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We use a game of cooperation with minimal groups to test whether ingroup favoritism can be explained by the expectation of reciprocity from ingroup members. To do this, we first manipulate participants' level expected cooperation from ingroup and outgroup partners by letting them play the game with different partners having different (high or low) cooperative reputations. We then analyze how these expectations affect ingroup bias in the game across different reputation conditions. We find that even if subjects expect the same level of cooperation from ingroup and outgroup partners with high reputation, they still cooperate more with the former than the latter. This contradicts the reciprocity hypothesis in the literature which explains intergroup discrimination solely in reference to differential reciprocal expectations. But, against ingroup and outgroup partners with low cooperative reputation, subjects' level of cooperation almost exactly parallel their reciprocal expectations. This result is in line with the reciprocity hypothesis. We explain these findings by arguing that both reciprocal expectations and social identity play their parts in the emergence of ingroup favoritism, but that their relative strengths may depend on the interaction with other contextual factors. We also argue in favor of further experimental research as to how reciprocity and social identity interact with such third factors as partner's reputation in different games of social exchange., Author(s): Serhat Kologlugil [sup.1] , Burcu Tekes [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.58192.37, 0000 0004 0595 7928, Department of Economics, Isik University, , Üniversite Sok. No:2, 34980, Sile, Istanbul, Turkey (2) [...]

Cooperation is commonly defined as an individual's choice that benefits both themself and others, in contrast to selfishness, which benefits the individual only. Cooperative behavior is more likely to occur when the benefit to others, discounted as a function of social distance (i.e., social discounting), is higher than the nondiscounted cost of cooperation Rachlin, H. & Locey, M. L. (Behavioural Processes 87, 25-33, 2011). We tested five 2-player prisoner's dilemma reward matrices with 117 participants, among which both nondiscounted cost and socially discounted benefit varied systematically. Costs and benefits were defined, respectively, as the amount the participant lost and the amount the other player won when the participant cooperated. In global terms, systematically increasing costs and decreasing benefits of cooperation decreased the percentage of participants who cooperated, as predicted. These results suggest that the balance of costs and benefits of cooperation is useful for predicting cooperative behavior in social situations, such as prisoner's dilemma games. Keywords cooperation * prisoner's dilemma game * Cost-benefit balance * social discounting * humans, Some behavior analysts have defined cooperation as an individual's choice that benefits both themselves and others. Selfishness, on the other hand, has been defined as an individual's choice that benefits [...]

What explains variability in norms of cooperation across organizations and cultures? One answer comes from the tendency of individuals to internalize typically successful behaviors as norms. Different institutional structures can cause different behavioral norms to be internalized. These norms are then carried over into atypical situations beyond the reach of the institution. Here, we experimentally demonstrate such spillovers. First, we immerse subjects in environments that do or do not support cooperation using repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Afterwards, we measure their intrinsic prosociality in one-shot games. Subjects from environments that support cooperation are more prosocial, more likely to punish selfishness, and more trusting in general. Furthermore, these effects are most pronounced among subjects who use heuristics, suggesting that intuitive processes play a key role in the spillovers we observe. Our findings help to explain variation in one-shot anonymous cooperation, linking this intrinsically motivated prosociality to the externally imposed institutional rules experienced in other settings. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168. Keywords: economics: behavior and behavioral decision making; economics: game theory and bargaining theory; organizational studies: decision making; games-group decisions History: Received April 5, 2014; accepted January 20, 2015, by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. Published online in Articles in Advance September 9, 2015., 1. Introduction The tendency to cooperate, or to pay a personal cost to give a benefit to, is not a constant between groups: norms of cooperation and trust vary markedly [...]

As the theoretical and practical interest in policy networks increases, so does the need for further research into how, and based on what rationales, actors within a policy subsystem engage in interorganizational collective action and form political coalitions. The aim of this paper is to continue the search for explanations for coordination and coalition structures in the setting of Swedish carnivore policy. Based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and a previous case study within the same policy subsystem, the study investigates a set of hypotheses regarding actors' coordinating behavior and the defining elements of coalitions. The empirical analysis indicates, in support of the ACF, that perceived belief correspondence is a better predictor of coordination than perceived influence. Moreover, the explanatory power of empirical policy core beliefs in general, and normative policy core beliefs in particular, is further reinforced, while deep core beliefs seemingly do not influence coalition structure. The relevance of more shallow beliefs for coalition formation cannot be dismissed and therefore calls for additional research. KEY WORDS: advocacy coalition framework, beliefs, carnivore management, collaborative management, governance, natural resource management, policy analysis, policy networks, social networks, social network analysis, Introduction Given a steadily increasing interest in the concept of policy networks, by scholars as well as practitioners, there is a need to further develop theoretically and empirically sound explanations [...]

Public goods cooperation abounds in nature, occurring in organisms ranging from bacteria to humans. Although previous research focused on the behavioral and ecological conditions favoring cooperation, the question of whether the molecular and regulatory properties of the public good itself can influence selection for cooperation has received little attention. Using a metapopulation model, we show that extended molecular durability of a public good--allowing multiple reuse across generations--greatly reduces selection for cheating if (and only if) the production of the public good is facultatively regulated. To test the apparent synergy between public goods durability and facultative regulation, we examined the production of iron-scavenging pyoverdin molecules by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, a cooperative behavior that is facultatively regulated in response to iron availability. We show that pyoverdin is a very durable public good and that extended durability significantly enhances fitness. Consistent with our model, we found that nonsiderophore-producing mutants (cheats) had a relative fitness advantage over siderophore producers (cooperators) when pyoverdin durability was low but not when durability was high. This was because cooperators facultatively reduced their investment in pyoverdin production when enough pyoverdin had accumulated in the media--a cost-saving strategy that minimized the ability of cheats to invade. These findings show how molecular properties of cooperative acts can shape the costs and benefits of cooperation. extracellular products | siderophores | public goods durability | inclusive fitness | microbes doi/ 10.1073/pnas.1011154107

Blank-slate theories of human intelligence propose that reasoning is carried out by general-purpose operations applied uniformly across contents. An evolutionary approach implies a radically different model of human intelligence. The task demands of different adaptive problems select for functionally specialized problem-solving strategies, unleashing massive increases in problem-solving power for ancestrally recurrent adaptive problems. Because exchange can evolve only if cooperators can detect cheaters, we hypothesized that the human mind would be equipped with a neurocognitive system specialized for reasoning about social exchange. Whereas humans perform poorly when asked to detect violations of most conditional rules, we predicted and found a dramatic spike in performance when the rule specifies an exchange and violations correspond to cheating. According to critics, people's uncanny accuracy at detecting violations of social exchange rules does not reflect a cheater detection mechanism, but extends instead to all rules regulating when actions are permitted (deontic conditionals). Here we report experimental tests that falsify these theories by demonstrating that deontic rules as a class do not elicit the search for violations. We show that the cheater detection system functions with pinpoint accuracy, searching for violations of social exchange rules only when these are likely to reveal the presence of someone who intends to cheat. It does not search for violations of social exchange rules when these are accidental, when they do not benefit the violator, or when the situation would make cheating difficult. evolutionary psychology | reasoning | cooperation | reciprocation doi/10.1073/pnas.0914623107

Subjective expected relative similarity (SERS) is a descriptive theory that explains cooperation levels in single-step prisoner's dilemma (PD) games. SERS predicts that individuals cooperate whenever their subjectively perceived similarity with their opponent exceeds a situational index, namely the game's similarity threshold. A thought experiment and 2 experimental studies illustrate and explore SERS's characteristics, showing that the theory predicts cooperation and competition in single-step PD games under 3 informational structures: (a) clear and transparent similarity cues, (b) experienced similarity, and (c) semantic similarity. The study's findings suggest that perceived similarity and its application in SERS play an important role in the evolution of cooperation underlying both kin and group selection mechanisms. Keywords: conflict, cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, kin selection, group selection

The comparative behavior of younger and older workers is investigated. Seniors are more cooperative than juniors, while risk aversion and response to competition are similar between juniors and seniors.

Any individual's response intended to be random should be as probable as any other. However, 3 experiments show that many people's independent responses depart from the expected chance distribution. Participants responding to instructions of chance and related concepts favor the available options unequally in a similar way. Consequently, in hide-and-seek games, hiders converge on certain locations and are thereby detected beyond chance by seekers who share their preferences. People agree on salient and on nonsalient options, both of which are preferred under different instructions and even in the absence of instructions. Group responses strongly correlate under diverse, even opposing (e.g., competitive and cooperative) directions. Apparently, common default tendencies, combining random and aesthetic choices, are only somewhat modified under specific instructions. Maximal agreement with others is obtained through one's own aesthetic choices. Hence, implementing one's personal aesthetic preferences succeeds in matching others' choices even better than deliberate mutual coordination efforts. These results broadly replicate in 1- and 2-dimensional tasks. Implications of the findings, their possible roots, and their connection to constructs from, e.g., game theory and subjective-complexity research, are discussed. Keywords: randomness, hide-and-seek, competition versus cooperation, aesthetics, default tendencies Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.35.1.203.supp

Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore the available strategies at random. Most research has focused on how strategies spread via genetic reproduction or cultural imitation, but random exploration of the available set of strategies has received less attention so far. In genetic settings, the latter corresponds to mutations in the DNA, whereas in cultural evolution, it describes individuals experimenting with new behaviors. Genetic mutations typically occur with very small probabilities, but random exploration of available strategies in behavioral experiments is common. We term this phenomenon 'exploration dynamics' to contrast it with the traditional focus on imitation. As an illustrative example of the emerging evolutionary dynamics, we consider a public goods game with cooperators and defectors and add punishers and the option to abstain from the enterprise in further scenarios. For small mutation rates, cooperation (and punishment) is possible only if interactions are voluntary, whereas moderate mutation rates can lead to high levels of cooperation even in compulsory public goods games. This phenomenon is investigated through numerical simulations and analytical approximations. cooperation | costly punishment | finite populations | mutation rates

One crucial element for the evolution of cooperation may be the sensitivity to others' efforts and payoffs compared with one's own costs and gains. Inequity aversion is thought to be the driving force behind unselfish motivated punishment in humans constituting a powerful device for the enforcement of cooperation. Recent research indicates that non-human primates refuse to participate in cooperative problem-solving tasks if they witness a conspecific obtaining a more attractive reward for the same effort. However, little is known about non-primate species, although inequity aversion may also be expected in other cooperative species. Here, we investigated whether domestic dogs show sensitivity toward the inequity of rewards received for giving the paw to an experimenter on command in pairs of dogs. We found differences in dogs tested without food reward in the presence of a rewarded partner compared with both a baseline condition (both partners rewarded) and an asocial control situation (no reward, no partner), indicating that the presence of a rewarded partner matters. Furthermore, we showed that it was not the presence of the second dog but the fact that the partner received the food that was responsible for the change in the subjects' behavior. In contrast to primate studies, dogs did not react to differences in the quality of food or effort. Our results suggest that species other than primates show at least a primitive version of inequity aversion, which may be a precursor of a more sophisticated sensitivity to efforts and payoffs of joint interactions. cooperation | refusal of unequal pay | Canis familiaris

This study explores correlates of social value orientation, a personality trait that reflects a stable individual difference in the way people evaluate outcomes for themselves and others in situations of interdependence. Previous findings (e.g., the triangle hypothesis) have indicated that people with a prosocial orientation tend to view their interacting partners as having heterogeneous social motives, whereas people with a proself orientation tend to believe all people are alike and selfish. Consistent with this idea that people vary in their perception of other's social motives, the data in this study indicate that a prosocial orientation correlated positively with the ability to adopt another person's point of view and infer mental states from eye gazes. These social skills correlated negatively with an individualistic orientation. Keywords: empathy, eye gazes, prosocial behavior, social value orientation, theory of mind, IN SITUATIONS OF SOCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE, people vary systematically in their willingness to cooperate versus their tendency to freeride. Some people seldom cooperate genuinely, and when they do, it is at [...]

Cooperation among nonrelatives can be puzzling because cooperation often involves incurring costs to confer benefits on unrelated others. Punishment of noncooperators can sustain otherwise fragile cooperation, but the provision of punishment suffers from a 'second-order' free-riding problem because nonpunishers can free ride on the benefits from costly punishment provided by others. One suggested solution to this problem is second-order punishment of nonpunishers; more generally, the threat or promise of higher order sanctions might maintain the lower order sanctions that enforce cooperation in collective action problems. Here the authors report on 3 experiments testing people's willingness to provide second-order sanctions by having participants play a cooperative game with opportunities to punish and reward each other. The authors found that people supported those who rewarded cooperators either by rewarding them or by punishing nonrewarders, but people did not support those who punished noncooperators--they did not reward punishers or punish nonpunishers. Furthermore, people did not approve of punishers more than they did nonpunishers, even when nonpunishers were clearly unwilling to use sanctions to support cooperation. The results suggest that people will much more readily support positive sanctions than they will support negative sanctions. Keywords: cooperation, punishment and reward, public goods game, social dilemma, altruism

The mechanism behind the collaboration of organizations challenging established social systems, such as the open-source software project, is studied. Boundary organizations, established by groups challenging these social systems, help manage the governance, membership, ownership, and control over production, of organizing practices.

A decrease in the surface area per unit volume is a well known constraint setting limits to the size of organisms at both the cellular and whole-organismal levels. Similar constraints may apply to social groups as they grow in size. The communal three-dimensional webs that social spiders build function ecologically as single units that intercept prey through their surface and should thus be subject to this constraint. Accordingly, we show that web prey capture area per spider, and thus number of insects captured per capita, decreases with colony size in a neotropical social spider. Prey biomass intake per capita, however, peaks at intermediate colony sizes because the spiders forage cooperatively and larger colonies capture increasingly large insects. A peaked prey biomass intake function would explain not only why these spiders live in groups and cooperate but also why they disperse only at large colony sizes, thus addressing both sociality and colony size range in this social spider. These findings may also explain the conspicuous absence of social spiders from higher latitudes and higher elevations, areas that we have previously shown to harbor considerably fewer insects of the largest size classes than the lowland tropical rainforests where social spiders thrive. Our findings thus illustrate the relevance of scaling laws to the size and functioning of levels of organization above the individual. Anelosimus | cooperation | group foraging | sociality | allometry

The effect of role-reversibility and stochastic ignorance on social cooperation are investigated. Cooperative norms emerging under stochastic ignorance are more likely to be close to first-best than norms chosen under role-reversibility.

Although laboratory experiments document cooperative behavior in humans, little is known about the extent to which individual differences in cooperativeness result from genetic and environmental variation. In this article, we report the results of two independently conceived and executed studies of monozygotic and dizygotic twins, one in Sweden and one in the United States. The results from these studies suggest that humans are endowed with genetic variation that influences the decision to invest, and to reciprocate investment, in the classic trust game. Based on these findings, we urge social scientists to take seriously the idea that differences in peer and parental socialization are not the only forces that influence variation in cooperative behavior. behavioral genetics | cooperation | experimental economics

For a number of years, commentators and professionals have noted that effective public diplomacy requires that state and private actors communicate with the people of other nations by moving from monologue to dialogue. This article argues that both monologue and dialogue are essential public diplomacy tools and that collaboration is a third layer of public diplomacy that should also be examined. Collaboration, defined in this article as initiatives that feature cross-national participation in a joint venture or project with a clearly defined goal, may in certain instances be a more effective public diplomacy technique than either monologue or dialogue. By examining related social science research, this article seeks to start a systematic examination of the circumstances in which each of these three layers of public diplomacy--monologue, dialogue, and collaboration--is most appropriate, Keywords: public diplomacy; monologue; dialogue; collaboration; social capital

Participants' (N = 256) competitive or cooperative attitudes toward national groups were activated by their reading 1 of 2 selected newspaper articles. Participants then judged the competence and attractiveness of a stranger who was categorized, separately for race and nationality, as belonging to an out-group or in-group. As predicted, the activated competitive attitude produced responses prescribed by the model of category dominance by nationality. In the condition of cooperative attitudes, however, competence responses were consistent with the model of equivalence (i.e., no effect of category) and attraction responses were consistent with the model of category dominance by race. The authors discuss reasons for the discrepant models in the condition of cooperative attitudes and the implications of these findings. Keywords: attitudes, competition, cooperation, crossed categorization, Outside the laboratory, one categorization tends to be primary whenever research relies on real social categorizations that have historical, cultural, socio-economic and affective significance. Thus, the category dominance model appears [...]

A study was conducted to examine the effects of competition on subjects' attitude toward cooperation. The study included three groups facing three economic environments with different degrees of competition. It is concluded that the willingness of individuals to cooperate was affected by the presence of competition in the economic environment, in a negative relation.

A study was conducted to determine how inter-group and intra-group cooperation and conflict can be predicted using simple game harmony measures. The relationship between group identity, game harmony, and other psychological mechanisms is analyzed. Findings show the need for cooperation to vary according to the degree of common fate, group salience, the method of group formation, and other mediating factors.

Humans, as discriminately social creatures, make frequent judgments about others' suitability for interdependent social relations. Which characteristics of others guide these judgments and, thus, shape patterns of human affiliation? Extant research is only minimally useful for answering this question. On the basis of a sociofunctional analysis of human sociality, the authors hypothesized that people highly value trustworthiness and (to a lesser extent) cooperativeness in others with whom they may be interdependent, regardless of the specific tasks, goals, or functions of the group or relationship, but value other favorable characteristics (e.g., intelligence) differentially across such tasks, goals, or functions. Participants in 3 studies considered various characteristics for ideal members of interdependent groups (e.g., work teams, athletic teams) and relationships (e.g., family members, employees). Across different measures of trait importance and different groups and relationships, trustworthiness was considered extremely important for all interdependent others; the evidence for the enhanced importance of cooperativeness across different interdependence contexts was more equivocal. In contrast, people valued other characteristics primarily as they were relevant to the specific nature of the interdependent group or relationship. These empirical investigations illuminate the essence of human sociality with its foundation of trust and highlight the usefulness of a theoretically derived framework of valued characteristics. Keywords: trustworthiness, cooperation, relationships, groups, personality

Both the four-time AFC champion Buffalo Bills and Erie County, in whose stadium the Bills play, will always be associated with losing the big ones. The Bills have four Super Bowl losses to lament, but Erie County must contend with the loss of hundreds of businesses and tens of thousands of people in recent years. The blame for the Super Bowl losses is the subject of countless Buffalo radio call-in shows. The liability for the job and population losses is most often assigned to the county's many units of local government. With three cities (including Buffalo), twenty-five towns, sixteen villages, and twenty-nine school districts, Erie County could be the poster child for polycentrism., To be sure, much of the blame also rests with New York State. The Empire State's high taxes have not done anything to attract people and jobs either. Even so, [...]

Impact of shared communication and cooperation among employees of a company on increased efficiency is analyzed with reference to railroad operations.

Human children 18-24 months of age and 3 young chimpanzees interacted in 4 cooperative activities with a human adult partner. The human children successfully participated in cooperative problem-solving activities and social games, whereas the chimpanzees were uninterested in the social games. As an experimental manipulation, in each task the adult partner stopped participating at a specific point during the activity. All children produced at least one communicative attempt to reengage him, perhaps suggesting that they were trying to reinstate a shared goal. No chimpanzee ever made any communicative attempt to reengage the partner. These results are interpreted as evidence for a uniquely human form of cooperative activity involving shared intentionality that emerges in the second year of life.

The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in each round, they have a choice between cooperation and defection. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics of three simple strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma: always defect (ALLD), always cooperate (ALLC), and tit-for-tat (TFT). We study mutation-selection dynamics in finite populations. Despite ALLD being the only strict Nash equilibrium, we observe evolutionary oscillations among all three strategies. The population cycles from ALLD to TFT to ALLC and back to ALLD. Most surprisingly, the time average of these oscillations can be entirely concentrated on TFT. In contrast to the classical expectation, which is informed by deterministic evolutionary game theory of infinitely large populations, stochastic evolution of finite populations need not choose the strict Nash equilibrium and can therefore favor cooperation over defection. evolutionary dynamics | finite population | prisoner's dilemma | reciprocity | stochastic process

Unlike other species, humans cooperate in large, distantly related groups, a fact that has long presented a puzzle to biologists. The pathway by which adaptations for large-scale cooperation among nonkin evolved in humans remains a subject of vigorous debate. Results from theoretical analyses and agent-based simulations suggest that evolutionary dynamics need not yield homogeneous populations, but can instead generate a polymorphic population that consists of individuals who vary in their degree of cooperativeness. These results resonate with the recent increasing emphasis on the importance of individual differences in understanding and modeling behavior and dynamics in experimental games and decision problems. Here, we report the results of laboratory experiments that complement both theory and simulation results. We find that our subjects fall into three types, an individual's type is stable, and a group's cooperative outcomes can be remarkably well predicted if one knows its type composition. Reciprocal types, who contribute to the public good as a positive function of their beliefs about others' contributions, constitute the majority (63%) of players; cooperators and free-riders are also present in our subject population. Despite substantial behavioral differences, earnings among types are statistically identical. Our results support the view that our human subject population is in a stable, polymorphic equilibrium of types. behavioral economics | cooperation | evolution | public goods

Social scientists, especially anthropologists, have long endeavored to understand the evolution of 'human nature.' This investigation frequently focuses on the relative importance of competition versus cooperation in human evolutionary trajectories and usually results in a primary emphasis on competition, aggression, and even war in attempting to understand humanity. This perspective conflicts with long-standing perspectives in anthropology and some emerging trends and theory in evolutionary biology and ecology. Cooperation and competition are not mutually exclusive in an evolutionary context. As anthropologists, we have demonstrated that humans can--and usually do--get along. Evolution is complex with multiple processes and patterns, not all of which involve competition and conflict. In this article, I summarize elements of modern ecological and evolutionary theory in the context of human cooperative patterns in an attempt to illustrate the valuable role of evolutionary theory and cooperative patterns in integrative anthropological approaches to the human condition. [Keywords: cooperation, competition, evolution, violence, war]

The author shows the relationship between lack of cooperation and slowness of learning.

The authors use the Fisherman's Game to reach four benchmarks. It is possible that further research on cooperation could explain the research results.

The authors put forth the idea that explains how cooperative behaviors are formed and how they might change over time. For this study, Africans were studied to develop this economic theory.

When two people agree to trade, they unlock a mutual benefit, resolve a potential conflict and gain in proportion to their relative `aggression', eg the Hawk-Dove game. In an experiment with this game, a discriminatory convention evolved when half of the players were randomly assigned a red and the other half a blue label. Later, the same players were also offered the option of co-operating. Those disadvantaged by the colour-based discriminatory convention cooperated with one another most of the time while the rest did not. The paper offers an explanation of these observations based on a modification of Rabin (1993). The weaker are always anxious for justice and equality. The strong pay heed to neither. (Aristotle, Politics, s1318b)

This paper analyses how collaborations between established organizations give rise to proto-institutions.

Research on effective sales management focuses on the dynamics of cooperation between sales personnel. A model of salesperson cooperation is presented that considers personal ethics, social connections, organizational commitment, and management behavior.

Cooperation and between-group competition are considered.

Research presented concerns the management of strategic learning alliances among corporations, focusing on the tension between cooperation and competition. Topics addressed include firm learning behavior, private and common benefits to learning alliances, and profit-maximizing behavior.

Research presented concerns the dynamics of corporate learning alliances, focusing on the tension between competition and cooperation. Topics addressed include business learning behavior, alliance management, and firm management of private and common research benefits.

Byline: Aric Rindfleisch (1) Keywords: interorganizational relationships; trust; cooperation; alliances Abstract: Over the past decade, trust has emerged as the central means of achieving cooperation in interorganizational relationships. Past empirical inquiries have largely focused on the role of trust within the context of vertical relations between channel members or service providers and their clients. Thus, little is known about the nature or the role of trust in horizontal relations. A number of interorganizational scholars suggest that the nature and the effect of behavioral norms such as trust may be widely different in horizontal versus vertical relationships. This study examines the effect of relationship form on organizational trust using data from a survey of 106 U.S. firms who have recently participated in either horizontal or vertical R&amp D alliances. The results of this survey indicate that participants in vertical alliances display higher levels of organizational trust than participants in horizontal alliances. In addition, while organizational trust enhances cooperation in vertical alliances, trust is unrelated to cooperation in horizontal alliances. Author Affiliation: (1) Eller College of Business and Public Administration, Department of Marketing, University of Arizona, 320 McClelland Hall, Tucson, AZ, 85721 Article History: Registration Date: 16/10/2004