Search

Radical realists criticise the role that moral intuitions play in moralist political philosophy. However, radical realists may also rely on certain epistemic intuitions when making use of their theories of ideology critique. Hence, one might wonder whether radical realists' criticism of moralists' intuition-dependence is hypocritical. Call this the intuition asymmetry objection. My aim in this article is to show that the intuition asymmetry objection fails. After examining the basis of objections by radical realists to the role of moral intuitions in moralist political philosophy, I show that the presence of intuitions in radical realist theories of ideology critique is consistent with their criticism of moralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moralists and radical realists both seem to employ a division of intellectual labour to enable their theories to be action-guiding. Moralists typically distinguish between formulating normative principles and devising suitable means for implementing or approximating them. Radical realists, meanwhile, seem to distinguish between the findings of ideology critique and further political theorising informed by these findings. However, radical realist criticisms of the moralist division of labour may suggest a tu quoque objection to radical realism: if the moralist division of labour is defective, why does the same not also hold for the radical realist division of labour? My aim in this article is to answer this question. I identify two distinct radical realist objections to the moralist division of labour, which I refer to as the seminar room objection and the motivation objection respectively. I then argue that radical realists can deal effectively with these objections if they were to be turned against their version of the division of labour. Hence, radical realists can consistently criticise moralist versions of the division of labour while simultaneously employing their own version. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I defend a new argument against moralist theories of legitimacy and in favour of realist theories. Moralist theories, I argue, are vulnerable to ideological and wishful thinking because they do not connect the demands of legitimacy with the interests of rulers. Realist theories, however, generally do manage to make this connection. This is because satisfying the usual realist criteria for legitimacy – the creation of a stable political order that transcends brute coercion – is usually necessary for rulers to preserve their rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the concept of "performance legitimacy," especially in East Asian governments such as China which relies on positive material outcomes, such as economic growth and infrastructure development to establish political legitimacy. Topics include empirical and conceptual critiques of performance legitimacy, the role of values in citizen-ruler cooperation, and the realist perspective on legitimacy connecting it with rulers' interests.

Alison McQueen's study of the historical role of apocalyptic ideas in realist political theory cautiously proposes the 'redirection' of apocalyptic thought as a plausible alternative to its rejection. Apocalyptic redirection, so understood, uses apocalyptic language to describe potential future catastrophes in order to inspire drastic action to prevent them. Although McQueen acknowledges that apocalyptic redirection may have certain risks, she suggests it may be an appropriate response to the crisis of climate change. In this article, I aim to show that this use of the discourse of apocalyptic redirection is ideologically problematic. I argue that it involves conflating the interests of those who are at least moderately materially comfortable with the interests of humanity as a whole. I will also draw on the 2019 'Stop Adani Convoy' in Australia as a case study to show how the ideological character of this discourse renders it ill-suited to generating popular support for action on climate change, and liable to reproduce existing power relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I aim to bring apocalypticism and radical realism into conversation, with a view to their mutual interest in prefigurative politics. On one hand, radical realists may worry that an apocalyptic approach to prefigurative politics may be marred by wishful thinking. On the other hand, radical realists can (and sometimes do) acknowledge that wishful thinking is sometimes desirable. I argue that an apocalyptic approach to prefigurative politics suggests one way of guarding against the dangers of wishful thinking, while allowing space for its potential benefits; prefigurativists have reason to pay at least some attention to what Bernard Williams calls 'The First Political Question'. I will argue for this claim with reference to the case of Omar Aziz, a Syrian activist who played a pivotal role in the construction of local councils in the aftermath of the 2011 protests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]