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CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. SUMMARY OF COG A. Widespread Fear of Nuclear Attack Causing Mass Casualties and Mass Destruction B. The Impetus for and Intended Purpose of CoG Provisions C. [...], "Of this I am certain: If we prepare ourselves so that a terrible attack--although it might hurt us--could not destroy us, then such an attack will never come."--Edward Teller, the "Father of the Hydrogen Bomb," in an interview with Allen Brown of This Week Magazine in 1957. Bad actors have already used or may soon use AI to disrupt critical infrastructure,* (1) influence elections, (2) and upend economies. (3) Those most concerned about the risks posed by AI argue that it is a matter of when and not if state governments will have to respond to threatened or realized acts of AI aggression. Though a litany of scholars have examined the powers governors may use in emergency situations, (4) less attention has been paid to the role of state legislatures in responding to destabilizing events. Scholars have justified their focus on governors for practical reasons--the executive branch of state governments has been deemed the "the center of governmental response[s]" to public emergencies. (5) Two trends caution against perpetuating neglect of state legislatures. First, the legal and social bases for governors to take sweeping action in response to emergencies eroded in many states during COVID-19 (6) In turn, many state legislatures, by law, by popular support, or both, have amassed more authority to respond in worst-case scenarios. (7) Second, the likelihood of states being thrown into disarray will only increase as AI evolves and spreads; (8) thus, warranting a closer analysis of what powers state legislatures may exercise to restore normalcy. Thirty-five state constitutions contain variants of a template "Continuity of Government" (CoG) provision promulgated by the federal government at the height of the Cold War. (9) What events may trigger these provisions, as well as what powers they afford to state legislatures, has evaded judicial scrutiny as a result of state legislatures rarely invoking the relevant provision. (10) It follows that the scholarly analysis of how best to interpret these important provisions should occur in the relative tranquility of the present rather than at the height of a calamity. This preemptive analysis may improve the ability of state legislatures to respond to disorder by clarifying the likely scope and duration of their powers and, ideally, by spurring amendments to clarify the provisions in advance of any such event. This paper serves as one (and, likely, the first) entry in an inquiry that merits immediate and robust scholarly attention. Relying on the framework set forth by the New Haven School of Jurisprudence, this paper resolves one of the most consequential ambiguities contained in CoG provisions. This framework deserves special consideration given its inclusion of myriad disciplines and its characterization as an "explicitly policy-oriented jurisprudence." (11) Scholars from across the legal profession have a role in contributing to this inquiry. The incorporation of AI into legal practice imposes a responsibility on scholars to anticipate how the technology may require new doctrines, laws, and methods of interpretation. Though this paper focuses on the continuation of state governments in the wake of an AI emergency, related inquiries such as how to rethink contract law, property law, and the like upon such an emergency demand more scholarly attention. The exploration of those topics can, in turn, inform what sorts of powers state legislatures may need to exercise and for how long.

I. INTRODUCTION At the federal level, the nondelegation doctrine--prohibiting the delegation of legislative power from Congress to the executive branch--is one of the most debated yet least enforced of constitutional [...], The United States Constitution's separation of powers doctrine is foundational to the operation of the United States government. In theory, the nondelegation doctrine exists to preserve the separation of powers amongst the three branches of government. The doctrine's purpose is to give sole lawmaking authority to Congress, while yet allowing it to delegate rulemaking authority to an administrative agency, but only if it provides an "intelligible principle" to guide and constrain the agency's rulemaking. While on the surface this appears to be a high standard, the United States Supreme Court has not struck down a law promulgated by an administrative agency for violating the nondelegation doctrine since 1935. Therefore, at the federal level, the nondelegation doctrine is rather dead. Nevertheless, a recent study has suggested that at the state level the nondelegation doctrine is very much alive. This paper analyzes South Dakota caselaw and finds that, since 1935, the South Dakota Supreme Court has struck down numerous administrative rules for violating the nondelegation doctrine. This paper suggests that, if South Dakota is any indication of the viability of the nondelegation doctrine in the other forty-nine states, the nondelegation doctrine is in fact alive and well in the states.

It is originalist gospel that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended, at a minimum, to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states. This Article revisits forty [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 541 II. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON SENSE 543 III. THE GREAT NON SEQUITUR 546 IV. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 551 V. CONCLUSION 558 I. INTRODUCTION The proper scope [...]

I. INTRODUCTION II. ORIGINALISM AND ITS RELEVANCE. III. WHAT IS THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE? A. The Broader View: The Argument that the Original Public Meaning Requires [...], Author's Synopsis: Despite the rising influence of originalism on the Supreme Court 's jurisprudence, the Court has yet to acknowledge the theory's Achilles heel: the Takings Clause. The natural meaning of the text and historical evidence tends to show that the Takings Clause requires compensation only for physical takings. But the Supreme Court has recognized a right to compensation for regulatory takings for decades, and the current justices, at least four of whom are originalists, have not questioned the regulatory takings doctrine. The Court is vulnerable to criticism that it applies originalism only where it is ideologically convenient. The originalist justices' failure to address the original public meaning of the Takings Clause threatens originalism 's legitimacy, and until the Court addresses the theory 's most vulnerable point, it stands as proof that originalism is not as apolitical as its proponents insist. The originalist justices should incorporate into their takings decisions the arguments put forth by originalist scholars who support a broader view of the Takings Clause's original meaning. Although stronger evidence supports a narrow view, reliance on the evidence supporting a broader view is better than abandoning originalist analyses when they are inconsistent with the justices' political ideals. To protect the legitimacy of originalism, its proponents should urge the originalists on the Court to address originalism 's Achilles heel. The failure to do so emboldens one of originalism 's most poignant criticisms: that it is a conservative power-grab disguised as an apolitical, objective theory of constitutional interpretation.

A. The Right to Vote Deserves the Most Robust Protection Possible There is a simple reason to analyze state constitutions' explicit safeguards of voting rights faithfully and independently from federal [...]

This Article provides the first comprehensive look at state constitutional provisions explicitly granting the right to vote. We hear that the right to vote is "fundamental," the "essence of a [...]

It is a great pleasure to return once again to Stanford Law School, where in 1964 a J.D. degree launched me into a seven year legal career as a California [...]

The constitutions of the individual states in the US presents a gloomy picture in therms of their regulation of state government. Special interest groups have managed to get favorable clauses included in the state constitutions. Although the constitutions in theory should provide an effective check on governmental failures, in reality, the state constitutions have become just another instrument for demanding rent by the special interest groups.