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We argue that some fictional truths are fictionally true by default. We also argue that these fictional truths are subject to being undermined. We propose that the context within which we are to evaluate what is fictionally true changes when a possibility which was previously ignorable is brought to attention. We argue that these cases support a model of fictional truth which makes the conversational dynamics of determining truth in fiction structurally akin to the conversational dynamics of knowledge-ascription, as this is understood by David Lewis’s contextualist approach to knowledge. We show how a number of the rules which Lewis proposes for the case of knowledge-ascription can be employed to develop a novel and powerful framework for the case of truth in fiction.

Fictionalism is often seen as a way to enjoy the benefits offered by a certain type of representation without being fully committed to the picture of reality that representation offers. What fictionalist positions hope to draw from fiction itself is the idea that we can take a discourse seriously without invoking commitment to what it says. On the surface, fiction is a form of representation well-suited to the metaphysical aims often stated as motivations for fictionalism. But the nature of fictional representation is more contentious than it might first appear, and this has ramifications for fictionalism.Although our arguments will generalise in places, we focus on mental fictionalism – here understood as the view that we should adopt a fictionalist treatment of folk psychology, combining an endorsement of folk psychological discourse as valuable with a rejection of folk psychological discourse as a guide to the nature of the world. Close attention to the nature of fiction reveals a number of issues which bear on mental fictionalism. After sketching a few of these, we focus in particular on unearthing some difficulties for a figurative fictionalist approach to folk psychology, concentrating on Adam Toon’s recent attempt to understand folk psychology in terms of Kendall Walton’s notion of prop-oriented make-believe. We argue that there are problems with securing, in the case of folk psychology, the relationship between props, content and understanding that prop-oriented make-believe demands. In addition, by considering the relationship between fiction and metaphor, we identify a difficulty for those who might hope that an appeal to metaphor will facilitate withholding commitment from the ontology of folk psychology.Whilst attention to the nature of fiction creates obstacles for those sympathetic to mental fictionalism, it also suggests opportunities. We use considerations about the nature of fiction itself to sketch the beginnings of an alternative to fictionalism as it is usually conceived. Utilising a distinction between being true in a fiction and being true to a story, we propose a brand of mental ‘storyism’ which departs from mental fictionalism, but may do justice to some fictionalist ambitions. We also consider the so-called ‘fictionalist suicide’ problem, which alleges that mental fictionalism is self-defeating since appeal to folk-psychological concepts is needed in order to explicate the fictionalist’s appeal to fiction. We suggest that attention to the nature of fiction offers a potential new solution to this problem.

Personification has received little philosophical attention, but Daniel Nolan has recently argued that it has important ramifications for the relationship between fictional representation and possibility. Nolan argues that personification involves the representation of metaphysically impossible identities, which is problematic for anyone who denies that fictions can have (non-trivial) impossible content. We develop an account of personification which illuminates how personification enhances engagement with fiction, without need of impossible content. Rather than representing an identity, personification is something that is done with representations – a matter of use rather than content – and involves only a comparison of possibilities. We illustrate our account using the personification of death in the film Meet Joe Black, and show that there are no grounds for taking it to be fictionally true that there is a metaphysically impossible identity between Death and death.

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Craig Bourne, and Emily Caddick Bourne, ‘Explanation and Quasi‐miracles in Narrative Understanding: The Case of Poetic Justice’, Dialectica, Vol. 71 (4): 563-579, January 2018, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12201. Under embargo until 29 January 2020. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

Is there any difference between playing video games in which the player's character commits murder and video games in which the player's character commits pedophilic acts? Morgan Luck's “Gamer's Dilemma” has established this question as a puzzle concerning notions of permissibility and harm. We propose that a fruitful alternative way to approach the question is through an account of aesthetic engagement. We develop an alternative to the dominant account of the relationship between players and the actions of their characters, and argue that the ethical difference between so-called “virtual murder” and “virtual pedophilia” is to be understood in terms of the fiction-making resources available to players. We propose that the relevant considerations for potential players to navigate concern (1) attempting to make certain characters intelligible, and (2) using aspects of oneself as resources for homomorphic representation.

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Craig Bourne, Emily Caddick Bourne, and Clare Jarmy, ‘The Basis of Correctness in the Religious Studies Classroom’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 50 (4): 669-688, November 2016, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12166. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

Othello demonstrates what we call ‘conversational perversions’. This is a technical term which we introduce to identify conversational behaviours which are designed to block the possibility of mutual understanding that characterises successful communication. We believe that our notion of a conversational perversion can be put to work to illuminate conversational encounters in general, but here we show, in particular, how Othello furnishes examples of conversational perversions and, in turn, how the notion of a conversational perversion can be used to articulate a major driver of the play’s narrative: Iago’s manipulation of Othello.We explain the background, Gricean communicative framework, and how it relates to our framework for thinking about perversion. We illustrate our preferred account of perversion using the examples of sexual sadism and sexual coyness. We explain how to extend this account of perversion to cover conversational coyness and sadism. Finally, we identify how Iago’s (and Othello’s) ways of communicating exemplify these conversational perversions. In the course of this, we argue that Iago can be seen as making use of a perverted treatment of conversational implicatures, which we call ‘sham cancelling’.

We reply to Storrs McCall's objections to our proposed solution to his puzzle concerning time travel and artistic creativity. We also raise some further thoughts, developing the discussion of time travel's implications for aesthetic value and artistic creativity.

Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts, this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed Statements true. So what is a presentist to do?There are at least three conditions that would ideally be met in a satisfactory solution to this problem:a) It must preserve our views about which Statements are true and which falseb) It must be transparent what the truthmakers are for those Statementsc) It must accommodate the truth-value links between various times.

Some fictions seem to involve branching time, where one time series ‘splits’ into two or two time series ‘fuse’ into one. We provide a new framework for thinking about these fictional representations: not as representations of branching time series but rather as branching representations of linear time series. We explain how branching at the level of the representation creates a false impression that the story describes a branching of the time series in the fictional world itself. This involves explaining away the illusion of various causal connections which may at first appear essential to understanding the story as a unified whole. This provides a more accurate account of the relationship between the representation and what is represented, which in turn reveals the extent to which it is legitimate to draw conclusions about actual time from fictional representations.

If the future is real, and the outcomes of chancy processes are “already” occurrent, then in what sense is the chancy process genuinely chancy? This topic is the fatalism issue. Discussed by Aristotle more than two millennia ago, the question is whether various logical principles, when applied to propositions about future events, imply that the future is in some sense fixed. If the future is like the past, and the past is fixed, then are future events fixed in the same sense? This chapter gives the latest on this traditional topic, carefully surveying various works and trying a new tack that steers away from fatalism. It concludes that it is difficult to find ways to rule out causal loops, and gives an account of the direction of causation.

Discusses the Galilean transformations, and the Newtonian conception of space, time, and motion, essentials for understanding the Lorentz transformations and Einstein's special theory of relativity. Discusses, with the aid of many diagrams, the properties of Minkowski space‐time, such as the relativity of simultaneity, and concludes with some reflections on their philosophical significance.

Begins by showing how theories of causation can be accommodated within presentism, discussing the regularity theory, the counterfactual theory, and the chance‐raising theory. Discusses the direction of time and causation and whether counterfactuals can ground it; also, whether the means–end connotation of causation guarantees the earlier to later direction of causation, but shows that it cannot by discussing Newcomb's problem in decision theory. Shows that Mellor's attempt to rule out causal loops, and thus backwards causation, fails. Concludes by discussing the ways in which presentism might be is said to be compatible with time travel and backwards causation, but shows how it is not possible on the theory I have developed.

I introduce the Present Problem: how can a theory of time guarantee the infallible knowledge that we have that we are present? I show that only presentism and the tenseless theory can satisfy this requirement, and thus all other theories, such as Tooley's growing block theory and McCall's branching‐future theory, should be rejected.

Some tense theorists think that the expansion of the universe can be used to define an absolute cosmic time that then serves to define the notion of absolute simultaneity required by tense theories. I show how Mellor's argument against this strategy fails. Clarifying the strategy leads to an exposition of the Robertson‐Walker metric, which describes such expanding universes. I identify the real reasons why we should reject this way of defining absolute simultaneity and temporal becoming.

I begin by discussing what a theory of time is and what it should aim to do. Then discusses the initial plausible candidates for a theory of time; shows how best to frame the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time; and discusses the tenseless theory, and the various tense theories, such as the growing block view of Tooley, the branching‐future view of McCall, and presentism.

I discuss Gödel's philosophical position on the nature of time. I describe Gödel's model, which contains closed time‐like curves allowing us to take a journey into our future and arrive in our past, and show how it is incompatible with presentism. I do not discuss the well‐known implications of this for time travel, but focus on Gödel's subtler ‘modal’ argument. I discuss various ways of rejecting this argument and show that the conclusion that presentists must draw is that tense is not an essential feature of it: whether time is presentist or tenseless is an entirely contingent matter. I conclude by considering the extent to which metaphysics can tell us about the nature of time as it actually is.

I discuss the argument (put forward by Putnam and others) that special relativity is incompatible with presentism. I reject some ways (such as Stein's) to solve the problem, but suggest that the problem lies in Einstein's definition of simultaneity. I offer an alternative way of understanding and defining simultaneity and show how the Lorentz transformations are to be understood in light of it. After defending the position against possible attack, I go on to show its positive benefits.

Divided into five problems associated with presentism: McTaggart's argument; a need for other times; how to deal with future contingent statements; how to deal with transtemporal relations, and the possibility of reference to the past; and how to talk meaningfully about past individuals despite their non‐existence.

In 'An Insoluble Problem' (2010), Storrs McCall presents an argument which he takes to reveal the real problem with backwards time travel. McCall asks us to imagine a scenario in which a renowned artist produces his famous works by copying them from reproductions brought back to him by a time-travelling art critic. The novelty of the scenario lies in its introduction of aesthetic constraints on the possibility of time travel, something which sets it apart from other time travel cases. McCall states that 'The puzzle lies ... in finding where artistic creativity enters the equation', and that 'Unlike the traditional "paradoxes of time travel", this problem has no solution'. We offer four responses to McCall's puzzle. Whilst we show that the puzzle is not insoluble, we also argue that it reveals something about the proper relationship between copying and creativity, which may not have been apparent without considering time travel.