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INTRODUCTION 1287 I. CULTURAL CONVERGENCE OF SEXIST NORMS 1288 A. WOMEN AS PROPERTY 1289 1. People v. Chen 1290 2. People v. Moua 1292 B. THE HYSTERICAL WOMAN 1294 1. [...], American courts tend to accept cultural defenses raised by minority defendants attempting to explain their sex-subordinating crimes when the sexist norms underlying their cultural claims converge with those norms still embedded in American society. When culture is used as an excuse in this way, establishing an effective mechanism to assess the authenticity of minority defendants cultural claims is essential. Unfortunately, it is not the case in the American criminal courtroom today.

I Introduction Sexual violence law typically adopts consent as the principal benchmark for demarcating legally permissible from legally impermissible sex (for better or worse). In early rape law, a male-imagined [...], Sexual assault law reform commonly involves legislating a statement of appropriate standards of sexual interaction in the form of a positive definition of consent. In jurisdictions contemplating a legislated definition, the question of whether to adopt an orthodox attitudinal or unorthodox expressive definition must be confronted. Discussion around the adoption of an unorthodox consent model, commonly known as 'affirmative consent', has been beset by confusion, caused in part by the diversity of legal models to which this label has been applied. This article sets out a detailed comparison of the doctrinal mechanisms in jurisdictions commonly identified as having adopted some version of affirmative consent. The analysis sheds light on the variety of ways rape law can be reconstructed to reflect the aspiration of communicative sexuality, while also highlighting the core unifying objective of transforming the legal meaning of passivity. From the comparative analysis, four key points of divergence are highlighted, alongside the implications of those points of divergence for jurisdictions contemplating affirmative consent reform. Finally, the article notes the paucity of evidence on the substantive impacts of affirmative consent, and discusses the potential educative and symbolic functions of embracing such a model, despite ongoing uncertainty as to its practical effects.

I. INTRODUCTION 40 II. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TERRORISM AS AN EMERGING OR POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL 44 CRIME A. International Terrorism and International Maritime Terrorism: Towards a Legal Definition of an 44 International [...], The International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks jurisdiction over international terrorism. Despite related academic literature, no academic publication discusses whether the ICC should have jurisdiction over international maritime terrorism. This deserves attention due to the increasing importance of this global phenomenon in the last few decades. Consequently, this Article considers whether international maritime terrorism should be included in the ICC's jurisdiction. First, it discusses international maritime terrorism as a manifestation of the emerging international crime of international terrorism, examining i) whether there is an accepted or an emerging legal definition of international maritime terrorism, ii) whether international maritime terrorism is a serious threat to or attack against international peace and security, and iii) whether there is an emerging customary rule criminalizing international maritime terrorism. Then, the ICC law--particularly the Rome Statute, travaux preparatoires, and amendment proposals--and the ICC's practice on crimes committed by international terrorist groups or involving serious threats to maritime security are examined to determine the feasibility, advisability, or even necessity to incorporate international maritime terrorism into the Rome Statute. Finally, this Article argues for incorporation based on three main normative grounds: i) better protection of the marine environment (environmental security); ii) contribution towards filling important jurisdictional gaps concerning maritime zones; and iii) contribution towards coherence across supranational courts on international maritime terrorism and maritime security.

I INTRODUCTION The insanity defence has ancient origins in the common law of crimes. However, the modern version of the defence goes back to 1843 and the case of Daniel [...], The M'Naghten Rules formulated in 1843 have provided the basis for the insanity' defence in many Western countries, including New Zealand. Although many candidates for the insanity defence experience psychosis, the principal determining factor is whether they knew their criminal act was morally wrong, a difficult metaethical judgement. In New Zealand the advent of methamphetamine abuse has created a significant challenge for forensic assessors in differentiating between mental disease and chronic intoxication, raising the question of whether the insanity defence as currently formulated is fit for purpose in assessing criminal culpability in such cases. The article explores this problem through an examination of a number of leading cases, noting the variable character of expert testimony on insanity where methamphetamine is involved. The article then examines the question of whether evidence of mental states falling short of insanity may be utilised to support a palliative claim reducing murder to manslaughter. A tentative new approach invites consideration of allowing investigation of insanity in cases involving meth-induced paranoia, whether or not the threshold of disease of the mind is met. In the concluding sections the article examines the impact of developments in cognitive neuroscience and asks whether neuroscience can help in determining criminal responsibility and whether it supports a "control limb" in a reformulated insanity defence. The article concludes with a brief discussion of mental disorder and impulsive aggression.

INTRODUCTION 1516 I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND MENS REA ON THE ROAD TO REHAIF 1520 A. The Statute 1520 B. Mens Rea and Strict Liability 1522 C. Mistakes of Fact & [...], Over ten percent of all federal criminal charges involve possession of a firearm by a prohibited individual, with the vast majority of these charges involving convicted felons. In 2019, the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States fundamentally altered the legal landscape by imposing a new mens rea requirement onto the statute requiring knowledge of status. Given the significant use of this statute in federal prosecutions, Rehaif called into question numerous convictions, leading to a wave of appeals and habeas petitions. The question of how to consider an element far from the mind of judges, prosecutors, and even defense counsel in pre-Rehaif prosecutions vexed district and circuit courts alike, leading to widely uneven results. In an attempt to clarify and simplify the application of its Rehaif ruling infelon-in-possession cases, the Supreme Court in United States v. Greer proclaimed that none of these appeals should be overly difficult to rule on, because "[c]onvicted felons typically know they're convicted felons." In this Comment, I argue that it is not so simple. Greer undermines the promise of Rehaif--that a defendant should have to possess the requisite guilty mind before being convicted of a crime--by issuing a presumption that all felons know they're felons. This assumption is misguided, evidenced by the numerous situations in which it does not hold true. Accordingly, this Comment proposes a standardized set of factors that provide a framework for analyzing a defendant's mens rea and adequately account for the wide divergence in felony dispositions in the United States. Without this fact-based inquiry, courts deny defendants an honest examination of whether an element of the crime exists, thus risking punishing the innocent.

Table of Contents Introduction I. The Historical Development of the Tracing Doctrine Under [section] 1957 A. The Background and Purpose of [section] 1957 B. Tracing and [section] 1957 II. The [...], The United States criminalizes money laundering in part through 18 U.S.C. [section] 1957, which prohibits transactions of over $10,000 that are knowingly made using proceeds derived from specified illegal activities. The statutory requirement that transactions be more than $10,000 raises a complicated issue for courts. In many cases, potential launderers mix or "commingle" both legal and illegal funds in a single bank account. Once these funds are commingled, they become indistinguishable because money is fungible. In these cases, how can courts determine whether more than $10,000 of any particular transaction from the account in fact constituted illegal proceeds? An enduring circuit split has emerged over this question. While the Fifth and Ninth Circuits require the government to trace the funds to a specific underlying crime, the majority of circuits simply assume that a transaction of over $10,000 from a commingled account falls within the reach of [section] 1957. This Note presents an original survey of the existing split, tracing how the doctrine developed in the decades following the enactment of [section] 1957. It then argues that courts should adopt an intermediate stance: the proportionality approach, which would apply the percentages of illegal and legal funds in an account to each targeted transaction. This approach has been used by courts in similar legal contexts, including asset-forfeiture cases. In making this argument, the Note further urges courts to consider how new financial realities--in particular, the rise of cryptocurrency and digital assets--will affect the level of tracing that should be demanded from prosecutors.

INTRODUCTION 316 I. REASONS FOR THE DUTY 319 II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DUTY 323 III. THE EXISTING DUTY NOT TO CONTINUE DISPLAYING POSTS ON PHYSICAL PROPERTY 325 IV. SCOPE [...], Say something I wrote about you online (in a newspaper, a blog, or a social media page) turns out to be false and defamatory. Assume I wasn 't culpable when I first posted it, but now I'm on notice of the error. Am I liable for defamation if I fail to remove or correct the erroneous material? Surprisingly, courts haven't settled on an answer, and scholars haven't focused on the question. Libel law is stuck in a time when newspapers left the publisher's control as soon as they are printed--even though now an article or a post can be seen on the publisher's site (and can do enduring damage) for years to come. This Article also deals with a related question: Say I wrote about your having been indicted for a crime, but montlis or years later you are acquitted; am I liable for defamation if I fail to update the original story to reflect the new legal developments? That too is legally unresolved. This Article argues that existing common-law principles allow for a limited duty to stop hosting material that one learns is defamatory; and that legislatures can further supplement that duty.

INTRODUCTION 481 I. THE PROBLEM: THE NEED FOR STALKING LAWS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICT, AND THE DILEMMA OF MAZUR AND SHACKELFORD 485 A. The History of Stalking Statutes 485 B. [...], In State v. Mazur, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the state's felony stalking statute created a constitutional prohibition on criminal conduct and did not implicate any protected speech. Only months later, a different panel of the same court, in State v. Shackelford, held that the statute actually created a content-based restriction that unconstitutionally infringed on the defendant's First Amendment rights. These conflicting analyses did not rest on the factual differences between the two cases, although there were many. Rather, the disparity arose from how the two panels applied existing First Amendment jurisprudence. The conflicting applications highlight the First Amendment dilemma presented by stalking statutes, a dilemma that this Comment attempts to solve. Stalking statutes must balance two competing interests. On the one hand, stalking is a serious problem, causing significant physical, financial, and emotional harm to victims. One of the primary ways stalkers inflict these harms is through sending harassing messages. Thus, victims need laws that can protect them from harassing communications by stalkers. However, when taken too far, stalking laws can reach beyond harassing communications and start to infringe on the constitutionally protected speech of defendants. Therefore, to survive constitutional challenge, stalking statutes must be broad enough to protect victims yet narrow enough to leave defendants' First Amendment rights uninfringed. To solve this dilemma, this Comment uses the Mazur and Shackelford decisions to illustrate why North Carolina's current stalking statute creates a content-based restriction that requires strict scrutiny. But rather than dooming stalking statutes, this Comment argues that strict scrutiny is actually the appropriate vehicle for balancing the competing interests of victims and defendants. Because stalking communications lie at the intersection of three areas of less protected speech--unwanted one-to-one speech, speech that invades a reasonable expectation of privacy, and speech that inflicts substantial emotional distress--a stalking statute limited by these three criteria should survive strict scrutiny. Not only would this statute advance the compelling state interests of safety and security, but it would also be narrowly tailored by three different lines of First Amendment jurisprudence. Stalking remains a serious problem in the United States. To address it, legislatures cannot pass overly broad statutes that lend themselves to misapplication and facial challenges. Instead, this Comment offers a proposed provision that strikes a balance between competing interests and complies with existing precedent. In doing so, it hopes to provide a model for legislatures and courts to follow when wrestling with the constitutional dilemma posed by stalking statutes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 573 I. AN OVERBROAD STATUTE 578 A. The CFAA 578 B. Examples of Its Breadth 583 II. AN UNDUE FOCUS ON "WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION" 587 A. A [...], The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes the simple act of trespass upon a computer--intentional access without authorization. The law sweeps too broadly, but the courts and scholars seeking to fix it look in the wrong place. They uniformly focus on the term "without authorization" when instead they should focus on the statute's mens rea. On a conceptual level, courts and scholars understand that the CFAA is a criminal law, of course, but fail to interpret it comprehensively as one. This Article begins the first sustained treatment of the CFAA as a criminal law, with a full elaboration of the appropriate mens rea based upon congressional intent, cognate state criminal trespass statutes, and recent Supreme Court guidance on federal mens rea in general. A fully realized mens rea sweeps away many of the unjust potential applications of the CFAA on a far more principled basis than does a focus on, and re-writing of, "without authorization." My interpretative approach limits unjust applications of the provision, but many will remain. In a coda, I briefly show why we should likely abolish the trespass provision of the CFAA. The flaws of the CFAA, such as criminalizing ordinary and innocent behavior and arbitrary enforcement, flow from the same pathologies already inherent in criminal trespass law.

"We are unaware of any situation, involving any other law, where the Court has rejected a private right of action that has become so entrenched for so long, without any [...]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--WHAT HAPPENED ABROAD SHOULD HAVE STAYED ABROAD: THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE AND NOT-SO-SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS--United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2018). The Commerce Clause of the United [...]

I. INTRODUCTION 58 II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE YUGOSLAVIAN AND RWANDAN GENOCIDES 61 A. Genocide in the Former 62 Yugoslavia: 1991-1995 B. Genocide in Rwanda: 1994 63 III. 1948 CONVENTION DEFINITION [...], Genocide and its various iterations have repeatedly been contextualized in narratives assuming that victims are female. Part of this is due to the irrefutable data that shows the overwhelming number of victims are female. The United Nations 1948 treaty known as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provided for a definition for genocide that purposefully included other forms of genocide, particularly genocidal rape and sexual violence. Yet the two most comprehensive genocidal tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), refrained from charging criminals with genocide when their victims are male. This Article will address how males, similarly to female, have been victims of genocide in the forms of genocidal rape and sexual violence, and will argue that the ICTY and ICTR should have used the 1948 Convention's definition of genocide to achieve the goals of the United Nations.

Introduction 1044 I. The Prosecutorial Advantages Under the Material Support Statutes 1049 A. Limited Criminal Intent Component 1050 B. Prevention Approach 1052 C. Jurisdictional Reach 1053 II. The Problem: United [...]

United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2017) I. INTRODUCTION The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") is a federal law that imposes mandatory enhanced sentencing for offenders found [...]

INTRODUCTION Economists often say "there is no such thing as a free lunch." (1) In other words, although the recipient may not have to immediately pay cash for a "free" [...]

I. TRUE THREAT OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS 115 II. THE FAILED NEGLIGENCE STANDARD AND THE STRUGGLE TO FIND THE REASONABLE PERSON ONLINE 121 III. KNOWINGLY AND PURPOSELY: THE STRUGGLE TO UNMASK THE [...]

I Introduction Contemporary international law, including decisions from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the European Court of Human Rights, (1) does not offer a settled meaning [...]

Under the prevailing interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the lower courts, a defendant who causes a death inadvertently in the course of a felony is eligible for capital punishment. [...]

'It was not until several weeks after he had decided to murder his wife that Dr Bickleigh took any steps in the matter'.--Francis lies, Malice Aforethought 'It is sometimes said [...]

I was in a meeting with one of [my bosses], and a few other traders, and they were talking about the new hedge-fund regulations. Most everyone on Wall Street thought [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW A. Treason B. The Espionage Act 1. Sections 793 and 794 a. Section 793 b. Section 794 2. [...]

C. Other Relevant Statutes Issues of intent have arisen in debates surrounding other laws aimed at punishing the unauthorized disclosure of national security information. 1. Specific Categories of Information In [...]