationally representative survey (n = 1,200) was administered. Data reveals that religious respondents are more likely to find a deontological appeal more persuasive than a utilitarian appeal (p ≤ 0.001) when used as the ethical reasoning to reduce the effects of climate change. Implications and future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In five experiments with a total N = 1558, we studied to which extent the perception of wrongdoers' morality depends on wrongdoers' cognitive and emotional penitence on the example of deontological beliefs and guilt. Both types of penitence improved the target's moral impressions to a similar degree. We established a penitence congruity effect, whereby jointly signaling cognitive and emotional penitence amplifies the strength of each of these types of penitence. The penitence congruity effect was visible when participants compared several wrongdoers (Studies 1, 2, and 5) but disappeared when participants judged them independently (Studies 3 and 4). In a pre-registered Study 5, we showed how the credibility of the statements explained the penitence congruity effect: incongruent penitence (e.g. wrongdoer felt guilt but thought a murder could be justified) decreased the credibility of the positive statements and reduced its impact on the wrongdoer's moral perception. Taken together, people who judge transgressors do incorporate information about their cognitive and emotional penitence and expect this information to be congruent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author examines the morality of U.S. policy in the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999, using criteria for evaluating the morality of the U.S. president’s policy proposed by Joseph Nye (Joseph S. Nye Jr.). The aggression against FRY is controversial, particularly its a priori determined moral character and the designation of humanitarian intervention. Our main goal is to demonstrate the unsustainability of the assessment of the moral justification of the aggression precisely according to his criteria. Therefore, our hypothetical starting point is that if morality is present in the foreign policy of the U.S. president, the criteria by which Joseph Nye evaluates each president will also show whether the policy that is directly related to the aggression against FRY is also moral. After explaining the theoretical-methodological approach, and presenting the attitudes towards morality of the most important theories of international relations, the paper presents an analysis of the morality of aggression conducted on the basis of intentions, means, and consequences. In relation to this, we examined the deontological and consequentialist sustainability of the morality of aggression according to the proposed criteria and questions. It was concluded that there is no ethical justification for aggression, unless achieving political interests is valued as morally acceptable in the spirit of consequentialist ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers think that given the choice between saving the life of an innocent person and averting any number of minor ailments or inconveniences, it would be better to save the life. How, then, should one compare the risk of an innocent person's life to such minor ailments and inconveniences? If lives are infinitely more important than insignificant factors then any risk cannot be outweighed, and that is untenable. An alternative approach seems more promising: let the values of such insignificant factors be bounded, as then there will be well-behaved tradeoffs between insignificant things and the risk to an innocent life. We argue, however, that bounding the values of insignificant factors poses myriad problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since their emergence in the 1980s, environmental virtue ethics (EVEs) have aimed to provide an alternative to deontological and consequentialist approaches for guiding ecological actions in the context of the global environmental crisis. The deterioration of the ecological situation and the challenges in addressing collective action problems caused by global changes have heightened interest in these ethics. They offer a framework for meaningful individual actions independently of the commitment of other actors. However, by shifting the focus onto individuals, EVEs appear to grapple with the tension between anthropocentrism and respect for nature, as well as between self-flourishing and concern for other living beings. This article argues that this difficulty is rooted in the neglect within EVEs of the communitarian aspect of ancient virtue ethics. Drawing from Baird Callicott's ecocentric approach and Val Plumwood's works, this paper explores the possibility of conceiving ecological communities as collective frameworks in which both public and private virtues are defined and practiced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examines the relationship between deontological ethical orientations and public interest in public primary schools. A cross sectional survey design was used to collect data in two regions of central and western Uganda. Data were collected using a self-administered questionnaire from 270 government schools. It were analyzed using SPSS and AMOS. The study findings indicate a positive and significant relationship between deontological ethical orientation and public interest. Furthermore, the dimensions of deontological ethical orientations (in terms of Ethics of duty and Ethics of rights and justice) were found to be positive and significant predictors of public interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deontologists believe that it is wrong to violate a right even if this will prevent a greater number of violations of the same right. This leads to the paradox of deontology: If respecting everyone's rights is equally important, why should we not minimize the number of rights violations? One possible answer is agent‐based. This answer points out that you should not violate rights even if this will prevent someone else's violations. In this paper, I defend a relational agent‐based justification that focuses on the relation in which the agent stands to her would‐be victims. I argue that this justification can avoid two key objections levelled against agent‐based justifications: It can explain why we are not permitted to minimize our own rights violations, and the justification avoids the charge of being excessively self‐concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the empirical research on corruption for the past 45 years has focused on perception-based definitions and measurements. Citizens' perceptions, their attitudes and (self)reported experiences of corruption have been widely studied through different perception-based measures obtained in surveys, interviews, and experiments applied to citizens in general, and experts, business leaders, politicians, or public officials. Notwithstanding the significant progress made to understand the complexity of citizens' understandings, judgements and practices, we are still unable to decipher by what criteria they establish what is or is not corruption and what types of corruption are susceptible of being condemned/tolerated. This paper makes an innovative contribution to fill this gap. We propose a methodological design to identify and measure different perception-based definitions of corruption based on two contrasting normative perspectives: deontological and consequentialist ethics. We identified four groups: the Virtuous; the Intransigent; the Pragmatic; and the Hypocrite. Using survey data from a national sample of Portuguese citizens, we employ discriminant analysis and logistic regression models to differentiate individual profiles in terms of process- and outcome-based social definitions of corruption and explore the explanatory factors that account for these different conceptualisations and their different degree of tolerance towards corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Therapist expertise is a complex, multifaceted, and continually evolving concept. Defining this construct and its constituent components can yield a substantial contribution to the field of psychotherapy, consequently enhancing the comprehension of the fundamental factors that underlie its effectiveness. Within this framework, the present research aimed at developing and assessing the psychometric properties of the Psychotherapy Expertise Questionnaire (PEQ), a self-report measure to assess therapist expertise. A sample of 260 psychotherapists of various theoretical orientations were involved in this research. They completed a survey that included the PEQ as well as other self-reported measures aimed at evaluating personality traits, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and insight orientation. The analysis provided evidence of a good fit for both a correlational model with eight factors and a higher-order model, where the eight subdimensions were grouped into subjective (performance; cognitive functioning; personal and relational qualities of the therapist; therapist self-assessment) and objective (experience; reputation with clients and colleagues; training and professional updating; deontological ethics and setting rules) factors. The eight dimensions, two higher-order factors, and total score all showed excellent levels of internal consistency. Furthermore, significant associations were found between PEQ scores and insight orientation, general self-efficacy, self-esteem, personality traits, and time exercising clinical practice. To conclude, the Psychotherapy Expertise Questionnaire (PEQ) is a valuable, theoretically guided, and psychometrically robust self-report measure designed to assess therapist expertise and its constitutive dimensions. This measure can have practical applications in guiding tailored training and customised supervision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his widely read book, Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930), C.D. Broad introduced the distinction between two approaches to ethics: teleology and deontology. In the second half of the twentieth century, these terms found their way into Christian ethics, giving rise to a problem. Christian ethics seems to be straightforwardly teleological, but it also seems to be straightforwardly deontological. In this article, I argue that the problem is largely a product of the way teleology is construed: the ends in teleological ethics are implicitly assumed to be outcomes or states of affairs. I demonstrate the point through a reading of both the early philosophical sources and the more recent works of Charles Camosy and John Perry. I then argue that major sources in the Christian tradition, including those used by Camosy and Perry, are better understood as offering a more expansive picture of teleology in which ends are not always outcomes or states of affairs. I conclude by arguing that this more expansive picture of teleology resolves some important problems that have plagued debates about teleology and deontology in Christian ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Psychedelics are known for their powerful mental effects due to the activation of 5HT-2A receptors in the brain. During the 1950s and 1960s, research was conducted on these molecules until their criminalization. However, their clinical investigation as therapeutic tools for psychiatric disorders has revived the deontological ethics surrounding this subject. Questions arise as research on their therapeutic outcome becomes a reality. We aim to explore deontological ethics to understand the implications of psychedelics for the clinician, patient, and society. Results: A total of 42 articles were considered for this review. Methods: A methodological search of psychedelic studies from 2017 to 2022 was conducted in PubMed, Scopus, EBSCOhost, and ScienceDirect to address the deontological ethics of clinical psychedelic use. Conclusion: Psychedelics need to be culturally contextualized, epistemic harm minimized and represented to ensure informed consent. Open data and commissions are needed to ensure safe and equal distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ofsted requires UK schools to help students understand the working world and gain employability skills. However, the aims of education are much broader: Education should enable flourishing long after leaving school. Therefore, students' career decisions should be conducive to long-term flourishing beyond career readiness and educational attainment. In this mixed-methods study, we asked a representative sample of UK adults to reflect on their career decision-making processes at school and at university. We also measured current levels of self-reported objective (e.g., financial security) and subjective (e.g., subjective well-being) flourishing. The open-ended career decision reflections were coded for three moral reasoning strategies: virtue ethical, consequentialist, and deontological. Using correlations and structural equation modelling, we examined the association between the propensity for using each moral reasoning strategy in past career decisions and current flourishing. Virtue ethical moral reasoning in relation to career decision-making predicted aspects of flourishing most strongly and frequently. Consequentialist reasoning weakly and infrequently positively predicted aspects of flourishing. Deontological reasoning either did not predict flourishing at all, or negatively predicted flourishing. Our results suggest that the reasoning strategy behind career decisions people take in school or university is important to consider in UK careers provision, and current best practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a historical and conceptual overview of the foundations of bioethical principlism in its most widely disseminated version, as proposed by T. L. Beauchamp and J. Childress as a deontological approach. The paper analyzes philosophically the way in which the concept of a principle is conceived and the epistemological, anthropological, and social consequences of adopting such a conception. Firstly, it outlines the historical and cultural background leading to the formulation of American principlism, starting from the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report. Secondly, it examines the anthropological, epistemological, and philosophical elements underlying the principles of biomedical ethics. Subsequently, the methodological elements and application strategies of the principlist theory are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this study is to define a deontological code by presenting the precepts discussed in meetings, assemblies, and global tourism summits for analysis and synthesis. The methodology employed is content analysis, involving a literature review on the topic. Inventory techniques and tools such as checklists, exclusion lists, and information weighting were chosen. The primary source documents analyzed include: The Club of Rome Report, United Nations Environment Programme, Brundtland Report, Sustainable Tourism Charter, Global Code of Ethics for Tourism, and The Responsible Tourist. A synthesis is presented in inventory lists along with a comparison of the analyzed documents and their precepts. Furthermore, the principles, codes, and recommendations found in the selected documents are developed for review and analysis. Additionally, various recommendations are weighted to integrate the analyzed elements into a deontological code that serves as a practical precedent for theoretical foundations. The ethical participation of all stakeholders in tourism management at destinations is observed to ensure that sustainable tourism development programs implement governance principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanitarian intervention, as a form of military intervention purporting to prevent or end widespread and severe human rights violations, is based on the doctrine of universal human rights. The philosophical foundations of the universal human rights doctrine are largely shaped by natural law and natural rights, as well as the deontological ethics based on Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative." The natural law perspective, which is based on the presumption that human beings have certain natural rights just by virtue of being human, and Kant's ethics of obligation, which is based on the formula of humanity as an end in itself, are the underpinnings of the doctrine of universal human rights in this context. Humanitarian intervention is claimed on the same philosophical grounds, within the framework of the acceptance that humans have a value that needs to be protected and the necessity of helping others who need help in the context of Kant's ethical or imperfect duties. This study reveals that the arguments produced in favor of human rights and, therefore, humanitarian intervention are mainly rooted in natural law and deontology, and the philosophical foundations of humanitarian intervention are tried to be clarified within this liberal context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a philosophical explication of an African religious moral philosophy. Often philosophers repudiate the view that African Traditional Religions (ATR) can embody a religious moral philosophy. Theologians, on the other hand, tend to believe that ATR can, but they often do not provide a systematic account of such an ethical system. The article demonstrates that ATR can embody an under-explored moral philosophy. ATR refers to indigenous religious ideas, beliefs, and practices of the indigenous people below the Sahara. The article will invoke the metaphysical and moral concept of vitality as the basis to construct an African religious moral philosophy. (It is worth noting that this article merely constructs, but it does not defend, this ethical system.) Vitality is the spiritual energy that originates, maximally inheres and defines God, and God has since distributed it to all that exists, albeit in varying degrees. By 'moral philosophy', the article focuses on (1) meta-ethics (it proffers a vitality-based account of the moral terms right and wrong); (2) normative theory (it expounds on the perfectionist and deontological principles of right action); and (3) applied ethics (it invokes a vitality-based conception of moral status to explore environmental ethics and select bioethical themes). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a pragmatic approach to data justice in education that draws upon Nancy Fraser's theory. The main argument is premised on the theoretical and practical superiority of a deontological framework for addressing algorithmic bias and harms, compared to ethical guidelines. The purpose of a deontological framework is to enable the evaluation of justice claims, not as a burden for individuals or groups, but as part of an ongoing public dialogue about the disparate impacts of algorithmic decisions. In a deontological framework, scrutiny is not limited to differences in treatment but is broader and more demanding, involving the evaluation of design approaches and a wider-ranging political discussion about who might be harmed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that bilinguals respond differently to moral dilemmas posed in each of their languages, tending to make deontologically-based decisions (based on right or wrong) in their first language and utilitarian decisions (bringing about the most good) in their second language. In the present study, we tested several predictors of bilinguals' moral reasoning: language (L1 Russian or L2 English), gender, proficiency, age, and dilemma. We included two different personal moral dilemmas: one involving saving the lives of others (by killing a fat man) and one involving saving one's own life (by killing a baby). Russian-English bilinguals responded to one of these dilemmas in Russian and the other in English. The results showed only two significant predictors of responses: dilemma and age. The bilinguals made more deontological decisions for the dilemma about saving others and more utilitarian decisions for the dilemma involving saving their own lives. The participants who gave deontological responses were slightly older than those who gave utilitarian responses. We argue that factors other than language may be more important in bilinguals' moral reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Awareness of ethics codes and professional guidelines is crucial to a professional role in psychotherapy practice. Psychotherapy practice is increasingly heterogeneous, and there is much discussion about their effectiveness for clients. In some countries, psychotherapy is an autonomous profession. In others, is part of the professional features of psychologists and psychiatrists, and it is possible to find other health professionals working as psychotherapists in some countries. Considering that ethical principles are central to the performance of a profession, we intend to find connections between the ethical principles for psychotherapists and psychologists or psychiatrists. A critical review was done to promote an integrative vision of ethics codes in psychotherapy. Content analysis of the ethics codes in psychotherapy was performed. Confidentiality, competence, and integrity were the principles more frequently found. Psychotherapists seem to have a major concern with interpersonal relationships and are less linked to social responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the idea that non-person animals have a lower moral status than persons due to their relative lack of psychological sophistication, but argues that this justification is untenable when the first two ideas are analyzed more precisely using a hybrid moral theory that combines utilitarian and deontological principles. The author formulates the principles and discusses the concept of psychological unity as a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood.

The distinctive feature of a hybrid view (such as Nozick's "utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people") is that it divides moral patients into two classes: call them dersons and uersons. Dersons have a deontological kind of moral status: they have moral rights against certain kinds of optimific harms. Uersons, by contrast, have a utilitarian kind of moral status: their interests are morally important (in proportion to the magnitude of those interests), but uersons do not have deontological moral rights or any other kinds of deontological protections. In this paper, we discuss and critically evaluate three ways of supporting a hybrid view: a case-based argument; an autonomy-based rationale; and a rationale based in a capacity for what we call deep commitments. Finally, we discuss a way in which considerations about the moral significance of relationships might support an approximation of a hybrid view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Nozick famously raised the possibility that there is a sense in which both deontology and utilitarianism are true: deontology applies to humans while utilitarianism applies to animals. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in such a hybrid views of ethics. Discussions of this Nozickian Hybrid View, and similar approaches to animal ethics, often assume that such an approach reflects the commonsense view, and best captures common moral intuitions. However, recent psychological work challenges this empirical assumption. We review evidence suggesting that the folk is deontological all the way down—it is just that the moral side constraints that protect animals from harm are much weaker than those that protect humans. In fact, it appears that people even attribute some deontological protections, albeit extremely weak ones, to inanimate objects. We call this view Multi-level Weighted Deontology. While such empirical findings cannot show that the Nozickian Hybrid View is false, or that it is unjustified, they do remove its core intuitive support. That support belongs to Multi-level Weighted Deontology, a view that is also in line with the view that Nozick himself seemed to favour. To complicate things, however, we also review evidence that our intuitions about the moral status of humans are, at least in significant part, shaped by factors relating to mere species membership that seem morally irrelevant. We end by considering the potential debunking upshot of such findings about the sources of common moral intuitions about the moral status of animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is tempting to think that zebras, goats, lions, and similar animals matter morally, but not in quite the same way people do. This might lead us to adopt a hybrid view of animal ethics such as 'Utilitarianism for Animals; Deontology for People'. One of the core commitments of deontology is the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA): the view that doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm. I explore how this core tenant of deontology applies to non-person, non-human animals and whether hybrid views of animal ethics can accept it. In doing so, I aim to do three things. First, to show that my defence of the DDA can solve a problem surrounding our duties to wild animals, while making only minimal claims about animal moral status. Second, to offer an argument that for many non-person, non-human animals, we should recognise deontological constraints on their treatment, but also see those constraints as importantly different from the constraints against doing harm to persons. Third, to get clearer on how we should understand Utilitarianism for Animals and Nozickian hybrid approaches to animal ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that shifts between deontological and virtue-ethical moral reasoning hamper public moral conversations about misogyny and racism. Using examples ranging from sexual assault to police violence, I show that when someone is accused of committing a moral wrong, they often respond by shifting from deontological to virtue-ethical modes of analysis. This kind of "toggling" between the two enables a person to claim that they are "a good person" even when they have violated important moral rules. In this way, toggling shuts down or makes incoherent our efforts to call one another to moral account, especially (but by no means exclusively) when we are attempting to address issues of systemic oppression and discrimination, including misogyny and racism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Mencius, shame is the human way of existing in a virtuous disposition and concretely manifests not only as the self-affirming of the passion of shame in the action of stopping something bad from happening, but also as a way of handling affairs and processing things. This paper explains how shame functions as moral motivation by analyzing the affective mindset of shame and aversion (xiu e zhi xin 羞恶之心) and its relation to honoring decorum (yi 义) in the Mencius. Furthermore, I clarify that shame not only refers to cases of shameful self-concern but also to cases of morally detesting others and that the object of both is honoring decorum (yi 义). This unique psychological affect that we call shame develops from the dissonance or misalignment between one's own moral conduct and the criteria of socially beneficial interaction; however, for this reason, it is commonly misinterpreted as negative. In order to demonstrate the positivity of shame and lay out the moral groundwork for an ethics of shame, this paper unfolds the complex interrelation between honoring decorum (yi 义) and shame. Lastly, this paper argues that shame is a deeply-rooted natural disposition that grows and expands in connection with self-approved norms during interactions with other people; therefore, it is the unfolding of a coherence between affect and norm and a relational moral emotion that takes us beyond the symmetry and asymmetry of utilitarian and deontological ethics, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author opts for the "dialogue model" as the best way to approach the science-faith relationship. The aim of the book is to provide readers with a tool to approach the complexity of the interaction of science and faith, an area of knowledge in which, unfortunately, easy solutions often form part of the common perception of the argument. [Extracted from the article]

This essay argues that the deontological view of morality is connected to extreme and massive forms of violence through a kind of phenomenological necessity. In the first main section, I examine one family of such violence, which usually comes under the label of "religious violence". I argue that it is not the religious element but the disqualification of context from the realm of justification which characterizes such violence. In the second main section, I examine the phenomenology of duty to conclude that duty, by definition, denies any normative relevance to context. In the third main section, I use this sketch of a phenomenology of duty to propose a hypothesis about the underpinnings of the connection between mass violence and duty, namely, that the notion of duty carries with it the exclusion of moderation, and places the agent before an impossible situation that can only be resolved by violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of emotions in judgments of culpability and blame. It argues that traditional cognitive models of culpability, which primarily rely on the expected harm caused by an agent, are insufficient and should be supplemented by a greater understanding of how emotions affect both culpability and judgments of blame. It also highlights the role of deontological and retributive punishment models in legal theory and penal policy.

The concept of truth, although unavoidable, is very problematic from a philosophical point of view and, in the field of librarianship, it is even more disputed for various reasons: inapplicability to libraries' collections and reference services; scarcity of resources necessary in the event of a possible application; conflict with the value of intellectual neutrality. The "alethic rights" proposed by D'Agostini in 2017, pertinent to truth claims in social contexts, can be interpreted in two ways: the "strong" way is not applicable to libraries because it would lead to the same problems caused by the research of the truthfulness of each document preserved by libraries and of any information provided by their reference services; the "weak" way would instead be applicable to libraries, but it is more appropriate not to apply this either, both because there would be the risk that it could be interpreted in the strong way, and because its application would still be redundant compared to what already happens in libraries and to what, if necessary, could be obtained in emergency situations by applying instead the principle of social responsibility. In the library field it would be more sensible and useful to apply, instead of alethic rights, the epistemological theory of "alethic pluralism" by Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press and Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Clarendon, which defines the concept of truth in a way compatible with technical practices and with deontological rules currently more widespread in libraries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor might step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. In a series of experiments, we study whether people invoke the replacement excuse, that is, the argument "if I don't do it, someone else will," to justify narrowly self-interested actions. Our data are consistent with the possibility that the existence of a clear social norm of moral conduct can limit the impact of the availability of the replacement excuse on behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the sociocultural construction of the local moralities, practices, and public policies regarding the purchase, sale, and brokering of organs. Based on ethnographic study of the case of Israel, where the prevailing moral perceptions and public policies have been relatively tolerant toward the purchase and sale of organs, the article proposes a model of four main sources of justification underlying these perceptions and policies: (1) Deeply held religious views on ethics, social relations, and the body. (2) Philosophical approaches to moral dilemmas, particularly deontological versus utilitarian approaches. (3) The human rights discourse in its transnational, as well as localized, versions, and (4) socioeconomic worldviews such as liberalism, neoliberalism, and conceptions of individual autonomy. Each of these four discourses is weighted differently, depending on the context, and interacts with the other discourses. This process shapes the way in which international ethical norms are implemented, rejected, or adapted and translated into local meanings and institutions. The article offers a multi‐faceted explication of why translation occurs, especially in the framework of international human rights norms related to health and medicine, which have not been adequately addressed in prior research. The findings contribute to explaining how "ethical variability" is formed in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article seeks to contribute to the reflection on the teaching of ethics in journalism courses, from an approach that recognizes the centrality of the discipline in professional training. In this sense, it dialogues with proposals from the field of Education to discuss methodological strategies that include transversality and interdisciplinarity as a reference for a holistically constituted teaching of ethics, capable of overcoming limitations of Journalism’s academic field. For this, specific characteristics involving the deontological debate are described based on the identification of three distinct approach dimensions to the field of teaching. It is a proposal that aims to contribute to the debate on the construction of curricular matrices of journalism courses in Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussion of the ethics of driverless cars has often focused on supposed real‐life versions of the famous trolley problem. In these cases, a driverless car is in a position where crashing is unavoidable and all possible crashes risk harm: for example, it can either continue on its current path and crash into five pedestrians or swerve and crash into one pedestrian. There are significant disanalogies between the human versions of the trolley problem and situations faced by driverless cars which affect the application and moral significance of key deontological distinctions, such as the distinction between doing and allowing harm. The application and moral significance of the doing/allowing distinction in the context of the behaviour of driverless cars depend on (a) our conception of the behaviour of driverless cars; (b) the forms of driverless cars that are developed and used; (c) the background expectations of programmers/manufacturers/owners of driverless cars and the conditions of being able to put those cars on the roads. These are as yet unsettled – and may even be undetermined. Nonetheless, trolley problems may still be useful in thinking about the ethics of driverless cars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the premise of police abolition. It exploring the assertion that policing causes harm in a racially biased pattern and does not prevent harm, leading to the argument for abolition; the comparison of this argument to the deontological principle of doing harm versus allowing harm, drawing parallels to the death penalty discourse; and presents analytical frameworks for approaching the question of police abolition for skeptics.

We motivate the desire for self-driving and explain its potential and limitations, and explore the need for—and potential implementation of—morals, ethics, and other value systems as complementary "capabilities" to the Deep Technologies behind self-driving. We consider how the incorporation of such systems may drive or slow adoption of high automation within vehicles. First, we explore the role for morals, ethics, and other value systems in self-driving through a representative hypothetical dilemma faced by a self-driving car. Through the lens of engineering, we explain in simple terms common moral and ethical frameworks including utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics before characterizing their relationship to the fundamental algorithms enabling self-driving. The concepts of behavior cloning, state-based modeling, and reinforcement learning are introduced, with some algorithms being more suitable for the implementation of value systems than others. We touch upon the contemporary cross-disciplinary landscape of morals and ethics in self-driving systems from a joint philosophical and technical perspective, and close with considerations for practitioners and the public, particularly as individuals may not appreciate the nuance and complexity of using imperfect information to navigate diverse scenarios and tough-to-quantify value systems, while "typical" software development reduces complex problems to black and white decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Location-based augmented reality games are becoming increasingly popular, which causes a variety of tensions among players as well as between players and non-players. Subsequently, numerous ethical issues and challenges in designing and playing these games emerged. We conducted an online survey and analyzed 2,023 responses to better understand users' participation in various game actions in location-based augmented reality games, and their perspectives on how ethical the actions are and for what reasons. We provide descriptive statistics showing people's participation in these actions and analyze users' expressed reasons as to why they think these actions are ethical or not. We use the theoretical lens of three ethical traditions–consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics–in our analysis, showing the dominance of consequentialism and deontology in people's ethical judgment related to playing the game, and discuss implications and future consideration for game design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social value has evolved rapidly over the last decade or so. Legislation has been a key driver, and added value and numerical measurement are emerging as important focal points. An emerging body of literature in this space draws attention to social value in placemaking, infrastructure and construction work. Using deontological principles of ethics, a critical discussion is presented on the problems associated with numerical measurement of social value as added value. Two key questions are addressed: How does mandating social value by legislation and policy impact good practice? How effectively can numerical measuring of social value evidence the range and diversity of activity and outcomes? This responds to a wider call to take a critical view of both policy and the activities of the sector and advocate a move away from solving immediate problems and development of ever more elaborate tools. The development of a holistic appreciation of the long-term need and outcomes of social value is recommended: the contextual, contingent middle ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Universal Epistemic Deontology, all of our doxastic attitudes are open to deontological evaluations of obligation and permissibility. This view thus implies that we are responsible for all of our doxastic attitudes. But many philosophers have puzzled over whether we could be so responsible. This paper explores whether this puzzle can be resolved, and Universal Epistemic Deontology defended, by appealing to a view of responsibility it calls the Revelatory View. On that view, an agent is responsible for something when it reveals the kind of person the agent is. The paper explores four ways of developing the Revelatory View and argues that none of the views ultimately defends Universal Epistemic Deontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]