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Philosophers have described the human perspective on climate change as a perfect moral storm. I take a new angle on that storm: I argue that our relevant desires feature a particularly problematic case of seemingly consistent but genuinely inconsistent desires. We have, first, non‐indexical desires such as a desire to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment at some point. We have, second, indexical desires such as a desire not to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment this year. Our indexical and non‐indexical desires are inconsistent. Such inconsistency is obvious in most short‐term, individual cases such as when we need to make a dentist appointment. But when it comes to climate change, that inconsistency is masked by factors such as longevity and bitter divisions. This is, unfortunately, why humanity may continue putting off the collective action required to address climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm suggest marks of intrinsic value. Contemporary philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard have insightful discussions of intrinsic value. But how do we verify that some specific thing really is intrinsically valuable? I propose a natural way to test for intrinsic value: first, strip the candidate bare of all considerations of good consequences; and, second, see if what remains is still a good thing. I argue that we, as ordinary human beings, have an astonishingly difficult time completing this test for plausible candidates. More precisely, for us as we are, it seems that the conditions for completing the first step of the test militate against the conditions for completing the second step. I conclude, then, that we have a good reason to think that we cannot verify whether or not particular things are intrinsically good. I explore some implications and I consider a number of important objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Those attitudes show that, even though Joe did I not i kill a pedestrian I because i he wanted to do so, Joe I would i have killed a pedestrian if circumstances had been different such that Joe had a choice. Consider whether Joe should be blamed or not blamed for the morally relevant events in the following case: I Angry Truck Driver i : Over the past five years, Joe the Angry Truck Driver has grown so angry at pedestrians crossing the road where they shouldn't that Joe wants to hit and kill the next pedestrian who does so. It seems appropriate to reproach Joe for the pedestrian's death not as a public message about the importance of careful driving (for, after all, Joe is an excellent driver, and anyone in Joe's position would have been distracted) but, rather, so as to make it clear that Joe and others in similar positions have a duty to feel and express agent-regret. Jeff and Joe ought to feel not just regret in general, not just the kind of regret felt by a nearby shopkeeper or someone skating on the opposite side of the rink; rather, Jeff and Joe ought to feel a special, distinctive kind of regret. Keywords: agency; agent-indifference; agent-regret; agent-satisfaction; Aristotle on responsibility; blame vs. reproach; moral responsibility; non-intentional; nonvoluntary; responsibility vs. criticism EN agency agent-indifference agent-regret agent-satisfaction Aristotle on responsibility blame vs. reproach moral responsibility non-intentional nonvoluntary responsibility vs. criticism 165 183 19 06/09/21 20210601 NES 210601 INTRODUCTION Sam says something hurtful to Charlie. [Extracted from the article]

Early on in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that there must be a single end or good desired for its own sake, for the sake of which all of our other ends are desired. The argument includes the following conditional: "If we chose everything for the sake of something else so that the process went on forever, then our desire would be empty and futile." This paper addresses that conditional. First, I explain why the conditional appears to be false. Second, I resolve some ambiguity in it. Third, I argue that the conditional enjoys a plausible and charitable reading when understood as a claim about ordinary human lives and psychology, and when read in the context of Aristotle's conception of ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]