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CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 333 II. OVERVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL 336 A. What is Venture Capital? 336 B. How are Venture Capital Funds Organized? 337 C. How do Venture Capital Funds [...]

Author's Synopsis: This Article discusses three income tax regimes regulating section 501(c)(3) public charities: the proscription against inurement, the proscription against more-than-incidental private benefit, and the rules imposing excise taxes [...]

Introduction 220 I. The Purpose of the Derivative Suit and Historical Procedural Challenges 223 II. Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion and the Derivative Suit 227 A. Board and Executive-Level Diversity Suits [...], In the wake of several social justice movements, including the #MeToo movement in 2017 and the Black Lives Matter Movement in 2020, corporations increasingly emphasized their commitments to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in a variety of ways. Amid shifts in both public attitudes and the corporate landscape, a new trend in shareholder derivative actions emerged: shareholders began suing boards of directors for corporate failures related to DEI shortcomings. As a result, major corporations like Meta, Cisco, and Gap have faced suits brought by shareholders seeking to hold boards accountable for corporations' public pledges to DEI values and initiatives. Although these actions have experienced limited legal success so far, this Comment argues for a reconceptualization of "success" in shareholder derivative suits related to board and executive-level diversity that recognizes these actions may carry value in serving a deterrent purpose, inducing corporate action through public shaming, and acting as a positive social force that demands industry attention on matters of DEI accountability. Next, this Comment proposes a modification to the substantial benefit doctrine that recognizes benefits may be derived from diversity-related derivative suits for the corporation or broader class of shareholders based on a fact-intensive inquiry as to whether the action resulted in changes which reduce the risk of reputational harm and future litigation or increase investment opportunities. Further, as regulators and state legislatures consider novel strategies to encourage leadership diversity, these suits may also complement public sector initiatives as a private enforcement mechanism.

I. EXPLORING THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF DIGITAL CONSTITUTIONALISM THROUGH SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM Traditional state-centered constitutionalism does not keep pace with the inherent dangers of the digital revolution. The digital code increases [...], This paper introduces the symposium issue of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies dedicated to "Digital Constitution: On the Transformative Potential of Societal Constitutionalism," where a group of scholars, using societal constitutionalism as a background theory, presents concrete proposals for a digital constitutional law. The symposium issue seeks to answer three interrelated questions. What is the message of societal constitutionalism for the emerging digital constitution? How can fundamental principles of nation-state constitutions be generalized and re-specified for global digitality with a transformative outlook? What would new institutional arrangements and interpretive practices look like? In this introduction, we aim to overcome three reductive tendencies stemming from traditional constitutionalism's legacy. We argue that digital constitutionalism needs to look beyond (1) the still dominant state-centricity of constitutional principles, (2) their exclusive focus on political power, and (3) their narrowly individualist interpretation of constitutional rights. This deconstruction opens the view to the main constitutional threats posed by digitalization--in particular, what we call the double colonization of the digital space--and to possible counterstrategies inspired by societal constitutionalism. Subsequently, we outline the content of the contributions to this symposium, grouped into four areas: (1) reformulation of constitution- and law-making; (2) digital economy; (3) institutions of constitutionalism; and (4) digital justice. Finally, we point to future developments as well as to links to other strands of literature that focus on the relationship between digital technologies and (constitutional) law.

I. INTRODUCTION The apparel industry, and the importance of clothing, has transformed over time--whether clothing is used to protect the body from the elements or to express individuality, it is [...]

I. INTRODUCTION Two events marked the year 2021 for Meta, the social media company which owns Facebook and Instagram. (1) The first event occurred on January 28, 2021. Meta's Oversight [...], Meta's Oversight Board (OB) is at the center of divisive debates. Some commentators look at this experiment as the "Supreme Court" of a global order that is going through a process of constitutionalization. Others express concern about the OB, seen as a way to avoid public accountability and, more generally, as the legitimization of global private censorship. Either way, the debates normally focus on the important but still relatively narrow issue of content moderation and freedom of expression. In contrast, it is the manipulation of individuals and the related social effects deriving so-called informational capitalism --among them, the mental health distress of young people--that needs to be counteracted. Against this background, this article, resorting to societal constitutionalism as an analytical framework, aims to contribute to the debates on digital constitutionalism. It has two goals. First, to use the instruments available within Meta's normative system to thematize the broader, systemic effects of social media and digitality in constitutional terms. Second, to question informational capitalism "from within," using the right to the mental health of children as a case study. In this sense, it is an exercise of (strategic) legal imagination that focuses on the internal side of an involved actor. After the introduction, section II analyzes the features of Meta's normative system, distinguishing between juridification (II.A) and constitutionalization (II.B). Against this background, section III outlines a litigation strategy aimed at bringing such issues before the OB. It separately examines the strategies preceding the proceeding (III.A), the authority and scope of OB's jurisdiction (III.B), the relevant standards of review (III.C), and the potential content of the decision and the policy advisory statement s ( III.D). Section IV concludes.

I. INTRODUCTION The public eye is on tech companies aiding governments in cracking down on climate protesters; (2) using the Covid-19 pandemic to leverage a greater role in education and [...], Digital constitutionalism, to date, has been proceduralist; it has assumed that transparency and due process can temper power and attain justice for people vis-a-vis the automated state and powerful tech companies. So far, digital constitutionalism has also been very soft and blind to its own coloniality: Instead of deploying hard law, we are still looking for ways to pressure digital behemoths to self-regulate. We downplay US dominance, colonial exploitation, and environmental degradation caused by digital imperialism. Meanwhile, the power of tech companies has escalated. They now influence many aspects of our public and private lives, from elections to our own personalities and emotions, to environmental degradation. To be successful, the project of digital constitutionalism must resist a corporate agenda of procedural fetishism, a strategy to redirect the public from more substantive and fundamental questions about the concentration and limits of power to procedural microissues. Such diversion merely reinforces the status quo. To rectify the imbalance of power between people and tech companies, a new digital constitution must therefore try something different. It must shift its focus from soft law initiatives to tangible legal obligations by the tech companies. We must redistribute wealth and power not only by breaking and taxing tech companies, fortifying regulatory enforcement, increasing public scrutiny, and adopting prohibitive laws but also by democratizing big tech by making them public utilities and giving people a say how these companies should be governed. Crucially, we must also decolonize digital constitutionalism through recognition of colonial practices of extraction and exploitation and paying attention to the voices of Indigenous peoples and communities of the so-called Global South. With all these mutually reinforcing efforts, a new digital constitution will debunk the corporate and state agenda of procedural fetishism and will establish the new social contract for the digital age.

I. INTRODUCTION The development of the data economy is probably one of the most disruptive events of our time. Social media platforms and digital management practices deeply impact the way [...], This contribution deals with algorithmic profiling as an example of datafication and machine colonization. It examines to what extent Teubner's theory of societal constitutionalism (SC) describes the emergence of an EU digital constitution, including its capacities to deal with datafication and machine colonization. This article advances an internal critique of SC, by questioning its assumptions concerning the capacity of societal actors and nonlegal media, such as public outrage and litigation, to exert the pressure needed for change from within. Using Habermas's colonization theory as well as the insights of the law and political economy literature helps to understand the structural power of companies as an inhibition to the buildup of external pressure and to justify the adoption of a counter-concept of structural digital vulnerability, which can be used to interpret existing rules in a stricter way. Keywords: Profiling, Datafication, Machine Colonization, Societal Constitutionalism, Teubner, Habermas, Political Economy

I. INTRODUCTION We need a "digital constitution." This is a claim that has frequently resonated in the words of various digital literati, academics, politicians, and civil society groups. The digital [...], Scholars have advocated the need for a "digital constitution," including the idea of drafting an "internet bill of rights." Numerous civil society groups have crafted decalogues of digital rights, giving rise to a movement advocating a form of digital constitutionalism. This paper investigates the added value of these texts is in the constitutional ecosystem. These declarations highlight the transformative potential of societal constitutionalism well. By adopting the language of constitutions, they seek to be part of the current conversation on how to translate the core values of contemporary constitutionalism in the context of the digital society through a process of generalisation and respecification of principles. Internet bills of rights are not legally binding sources, yet represent a ductile instrument whereby their promoters are free to experiment with new legal solutions in a gradual way and in a more democratic manner. This includes actors beyond the worlds of politics and business.