Search

The inability of Department of Defense (DoD) programs to sufficiently reduce technology risk prior to entering formal systems development has between 2007 and 2012 contributed to a 13 percent cost growth in weapon systems acquisition and a 17 percent increase in cycle time to deliver initial operational capability. With the advent of key legislation and resulting DoD acquisition reform initiatives, weapon systems programs are now required to enforce a technology development strategy that can foster true risk reduction prior to entering systems development. A key enabler to reducing technology risk and thereby accelerating design maturity is the use of system prototype demonstrations. The objective of this article is to present research findings on the effects of system prototype demonstrations on weapons systems development for major defense acquisition programs. The results of this research will better inform systems engineers and contribute to improved technology development strategy.

Cost growth is a persistent adversary to efficient budgeting in the Department of Defense. Despite myriad studies to uncover causes of this cost growth, few of the proposed remedies have made a meaningful impact. A key reason may be that DoD cost estimates are formulated using the highly unrealistic assumption that a program s current baseline characteristics will not change in the future. Using a weather forecasting analogy, the authors demonstrate how a statistical approach may be used to account for these inevitable baseline changes and identify related cost growth trends. These trends are then used to reduce the error in initial acquisition cost estimates by over one third for major defense acquisition programs, representing a more efficient allocation of $6 billion annually.

Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is the department's premier software acquisition training institution. Software applications are now the primary method of providing warfighter capability in all of our programs. Education about how to do software acquisition management of the requirements, design, development deployment, operations, maintenance and disposal of software applications is a key factor to providing operationally effective, efficient and timely capabilities for our warfighters. DAU educates our DoD Acquisition professionals with the evidence-based best practices, lessons learned and DoD policy mandates that allow our warfighters to receive highly capable and reliable software-based capabilities. This article describes where DAU is at with software acquisition training, where we are headed in the next couple of years and the long term realization that software now impacts all systems and all career fields. This article will help the reader understand the current DAU training model and how DAU is working with the IT Functional Leader to identify ways to train all of DoD as needed to ensure we deliver software acquisition management training that improves the IT acquisition outcomes for our warfighters., Published in CrossTalk, p19-31, Jan/Feb 2015.

The original document contains color images.

Leveraging the use of statistical methods is critical in providing defensible test data to the Department of Defense Test and Evaluation (T&E) enterprise. This article investigates statistical tolerance intervals in designed experiments for the T&E technical community. Tolerance intervals are scarcely discussed in extant literature as compared to confidence/prediction intervals. The lesser known tolerance intervals can ensure a proportion of the population is captured in the design space, and have the ability to map the design space where factors can be reliably tested. Further, the article investigates several two-sided approximate tolerance factors estimated by Monte Carlo simulation and compares them to the exact method. Finally, the applicability of tolerance intervals to the defense T&E community is presented using a simple case study., Published in Defense ARJ v21 n4 p804-824, 2014.

The theme for this edition of Defense Acquisition Research Journal is ...All Others Must Bring Data. It derives from the famous quote by American management consultant W. Edwards Deming, In God we trust; all others must bring data, displayed outside the office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall. Accurate and meaningful data are the basis for making informed acquisition policy decisions; as British scientist William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) said over a century ago, When you can measure what you are speaking about ... you know something about it; but when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind., The original document contains color images.

The U.S. Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) provides a standard framework for transforming systems concepts into a consistent set of products containing the elements and relationships required to represent a complex operational system. However, without a human perspective, the current DoDAF does not account for the human performance aspects needed to calculate the human contribution to system effectiveness and cost. The Human Viewpoint gives systems engineers additional tools to integrate human considerations into systems development by facilitating identification and collection of human-focused data. It provides a way to include Human Systems Integration (HSI) constructs into mainstream acquisition and systems engineering processes by promoting early, frequent coordination of analysis efforts by both the systems engineering and HSI communities.

The specialized nature of technology-based programs creates volumes of data on a magnitude never before seen, complicating the test and evaluation phase of acquisition. This article provides a practical solution for reducing network traffic analysis data while expediting test and evaluation. From small lab testing to full integration test events, quality of service and other key metrics of military systems and networks are evaluated. Network data captured in standard flow formats enable scalable approaches for producing network traffic analyses. Because of its compact representation of network traffic, flow data naturally scale well. Some analyses require deep packet inspection, but many can be calculated/approximated quickly with flow data, including quality-of-service metrics like completion rate and speed of service., Published in Defense ARJ v21 n4 p788-802 Oct 2014.

In 2010, the author presented a paper that examined Defense Department program manager (PM) competencies, as observed and reported in a survey by their industry PM counterparts. The current study mirrors that 2010 effort in examining how government PMs view their industry partners. Together, this paper compares and contrasts the findings from the two surveys. Since government and industry work closely together to manage large, complex Defense Department programs, the hope was to observe some complementary skills and abilities. The data gathered from this survey indeed shows this to be the case, but also reveals a number of key shortfalls in both technical and leadership/management skills. The results of this study may be useful in suggesting program management improvements as well as informing training and development strategies to improve program outcomes.

In today s dynamic environment, program managers (PMs) and acquisition professionals, across a variety of sectors and disciplines, are increasingly subject to a wide variety of pressures and constraints. Program managers must balance the perspectives, interests and motivations of a variety of organizations both internal and external to the program office in order to achieve program goals. There are relationships with the end user employing the system being acquired, fielded and sustained as well as interaction with the defense industrial base that helps to develop the systems for use in end products. Corporate staffs provide the necessary oversight of program health and guidance required to ensure compliance with applicable statute, policy and law. Depending on the phase or development level of the program, various other agencies and independent organizations may have a role in ensuring the success of acquisition efforts. As a result, PMs often are pulled in multiple directions, struggling to find the appropriate balance in tending to the needs of the myriad, increasing stakeholders and required certifications, while simultaneously leading projects and managing the program s cost, schedule and performance.

As William Penn noted centuries ago, time might be our most precious resource but it is also one that we have trouble managing effectively. While cost-performance trade-offs get a lot of emphasis in developmental acquisition efforts, schedule or cycle time is also an important part of the cost-schedule-performance triad that determines outcomes. Note that the terms cycle time and schedule will be used interchangeably in this article to mean the total time required from program initiation until Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Acquisition cycle time continues to be a hot topic. Over years, many have argued that it simply takes too long to get capability to the warfighter and that fundamental reform is needed to address this issue. More recently, we see the imperative to deploy capabilities faster in light of cyber and asymmetric threats. Several studies have validated this notion that it is taking longer now than in past decades to develop and field Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems. Despite all the attention and reforms, the issue has not gone away. In fact, it may even be more problematic now than in the past because of program complexity, use of new and advanced materials, software-intensive designs, advanced manufacturing techniques and many other factors.

The Department of Defense (DoD) can foster dynamic and innovative solutions for tomorrow s warfighter by designing acquisition portfolios that deliver an integrated suite of capabilities. Program executive officers (PEOs) today often focus on executing a dozen similar, but independent, programs. In contrast, large commercial businesses manage integrated product lines for items ranging from automobiles and electronics to software and health services. The DoD could leverage this model as a basis for constructing portfolios of similar programs that deliver enhanced capabilities in shorter timeframes.

The 198th Expeditionary Signal Battalion (ESB) provided unparalleled communications support to the warfighters during its 2013 2014 deployment to Afghanistan. The ESB provided tactical satellite communications, network operations expertise, and cable and wire services. This National Guard Battalion is comprised of three units from Delaware and a fourth from South Carolina. The Battalion faced the unique challenge of learning how to close a Technical Control Facility (TCF). The Battalion met this daunting task with detailed preparation and coordination, effectively closing four TCFs.

It has been three years since I witnessed the last Space Shuttle launch, STS-135, lifting off from Earth on July 8, 2011. It was the seventh I had witnessed, but this one had special meaning. Twenty-nine years ago, I was on the inside looking out as a part of the STS-23 (STS 61-B) crew. I flew Atlantis on her second flight in 1985 and had observed her construction years earlier at Rockwell International s space shuttle-assembly location. As a crew, we visited the facility in Palmdale, Calif., where the components were finally assembled. It was an awesome spectacle. This was where a reusable, reliable and incredibly powerful rocket ship called Atlantis came alive. Technology was ubiquitous. There were so many critical components that had to be harmonized. If it weren t for systems engineering and its embedded process imperatives though, the shuttle would have never taken off the ground. In the last six years, in my capacity as a professor at the Defense Acquisition University, I have found myself reflecting more and more about that day and the importance of Systems Engineering and Test as well as the influence NASA has had on Department of Defense (DoD) weapon system developments.

Tiny metallic nanoparticles have the potential to change the landscape of defense technology, from obscuring warfighters from view to providing transparent displays in aircraft and vehicles. A nanoparticle is defined as a particle with one or more dimensions measuring 1 billionth of a meter (1 nanometer [nm]). Typical nanoparticles range from 1 to 1,000 nm. A typical human hair is about 90,000 nm thick. Therefore, an item of 1 nanometer would be invisible to the naked eye. Scientists at the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (MIT-ISN) and the Harvard University Department of Physics are using nanoparticles to develop a novel transparent display technology and improve the design of obscurants, which are used to generate smoke that can hide a warfighter from plain sight., Published in Defense AT&L, p32-34, Sep-Oct 2014.

Retirement of the Space Shuttle and Constellation programs has created significant ripple effects in Department of Defense (DoD) missile and rocket acquisition. Notably, the decline in propulsion system skills and capabilities has led to a decrease in technology advances. This is exemplified by DoD's reliance on Russia for Atlas V rocket engines to launch military payloads. Enter the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and its Mission Assistance for the National Institute for Rocket Propulsion Systems (NIRPS). DAU's South Region led a study for NIRPS, a joint DoD-NASA virtual organization, to assess issues relating to the propulsion industrial base. The results include an innovative framework for developing flexible, yet binding, agreements that promote commercial access to government resources., Published Defense AT&L, p6-12, Sep-Oct 2014.

The organization with the formidable task of training and educating this workforce is the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). Headquartered near Washington, D.C., DAU has 500 instructors in five regional campuses across the country. These instructors train all of DoD's 152,110 program managers (PMs), financial managers, contracting officers, engineers and logisticians. Each year, DAU receives many accolades for the excellent job it does in educating the acquisition workforce. In 2013, KnowledgeAdvisors recognized DAU as the top overall corporate university. Yet it is the graduates of this award-winning university who are responsible for and lead the multitude of failed acquisition programs. Certainly, one cannot hold DAU accountable for failed acquisition programs, but this apparent dichotomy points to an important question: Are the Department's personnel adequately prepared to lead the highly complex programs of today and tomorrow?, Published in Defense AT&L, p17-21, Sep-Oct 2014.

Infectious diseases--whether naturally occurring or engineered with intent to harm--can cause serious consequences for a fighting force. Absenteeism due to illness, costly prolonged recovery, the loss of combat readiness and--in the case of Ebola virus--even death are challenges facing military commands. MCS is determined to find medical countermeasures (MCM) for several viruses, including Ebola. Recognizing the high failure rate associated with drug and vaccine development, our strategy is to advance several promising candidates concurrently so that if one MCM fails, we can keep moving forward with the more successful options. This is the government's most cost-effective and efficient approach, because by the time some drugs fail, others with better track records have reached important milestones., Published in Defense AT&L, p27-30, Sep-Oct 2014.

The Center for Army Acquisition Lessons Learned (CAALL) was established within the U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) to collect, analyze and disseminate acquisition lessons learned. The center serves as the authoritative source for timely, real-world acquisition lessons learned to enhance the performance of the Army s project offices in support of the warfighter. The mission originated with the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, which repeatedly cited the need for a centralized source for lessons learned across the acquisition life cycle. The report stated that there are lessons learned within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA[ALT]), the test community and other acquisition stakeholders, but they are all dispersed and need to be synthesized. In addition, the report stated there is no formal way to track successes, analyze failures and develop best practices from historical programs. Therefore, the acquisition community needs a robust, readily accessible database and associated analytical capability to extract relevant information. The report recommended that a Center for Army Acquisition Lessons Learned be established to provide a record of acquisition experiences in order to allow others within the acquisition community to understand what occurred and avoid previous mistakes, as well as to provide the basis for making improvements., Published in Defense AT&L, p36-40, Sep-Oct 2014.

Modern warfare relies on electrical generators at base camps. While the associated fuel costs are well understood, we cannot explain where our kilowatt-hours (kwh) are going. Reducing demand without reducing our capability requires appliance-level feedback, which current smart-meter technology does not provide., Published in Defense AT&L, p44-49, Sep-Oct 2014.

Cybersecurity threats to Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs are both challenging and complex. Program managers (PMs) have the daunting responsibility to minimize cybersecurity vulnerabilities in their systems against current and future cybersecurity threats. To effectively address cybersecurity threats in DoD acquisition programs, PMs need a combination of the right policies, processes, people and tools. Furthermore, cybersecurity is dynamic by nature, requiring proactive engagement and expertise to minimize risk throughout the acquisition life cycle. Effective cybersecurity can only be achieved through a holistic approach that takes into account more than just information assurance compliance. This holistic approach includes areas of known cybersecurity risk for DoD programs and provides an effective framework for developing, planning and implementing an effective cybersecurity strategy., Published in Defense AT&L, p41-43,Sep-Oct 2014.

A few months ago, I wrote a short article, Time Management Tips for Those Who Don t Have the Time (Defense AT&L, November December 2013, p. 58), that offered some time-saving tips for busy people like you. Here are a few more ideas that I hope you find helpful., Published in Defense AT&L, p50-51, Sep-Oct 2014.

Defense AT&L (ISSN 1547-5476), formerly Program Manager, is published bimonthly by the DAU Press and is free to all U.S. and foreign national subscribers. The topics primarily concern defense acquisition and government procurement.

This article uses the DOTmLPF-P construct (defined below) usually associated with non-materiel solution requirements analysis to propose recommendations for U.S.-coalition and host nation government (HNG) forces plus host nation vendors (HNV) when conducting procurements for HNG forces using the host nation (HN) industrial base in a contingency environment. These proposals are by no means exhaustive but are intended to provide some major areas to consider when executing an HN-first procurement policy. What Is DOTmLPF-P? The acronym DOTmLPF-P stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy. These topics together in this acronym are normally associated with the term non-materiel solution when conducting capability-based assessments under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01H, Jan. 10, 2012). The JCIDS Manual (Jan. 19, 2012) defines a non-materiel solution as Changes to doctrine, organization, training, (existing) materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and/or facilities, implemented to satisfy one or more capability requirements (or needs) and reduce or eliminate one or more capability gaps, without the need to develop or purchase a new materiel solution. In recent years, a P for Policy has been added to the acronym for a more inclusive analysis. The DOTmLPF-P construct also can be used to assess the impacts a new materiel solution will have on DOTmLPF-P, most of which are captured in the logistics functional area s 12 Integrated Product Support elements. In this article, I instead use the DOTmLPF-P construct to provide recommendations for contingency procurement operations in which HNVs are used to supply and/or manufacture products for HNG forces under the auspices of U.S.-led procurements., Published in Defense AT&L p39-43 May-Jun 2014. See also ADA609766.

My previous article in the May June 2014 issue of Defense AT&L introduced the application of the DOTmLPF-P construct for implementing a host-nation (HN)-first contingency procurement strategy. That article covered Policy, Doctrine, Organization and Training. This concluding article focuses on the remaining areas of materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities. The recommendations herein are by no means exhaustive but are intended to provide some major areas to consider when executing a HN-first procurement policy such as we attempted to carry out in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom., Published in Defense AT&L p24-28 Jul-Aug 2014. See also ADA609765.

Commercial markets abound with examples of competitive forces providing reduced costs and increased innovation. However, the defense market is materially different from commercial markets in many ways, and thus does not respond in the same way to competition. This analysis examines a series of outcomes in both competitive and sole-source acquisition programs, using a statistical model that builds on a game theory framework developed by Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. The results show that the Department of Defense may actually incur increased costs from competition. Competition in defense acquisition may not reduce costs, but may like a placebo create a powerful perception of cost control., Published in Defense ARJ, v21 n1 p416-440, Jan 2014. See also ADA597949. The original document contains color images.

The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is 10 years old and ripe for review. A central output document of the JCIDS process is an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) used by the Department of Defense to define gaps in a functional capability area and define new capabilities required. The research team analyzed 10 years of ICDs to identify methods and trends. The team found that several methodologies were favored and a convergence emerged in format and necessary content. Additionally, potential shortfalls in current best practices of interest to implementers and decision makers are identified. Guidelines and best practices are presented to create more effective, concise, and complete ICDs. It may come as a surprise to many acquisition practitioners that the historically unstable, formal written procedures and processes that embody the Defense Acquisition System and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) are now over 10 years old. During this time, the Department of Defense (DoD) has published significant revisions and updates to the JCIDS-related documents, including Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 entitled, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual (DoD, 2013; Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC], 2012). The current system s longevity may be partially attributable to its utilization of modern management approaches, further enabled by a slow convergence of the Joint Strategic Planning System set in motion by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Goldwater-Nichols, 1986). With its focus on Joint development and deconfliction of capabilities, JCIDS uses a portfolio management approach and streamlined documentation to elevate user requirements relatively quickly and vet them against current capabilities., Published in Defense ARJ v21 n3 p716-749, Jul 2014.

A Real Options Valuation Model is developed to recommend how to valuate technology when benefits cannot be measured in monetary value. Expected values of effectiveness are used to select the preferred alternative. The methodology is illustrated using three guidance system technologies in the Army s Javelin program. The strategy created multiple real options that gave the Army the right (without the obligation) to select one guidance system technology based on the outcome of technology development tests. Results indicate the Army paid less than the total value of the options, but could have increased net savings by paying different amounts to test each alternative. The analysis method provides a logical and defendable approach to the analysis of alternatives under technology development uncertainty., Published in Defense ARJ v21 n3 p668-692, Jul 2014.

The U.S. Army s mission reflects a strong impetus to provide flexible and adaptable ground vehicles that are rapidly fieldable. Emerging manufacturing technology, such as three-dimensional (3D) printing, is making mass customization possible in commercial industry. If the Army could produce tailored military ground vehicles that incorporate mission-specific tactics, it would outperform generic systems. To produce such systems, a new systems engineering (SE) process should be developed. Virtual environments are central to the proposed SE/2025 process because they provide a sandbox where soldiers and engineers might directly collaborate to codevelop tactics and technologies simultaneously. The authors intent is to describe how ground vehicle systems might be developed in 2025 as well as to describe current efforts underway to shape the future. In the past, the United States Army has been able to anticipate capability gaps and needs based on a relatively static threat, but that model has disintegrated over the past two decades (United States Army, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates pictorially the range and complexity of the current defense landscape. Constantly shifting mission requirements will likely remain the norm in the foreseeable future. As such, combatant commanders will need ground vehicles, including robots that are flexible, adaptable, and rapidly deployable. Additionally, some of the most promising future warfighting technologies, such as robotics, computing, and advanced communications, will be readily available for non-State actors and nations to purchase from the global commercial market. To maintain a military advantage, the United States needs to develop a process that enables the lucid and rapid production of mission-tailored platforms that do not rely solely on cutting-edge technology. Just as radar stealth and drones were game changers in the past, the acquisition process itself could become a game-changing technology in the future., Published in Defense ARJ, v21 n3 p752-774 Jul 2014.

For those not familiar with Norman Augustine s laws, they are a collection of 52 observations first published in 1983 by Augustine, former president and chief operating officer of Martin Marietta Corp. While the laws are humorous, they also offer interesting insights into the tough realities of defense acquisition. What did you do to deserve this? Didn t anyone tell you how messed up this program is? Why did you accept this assignment? If questions like these are the first things you hear from your new team on Day One of your new program manager (PM) job, chances are you might be managing a Red program. PMs work hard to keep their programs on track and executing, but many PMs will encounter the dreaded Red program. You may even inherit one as part of your new job assignment, like I did. This article will look at some of the dynamics of these programs and discuss some of my experiences and the lessons I learned during my career when trying to fix a troubled program., Published in Defense AT&L, p20-23, Mar-Apr 2014.

The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to look for ways to encourage innovation and the transition of innovative concepts into its programs. The federal government has continued to support DoD rapid acquisition programs to get great ideas out to the warfighter. For example, the Air Force Research Laboratory s Vehicle Stopper Challenge encourages hopeful innovators to solve a specific problem. Similarly, the government website Challenge.gov offers prizes to people who can help solve technical problems in a wide variety of government programs. While attracting innovation through programs like these is extremely valuable and provides great exposure, what can be done to improve the overall DoD acquisition process? What changes can be made within the infrastructure that will encourage innovation in all programs? The new interim DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2, dated Nov. 26, 2013, formally calls for the program manager (PM) and program office (PO) to be established during the first phase in the acquisition life cycle, the Material Solution Analysis (MSA) Phase. The designation of the PM at the nascent phase of a program gives the DoD an unprecedented opportunity to bridge the science and technology (S&T) valley of death and open the door to encouraging more innovation in DoD programs. Call it alpha-innovating from the DoD PM perspective.

John DelGreco starts each morning at 0600 at the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Raytheon Tewksbury Contract Management Office (CMO). He s been doing it a while. January 2014 represented the start of his 27th year as a contract price/cost analyst at DCMA. Over the course of his career, he has seen many changes within the agency and the pricing career field. In the early 1990s, with mandatory personnel reductions, the pricing function began its slow move away from DCMA and toward the buying commands. When DelGreco first started at DCMA, 12 price/cost analysts and six cost monitors assigned to the CMO were performing pricing work. By 2008, only two price/cost analysts remained at the CMO. In April 2009, however, this was all set to change as Ashton Carter was appointed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 requires the intelligence community to provide a technology-based assessment, known as the System Threat Assessment Report (STAR), delivered at Milestones B and C. The STAR is intended to reduce technology surprise for weapon systems in development by informing the program office of foreign developments and operational capabilities. Changes to DoDI 5000.02 are expected to force a dramatic increase in STAR production, due to new requirements for an additional STAR at Milestone A and for system-specific STARs for all Major Defense Acquisition Programs, Major Automated Information System programs, and programs under oversight of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The DoD intelligence community must adapt to meet the increased demand for STAR production, but without additional resources. Modifications to current threat-support production methodology will create an efficient means to enable both large-scale STAR production and to standardize content for all STARs, ensuring currency of the information, uniformity of assessments and improved decisional value for the requirements generation, acquisition and test communities., Published in Defense AT&L, p24-28, Mar-Apr 2014.

The Air Force (AF) develops some of the premier military business professionals in the world but it can do even better. It has to if its next generation of leaders is expected to effectively navigate the ever-evolving defense acquisition landscape while simultaneously ensuring the materiel readiness of the force. The notion that the AF, and the Department of Defense (DoD), should invest in the professionalism of its workforce is widely discussed and seldom criticized. Examples of recent deliberation are easy to find. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall s 2013 Better Buying Power initiative (2.0) explicitly added improving the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce as one of the initiative s six main tenets. A recent Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report suggested that a separate career track be developed exclusively to incubate the most promising military business professionals. Even recent congressional testimony on the state of acquisition reform stressed the need for a skilled defense acquisition workforce. There is no doubt that enhancing the acquisition profession through personnel development is a DoD priority. The development of military acquirers, with their recognizably unique status, should be no exception., Published in Defense AT&L p43-45 Mar-Apr 2014.

Cyber acquisition professionals need to develop a wide range of expertise, not strive to become experts at any one discipline. The concept of subject matter experts (SME) that permeates the government information technology (IT) profession today must shift to nurture the concept of encouraging the workforce members to diversify their experience. It is more important than ever to develop diverse expertise through a rapid paradigm shift in thinking. I realize this way of thinking certainly will alienate some IT professionals, many of whom take great pride in their respective specialities. I also realize that they have spent an enormous amount of time in learning their craft. However, it is a paradigm shift that I believe is needed to secure better the cyber systems and capabilities that acquisition professionals field for the Department of Defense (DoD). The reason I say develop expertise versus becoming experts is that the technology we rely on is advancing so quickly that it is nearly impossible to become an expert at any one aspect. Take networking for instance. The cyber systems hardware, protocols and vulnerabilities known today will be obsolete tomorrow. As a result, striving to become an expert in any one IT discipline might render one less effective compared with those who focus on gaining expertise in a wide range of disciplines. This is not to say IT professionals should not seek to develop the traditional skills that have become the foundation of the profession. Learning the knowledge and developing the skills needed to be system administrators, network administrators and field technicians are essential to IT professionals. However, it also is important to expand outside of these areas, to diversify experience in order to keep up with the profession s development as technology advances and cyber systems become more robust and integrated via convergence and interoperability., Published in Defense AT&L p29-31 Mar-Apr 2014.

Are you an entrepreneur? Are you passionate about the successes of your program and your team? Does risk not only describe threats but areas for opportunities? Do you work your budget to ensure that you get the maximum output from every dollar? Do you have the right stuff to be counted among the future entrepreneurial program managers (PMs) within the Department of Defense (DoD)? Today, the label entrepreneur is attached to breakthrough economic success resulting from the pursuit of new products and business applications with an eye toward incorporating technology innovation. These opportunities frequently occur when new management approaches are combined with leap-ahead technical breakthroughs. Diverse examples from the past include refining oil into kerosene as a replacement for whale oil for home lighting in the late 19th century, developing the mass production of cars to replace horses as a means of transportation in the 20th century, or creating low-cost smartphones to supplant phone booths for on-the-go communications in the early 21st century. In these and many more cases, entrepreneurs were the visionaries who implemented innovative solutions to solve problems, establish new levels of capability and capture great rewards for themselves.

The Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (SORDAC) created a small Joint Acquisition Task Force (JATF) to lead the Dragon Spear Program, integrate program activities and report directly to the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive. The JATF was a small group of program management, financial and contracting specialists whose challenge was to execute innovative management strategies and meet the demanding requirements of a UDA. Less than 12 months after the program was initiated, the first modified MC-130W was demonstrating its new suite of weapons, following delivery to Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), to support aircrew training and deployment preparations. Seven months later, an interim capability was deployed to Iraq. And 2.5 years after initiation of the UDA, PSP Capability Release 3--the objective configuration--was fielded on the MC-130W. On Nov. 18, 2011, crews from the 73rd SOS employed the new capability during operations in Afghanistan. The success of the Dragon Spear program depended on rapid but disciplined program execution. Certain strategies were essential to limit the program's cost and schedule and provided lessons learned for those crafting the AC-130J program strategy, Published in Defense AT&L, p16-19, Jul-Aug 2014.

The laboratories and testing centers in the Department of Defense (DoD) are primary sources of technological innovation in making our warfighters more mission-capable. A large number of facilities within each of the three Services the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army are dedicated to providing the U.S. military with its technological edge through research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) centers. Although the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) has activities in RDT&E, they are largely provided by the U.S. Navy. There are various categories of research and development, but let s look at what is considered fundamental research. This refers to basic research and applied research. Basic research is systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications in mind (6.1 funded). Applied research is the systematic study to gain knowledge or understanding necessary to determine the means by which a recognized and specific need may be met (6.2 funded). A great advantage of research, especially fundamental research, is that it enables our Services to start fighting the enemy on the battlefield 10 to 15 years in the future. As with most activities, the greater the funding the better; however, budgets always are limited and it is necessary to get the most out of the funds available. This includes both adopting new policies/practices and shedding existing ones that interfere with generating great research in support of military systems development. A current policy that is greatly detrimental to advancing fundamental research but readily fixable is the specific restriction on attending conferences not organized by DoD. This does not refer to the general DoD policy that reduces travel. The general restriction on travel is to reduce its relative proportion of the budget. Limited budgets mandate restricted expenditures., Published in Defense AT&L, p46-49, Mar-Apr 2014.

In 1986, I started keeping a list of profound lessons I had learned as an operational test director, defense contractor, government project engineer, and government program manager (PM) for mostly non-major acquisition programs (i.e., ACAT [Acquisition Category] III, IV) and a couple of ACAT I programs. I would jot them down on a special page in my paper brain as they occurred to me, sometimes in the heat of the moment, but usually during quiet periods of retrospection. In defense acquisition, we get a lot of education and training in managing research and development, much of which is the best in the world. But most of it is nuts and bolts, driven by the numerous laws and regulations that govern federal programs and contracts. The lessons below aren t necessarily driven by anything more than common sense, experience and, as W. Edwards Deming put it, Profound Knowledge of the system. These lessons generally fall into four areas: Program Teams; Contract Architecture; Design and Engineering; and Sponsors and Money. Over the years, I ve provided these to my colleagues, both inside the government and outside such as at the Marine Technology Society s Underwater Interventions conference, and usually received positive reviews. So I m providing them here in the hopes that readers will be able to glean some nuggets of value., Published in Defense AT&L, p33-37, Jul-Aug 2014.