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This commentary responds to Gates Brown's article 'The Army's Identity Crisis' published in the W'inter 2016-17 issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 4). Although it recognizes the difficulty of predicting [...]

A brief analysis of the efforts of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan over nine years is presented. The force's role in Afghanistan is at a crucial stage in 2010 as its members try to build local security capability, ensure good governance and create a better way of life for the people of the country.

The article discusses the challenges, changes and lessons that the U.S. forces appear to have learnt following their pullout from Iraq. The counter-insurgency challenges faced by the US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) following six years of war in Iraq has led to several tactical and institutional changes.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] NEARLY HALF A CENTURY AGO, Colonel Roger Trinquier, a French Army officer, wrote Modern Warfare: A French View o f Counterinsurgency. (1) Intent on capturing what really worked [...]

The article discusses two important military conflicts that the U.S. undertook in Korea and Vietnam. The war in Vietnam as well as the one in Korea saw many counterinsurgency operations, which are highlighted.

The article discusses that there has been a tremendous rise in terrorism and insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has given rise to massive counterinsurgency operations by the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and also Iraq.

The author, an Executive Officer, HML/A-269 during OIF 05-07.1, describes the birth and the success of aero scout. Aero scout played a very significant role in controlling of Al Anbar Province from the stranglehold of the insurgent forces and deserves a unique footnote in the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The only way for soldiers to protect themselves from sniper attacks is to prevent the attacks itself by conducting countersniper operations. This is amply evident from the true experiences of soldiers on deployment in Iraq for operation 'Iraqi Freedom'.

The only war to tackle the war on insurgency is to learn from the lessons of the past and try and incorporate the successful points into current operation. The positive and negative points should be picked from earlier counterinsurgency experiences and incorporated into current ones to make the Iraq war a success.

IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW) in general and counterinsurgency (COIN) more specifically require a particular mind-set and specific talents not entirely applicable or common to more traditional styles of warfare. That does [...]

The courageous and relentless heroism and sacrifice displayed by a team of American paratroopers in a combat with Al Qaeda insurgents is vividly described. The incident occurred when the soldiers were stationed on a rooftop of a building in Samarra, Iraq, on August 26, 2007.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] IN DECEMBER 2006, the U.S. Army published a new field manual, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (COIN). This FM identifies 'the ability to generate and sustain popular support' as an [...]

The article discusses insurgency and counterinsurgency as two very different tasks in war efforts.

The author discusses counterinsurgency uncertainty that is faced by the U.S. forces in Iraq at Al Anbar. He further states that people in Al Anbar are much more concerned of alignment forces than of the rebels.

The author describes counterinsurgency discussing its basic principles and procedures at the company-level.

The article discusses some essential differences between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency and its importance to Marines.

The single battle concept is essential for lasting success in counterinsurgency operations, and the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) command element (CE) has a crucial and far-reaching role in seeking and achieving it. In irregular warfare, the CE is necessary for planning, executing and synchronizing all MAGTF operations and also ensuring that these operations are correlated with higher headquarters' campaign objectives.

The US military's signature skills of firepower, maneuver, and shock action make it the most effective conventional fighting force in the world, yet the services are struggling to counter insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US military, in order to wage successful operations against insurgents, must apply the classic counterinsurgency doctrine developed by the French and the British that aims to control the target population and win its support, and not to kill people.

ASSESSING THE SOUNDNESS of Osama bin Laden's global jihad concept by analyzing the movement and its myth has implications for U.S. information operations and counterinsurgency strategies and demonstrates the importance [...]

REFLECTING UPON Mr. Remy Mauduit's excellent article 'Effects-Based Information Battle in the Muslim World' (Air and Space Power Journal Spring 2008), I found that I had more questions than answers. [...]

Fighting and terrorist attacks are intensifying in Afghanistan, which is increasing American casualties, creating a worrying situation for the United States. The increasing need for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan is proving to be quite a burden on the U.S. economy.

The article discusses certain principles specified by David Kilcullen of the Australian Army on how to effectively tackle insurgency operations in Iraq.

A Marine who was the logistics chief of a military transition team (MiTT) that trains and advises an Iraqi Army (IA) unit writes a letter to his replacement, recounting his experiences and the necessary qualities for the job. He states that his standard Marine noncommissioned officer (NCO) training and experience would enable him to use his combat skills in addition to the advisory capacity, and mental toughness. This would build a rapport with Iraqi counterparts, providing effective logistical training that are essential for the advisor.